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EDITOR'S NOTE
Settling into the twenty-first century, practitioners and water users
alike face a drought unlike any before. The sheer magnitude of
diverse interests, from agriculture to environmental needs, makes
administering a mature water rights system quite challenging. As I sit
here preparing for publication, the cries of water crisis are universal.
For instance, residential Metro Denver anxiously awaits word from its
water officials telling them that their lawns cannot be watered, nor can
their children play organized games in the park because of the
potential damage to fields. South Platte groundwater users are
readying to go to the Colorado Supreme Court to defend their right to
pump irrigation water for their crops this summer. Even Gale Norton,
Secretary of the Interior, has taken a hard line with California and
their lack of compliance with the Colorado River Compact. The
common theme throughout the articles of the Water Law Review
Volume 6 Issue 1 is one of solution to the "quandary of quantity."
As the water rights doctrine evolves, it must make room for the
new kid on the block, the environmental interest groups. In their
article, Jennifer Pitt, Chris W. Fitzer, and Lisa Force suggest solutions
to a potential water quantity problem in the now revived Colorado
River delta. David M. Freeman and Annie Epperson account the
solution of a few water users instituting winter flows on the North Fork
of the Cache La Poudre River through the once dry Phantom Canyon.
Because surface water and groundwater are hydrologically
connected, increased groundwater pumping adds to the problem of
an already dwindling resource. Martha 0. Pagel updates us on
Oregon's solution to groundwater management and their mitigation
banking procedure in the Deschutes Basin. Eric Opiela explains the
evolution of the rule of capture as Texas' groundwater management
doctrine. He suggests that Texas join the twenty-first century by
retiring the rule of capture, and by looking to other alternatives to
manage their water resource.
Across the Atlantic Ocean and through Eastern Europe flows the
Elbe River. Jason S. Wells gives us an historical perspective of the
basin wide management of the Elbe. The fall of Communism and the
onset of a free market society have created numerous challenges for
Germany and the Czech Republic in managing the river basin to meet
development and environmental conservation desires.
Justice GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr., of the Colorado Supreme Court, has
been kind enough to update us on recent judicial review of Colorado
Water Law. Studies have predicted an extended drought period for
the West. Whether they are valid or not, water users will undoubtedly
have to come up with creative solutions to their quantity problems and
even forge relationships with parties once thought to be adversaries. I
know these articles will provide food for thought in solving the
"quandary of quantity."
Holly Kirsner
Editor-in-Chief

IN MEMORIAM
HOLLY I. HOLDER, ESQ.
MAY 16, 1952 -JUNE 6, 2002
CARRIE L. CILIBERTOt

Holly was born in Albuquerque, New Mexico in 1952. When she
was a child her family moved to Colorado and she spent the rest of her
life here; first in Broomfield and finally in Columbine Valley, where
she lived with her husband, Bill and her son, Eric.
Holly was a member of Mensa. She was brilliant and witty. She
earned her Bachelor's with honors from the University of Colorado
where she was the first woman Evans/Eisenhower Golf Scholar. She
was an avid golfer and introduced many to the sport, including me.
She earned her Juris Doctor with honors from Denver University Law
School.
After working at several Denver law firms, Holly opened her own
firm where she continued her practice focusing on water, natural
resources, environmental, development and land use law. I had the
privilege of working with Holly, and the honor of being named her law
partner. In addition to her private practice, Holly also served as a
municipal judge for the Towns of Hudson and Keenesburg. She gave
back to the University of Denver by serving on the Advisory Board of
this publication, the Water Law Review, and judging many moot court
competitions, namely the Natural Resources Environmental Law
Society's Appellate Competition. She also participated in many other
civic endeavors.
I believe that anyone who knew Holly would agree that she was a
Although Holly suffered many personal
truly special person.
tragedies, losing a child, her parents, her husband, and her extended
battles with cancer, Holly always had a smile for others. Both Holly's
personality and outfits were always colorful and brought joy to all she
encountered. Holly and I used to say, "We work hard and we play
hard!" All who knew her will miss Holly. Hopefully, we will all learn to
be a little more like Holly and live life to its fullest every day.

t Carrie L. Ciliberto began practicing water law with Holly Holder in 1999.
Carrie has since established her own practice in environmental and natural resources
law, concentrating on water rights. The Water Law Review would like to welcome
Carrie onto our Advisory Board and thank her for taking time to write this tribute to
one of our own Advisory Board Members. Holly was always enthusiastic about the
Water Law Review, and we will miss her valuable contribution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Eastern Europe, a fervent debate is presently being waged over
whether - and to what extent - to further develop the Elbe River
Basin. While the answer to this question remains undecided, many
fear that despite the fact that the Elbe Basin ("Basin") has witnessed a
significant revitalization of its riparian ecosystems over the last decade,
a new era of dam and canal building will cause a backslide into a
renewed period of environmental discontent. Although the Elbe flows
through only two nations, the Czech Republic and Federal Republic of
Germany, interest in the fate of the Elbe has been far reaching,
garnering the attention of non-riparian nations, commercial interests,
and both governmental and non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") throughout Europe and the world.
As is the case in many river basins around the world, competing
commercial and environmental interests are battling for position in
the debate over the Elbe's future. Presently, there are a number of
dams, impoundments, and other diversions in place along the Elbe
and its tributaries.2 While further construction of various hydrological
projects within the Basin is imminent, the scope of development and
extent to which it is seen as beneficial to the region is still in dispute.
Depending on the source of opinion, large-scale development is seen
either as an advantageous step toward European economic security or
as a dangerous undertaking, with possible catastrophic environmental
consequences. The resolution to the ongoing controversy hinges on
the degree to which the Elbe is managed as a watershed in the coming
years. Many, most notably those in or influenced by the economic
sector, view the Basin as one appendage of a potential labyrinth of
waterways. The construction and improvement of a multitude of dam
and canal projects, they believe, will open up markets of regions
presently inaccessible to the shipping industry. Conservationists have
rejected this notion and demand the Elbe region be treated as what it
indeed is - a river basin.
For a multitude of parties with vested interests in the Basin today,
the continuing ability to make use of the Elbe as a waterway is still the
predominant concern. However, this concern increasingly conflicts
with the public's desire to mitigate the harms that have already been
inflicted in order to improve the river system's navigability. For many
years, the Basin bore the ill effects not only of such improvements, but
also of unregulated industrial, commercial, and municipal use.
Although water quality within the Basin depreciated greatly for a
number of years without redress, historical intervention prompted
1. For the purpose of maintaining consistency, this paper refers to the entire
expanse of the river as the "Elbe" and the Elbe River Basin as "Basin." However, in the
Czech Republic, the Elbe River is known as the Labe. JAMES R. PENN, RIVERS
WORLD: A SOCIAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SOURCEBOOK 77 (2001).

OF THE

2. See infra text accompanying notes 45-50 (identifying some of the structures
along both the Czech and German reaches of the Elbe and its tributaries).
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numerous present-day efforts to restore its ecological vitality. Since
many of the Elbe's tributaries, as well as a significant portion of the
river itself, lay within what was formerly East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe opened the
Basin to broader global and regional scrutiny.3 This occurrence,
coupled with growing environmental awareness among the riparian
nations, led to the German, Czech, and Slovak Republics' decision to
draft a treaty in 1990 aimed at protecting the quality of water in the
Elbe waterway ("Elbe Convention") .
While conservation and restoration efforts on the Elbe have met
with general success, many areas of the river system remain
threatened. The time-tested adage that "water flows uphill toward
money is as true on the Elbe as it is elsewhere, and the desires of
those who view the river merely as an under-exploited commercial
resource will presumably shape the Elbe's future to the same extent as
the present international legal regime. Other multi-national treaties6
may provide a degree of constraint and direction in resolving the
Elbe's fate. However, enduring principles of sovereignty will likely
prevail, as the application of Czech and German federal laws, shaped
in varying degrees by the Elbe Convention, European Union ("EU")
policy, and the prospect of internal economic growth will strike an
eventual concord between the conflicting interests.
The objective of this article is to first trace the history of conflict in
Eastern Europe as it relates to the management of the Elbe River
Basin; and second, to offer a commentary on approaches the
concerned parties have employed to solve this conflict. Section I will
review the vital statistics of the Basin. Specifically, it will: (1) review the
",5

3. See generallyJohn Linarelli, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the Post-Cold War Era, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373 (1995) (explaining the
environmental due diligence requirements which the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development follows during the evaluation stages of projects,

prior to financing approval, and during loan negotiations with the potential borrowing
state).
4. Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Elbe,

Oct. 8, 1990, F.R.G.-Czech Rep., I.E.L. 990:75, reprinted in STEFANO

BURcHI, TREATIEs

CONCERNING THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES - EUROPE,

FAO LEGISLATIVE STuDY No. 50, at 40 (1993) [hereinafter Elbe Convention]. In the
summer of 1992, based on the outcome of the general elections, a law dissolving the
seventy-four year union between the Czechs and Slovaks passed. Following this
dissolution, the German, Czech, and Slovak governments reached an agreement
concerning certain treaties:
[A]ll German-Czechoslovak treaties would remain in force between Germany
and the Czech Republic. In contrast, Slovakia was officially released from its
obligations from the Commission on the Protection of the Elbe through a
multilateral exchange of notes because neither the Elbe nor any of its
affluents pass through Slovakia.

Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in InternationalLaw: Remarks on Recent Theory and
State Praxis, 15 B.U. INT'L LJ. 71, 95 (1997).
5.

MARC REISNER,

WATER 13

CADILLAC DESERT, THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING

(1986).

6. See, e.g., Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, Feb. 25, 1991, U.N., 30 I.L.M. 800, available at http://www.unece.org/
env/eia/welcome.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Espoo Convention].
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geography of the river and its tributaries, offering an explanation as to
why they are deserving of attention; (2) focus on specific regions
within the Basin, particularly those which have been the subject of
legal and political dispute; and (3) define the basic hydrology of the
Basin, evaluating the system's natural flow rates, and the effect that
man-made structures within the Basin have had on those rates.
Section II will provide a brief history of the Elbe, touching on the
settlement of the region as well as some significant events that shaped
the development and control of the river. Section III will identify the
numerous factions with interests in the river's future. This section will
include the motivations and objectives of the primary nations,
economic sectors, and NGOs at play. Section IV will outline the
development of the national and international law governing the
navigation, protection, and development of the Elbe region. Section V
will briefly speculate on the means by which conflicts regarding the
Elbe's future may be resolved.
In section VI, this article will conclude that although there is a
long-standing history within the Basin of managing the river as
watershed, this tradition has been contravened by national laws,
increasing influence of the economic sector over the river's
management, and failure of international agreements to enforce such
an approach due to their inherent lack of enforcement mechanisms.
If the conservationist interests are to succeed in thwarting a renewed
era of dam building and canal improvement, they should not hang
their hat on the ability of the Elbe Convention to unilaterally achieve
this goal. Although the Elbe Convention provides a sound declaration
of intent, its limitations will require those opposed to further
development to seek either state adherence to broader reaching
treaties and/or strengthened domestic political support for further
conservation measures.
H. GEOGRAPHY
A. PHYSIOGRAPHY
The Elbe is Germany's second largest river-within Germany, only
the Rhine dwarfs its length.7 The total length of the river is 724 miles,
or 1,165 kilometers, with approximately two-thirds of it flowing
through Germany, and the initial third flowing through the Czech
Republic, Germany's neighbor to the south.8 The Czech Republic's
largest and most important river, the Vltava, is the Elbe's first major
tributary, joining the burgeoning Elbe a considerable distance
7. Measuring 1,770 miles (2,850 kilometers), the Danube is also a much longer
river.

However, the majority of Danube River lies beyond German borders.

12

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD GEOGRAPHY, GERMANY, AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND 1595 (Peter

Haggett et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter WORLD GEOGRAPHY].
8.

ENCYCLOPEDIA

BRITANNIcA

ONLINE,

http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=108586
[hereinafter BRITANNCA ONLINE].

ELBE

(last

visited

RIVER,

Oct.

9,

at

2002)
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downstream from its headwaters. 9

The headwaters originate at 4,000 feet in the Czech Republic's
Krkonos Mountains, located in the northwest region of the Czech
Republic near Poland's border.'0 The Elbe meanders through the
Krkonos and Sudeten Mountains in a general southwesterly direction
for approximately 225 miles. It then curves to the northwest, forming
an arc in Bohemia, thereby shifting its path toward Germany."
The Elbe passes through Northern Bohemia, then crosses the
Czech-German border southeast of the ancient German City of
Dresden. It flows through Dresden, and into Riesa, where, twenty-five
miles below Dresden, the Elbe enters the expansive area known as the
North German Plain.12 The North German Plain is an extremely lowlying area:
Almost the entire plain lies less than 300 feet (91 meters) above sea
level. The region is drained by broad rivers [including the Elbe] that
flow northward into the North Sea or the Baltic Sea....
The wide river valleys, as well as land along the seacoasts, have
soft, fertile soil. Between the river valleys are large areas covered with
sand and gravel. These areas are called heathlands. The sand and
gravel were deposited by glaciers that moved across much of Europe
thousands of years ago. The glaciers also formed many small lakes in
the North German Plain.
The southern edge of the North German Plain has highly fertile,
dustlike soil called loess. This area is heavily cultivated and thickly
populated. Many of Germany's
oldest cities, including Bonn and
3
Cologne, are in this area.
As the river flows out of the North German Plain and approaches
the North Sea, the floodplain widens. Along this stretch, there are a
number of dikes down either side of the river" as it makes its way
northward to Hamburg-the largest city on the Elbe, and most
important port in Germany." Before reaching Hamburg, however, the
river splits into two branches, the Norder Elbe and the Sider Elbe.' 6 It
then reconverges seven miles downstream of the city." The Elbe's
9. Czech Republic, at http://www.prahal.i-p.com/c.htm

(last visited Oct. 9,

2002).
PENN, supra note 1, at 77.
11. All rivers originating or flowing through the Czech Republic terminate in other
nations. For this reason, the Czech Republic has been called the "roof of Europe." Its
only sources of water are atmospheric rain and snowfall.
10.

See

Czech

Information

System,

Czech

Republic,

at

http://www.czis.cz/

czechrepublicinformation.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
12. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.
13. The Voyage-British German Connection, Geography, at http://www.thevoyage.com/e/infopoint/geography/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
14. BRITANNIcA ONLINE, supra note 8.
15. WORLD GEOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 1595.
See also Compass Hamburg
Handbook,
The Port of Hamburg, at http://www.hafen-hamburg.de/htmlengl/handbook/1.3h.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
16. BRrTANNIcA ONLINE, supranote 8.
17.

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S RIVERS AND LAKES 90 (Dr. R. Kay
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estuary extends from Hamburg to the river's termination into the sea
at Cuxhaven, a distance of about fifty-five miles.'8 Along this area
below Hamburg, the river is again "divided by some islands into several
branches that reunite [five miles] before reaching the river's outlet."'9
The Basin is one of six distinct river basins within Germany,20 and
one of three within the Czech Republic.2' While Germany boasts other
important river systems such as the Danube and Rhine, the Elbe
system is unquestionably the most important to the Czechs, with the
Vltava being the Czech Republic's primary river in a number of
respects, and Czech lands accounting for ninety-eight percent of the
drainage area of the Basin.
The Basin encompasses an area of roughly 56,000 square miles.23
While this is considerably smaller than some major United States and
European river basins, 4 the Elbe's drainaqe area is larger than the
closest neighboring river system, the Oder. 2 The Basin's upper and
central regions drain mostly from the west, receiving water from the
Ore Mountains and the Thuringian Forest.26 The Lower Basin, located
below Magdeburg, receives most of its drainage from the east, with the
2
Mecklenburg uplands providing the majority of this feedY.
The Elbe
has eight major tributaries: from the west the Vltava, Ohre (Eger),
Mulde, and Saale Rivers; and from the east the Iser, Schwarze Elster,

Gresswell & Anthony Huxley eds., 1965) [hereinafter STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA].
18. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.
19. PENN, supra note 1, at 79.
20. The others are the Danube, Rhine, Weser, Ems, and Oder. GERMAN FEDERAL
MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION & NUCLEAR SAFETY PUBLIC
RELATIONS DIVISION, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, IT'S OUR FUTURE, WATER RESOURCES

MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY, PART 2: QUALITY OF INLAND SURFACE WATERS 2 (2001),
available at http://www.umweltdaten.de/wasser/wawi-e-2.pdf [hereinafter WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT].

21. The Elbe (Labe) is the primary source of water for the western parts of the
Czech Republic (Bohemia). The Odra and Morava-Danube are the other river basins
serving the nation.

MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, THE CZEcH REPUBLIC'S SECOND
COMMUNICATION ON THE NATIONAL PROCESS TO COMPLY WITH THE COMMITMENTS UNDER
THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 16 (1997),
available at

http://www.chmi.cz/cc/czenc2.pdf.

The Odra serves a small area in the northeast

part of the Czech Republic and runs into the Baltic Sea. Id. The Morava - Danube
Basin serves the southeast region. Id.
22. Nurit Kliot & Deborah Shmueli, Development of Institutional Frameworks for the
Management of Transboundary Water Resources, 1 INT'LJ. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 306, 319
(2001).
23. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supranote 8.
24. The Elbe Basin is less than one-quarter the size of the Colorado and Columbia
Basins (244,000 and 259,000 square miles respectively).
Mary Christina Wood,
Reclaiming The Natural Rivers: The Endangered Species Act as Applied to EndangeredRiver
Ecosystems, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 197, 200 (1998). It is also smaller than the nearby Rhine
and Danube Basins (85,000 and 315,000 square miles respectively). BRITANNICA
ONLINE, supra note 8, at Danube River.
25. The Oder watershed, to the east of the Elbe, covers an area of roughly 46,000
square miles. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8, at Oder River.
26. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.
27. Id.
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Havel, and the Alster, which converges with the Elbe in Hamburg."
B. HYDROLOGY
As discussed in greater detail below, artificial impoundments and
topographical alterations have significantly impacted the Elbe's
natural hydrology in the upper Czech portions of the river, while "the
near-natural character of the Elbe... has largely been preserved to the
present day, at least in its middle reaches.0 9
Nevertheless,
environmental groups have decried the loss of valuable ecosystems
along many parts of the Elbe they claim once depended on now-lost
natural dynamics of river level and flow rate fluctuations3
Despite these continuing expressions of discontent and concern
with the static nature of water levels on the Elbe, discharge rates and
annual flow totals demonstrate considerable variance when compared
to those of other major rivers. Although fluctuations in annual rainfall
amounts have a powerful effect on annual flow rates,3' scientists
estimate that the average total discharge is 23.7 cubic kilometers per
year.32
From 1931-75, the discharge rate at Dresden, not far
downstream from the Czech-German border, was measured between
800 cubic feet per second ("cfs") and 118,700 cfs, with an average of
11,200 cfs. 33 "At Neu-Darchau, about 140 miles above the mouth, the

discharge rate was 24,700 [cfs] in the period 1926-65, with extremes of
5,100 and 127,700.""4 Despite the fact that these statistics are
somewhat dated, there has been little artificial alteration of the Elbe in
these areas to expect much variation in these data.
The Elbe's flow rate generally increases substantially as the river
progresses downstream, as demonstrated by the fact that it more than
doubles from Dresden to Neu-Darchau. This impressive increase is
likely due to the influx of water from the aforementioned tributaries.35
In addition, the Dresden area receives annual rainfall of about twentyseven inches,36 sufficiently replenishing water removed from the river
above Dresden for industrial and municipal uses. Because the Elbe's
levels are exceedingly dependent on precipitation, the river's flow is
28.
29.
30.
visited
31.

Id.
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, supranote 20, at 4.

Elbe River in Czech Needs Help - Now!, at http://abe.ecn.cz/elbecall.php (last
Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Help.'].
See generally WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, supra note 20. See also BRITANNIcA
ONLINE, supra note 8.
32. SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ScoPE-42
BIOCHEMISTRY OF MAJOR WORLD RIVERS tbl.8.1 (1991), at http://www.icsu-

scope.org/downloadpubs/scope42/chapter08.html

[hereinafter

SCIENTMIC

COMMITTEE].

33.

BRrrANNicA ONLINE, supra note 8.

34. Id.

35. The combined catchment area for the Saale and Havel Rivers alone is 47,000
square kilometers. SCIENaiFIC COMMITTEE, supra note 32, at tbl.8. 1.
36. Worldclimate,
Weather
Rainfall
and
Temperature
Data,
at
http://www.worldclimate.com/cgi-bin/data.pl?ref=N51E013+2100+09488W
(last
visited Oct. 9, 2002).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

essentially determined seasonally, with the lowest rates generally
recorded during late summer.37
Despite its unpredictable water levels, the Elbe has long been
38
considered Germany's second most important commercial waterway.
The river system is notably navigable, both in the southern Czech, and
the northern German segments of the river. In the southern regions,
almost the entire length of the Elbe has been developed for the
expansion of navigation; today very few stretches of the Southern Elbe
maintain historical minimum flow rates and fluctuations.39 Meanwhile,
the Northern Elbe boasts the City of Hamburg, Germany's most
important port.40 The geographical locations of the Czech's capital,
Prague, in the upper southern reaches of the river, and Hamburg in
the lower northern reaches, are considered as primary factors
contributing to the Basin's attractiveness as a major trade artery.4 '
"Hamburg's harbor can easily accommodate the largest liners,"42 and
"[a]s late as 1938 most of the traffic that reached Hamburg was
waterborne." 3 In addition to serving inland traffic, the Elbe can also
accommodate intercontinental sea crafts because the large Kiel Canal
serves the Elbe south of Hamburg, and runs from the mouth of the
Elbe northeast to the Baltic Sea."
Many important destinations are also accessible by artificial
constructs. Between Prague and Cuxhaven, an expansive system of
man-made canals allows commercial shipping to reach numerous
significant waterways remotely located from the Basin. "The canal
network along the lower Elbe includes links eastward to Berlin [via the
Havel canal]; westward to Hanover via the Mittelland Canal; and to the
Ruhr and Rhine (Rivers] via the Dortmund-Ems Canal." 45 The
aforementioned variance in discharge rates, however, sometimes acts
as a hindrance to navigation. 6 Seasonally low water levels prevent
larger ships from reaching destinations otherwise reachable during
periods of high runoff.
While both the Czechs and Germans have constructed a number of
dams on the upper reaches of the Elbe System,47 the lower German
37.
38.

WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 4.

The Rhine is commonly considered Germany's most important waterway.

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17, at 90.

39. See Czech Ministers Hurl Insults Over Dam Plan, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Mar.
7, 2002, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Germany, News [hereinafter
Czech Ministers]. See also Help!, supra note 30.
40. WORLD GEOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 1605.

41.

PENN, supranote 1, at 78.

42.

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17, at 90.

43.
44.
45.
46.

PENN, supra note 1, at 78.
BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.

PENN, supra note 1, at 78.

BRiTANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.
47. "There are about one hundred water life endangering installations in the Elbe
(Labe) basin, 29 of them on Czech Territory, the rest in Germany .... One Hundred
Potentially Dangerous Places Along the Elbe, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, October 24, 2001,
LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Czech Republic, News.
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portions of the river have remained relatively free of such structures.
Nevertheless, some significant barriers do exist on the lower German
segment, most notably the one at Geesthacht, which is less of an
impoundment and more of a means to control tidal variances in the
river's water level." Other significant dams are in place on the Elbe's
tributaries, specifically on the Vltava and the Saale within the
Thuringian Forest." However, as previously mentioned, the relative
absence of dams on the lower and central Elbe leaves control of water
levels in the hands of nature rather than man: "[t]he lower course of
the Elbe is tidal as far as the dam at Geesthacht, [thirty-five kilometers]
above Hamburg, where the river flow periodically reverses its
direction."0 At Hamburg, flooding occurs occasionally when storms
cause the tide to reach beyond its usual eight-foot height, 51 and even
above Geesthacht,
along the North Plain, levels fluctuate
52
considerably.
The Czech Republic is considering the construction of additional
dams near the Czech-German border. However, if the Czechs decide
to proceed with these projects as presently contemplated, they must do
so against the concerted wishes of a number of conservation-minded
organizations and the German government.54
The prospective
alterations to the Elbe have received attention well beyond the river's
riparian nations, garnering worldwide notice.
The projects
themselves, as well as their possible effects on the Basin will be
discussed in section III.
III. HISTORY
The Elbe River Basin is rich with historical relevance. Some have
said that although the Rhine boasts a greater expanse through
Germany, the Elbe "has been a more significant shaper of German
settlement and history;" it has "been accorded respect by statesmen,
kings, dictators, and warriors."55 The Basin has been settled since
prehistoric times. 56 The Romans, who called the river "Albis,"57 are
known to have reached the region as early as 9 B.C. In fact, the river
marked the farthest advance into present-day Germany by both the
5
Roman and the Charlemagne EmpiresY.
The Elbe was also commonly
considered the western boundary of Slavic inhabitation until the
48. Telephone Interview with Olaf Kuhlke, Visiting Assistant Professor, University
of Wyoming, Department of Geography & Recreation (May 8, 2002).
49. BRrrANNcA ONLINE, supra note 8.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Help., supra note 30.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. PENN, supranote 1, at 77.
56. BRrrANNIcA ONINE, supra note 8.
57. PENN, supranote 1, at 77.
58. Id.
59. STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 17, at 90.
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Middle Ages, when the Germans colonized land east of the river, and
alongside the Baltic Sea.
The banks of the Elbe are home to a number of other ancient
cities, most notably Magdeburg and Dresden. Magdeburg, located in
the North Plain, was a major commercial center as early as the Ninth
Century.
Because the city bordered both German and Slavic
settlements, each utilized the city as a trading post." Dresden, on the
other hand, has served as the cultural center of the Elbe Region.
Founded in approximately 1200 A.D., the city has been called the
"Florence on the Elbe," and is known for its beautiful architecture.
As home to a number of culturally and commercially important
centers, the Basin has been the subject of various international
instruments. The Treaty of Versailles ("Treaty") established the first
basin-wide institution, the International Commission of the Elbe
("ICE")." Although the ICE's central concern was the free navigability
of the Elbe, 4 the Treaty's provisions were inherently applicable not
only to the Elbe, but also to all its associated waterways. 65 As
demonstrated below, this fact may have important ramifications for
future management of the Basin.
The advent of World War II thrust further historical significance
upon areas within the Basin. The City of Dresden, founded around
1200 A.D.," was a primary target for allied forces during the War.6 ,
The Allied Forces destroyed most of the ancient part of the city in
February 1945 by conducting "a sustained fire-bombing raid in which
[they dropped] hundreds of tons of phosphorus bombs."" The city
has since undergone impressive reconstruction. "With clues provided
by Renaissance and Baroque portraits of the city.., landmarks could
be reconstructed accurately"6 -allowing the city to recapture a certain
degree of its aesthetic appeal.
The War also gave significance to the City of Torgau. "[O]n the
afternoon of April 26, 1945, World War II in Europe had come to an
end when advance elements of the 69th Division of the U.S. First Army
met a spearhead of the 58th Guards Division of the Ukrainian First
Army on the partially destroyed Elbe bridge" near the city.76 Today
60.

BRITANNIcA ONLINE, supra note

61.

Id.

8.

62. Id. Although almost the entire ancient city was destroyed during World War II,

it has been partially rebuilt based on its ancient style. Id.

63. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, art. 340, reprinted in 2
PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1265, 1490 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967)

MAJOR

(negotiating peace between Germany and the Allies following World War I)
[hereinafter Treaty].

64. Kliot & Shmueli, supra note 22, at 319.
65. See Treaty, supranote 63, at 1489 art. 338 (referring to the Elbe and other rivers
affected by the Treaty as "river systems").
66. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.
67. PENN, supra note 1, at 77-78.
68. Id.
69.
70.

Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
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there are still a number of landmarks placed on the Elbe's riverbanks
at Torgau where United States and Soviet
troops first made contact
71
following the defeat of Hider's Germany.
During the Cold War, portions of the Elbe formed the
demarcation between East and West Germany, thus comprising a
portion of the Iron Curtain.72 "South of Libeck and east of Hambur ,
a section of the river was bordered by electrified barbed-wire fence.
This delineation prolonged hostility and "disrupted the Elbe as a trade
artery, reducing the amount of waterborne goods received by its cities
but increasing the geopolitical importance of the river."74 During this
period, the Elbe sustained significant and unchecked ecological harm.
In some cases, water contamination was directly linked to the military
buildup occurring in Eastern Europe. 7
Throughout most of the Twentieth Century, efforts to improve the
river's condition were relatively non-existent. National, as well as
international policy regarding the river dealt almost exclusively with
the maintenance of navigation. 76
In 1990, however, the Elbe
Convention established the International Commission for the
Protection of the Elbe ("ICPE"), the sole purpose of which was to
monitor water quality conditions on the Elbe.7 Much like the Treaty
accomplished in terms of governing navigation, the Elbe Convention
employed a watershed approach to maintaining water quality.78 While
the ICPE has the power to advance proposals in furtherance of
improved conditions within the Basin, it has yet to devise an ultimate
plan to guarantee the ecological fitness of the Elbe. Furthermore, the
ICPE's power is merely advisory in nature, 79 allowing for influence
from the growing free market economy in Eastern Europe, and broad
discretion of the riparian states as to the manner in which the ICPE's
purpose should be fulfilled.

71.

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note

72.

PENN, supranote

17, at 90.

1, at 79.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. For example, uranium contamination of oil and water around and adjacent to
the Elbe River in eastern Germany is still being cleaned up. 'Smart'Plantscan Extract
Yellowcake
From
Solution,
AUSTRAUAN
MINING,
Oct.
3,
2001,
at
http://www.miningaustralia.com.au/articles/b3/0c007bb3.asp. During the cold war,
this area was the scene of very active uranium mining for military purposes. Id.
76. See, e.g., Treaty, supra note 63, at 1489 art. 338.
77.

Ludwik A. Teclaff, Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and

International Water Law, 36 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 359, 384 & n.144 (1996) (noting the
"single purpose" nature of the Elbe Convention as it pertains only to pollution)
[hereinafter Evolution of the River Basin].

78. See Elbe Convention, supra note 4, at 40 art. 1(1) (indicating that the nations
shall cooperate to ensure the protection of "the Elbe and its drainage area") (emphasis
added).

79. Id. at art. 1(3) (stating the Commission shall provide "proposals for the
application of ...techniques for the reductions of emissions ....).
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IV. CONFLICTING INTERESTS
A. ECONOMY

The demise of the Iron Curtain marked the emergence of a new
era within the Elbe Basin. A united Germany quickly embraced the
world market."0 Today, the Elbe River is inexorably entwined not only
with the economies of the riparian nations through which it flows, but
also those far beyond the Basin. It acts as a natural vein linking the
shipping industry to a number of commercial cities within Central
Europe. Like the Rhine, the Elbe serves as an important "means of
international communication,"8 ' with its vast system of canals serving
areas within the Basin and beyond:
By means of the Elbe and its connecting waterways, vessels from
Hamburg can navigate to Berlin, the central and southern sections of
Germany, and the Czech Republic.... The Elbe itself is navigable for
1,000-ton barges as far as Prague through the Vltava. In eastern
Germany[,] it serves the river ports of Magdeburg, Schonebeck,
Aken, Dessau, Torgau, Riesa, and Dresden, carrying bituminous coal,
lignite, coke, metal, potash, grain, and piece goods. Although
Hamburg lies far upstream from the mouth of the Elbe, it is one of
the largest seaports in Europe; a six-line railway tunnel and a
multilane road tunnel under
the Elbe there are important links in
8
trans-European traffic flows. 2
In the Czech Republic, the Elbe and the Vltava Rivers directly serve

two of the nation's larger industries. The first is tourism, one of the
nation's greatest sources of income. The Vltava flows directly through
the capital City of Prague, enhancing its attractiveness as one of
Europe's most popular tourist destinations." The second economic
sector which depends heavily on the river system is shipping; the Czech
shipbuilding and shipping industry has existed since 1921.84 "Highly
important to inland waterborne transport is the Labe-Vlatava waterway
of 303 [kilometers], including the Labe (Elbe) section... to the
5 state
frontier and the Vltava section ... where it flows into the Labe."0
In addition to being a major shipping thoroughfare and an
impetus for tourism, the Elbe and its tributaries have supported

numerous other industries to a lesser extent.

Its waters have been

80. Kim Ji-ho, Korea learning from Germany's experience: Studies political, economic
developments since German reunification,THE KOREA HERALD, March 3, 2000, LEXIS, News

& Business, News, News Group All File.

81.

STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA,

supra note 17, at 90.

82. BRITANNICA ONLINE, supra note 8.
83. Czech Republic: Country Profile, EUROPE REVIEW or WORLD INFORMATION, Sept. 19,
2000, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, World News File.
84. See Ministry of Industry & Trade, Czech Republic, ShipbuildingIndustry,
at http://www.mpo.cz/gc/s0697/page0047.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
85. See id., The Transport Infrastructureof the Czech Republic,
at http://www.mpo.cz/gc/4-97/pageOO07.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
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use

some

impoundments along the river system to generate hydroelectric
88
In fact, "[t]he Vltava water system was mainly built to
power.
generate energy." 9 However, the use of the rivers for such purpose

has greatly diminished in recent years. In 2001, "'flowing' water power
plants accounted for [only] 3.4 percent of energy consumption" in the

Czech Republic.9"
While the Elbe has demonstrated convincing success in serving

commercial needs throughout a number of regions, success inevitably
leads to a desire for expansion. Engineers have already modified
portions of the Elbe to provide easier navigation and to meet the

growing need for larger ships to travel upriver. "The modification of
the lower and outer Elbe channel has increased the Port of Hamburg's
accessibility, and ships with a draft of 12.80 meters can enter and
depart the port at any time, independent of the tides." 91
B. ECOLOGY

By the 1990s, the lengthy history of human activity along the Elbe
River System had severely threatened its ecological vitality.9" It is
notable, however, that while the past decade seemingly produced only

allegations of degradation and cries for conservation,93 the new
millennium has given rise to more optimistic stories rejoicing in the
revitalization of the Elbe. 94

While the positive reports are indeed

encouraging, one must remain skeptical toward the notion that the
extent of damage incurred by the late century has already been

remedied through the implementation of a more stringent regulatory
scheme.
The fall of the Iron Curtain revealed to the West "industrial
86. See WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, supra note 20, at 18. See also Water in the
at
DAY,
WATER
WORLD
User's
System,
in
Water
Republic,
Czech
http://www.env.cz/www/zamest.nsf/defc72941c223d62c125643b30064fdcc/fcee8b02
b6505849c1256585003cbbb3?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
87. See, e.g., Tramscape, Paddle Steamer Resources, Prague PassengerShipping (Prazska
at
http://myweb.tiscali.co.uk/tramways/
PPS,
spolecnost)
paroplavebni
PraguePassengerShipping.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
88. One example is the Czech plant, Tri Chaloupky. Czechia, http://www.unitenergy.com/en/generation/czechia.htm.
89. Water System Not Built Against Hoods, CZECH NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 19, 2002, LEXIS,
News & Business, Country & Region, Czech Republic, News.
90. Id.
91. Hong Kong Shippers' Council, HamburgEmbarks on Deepening of the Elbe River, at
(last visited Oct. 14,
http://www.tdctrade.com/shippers/9/7ports/portsO3.html
2002).
92. Roberto A. Epple, Important Victory on the Elbe River, 11 WORLD RIVERS REVIEW
(1996), available at http://www.irn.org/pubs/wrr/9612/elbe.html.
93. See, e.g., Michele B. Corash et al., Recent Developments in InternationalLaw, 445
PRAc. LAW INST. LrG. 747, 773 (1992).
94. See, e.g., Salmon Expected to Return to Elbe as Water Quality Improves, CZECH NEWS
AGENCY, Oct. 23, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Czech Republic,
News [hereinafter Salmon].
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pollution of almost unimaginable proportions in Central and Eastern
Europe."9 5 According to the European Commission ("EC") at that
time:
[TIhe environment in the former East Germany is in a catastrophic
state: nearly half of the water resources are unusable for the
production of drinking water; the Elbe River is almost dead, and its
fish are unfit for human consumption; 60% of the industrial waste is
disposed of without any controls at all; and it is to be feared that
colossal expenditure
will be required for cleaning up the
96
contaminated soil.

If this were really the case, the unavoidable question is whether an
environment in such a dismal state of being could actually recover so
quickly.
While the EC's statement reflects the conditions in all of Central
and Eastern Europe at the time, other observers have spoken directly
to the state of the Elbe: "[u]ncontrolled waste disposal has made the
Elbe [R]iver in East Germany the most polluted in Europe."97 Clearly,
at the time of Germany's reunification, many saw the Elbe River as a
particularly threatened resource in a region already mired in a state of
ecological urgency. Just ten years ago, those concerned with the effect
of global climatic change on streamflows singled out the Elbe as one
river system whose pollution problems could suffer severe aggravation
if such changes occurred. 98
As the 1990s came to an end, the World Wildlife Fund estimated
that "[h]alf of Europe's freshwater wildlife habitat [had] been
destroyed.... ,99 Across Europe, however, numerous efforts are now
underway "to restore rivers and return their original wildlife."'' 0
"Species like otter, beaver, and recently salmon have returned to their
old homes along the Elbe [R]iver and its tributaries.".. Furthermore,
introduced species, such as muskrats and Fallow deer, now thrive
along the river's banks." 2
The apparent turnaround in the condition of the Elbe waterway is
certainly impressive. If recent reports are accurate, and the return of
95.

Corash et al., supra note 93, at 772.

96.

Id. (quotations omitted).

97. MariaJ. lonata, German Unification and European Community EnvironmentalPolicy,
14 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 333, 337 (1991).
98. Ludwik A. Teclaff, The River Basin Concept and Global Climate Change, 8 PACE
ENVTL. L. REv. 355, 379 (1991) [hereinafter The River Basin Concept].
99. Oliver Tickell, Halfof Europe's FreshwaterHabitats 'Ruined'FewFreshwaterHabitats
Still in Natural Condition, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 23, 1999, LEXIS, News & Business,
Country & Region, World News File.
100. Id.
101. Press Release, European Rivers Network, International Opposition Against
Planned Dams on Elbe River in Czech Republic is Growing. NGOs Demand a Public
Hearing, a Real Transboundary EIA and Alternative Solutions (March 19, 2001), at
http://www.rivernet.org/elbe/prsO0_2.htm#2103
[hereinafter
International
Opposition].
102. WORLD GEOGRAPHY, supra note 7, at 1597.

Issue 1

MANAGING THE ELBE RIVER BASIN

indigenous species to a waterway is in fact a viable indicator of an
improving ecology, then conditions within the Basin have in fact
improved a great deal. The German Environment Minister, Juergen
Tritten, recently remarked, "[t]he quality of River Labe (Elbe) water
as proved by the fish
has markedly improved over the past decade
01 3
population having been grown by 30 species."

These improvements are due in large part to enormous
investments made to construct many waste treatment facilities within
the Basin. "Since 1990 as many as 239 community water treatment
plants have been built along the Elbe and all towns with a population
of over 20,000 are now equipped with this environment protection
facility." 04 The Czech Republic has announced that no segment of
either the Elbe or the Vltava River is designated as Class V (highly
polluted) quality. 05 According to the Czech government, "[t]he values
of most of the important water pollution parameters (organic
pollution, ammonium nitrogen, phosphates) at the main sampling
sites on the Labe [and] Vltava ... had dropped by 1995. " '06

The economic community has also played a meaningful role in
affecting the turnaround. The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe
07
has opened the region to investment by multinational companies.'
While strained government budgets were previously expected, yet
unable to endure the costs of cleanup, the growing trend is to hold
national and multinational companies responsible for the costs of
"As a result, contaminated land is becoming an
these efforts.'
increasingly important issue for companies investing in... Eastern
Europe. More sites are being identified, more clean-ups are being
required, more money is being spent, and the private sector is being
asked to bear more of these costs."0 9
A frequent and paradoxical consequence of environmental
reparation is the resulting existence of more ecologically important
lands that deserve protection. The recent revitalization of the Elbe's
riparian ecosystems provides a good example of this phenomenon;
restoration efforts have led to the establishment of an abundance of
protected areas within the Basin."0 There are two national parks and
three landscape protection areas along the Elbe River."' Of note is the

103. Salmon, supranote 94.
104. Id.
105. Bedrich Moldan, Industrial Development in Czech Republic in Light of Sustainable
Development (Oct. 26, 2001), at http://www.unido.org/userfiles/timminsk/RIO10-INDczechRep-eng.pdf.
106. Czech Republic Communication, supra note 21, at 18.
107. Corash et al., supra note 93, at 773.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Press Release, WWF Living Waters Programme-Europe, Destruction of
Nature Beyond Borders: Horror Vision of the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal (April 16,
1999), at http://archive.panda.org/europe/freshwater/newsroom/newsrooml 2.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Horror Vision].
111. International Opposition, supra note 101.
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"Elbe Riverside" biosphere preserve, covering 273,000 hectares. The
preserve "provides habitats for 2,000 beavers, almost 1,000 couples of
storks, 32 species of fish, sea eagles, old world otters, and cranes."' 12 In
the Czech Republic, several natural features along the Elbe qualify it as
a candidate for the European network of protected areas "Natura
2000."'
In some cases, the Elbe itself acts as a line of demarcation
between distinct subspecies,"4 and its banks are home to some species
that have been pushed to the brink of extinction in other areas.
The vitality of the river, particularly along its lower reaches, is
*arguably attributable to the continuing variance in the river's flow
levels." This belief led NGOs to insist that if the Czech government
permitted current plans to further develop the navigation capabilities
of the Elbe, the areas surrounding the projects will suffer irreparable
harm." 7 As relayed by one Czech news agency concerning a
navigability enhancement project, some are fearful that "making the
Labe (Elbe) river navigable at Prelouc, east Bohemia, will destroy
endangered animal and plant species which are EU protected."" 8
C. THE POLITICAL SITUATION
During the 1930s, Germany constructed the bulk of its expansive
canal system." 9 Germany intended the system to join two of it's major
canals: the Mittelland, which runs westward from the Elbe to
Hannover; and the Havel, which runs east, linking the Elbe with
Berlin. However, "World War II intervened and East Germany, under
communist rule, never completed the project. This missing link is
(nevertheless] now underway, ' with improvements to both canals
being completed. The renewal of the long-abandoned Mitteland and
Havel canal projects indicate the reinvigorated general interest in
improving the navigability of the Elbe's waterways.
The desire to see a more navigable Elbe now extends well beyond

112.
113.
114.

Horror Vision, supra note 110.
International Opposition, supra note 101.
One such species is the Carrion Crow, which has two very distinct subspecies

existing on either side of the river. WORLD GEOGRAPHY, supranote 7, at 1642.

115. For example, the European beaver (Castor fiber) disappeared from England
long ago. However, thriving populations are still found on the Elbe, and these
populations are notably blonde in comparison to others. June Southworth, Viva the
Beaver! 1,000 Years After it was Hunted to ExtinctionHere, This BizarreAnimal is Back, DAILY
MAIL, May 2, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, United Kingdom,
News.
116. See Help!, supra note 30.
117. See, e.g., Czech, Germans to Submit Petition Against Waterworks on the Elbe, CZECH
NEws AGENCY, Aug. 27, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Czech
Republic, News (arguing that the planned waterworks would mean the disappearance
of fourteen animal and vegetable species from the area).
118. Czech Ecologists Protest Against Extending Elbe's Navigation, CZECH NEWS AGENCY,
May 2, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Czech Republic, News.
119.

Elementary Canal, INT'L CONSTRUcnON 123, Mar. 13, 2001, LEXIS, News &

Business, News, Individual Publication, International Construction.
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Germany's borders, and in fact, Germany is one of the strongest
opponents to a number of large-scale undertakings."' Ten years ago,
Germany rejected, for financial reasons, some of the projects that the
Czech government is now currently considering."' Nevertheless, the
long-delayed Elbe River canal projects are only two of many to be
actualized throughout Europe pursuant to a 1993 EU decision to
create a Trans-European Inland Waterway Network ("TEN") . The
TEN project envisions a massive alteration of Eastern and Central
Europe's infrastructure. The TEN will "link East-European waterways
(especially in Poland) with Germany (Elbe, Oder, Rhine-MainDanube) and Austria (Danube) ."14 The construction of a canal that
would link the Danube River with the Elbe and Oder Rivers ("DEO
Canal") is the most ambitious proposal,
and, according to many, has
25
the potential for the most destruction.
The EU's stated objective of this decision was "[t]o improve the
inland waterway network in order to facilitate the transport of goods
between the main seaports and the industrialized regions of the
European hinterland." 1' 6 The decision also includes provisions that
will improve the navigability of the Elbe itself linking Magdeburg and
the Czech frontier as well as the connections between the Elbe and
Oder Rivers.2 7 This original decision applied only untilJune 30, 1995.
On July 23, 1996, the Council adopted a new decision incorporating
the considerations set out in the 1993 Council Decision. 21 Since then,
"the European Commission has been working on the development of a
coherent transport network." 29 The massive DOE Canal project is just
one of many under consideration. "s Although the proposed canal
improvements are at the core of the TEN proposal, navigation on the
scale anticipated will not be possible without considerable dam
construction throughout the Basin. "In order to render the river
121. See, e.g., International Opposition, supra note 101.
122. Id.
123. Council of the European Communities, Council Decision of 29 Oct. 1993 on
the Creation of a Trans-European Inland Waterway Network, 1993 O.J. (L 305) 39
[hereinafter Council Decision of 29 Oct. 1993].
124. WWF Living Waters Programme-Europe, Waterways,
at http://www.panda.org/europe/freshwater/initiatives/waterways.html (last visited
Oct. 15, 2002).
125. See, e.g., New Shipping Plans For Danube River Disastrous - WWF, Dow JONEs
INTERNATIONAL NEwS, January 30, 2002, WESTLAW.
126. Europa, Trans-European Inland Waterway Network, THE EUROPEAN UNION ONLINE, at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124093.htm (last visited Oct. 11,
2002).
127. Council Decision of 29 Oct. 1993, supra note 123, at art. 2.
128. See generally Council of the European Communities, Council Decision of 23July
1996 on Community Guidelines for Development of the Trans-European Transport
Network, 1996 O.J. (L 228) 1 [hereinafter Council Decision of 23 July 1996]. See id.
(addressing the concepts re-adopted in the 1996 decision).
129. Dr. E. Wenger, InternationalConference on Waterways and SustainableDevelopment
Factsheet TransEuropean Transportation Network (2000), at http://www.rivernet.org/
general/waterways/tenfacts.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
130. Id.
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system of the Danube, Oder, and Elbe, which still is predominantly
natural, navigable all year round, between 67 and 77 dams would have
to be built. . .

." '

While not all of these would be constructed in the

35 dams would have to be built along the Elbe and
Basin, "[a]bout
32
Oder."

In the Czech Republic, the last free-flowing section of the Elbe is at
133
The Czech
risk of losing this distinction to dam construction.
Republic is considering two major projects: one at Prostredni Zleb and
Male Brezno in the Northern Bohemia region of the Czech republic;
and the other just south of the German border.34 The EC M and
factions within the Czech government, particularly the Transportation
Ministry, 136 seem to be the strongest supporters of continued
development. Both have advanced economic as well as environmental
arguments in favor of completing navigation enhancement projects.
The Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment ("TINA"), is the
"main instrument" through which the EC has proceeded toward the
completion of a more expansive network of waterways.' 7 "According
to the TINA Secretariat, socio-economic aspects are to be considered
as well as environmental aspects" in fulfilling its mission. 38
Economically, the EC sees the improvements as "part of a... strategy
by which freight transport should be moved away from roads to both
train and inland waterways."'39 The trans-European network, it
believes, will strengthen social and economic cohesion. Likewise, the
Czech Transportation Ministry embraces development because it
would "triple shipping traffic and boost economically distressed
1
,4,
communities in the north Czech Republic ....
The environmental justifications for the projects are essentially the
same on both sides. One argument, for instance, is that "road
transport is a key player in air pollution, climate change, noise, [and]
From this point of view, the parties
nature degradation.. .."4'
perceive the TEN as means to head off environmental degradation in
non-riparian areas. However, the expansion plan, specifically as it
relates to the proposed dams on the Czech-German border, is not
without strong opponents. Evaluating the potential effects of the
construction of the DEO Canal, Ulrich Eichelmann, an ecologist with

131.

Horror Vision, supra note 110.

132. Id.
133. Help!, supra note 30.
134. Id.
135. Wenger, supra note 129.
136. Czech Transport MinisterJaromir Schilig reportedly supports the construction
of the dams at Prostredni Zleb and Male Brezno because they will "increase
commercial traffic on the Labe River .... Czech Ministers, supra note 39.
137. Wenger, supra note 129.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140.
141.

Council Decision of 23July 1996, supra note 128, at 1.
Czech Ministers, supra note 39.

142. Wenger, supra note 129.
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the World Wildlife Fund, stated that "[w]hoever supports this
monstrous project approves of the destruction of nature in modern
Europe on the largest scale ever. We call for an immediate halt of the
project .... The one who takes part in the planning will have to share
the guilt!" 143

Many of those adverse to the proposed projects have

argued that that application of the 1991 United Nations Convention
regarding Environmental Impact Assessments ("Espoo Convention") 4
bars their completion as presently contemplated before the acting
state initiates full consultation with potentially affected 4nations,
and
5
provides an assessment of possible harms to those nations.
On June 14, 2000, "fifty-two participants from twelve countries
attended the international conference on 'Waterways and Sustainable
Development"' in K6nigswinter, Germany.
Many came to express
their dissatisfaction with the TEN proposals. At last count, nine
German, and seven Czech NGOs officially opposed completion of the
TEN as currently proposed. "7 The main objective of many of these
organizations is the transboundary protection
of the Elbe River as a
4
free flowing river downstream from Usti.

8

Although the Czech Republic is not currently a member of the
EU ," "integration into the European Union ... has been a priority for
the Czech government,"' 50 and the Republic plans accession to the EU
in January, 2003.1" This potential union places the Czech government
in a difficult position. Pressure from Czech nationals and conservation
groups to ensure that the Elbe is not developed beyond its current
state conflicts with the governmental directive and local desires to
expand the usefulness of the waterway as a commercial throughway.
Heated exchanges
between Czech cabinet members have already
5
transpired.

1

Despite the affirmative position on development that both the
Czech Transport Minister and the EU have taken, some believe that
Czech accession to the EU will effectuate further environmental

143. Horror Vision, supra note 110.
144. Espoo Convention, supranote 6.
145. International Opposition, supra note 101.
146. Press Release, WWF Living Waters Programme-Europe, Learning From
Mistakes: International Waterways Conference Releases Resolution for Sustainable Use
of Rivers (June 14, 2000),
at http://www.panda.org/europe/freshwater/
newsroom/newsroom 10.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
147. International Opposition, supra note 101.
148. Id.
149. See Europa, The European Union at a Glance, THE EUROPEAN UNION ON-LINE, at
http://europa.eu.int/abc-en.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2002).
150. David E. Madeo, Environmental Contamination and World Trade Integration: The
Case of the Czech Republic, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 962 (1995).
151. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic, Mission of the Czech Republic to the
European Communities, at http://www.mzv.cz/missionEU/preparation.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2002).
152. Czech Ministers, supra note 39 (reporting that the Czech Transportation Minister
called the Environment Ministry a "useless body," after hearing of the Environment
Minister's opposition to the proposed dams on the Czech-German border).
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improvement: "Since the European Union has higher environmental
standards and better enforcement mechanisms than the Czech
Republic, E.U. membership
would require imposition of stricter
15 3
environmental policies."

V. THE APPLICABLE LAW
A. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Sociopolitical and historical developments commonly shape a
region's natural resource management approach. Such is the case in
the Elbe Basin. One can easily trace the development of the legal
regime governing the Elbe to Eastern European and even world
history. When peace came about in Europe following World War I,
the victorious Allied Powers sought to insure the free nariation of the
Elbe.' "The first institution for the Elbe was the [ICE]' established
by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.""6 Out of this body arose the
earliest instrument of law concerned solely with managing the Basin:
the Convention Instituting the Statute of Navigation of the Elbe
("Navigation Convention"). 57 Under the Navigation Convention, the
ICE was given the duty and the power:
(a) To supervise the conservation of the freedom of navigation, the
maintenance in good order of the navigable channel and the
improvement of that channel;
(b) To pronounce upon complaints arising out of the application of
the present convention and likewise of the regulations which it
contemplates;
(c) To decide whether the tariffs applied are in accordance with the
conditions laid down by the present convention;
(d) To pronounce upon the claims proffered in appeal before it;
(e) And, in general, to exercise the powers arising out of the
provisions of the ... convention.
The most significant function of the Navigation Convention was to
internationalize the Basin. 159 Under the ICE's supervision, the Elbe
was to remain "open without restriction to the ships, boats and rafts of
all nations ....
While the Navigation Convention refers to only one
specific tributary (the Vltava), the explicit language "[t]he international
system of the Elbd' nevertheless makes it clear that the Navigation
153. Madeo, supranote 150, at 962.
154. Treaty, supranote 63 (dealing generally with navigable international rivers).
155. The Commission consisted of four representatives of the German States
bordering on the Elbe, two representatives of the Czecho-Slovak State, and one
representative each from Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium. Id.

156. Kliot & Shmueli, supra note 22, at 319.
157. Convention Instituting the Statute of Navigation of the Elbe, Feb. 22, 1922, art.
2, 1923 Gr. Brit. T. S. No. 3, reprinted in 17 AM.J. INT'L L. 227.
158. Id. at art. 2.
159. See id. at art. 1.
160. Id. at art. 12.
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Convention's provisions were applicable to the entire Basin."' The
significance of this wording has not been overlooked. Because the
Navigation Convention encompasses the Elbe's tributaries, many
acknowledge it as one of "the first legal instruments clearly applicable
to entire individual basins prescribing that the river basin be treated as
a unit for the purpose of a single major water use. '
Although the Nineteenth Century witnessed "substantial
development
of the principles of non-discrimination and
internationalization
of many European
rivers... ,,163
legal
proclamations explicitly emboding these principles were uncommon
in the early Twentieth Century. The "community of riparianstates did
not appear until treaties [such as the Navigation Convention] affirmed
1 65
the principle of freedom of navigation among such states."
Although Germany and Czechoslovakia were not necessarily zealous
advocates
of the Navigation
Convention's
adoption, the
implementation of a basin-wide approach to the Elbe was indicative of
the growing acceptance of an approach that is customary today. 66 The
question, however, is whether that approach will be honored in the
Basin, or overlooked in favor of an extra-basin management policy.
B. ELBE CONVENTION

Most likely because of Communist isolationism, the Elbe's riparian
nations failed to execute an instrument respecting water quality until
much later than other nearby nations did regarding, shared
international rivers.'67 This delay is-quite possibly-the major factor
that caused the Basin to fall into a state of ecological devastation 6
When Germany and the Czech and Slovak Republics finally drafted the
instrument that would become the Elbe Convention, they settled upon
an agreement that was quite limited in reach and arguably incapable
of accomplishing the desired result-that is, unless the nations truly
wished to severely confine the scope of the agreement and provide
little, if any, forum for the resolution of conflicts between the
signatories. Although the Elbe Convention is based on a basin-wide
approach consistent with the Treaty, the Commission charged with its
oversight is constrained from adopting such an approach since its
jurisdiction is so restricted:

161. Id. at art. 1 (emphasis added).
162. Evolution of the River Basin, supra note 77, at 364.
163. Edward A. Laing, EqualAccess/Non-Discrimination and Legitimate Discriminationin
InternationalEconomic Law, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 246, 277-78 (1995).
164. See generallyEvolution of the River Basin, supra note 77, at 364-65.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. See, e.g., The River Basin Concept, supra note 98, at 355.
167. See, e.g., Proposal for a Council Decision relating to the Conclusion of the
Convention on the International Commission for the Protection of the Oder, April 11,
1996, 1998 O.J. (C 316) 5; Bern Convention on the International Rhine Commission
for the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution, Apr. 29, 1963, 994 U.N.T.S. 18.
168. See Ionata, supra note 97, at 337.
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The International Commission for the Protection of the River Elbe
(ICPE) has a narrow scope of activity: water quality. Its role was
defined so as to enable the Elbe to be used for drinking water supply
and irrigation, restoring the natural ecosystem169and reducing the
waste load carried by the Elbe into the North Sea.
In its present state, the ICPE is required to "provide documentary
evidence regarding the ecological importance of the various biotope
elements of the waters and proposals regarding the improvement of
conditions for aquatic and coastal communities."70 The ICPE has "the
power to investigate damaged habitat, make proposals for
improvement and require its restoration." 7 ' In doing so, the ICPE
employs a watershed approach, but again, the proposals it advances
are purely advisory. The ICPE does "not provide for a procedure to
inform and consult as such, but empower[s] a joint body... to be
informed about all projects and verify all information and make
recommendations to the Parties."' Thus, interceding interests may be
afforded as much deference as the ICPE itself. Germany and the
Czech Republic are not bound by ICPE recommendations, but are
essentially free to yield to the prevailing forces operating within their
political systems.
It is possible that both nations may agree to an ICPE
recommendation out of their own general interest. The German
government has committed to not only the quality of water within the
Basin, but also that of the surrounding ecosystems.'
Meanwhile, the
Czech Republic might agree to an ICPE proposal as a means to
demonstrate its willingness to abide by United Nations-led directives,
thus improving (or at least not harming) its chances of EU accession.
The EU is a full member of the ICPE.'" This is significant, since the
Czech government is "motivated by a desire to harmonize its laws with

those of the European Union" pending its accession. 5 Thus, the EU's
participation as a member of the ICPE may prompt the Czech
government to draft its federal environmental laws in stricter
accordance with the terms of the Elbe Convention.
If, however, the dispute between the Czech and German
governments goes unresolved, the ICPE is devoid of authority to draft
a decision regarding management of the river that would be binding
upon the nations; the Elbe Convention clearly does "not provide for a
dispute settlement mechanism."'76 The notable absence of this
binding resolution device represents a major setback for the

169. Kliot & Shmueli, supra note 22, at 319.
170. Elbe Convention, supra note 4, at art. 2.
171. Evolution of the River Basin, supra note 77, at 377.
172.

lulia Trombitcaia, Transboundary Cooperation of Moldova and Ukraine on the

DniesterDraftConvention, 17J. ENVrL. L. & LInTG. 145, 157 (2002).
173. See, e.g., Corash et al., supra note 93, at 772-73; Salmon, supra note 94.
174. Kliot & Shmueli, supra note 22, at 321.
175. Madeo, supra note 150, at 957.

176. Trombitcaia, supra note 172, at 159.
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conservationist concerns on the Elbe since "provisions on the
settlement of disputes [are] commonly recognized as important
clauses in [treaties] relating to the protection and preservation of the
environment."177 If the anti-development camp is to achieve success in
the international legal arena, they may be well advised to rely upon
alternative sources of international law, and allude to the Elbe
Convention only as an example of the international legal tradition of
managing the Basin under a watershed approach.
C.

APPLICABLE STATE LAW

According to the Czech government, its federal water laws are
shaped by the Elbe Convention, "applied in hydrological catchment
areas... since 1990 when the cooperation in the protection of Elbe
It thus purports to apply a basin approach,
River was launched.. ,,."s
relying on "the principle of [protecting] surface waters and
groundwater in individual river basins or hydrogeological regions.",79
The Czech Republic based further legislation on a 1992 Act,'80 the
purpose of which was "to maintain natural processes in ecosystems and
landscapes, stressing both the diversity and importance of lifesupporting processes in various biological systems, outside as well as
The
within areas designated for the protection of nature."'
legislation was reportedly based on the concept of the Territorial
System of Ecological Stability."2
Germany's federal legal framework includes a Federal Water Code,
the Wasserhaushaltsgesetz ("WHG") .18' The WHG focuses on the
notion of collective ownership of water resources. Scholars of German
law have noted that "[t]he trend in German water law is toward the
[and that] the
'de-individualization of a legal framework,'
promulgation of the Federal Water Code... may have been the first
step in the 'transfer of water into collective ownership."

84

Thus, the

German framework is not unlike the United States' public trust

177. Id.
178. Ministry of the Environment, Czech Republic, Multilateral International
Cooperation in Water Protection, at http://www.env.cebin.cz/publikace/3_vodae/
02e.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
179. Id.

180. Czech National Council Act No. 114/1992 S.B., Protection of Nature and the
Landscape (Feb. 19, 1992), at http://www.env.cz/www/laws/cites2.nsf (last visited Oct.
16, 2002).
181. Gabriella Richova & Michael Andreas, Country Reports Czech Republic,
ESTABLISHING NAwURA 2000 IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES PROCEEDINGS (Mihdly Vgh &
D6ra Szuics eds., 1999), available at http://www.ecnc.nl/doc/ecnc/publicat/
n2000sem.doc.
182. "This concept dates from the 1970s and is one of the first ecological networks
at the national, regional or local level in Europe." Id.
183. Hanno Kube, Private Property in NaturalResources and the Public Weal in German
Law - Latent Similarities to the Public Trust Doctrine?, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 857, 868
(1997).

184. Id. (citing MICHAEL KLOEPFER, UMWELTRECHT 52 n.78 (1989); Paul Klemmer,
Wasser, in STAATSLEXIKON DER GOERRESGESELLSCHAFr 884, 890 (7th ed. 1986)).
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doctrine in that water resources are free from ownership, serving the
public of each state.'
The Grundgesetz, Germany's federal constitution, also has its own
provisions for water management. The Grundgesetz establishes a
dichotomy between two distinct clusters of environmental concerns,
with the German states-the Liinder, having greater autonomy to
legislate in regard to some matters-than to others. 6 Water falls into
the category of resources over which the Lander has broad
discretion. 8 Thus, the legal regime governing the Elbe may vary from
region to region, and there is no federal directive to meet certain
quality standards.
Commentators have noted that the laws which compose the
German system "constitute the weakest form of federal legislative
authority.
However, the federal government does oversee
cooperative planning, and century-old associations of water users
which "control both the water quality and use of a number of rivers."'8 9
In addition, it has the authority to enter agreements such as the Elbe
Convention, upon which national policy is built. The Grundgesetz
grants the federal government the power to indirectly impose this
policy upon the Liinder via its power to allocate revenue.
D. TRANSBOUNDARYEIA CONVENTION

In 1991, the United Nations drafted the Espoo Convention. '' On
September 10, 1997, after the Convention's sixteenth ratification, it
entered into force. 92 The general aim of the Convention is to ensure
that all parties "take all appropriate and effective measures to prevent,
reduce and control significant adverse transboundary environmental
impact from proposed activities."' 93
The general intent of the
Convention, it would appear, is to avoid international litigation
resulting from harm caused to one state by the activities of another
state within its own boundaries. In this sense, it seeks to avoid the type
of dispute at issue in
9 4 the Trail Smelter controversy between the United
States and Canada.
The procedural obligations, which the Convention imposes on
member states, are very similar to those that the United States
185. For the United States Supreme Court's articulation of applicability of the
public trust doctrine to waterbodies, see generally Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387 (1892).
186. Susan Rose-Ackerman, EnvironmentalPolicy andFederal Structure:A Comparison of
the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1587, 1603-04 (1994).

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id. at 1604-05.
Id. at 1605.
Id. at 1606.
Espoo Convention, supra note 6.

192. Environment and Human Settlements Division, United Nations Economic
Commissionfor Europe, at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2002).

193. Espoo Convention, supra note 6, at art. 2, cl. 1.
194.

Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1949).
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government must abide by under the National Environmental Policy
Act.'9
The Convention obligates parties to assess the potential
environmental impacts of their activities at an early stage of planning.
It also imposes the general obligation of states to notify and consult
each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to
have a significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries.96
The EU signed the Convention on June 24, 1997, but has yet to
ratify it. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, has demonstrated its
assent to the Convention by ratifying it in February of 2001.'9
Germany, along with Ireland, is the last European holdout to the
Espoo Convention.'9 8 However, as of February 2002, Germany has
manifested its willingness to be bound by the Espoo Treaty insofar as it
has reached a bilateral agreement with Poland to conduct
environmental assessments in order to facilitate environmental
cooperation.' " A number of organizations that oppose completion of
the TEN projects have demanded compliance with the Espoo
Convention as necessary under principles of customary international
law. °° In concert with the general intent of the Treaty and the Elbe
Convention to manage the Basin under a watershed approach,
application of the Espoo Convention may represent the most prudent
approach to ceasing, or at least limiting, massive development in the
Basin. In fact, Espoo may represent the "optional formula" for nations
in conflict over environmental protection issues to "declare the
acceptance of either adjudication in the [International Court of
Justice] orarbitration ....

VI. FUTURE PROSPECTS
The future of the Elbe very much depends upon the intent of the
two riparian nations to be bound by the Elbe Convention's purpose
and direction. Perhaps the ICPE will issue a firm policy statement in
regard to TEN-related projects along the Elbe, but the affected nations
should not wait for such a communication as "there have been few
policy pronouncements on the issue [of river restoration] by
195. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70(d) (2000).
196. See generally Espoo Convention, supranote 6.
197. Aarhus Convention Working Group for the Preparation of the First Meeting of
the Parties, Preparationfor the Ratification and Implementation of the Aarhus Convention in

the Czech Republic, at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/national/czech.republic.2.pdf
(last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
198. Baltic Environmental Information Dissemination System, Germany to ratify UN
EIA convention, at http://www.beids.tec-hh.net/beids-archive/english/transport/

showdate.php?year=2002&month=2 (Feb. 2002) (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) [hereinafter
BEIDS].
199. See Thomas Bunge, Transboundary Impacts And EIA: A German-Polish Research

Project, at http://www.art.man.ac.uk/EIA/nl14gerp.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
Germany appears ready to ratify the Espoo Convention. At the time this paper was

published, the German cabinet had approved a proposal to ratify the UN Espoo
convention. See also BEIDS, supra note 198.
200. International Opposition, supra note 101.
201. Trombitcaia, supranote 172, at 159.
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organizations [such as the ICPE]."2°2 In all likelihood, the German and
Czech governments must therefore act with due regard for the
Convention unilaterally, as an expression of their willingness to be
bound by its terms. If the nations choose to disregard the purpose or
declarations of the ICPE, there is little possibility of enforcement
under the Elbe Convention alone.
Germany's current policy is clear: "[tIhis decision against any
damming structures on the German part of the Elbe river has been
stressed several times [in recent years] by the German Ministries for
Transportation [as well as] by the German Chancellor. ... ,203 If there
is an ideological shift in the current administration, however, the
German Lander may find themselves less constrained by a federal
government in strong opposition to Basin development. Should this
be the case, riparian Linder may become so enticed by the prospect of
economic growth as to support further development, much like some
Czech regions have." 4
As for the Czech government, it appears that, at this time, it is
inundated with dissenting opinions regarding a policy approach to the
Basin.
Its national conservation laws would appear to reject
widespread development on the Upper Elbe. However, Czech practice
in recent years has not coincided with its federal law. With impending
admission to the EU, the Czech Republic may begin to adhere to its
own legislation more rigidly.
The EC's role in shaping the Elbe's future is vital. While the EC is
a member of the ICPE, it also has a vested interest in improving
navigability within the Basin. Thus, the EC is situated such that it must
balance strong economic incentives to develop against an affirmative
duty to serve the purpose of the Convention. The EC's feet appear
already planted on the side of economic growth." 5 One must
remember, however, that they are not a one-party committee; their
interests must be reconciled with those of the other members.
The effectiveness of Espoo as a legal tool remains untested.
However, the mere threat of litigation in the ICJ or availing itself to
the arbitration process may dissuade the EU and/or Czech
government from continuing their hard line policy in favor of
202. Evolution of the River Basin, supra note 77, at 377.
203. International Opposition, supra note 101.
204. See, e.g., Making Vtava Navigable Could EnhanceEcological Transport, CZECH NEWS
Nov. 1, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Czech Republic,
News (reporting on Central Bohemian support for proposals on the Vltava, which
would increase its navigability).
205. When asked what prospects the EC saw for requiring Germany to comply with
EU Environmental protection directives and preventing further destruction of the
Elbe water meadows, the EC replied that it was:
not aware of problems of European significance concerning nature
protection along the Elbe river. On the contrary, publications of German
non-governmental organizations ...[referred] to a satisfactory compromise
reached between the interests of traffic and nature conservation along the
river Elbe.
European Union Parliamentary Questions, E-0419/97, 1997 O.J. (C186) 257, 258.
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increasing navigability throughout the Basin. It is thus entirely
foreseeable that an alliance consisting of the nation of Germany and
conservation organizations speaking out against portions of the TEN
proposal will gain victories where projects would undoubtedly cause
harm to bordering nations, and in most cases, downstream Germany.
Naturally, Germany must ratify the Espoo Treaty for it to argue against
the completion of Czech projects on the Upper Elbe on behalf of itself
and the interested NGOs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of numerous legal and conventional forces at play in the
Basin, the Elbe's future is still very much in doubt. As the duly
appointed international steward over water quality in the Basin, one
might expect that the ICPE would be in a position to issue a final and
binding declaration concerning management of the Basin. However,
the ICPE is competent only to issue guidance on recommended
courses of action, and is specifically devoid
of the power to regulate
20 6
matters relating to the shipping industry.
Admission of the Czech Republic to the EU would not
systematically strip the nation of its right to regulate the natural
resources located within its boundaries. Regardless of the Czech
Republic's accession, "the doctrine of 'limited territorial sovereignty' is
probably the prevailing theory of international watercourse rights and
obligations today."217 With this in mind, it seems that the Czech
Republic can permissibly go forth with its plans to improve upon the
navigability of the Upper Elbe so long as doing so will not "cause
significant harm to other states." 08 The same principles would also be
applicable to the TEN proposals in Germany and in the Czech
Republic.
The steadily increasing influence of local, national, and
international
conservation
organizations
should
not
be
underestimated. The ability for these groups to unite and effectively
argue for applicability of the Espoo Treaty to any, and all, projects that
may affect neighboring nations may play a large part in shaping the
future of the Elbe.
Speculation on possible international legal remedies to disputed
issues on the Elbe may be premature. If Czech and German federal
laws are crafted in a manner that respect the international custom of
managing the Basin under the watershed concept, an accord could
likely be struck between the riparian nations which would satisfy
concerns of interested conservationists. Naturally, the answer to this
question rests on the degree to which riparian nations are willing to
forgo exercise of their sovereign rights respecting the long-established

206.
207.

Elbe Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, cl. 4.

208.
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historical tradition embodied in the Treaty, the Elbe Convention, and
newer international legal principles of environmental cooperation and
consideration, promoted by such instruments as the Espoo Treaty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Oregon's Deschutes River Basin provides an example of what is
likely to become one of the most contentious and problematic water
management issues in the West: the scientific and public policy
questions presented by the hydrologic connection between surface
water and ground water. In the Deschutes River Basin, geologists have
mapped an extensive ground water aquifer, capable of supplying the
domestic, irrigation, municipal, industrial, and other water needs of a
growing population for years to come. However, this vast water supply
will be inaccessible to new development unless, and until, Oregon's
Water Resources Department ("WRD") finds a way to reconcile
existing laws designed to protect surface water with the need to make
reasonable use of an ample ground water supply.
For nearly three years, the WRD worked with a local advisory
t
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group, the Deschutes Basin Ground Water Supply Work Group
("Work Group"), in an attempt to meet that challenge. Recognizing
the need to seek a workable balance between development and
environmental interests within the framework of strict surface water
protection laws, the WRD used the collaborative Work Group process
to identify key issues and seek consensus-based
policy
recommendations.
Growing impatient with the Work Group's inability to reach full
consensus on all issues, in February 2001, the WRD issued a Ground
Water Mitigation Strategy ("Mitigation Strategy") for the Deschutes
Basin.1 The WRD based the Mitigation Strategy Report on the general
principles agreed to in the consensus process, and included its own
policy recommendations for unresolved issues. In September 2001,
following a public comment period on the Mitigation Strategy, the
WRD issued proposed rules for the program. On September 13, 2002,
the Oregon Water Resource Commission adopted final rules. Despite
the rocky path toward development of a mitigation program, the
Mitigation Strategy and new rules include important new concepts for
the water rights process in Oregon: mitigation credits and mitigation
banking. Such an approach presents the option of identifying and
addressing the potential impacts of ground water development on
surface water sources.
This article, based on a report originally delivered at the
Nineteenth Annual Water Law Conference of the American Bar
Association in February 2001, provides a summary of the legal and
policy issues confronted during the Work Group and rule
development processes. An abbreviated version of this article first
appeared in Western Water Law and Policy Review, October 2001.4
II. BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW OF OREGON LAW

Under Oregon law, both surface water and ground water are
public resources. Most uses of water require the WRD to issue a water
right permit. 6 In deciding whether to approve applications for new
ground water rights, the WRD must first determine that the proposed
1. See Oregon Water Res. Dep't, Ground Water Mitigation Strategy for the
Deschutes (Feb. 9, 2001) (on file with the Oregon Water Res. Dep't) [hereinafter
Public Review Draft].
2. See Oregon Water Res. Dep't, Public Hearing Draft, Deschutes Basin Mitigation
Rules (Sept. 7, 2001) (on file with the Oregon Water Res. Dep't).
3. See Oregon Water Res. Dept, Final Deschutes Basin Mitigation Rules (Sept. 13,
2002) (on file with the Oregon Water Res. Dep't) [hereinafter Final Proposed Rules].
4. Portions of this article originally appeared in the Oct. 2001 Issue of W. WATER
LAW & POL'Y REP., copyright © 2001, 2003, Argent Communications Group. Reprinted
with permission. Further reprints require written consent: Argent Communications
Group, P.O. Box 1425, Foresthill, CA; e-mail: reporters@argentco.com.
5.

OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.110, 537.525 (1999).

6. Id. §§ 537.130(1), 537.615(1).
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new use will "ensure the preservation of the public welfare, safety and
health .... "7 A key element of the public interest-based review is the
determination that water is available for the new use, and that the new
use will not injure existing senior water rights.8
Since the mid-1970s, Oregon law has also required special
protection for rivers and streams designated as state "Scenic
Waterways." 9 The State Scenic Waterway Act ("Act"), first approved by
voters through Oregon's initiative process, 0 prohibits the issuance of
new ground water rights within or above designated scenic waterways,
Oregon
unless minimum surface flow requirements are met."
designated portions of the Deschutes River as a Scenic Waterway under
this Act."
Until the early 1990s, implementation of the Act was relatively
straightforward and, for the most part, agplied only to new
With a growing
applications for the use of surface water.
understanding of the hydraulic connection between ground water and
surface water and a growing database of information about ground
water supplies in the Deschutes Basin ("Basin"), came new questions
about interpretation and implementation of the Act.
As a result of clarifying amendments in 1995, the Act now includes
detailed requirements for evaluating the potential impacts of new
ground water uses within and above Scenic Waterway reaches. 14 Where
the WRD determines that the proposed use would result in reduced
surface flows, it must deny an application unless the surface flow
impacts can be fully mitigated.0 Where sufficient hydro-geologic
information is not available to make an informed determination as to
the potential impacts of the proposed ground water use on surface
flows, the WRD may approve the application if it meets other review
criteria. 6 However, the WRD must condition the new water right
allowing for future curtailment of the ground water use if and when
data are available and it demonstrates an adverse impact on the Scenic
Waterway.7

Since 1995, all new ground water rights, issued within the
Deschutes Basin, have included such a condition. 8 In early 1998, it
became clear thatjudgment day was approaching.19
7. Id. § 537.621(2).
8. Id.
9. Id. §§ 390.805 through .925.
10. Id. §§ 250.135 through .355.
11. OR. Rlv. STAT. § 390.835(9) (a) (1999).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Work

Id. § 390.826(5).
See OR. REv. STAT. § 390.835 (1993).
OR. REV. STAT.

§ 390.835(9) (1999).

Id. § 390.835(9)(d).

Id. § 39 0 .835( 9 )(g).
Id.
Id.
See generally Oregon Water Res. Dep't, The Deschutes Basin Ground Water
Overview, at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/deschutes/
Group,
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B. OVERVIEW OF SCIENTIFIC/TECHNICAL ISSUE
For nearly ten years, state and federal geologists have been working
together on a comprehensive study of the Deschutes Basin ground
water resources. The U.S. Geological Survey led the Deschutes Basin
Ground Water Study ("Study"),2" with cost sharing and cooperation by
the state and local government agencies, as well as the Confederated
Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation. Preliminary results,
available as early as 1998, indicated a clear hydraulic connection
between most ground water uses and the designated Scenic Waterway
reaches of the Deschutes River.2 In essence, the Study described the
Basin as a large bathtub, with several key areas of discharge to the
Deschutes River." Because ground water in the Basin would naturally
flow toward these points of discharge, and because pumping of ground
water for new beneficial uses would interrupt this natural discharge,
the WRD has determined the triggering conditions for the Scenic
Waterway regulation will be met.
With the Study's completion in 2001,4 WRD now has the requisite
evidence, based on the Study's data and modeling, to not only deny
new water right applications, but also to require regulation and
curtailment of existing ground water rights issued since 1995.25
C. WORK GROUP PROCESS

When the Study's apparent impacts became clear, WRD officials
initiated an informal process to provide background information to,
and seek input from, other affected state agencies, local governments,
environmental groups, water users, the Warm Springs Indian Tribes,
and interested citizens.26 After initial town hall-type meetings in 1998,
the WRD convened a Work Group to develop a long-term strategy for
reconciling water supply needs with the environmental needs in the

overview.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2002) [hereinafter Overview].
20. RODNEY R. CALDWELL, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY

WATER-RESOURCES
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 97-4233, CHEMICAL STUDY OF REGIONAL GROUND-WATER FLOW

AND GROUND-WATER/SURFACE-WATER
ORPEGON (1998).

21.
22.
23.
Rules,
24.

INTERACTION IN TIlE UPPER DESCHUTES BASIN,

Seeid. at 22-30.
Id. at 3-5.
See Public Hearing Draft, supra note 2, § 690-505-0600; see also Final Proposed
supra note 3, § 690-505-0600.
MARSHALL W. GANNETT ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND-WATER

HYDROLOGY

OF

THE

UPPER

DESCHUTES

BASIN,

OREGON,

WATER

RESOURCES

INVESTIGATIONS REPORT No. 00-4162 (2001).
25. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, Final Deschutes Basin Mitigation Rules (to be
codified at OR. ADMIN. R. §§ 690-505-0600(3)-(4)), available at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/new-oars/Deschutes-ProgramMitigation.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2002) (on file with the Oregon Water Res. Dep't)

[hereinafter Final Rules].
26. See Overview, supra note 19; Oregon Water Res. Dep't, The Deschutes Ground
Water Work Group, Participants,at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/deschutes/
participants.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
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Basin.27 A Steering Committee, comprised of approximately twenty
members representing different affected interests, was chosen to
provide leadership and guidance for the Work Group."8 The Work
Group hired a neutral facilitator to assist with meeting management. 29
The Steering Committee adopted goals and operating principles to
effectuate the process." A key provision was that the Committee would
attempt to make decisions by consensus.
An Administrative
Committee comprised of the WRD Director, an environmental
representative, and a community at-large representative met regularly
with the facilitator to monitor progress and plan agendas. 3 Financial
contributions came from both public and private resources.
The Steering Committee met regularly, roughly on a monthly
basis, for nearly three years. By the end of 2000, the Work Group had
made substantial progress, but had not reached full agreement on all
aspects of the proposed recommendations for WRD. Despite this lack
of agreement, the WRD issued its own Mitigation Strategy in February
2001"4 followed by initial Draft Rules in September 2001. 3' The
proposed rules embodied key points on which the Steering Committee
had reached consensus, along with the WRD's own recommendations
on issues still in dispute.
Widespread criticism of the initial rule proposal was predictable,
based on the Steering Committee's failure to reach a consensus on
major points. The WRD received more than 100 written comments. A
revised draft of the rules, offered for public comment in the spring of
2002, generated similar controversy. Although the rulemaking process
was far from a consensus-generating model, the effort has been
instructive in identifying major policy and practical issues related to
the determination of hydraulic connection between surface and
ground water. The Work Group did reach agreement on general
principles and developed a framework for mitigation that may prove to
be a useful model.

27. See Overview, supranote 19.
28. Oregon Water Res. Dep't, The Deschutes Ground Water Work Group, Steering
Committee, at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/programs/deschutes/committee.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2002).
29. See Memorandum of Understanding for Deschutes Basin Water Management
Planning Process §§ 7.1.1, 9.1-9.5, available at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/
notices/deschutes-announce/99_0428mou.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002) (on file
with the Oregon Water Res. Dep't) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding].
30. Id. §§ 1.1 through 1.3, 2.1 through 2.9.
31. Id. § 10.1.6.
32. See Minutes, Deschutes Ground Water Steering Committee Meeting (June 29,
1999),
at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutes-sum/
97_0629.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
33. See Minutes, Deschutes Ground Water Steering Committee Meeting (Aug. 17,
1999),
at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutes-sum/
96_0817summary.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
34. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
35. See Public Hearing Draft, supra note 2.
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M. MITIGATION STRATEGY
A. MITIGATION GOALS

The Steering Committee agreed upon the following goals reflected
in the Mitigation Strategy:
i. To ensure compliance with state laws relating to Scenic
Waterway protection, water availability, and protection of
senior water rights;
ii. To Restore and enhance instream flows;
iii. To achieve long-term sustainability; and
iv. To accommodate projected water demand in the Basin in a
manner that does not compromise other goals. 6
B. KEY MITIGATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONCEPTS

The Mitigation Strategy included eleven specific standards for
evaluating mitigation proposals." The primary concept the standards
embody is that mitigation must be "wet." That is, a mitigation project
must directly replace the projected impact of a ground water use by
adding protected flow to the river. 9 Potential mitigation actions may
include: (1) retirement of existing ground water rights in trade for
new uses; (2) transfer of existing surface water rights to instream flow;
and (3) conservation to reduce consumptive use under existing
rights."
Development of new surface water storage and aquifer
recharge projects may also be possible mitigation options, but will be
subject to additional environmental scrutiny."
Under the mitigation strategy, ground water impacts are calculated
based on projected consumptive use levels.42 Mitigation is required to
replace the maximum amount of consumptive use authorized by the
new water right. 3 Where water development will occur over a period
of time, the WRD may allow phase-in mitigation measures to
correspond to the level of actual development. However, the WRD will
require full implementation of the appropriate level of mitigation
measures before water use may begin.
The application process requires mitigation plans for new ground
water rights.45
Upon approval, the WRD will incorporate the

36. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. SeeOR. REv. STAT. § 537.135 (2001); Final Rules, supra note 25, §§ 690-350-0110
through -0130.
42. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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mitigation plan into the Final Order "6 approving the new use. The
mitigation plan provisions will be conditions on the water right
permit.47
Failure to comply with the mitigation conditions will
constitute a violation of the permit, subject to enforcement action.
C. MITIGATION CREDITS AND MITIGATION BANKING

Mitigation credits and mitigation banking 4concepts
are the
innovative components of the mitigation strategy agreed to by the
Work Group and ultimately adopted by the Oregon Legislative
Assembly.
Under this procedure, any person may endorse and
execute a mitigation project not associated with a particular
application for new ground water use."
The review process and
standards will be the same as those required for mitigation plans
submitted as part of a water right application.
However, once
approved, the mitigation credit will stand alone and will not be
"attached" as part of any particular water right.5 ' The holder of the
mitigation credit may then freely assign the credit to any other party
for use within the same watershed 3
The Work Group encouraged the concept of a mitigation bank to
facilitate cooperative efforts and larger projects than would result from
a series of individual mitigation plans. The Deschutes Resources
Conservancy, a non-profit organization formed to promote watershed
restoration in the Basin, is a likely candidate to administer a mitigation
bank. Although the WRD would be involved in the process of
reviewing and approving actions for mitigation credits, it would play
no role in the development of a private market for the credits, or in
managing the mitigation bank.5
Similarly, transactions involving
mitigation credits would not require further WRD approval, so long as
the credit was attached to a new ground water use within the same
watershed."

46. See OR. REv. STAT. § 183.310(5)(b).
47. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
48. See OR. REV. STAT. § 537.720; Public Review Draft, supranote 1.
49. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
50. Act of June 28, 2001, § 2, 2001 Or. Laws 659 (enabling the Water Resources
Commission to establish rules related to water banking within the Deschutes River
Basin).
51. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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IV. MAJOR POLICY ISSUES AND POINTS OF CONTROVERSY

A. QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE MITIGATION
Early in the process, the Work Group engaged in extensive debate
over the definition of "mitigation."5 6
Specifically, environmental
groups argued for strict bucket-for-bucket replacement with wet water
as the only allowable type of mitigation. While other water users
sought more flexibility, including the opportunity to implement
upland-based watershed restoration measures, such as riparian
improvements or water quality improvements."
Although the Work Group had some interest in promoting this
type of qualitative watershed restoration measures, it reached
consensus that, initially, mitigation must consist of "wet" water. 5 The
final rules define "mitigation water" as water that is "legally protected
for instream use...." 9 In the future, the Work Group will encourage
development of a long-term watershed restoration plan for the Basin.6"
If and when such a plan is developed, the Work Group indicated a
willingness to review the issue of mitigation, and allow for
consideration of qualitative measures."
B. CANAL LINING AND PIPING

The Work Group also faced another difficult issue: whether to
include canal lining and piping projects as allowable forms of
mitigation. Most major existing irrigation diversion in the Basin
occurs through such systems." The Bureau of Reclamation estimated
up to forty six percent of annual irrigation diversions into canals are
lost to recharge leakage.6 3 "In 1994, 356,600 acre-feet ...of water
64
leaked through canal bottoms to become ground water recharge."
The Work Group recognized that canal lining and piping measures to
reduce ditch losses and conveyance requirements offered the greatest
potential for restoring summer flows in critical reaches of the
Deschutes River, which have long suffered from low flows due to

56. See Minutes, Deschutes Ground Water Steering Committee Meeting (Oct. 19,
1999),
at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutes-sum/
90_101999.summary.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
57. See id.; Report from Deschutes Groundwater Work Group No. 7 to Deschutes
Steering Committee, Water Quality/Habitat Improvement (Jan. 18, 2000), at
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutes-workgroups/
7_waterquality/96_1800.report.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
58. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
59. See Final Rules, supra note 25, § 690-505-0605(13).
60. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 29.
61. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
62. See GANNETr ETAL., supra note 24, at 23.
63. Id. at 26.
64. Id.
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senior irrigation diversions. 65
6
Oregon law expressly encourages conservation and efficiency.
The state's Conserved Water Program67 creates an incentive for
existing water rights holders by allowing a portion of the water saved
through conservation to be retained and used for additional irrigation
or other purposes. At least twenty five percent of the saved water must
be dedicated to instream flow. 68

If public grant funds pay for more

than twenty five percent of the project, then a corresponding portion
of the saved water must be used for instream purposes.
The
remainder of the saved water is available to the water right holder.70
The Work Group addressed whether such conservation measures
should qualify as mitigation for the specific purposes of offsetting the
impacts of new ground water uses." Environmental representatives
argued that such projects, though useful for restoring summer flows in
critical areas, would be "robbing Peter to pay Paul" in the context of
ground water mitigation.
They noted current stream flow data
include ground water discharges fed by leaking canals.7 3 Although
conservation measures would result in clear flow benefits during the
summer months, the projects are expected to cause a slight reduction
in surface flows, due to reduced recharge, during the winter months.74
As a result, environmental grouVs argued the conservation projects
should not qualify as mitigation. The argument faced considerable
resistance from others in the group who concluded the potential
surface flow benefits would far outweigh the impacts on ground water
recharge 6
As a policy matter, the WRD acknowledged a strong legislative
mandate, by virtue of the state's conservation policy and conserved
water statutes, to encourage efficiency improvements, notwithstanding
the potential reduction in recharge."7 However, the Final Rules do not
65. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
66. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 537.460 (2),(3) (2001).
67. Id. §§ 537.455 through .500.
68. Id. § 537.463(3).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Minutes, Deschutes Water Management Steering Committee Meeting
(March 21, 2000),
at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutessum/84_032100summary.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. See Minutes, Deschutes Water Management Steering Committee Meeting
(Aug. 29, 2000),
at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutessum/74_082900.summary.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
75. See Minutes, Deschutes Water Management Steering Committee Meeting
(Sept. 26, 2000),
at http://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutessum/73_092600.summary.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Steering
Committee Sept. 26].
76. Id.
77. See Minutes, Deschutes Water Management Steering Committee Meeting
(Nov. 27, 2000), at htttp://www.wrd.state.or.us/publication/notices/deschutes-sum/
72_112700.summary.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2002).
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offer clear policy guidance on this issue.
The rules include
conservation projects as a possible form of mitigation, but offer no
further guidance toward resolution of the legal, factual, and policy
issues raised during the Work Group debates. Under this approach,
no credit would be given for the portion of saved water dedicated to
instream flow by operation of the statutes (twenty-five percent or more
depending on the level of public grant funds). However, any portion
of the remaining amount of saved water could be converted to an
instream water right and receive full, bucket-for-bucket credit as
mitigation.
C. ENFORCEMENT
Early on, the Work Group members agreed that mitigation plans
should be incorporated into the water rights as permit conditions.79
Failure to implement a mitigation plan would be a violation of the
permit, and subject to enforcement action."
The Work Group
debated considerably over whether the specific remedy, or
enforcement action, should be curtailment of water use.81
Under the Final Rules, failure to comply with mitigation
requirements "shall result in the Department regulating the associated
ground water right.., and proposing to cancel the associated
permit." 2 However, the WRD retains discretion to determine the
appropriate method and level of enforcement, ranging from requests
for voluntary compliance to permit cancellation, including the option
to restrict water use.
V. WHAT CAN BE LEARNED?
As more information is obtained about the hydraulic connection
between ground water and surface water, the job of effective water
resource management and distribution will become more difficult.
Mitigation may offer a means of offsetting potential impacts, while
still allowing appropriate development to occur. Mitigation banking
can offer a useful tool by simplifying the process for individual
compliance with mitigation requirements and providing a mechanism
for water users to collectively fund major conservation efforts.
As new management strategies are employed, however, community
concern and skepticism may be high; appropriate strategies for
community involvement in the problem-solving process will be
needed.

78. See Final Rules, supranote 25, § 690-505-0610(3).
79. See Public Review Draft, supra note 1.
80.

Id.

81.

See Steering Committee Sept. 26, supra note 75.

82.
83.

See Final Rules, supra note 25, § 690-505-0620(3).
See OR. REv. STAT. § 537.720 (2001).
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM
In the fall of 1987, the North Poudre Irrigation Company ("North
Poudre") changed its near century-long pattern of completely shutting
down flows on the North Fork of the Poudre River and tweaked open
its gate at Halligan Dam just a bit. Prompted by Platte River Basin
struggles over the Endangered Species Act and associated conflicts
over federal demands that local water users "bypass" flows in the Gila
National Forest (New Mexico) and the Roosevelt-Arapaho National
Forest (Colorado), North Poudre implemented an agreement with
The Nature Conservancy ("Conservancy") to provide continuous
winter instream flows for purposes of enhancing fish and wildlife
habitat in Phantom Canyon, located in north central Colorado.
For fifteen years, the alliance between a traditional agricultural
commodity
production mutual irrigation
company and an
environmental organization has worked to the advantage of each, and
has also benefited one of the most pristine environments in northern
Colorado. The arrangement illustrates the role of law in catalyzing
changes in organizational behavior, the possibilities for incorporation
of environmental agendas into what has historically been exclusively
utilitarian use of Western rivers, and the methods of securing water for
year-round instream flows without recourse to litigation. How did law
catalyze this voluntary agreement to release water flows for
environmental purposes?
B. SIGNIFICANCE
Generally, people and profit-seeking organizations avoid making
investments that produce benefits that cannot be captured by the
investors to any greater extent than by non-investors, for example,
environmental amenities. The question that arises in the Phantom
Canyon episode is: why would an association of economically hardpressed irrigators, trying to keep costs of their irrigation system as low
as possible, decide to take on the added responsibilities entailed in
collaborating with the Conservancy to provide winter instream flows?
Alternatively, why should an irrigation company, operated for
collection, storage, and delivery of summer-season agricultural and
municipal water, voluntarily open its reservoir gate to supply water for
winter season instream flows in the name of fish and wildlife habitat
improvement? There was no lawsuit or court adjudication to compel
this action. In a highly contentious world of multiple and competing
uses for scarce western water, and costly, prolonged, and bitter fights
over its allocation, the Conservancy and North Poudre found a path to
re-regulating small North Fork stream flows that was cheap, relatively
quick, effective, voluntarily endorsed by all parties, and sustainable. It
is a story worth examining.
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H. BACKGROUND

A. RIVER AND CANYON
Located about thirty miles northwest of Fort Collins, Colorado,
Phantom Canyon is an environmental treasure situated immediately
downstream of Halligan Dam on the North Fork of the Cache la
Poudre River ("Poudre River") (See Figure 1). 1 As tributary to the
main stem of the Poudre River and a part of the Platte River Basin, the
North Fork is a component of one of the most intensively managed
river systems in the West.2 Phantom Canyon is a product of the
combined forces of geological uplift along the Front Range of the
Rocky Mountains and the scouring action of pulses of North Fork
waters that are most intense during spring and early summer.

Study Area

Larim
County

o r t Collins

oDenver

COLORADO

Figure 1. Location of the Study Area
Surrounded by rocky slopes carpeted in spring, summer, and
autumn with flowers and grasses, Phantom Canyon is a pristine
remnant of Colorado foothills ecology, and a reminder of preEuropean settlement conditions. Home to golden eagles, mountain

1. Colo. Dep't of Pub. Health & Env't, Total Maximum Daily Load Assessment,
Sediment, North Fork Cache La PoudreRiver, Segment 7, at 1 (March 15, 2002) [hereinafter

TMDL], athttp://www.cdphe.state.co.us/wq/Assessment/TMDL/pdf/tmdl/HalliganRes-sedi.pdf.
2. See LEO EISEL & J. DAVID AIKEN, PLATrE RIVER BASIN STUDY: REPORT TO THE
WESTERN WATER PoucY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION 5-17 (1997). This study reviews

the complexity in managing the Platte River Basin, of which the North Fork is part. See
generally ELLEN E. WOHL, VIRTUAL RIVERS: LESSONS FROM THE MOUNTAIN RIVERS OF THE
COLORADO FRONTRANGE ch. 3 (2001).
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lions, bobcats, elk, deer, and myriad smaller mammals and birds,
Phantom Canyon also gives life to native plants unique to the foothills.
The canyon's grassy hilltops, steep slopes, and deep-pooled river
bottom make up a complete ecosystem. Over thousands of years, the
river has gouged holes as deep as twenty-five feet into bedrock granite
that constitutes channel substrate, thus providing habitat for native
and introduced fish species. This mix sustains a blue ribbon trout
fishery, uncounted species of small fish, and could again potentially
sustain native cutthroat trout.3
Bird-watchers enjoy displays by
songbirds, as well as birds of prey. The six-mile stretch of the North
Fork, that has done so much to slowly shape this patch of landscape, is
essentially the only untouched reach of river and terrestrial habitat
along the foothills of Colorado's Front Range.4
The North Fork of the Poudre River originates in the snowmelt of
the Laramie Mountains, a southern extension of the Medicine Bow
Range. It is temporarily bottled up at Halligan Reservoir, and then
released into North Poudre's irrigation network during summer, while
residual flows move though Phantom Canyon and are once more
stilled in the City of Greeley's Seaman Reservoir.' From Seaman
Reservoir, flows are released to the main Poudre River a few miles
above the point where the main channel emerges on the high plains. 6
The Poudre River begins in countless rivulets above Milner Pass
(10,758' elevation) at the Continental Divide, then wends its way
through the rippled Front Range landscape to Fort Collins, and
proceeds past Windsor to its mouth on the South Platte, just east of
Greeley.

3. WOHL, supra note 2, at 26-28; The Nature Conservancy, Phantom Canyon Preserve,
at
http://nature.org/wherewework/northamerica/states/colorado/preserves/
art526.html [hereinafter Phantom Canyon Preserve].
4. Phantom Canyon Preserve, supra note 3.
5. HowARD E. EVANS & MARY A. EvANs, CACHE LA POUDRE: THE NATURAL HISTORY
OF A ROcKY MOUNTAIN RIVER 150-54 (1991).
6. See id. at 154; ROBERT G. HEMPHILL, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., IRRIGATION IN
NORTHERN COLORADO, BULLETIN No. 1026, at 2 (1922) [hereinafter USDA BULLETIN
No. 1026].
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Figure 2. Halligan Dam and Reservoir and Phantom Canyon Preserve,
Northern Colorado.
The Poudre River drains more than 1,850 square miles of
watershed mostly in north-central Colorado, but also includes a small
portion extending into southern Wyoming The Poudre River was the
first river in Colorado to be added to the National Wild and Scenic
River System.
That distinction, combined with the Conservancy's
commitment to preserving Phantom Canyon on the North Fork, has
inspired appreciation for both the environmental and the utilitarian
qualities of the River.
Topography within the Poudre River watershed is highly varied,
ranging in elevation from 14,000 feet to 5,000 feet.9 Precipitation in
the watershed averages less than fifteen inches annually, and, at its
extremes, has ranged from less than seven to greater than twenty-five
inches within a ten-year period.'0 The majority of precipitation occurs
in winter and early spring in the form of snow." Late summer
thunderstorms often fall with such intensity that infiltration on thin
soils and steep slopes is minimal compared to runoff.
The Poudre River's hydrologic cycles are typical of Rocky
7.
6, at 2.
8.
U.S.C.
9.

EVANs & EvANs, supra note 5, at 3, 37-39; USDA BULLETIN No. 1026, supra note

Act of October 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99, 100 Stat. 3330, 3330-32 (codified at 16
§ 1276(31) (2000)); EvANs & EvANs, supra note 5, at 231.
WOHL, supra note 2, at 4-5.
10. ARTHUR MAASS & RAYMOND L. ANDERSON.... AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOIcE:
CONFLICT, GROWTH ANDJUSTIE INARID ENVIRONMENTS 275 (1978).
11. Id.
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Mountain streams. The river has relatively low flows throughout the
year, except for high run-off generated by late-spring snowmelt." Peak
run-off flow typically occurs early to mid-June."3 However, spring rains
can alter peak flow, and low snowfall1 4has the capacity to reduce the
total volume of water in the watershed.
Poudre River users work the river hard. Over twenty irrigation
companies and municipalities divert water for agriculture, urban, and
industrial uses from the Poudre River and over one hundred irrigation
companies do so in the South Platte-Poudre River Basin. 5 Typical
Poudre main stem flows are in the range of 400 cubic feet per second
("cfs"), but the stream serves priorities amounting to over 4,000 cfs.' 6
The earliest adjudicated legal right on the Poudre River is dated June
1, 1861." Subsequent ditches and reservoirs have diverted under a
priority system organized on the principle of "first in time, first in
right," which is designed to protect those who had invested in their
communities from water predation by the latecomer. 8 As the river
rises, the flows accommodate more increasingly junior diverters.
Then, as flow volumes diminish, the water commissioner "calls out"
these junior diverters."9 Because flows of the Poudre River are highly
variable and generally inadequate to fulfill demands, users have
constructed reservoirs to capture winter flows and peak flows of late
spring and early summer.' ° Stored water is then released2 in summer
and early fall to supplement meager hot-season river flows.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM

Phantom Canyon is situated immediately below North Poudre's
Halligan Reservoir.2 2 Halligan Reservoir has been an essential element
in providing water security to the shareholders of North Poudre, and
the company has a legal right to impound water to the capacity of
Halligan Reservoir (6,428 acre-feet) between November 1 and March
31.' 3 This results in an essentially dry riverbed below the dam for
much of the winter season. 4 With the coming of each spring, water
released from Halligan Reservoir gushes out of a gate at the bottom of
the dam face into a stretch of the North Fork of the Poudre River that
extends through Phantom Canyon. 5 In the lower reach of the
12. Id. at 275.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 275, 281.
15.

MAASS & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 284.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

281 & f.7.3.
296 tbl.7.4.
293-99.
295.
MAASS & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 291.
Id. at 282-83, 297-98.
EvANs & EvANs, supra note 5, at 150.
TMDL, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
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Canyon, North Poudre diverts most flows from the river into a tunnel
that carries the water northeast to the highest, northernmost lands
irrigated by the company.16 Residual flows, depending on river and
storage conditions, fill Milton Seaman Reservoir.
Since completion of construction in 1910, the gate at Halligan
Reservoir was closed each fall at the conclusion of irrigation season in
anticipation of reservoir filling by small winter flows, spring snowmelt,
and rain.28 The North Fork river channel below the dam was thereby
denied river flow from November through the end of March.2 9 Fish
survived in the stretch below the dam by finding sufficiently deep
water in granite river bottom holes that were periodically and
temporarily re-connected by local precipitation and small trickles
produced by winter canyon snowmelt.3 °- The river management
solution for irrigators tended to be a problem for maintenance of fish
and other biotic habitat in the canyon that required winter freshening
flows that would link river bottom holes and be a source of sustenance
for flora and fauna.
C. NORTH POUDRE IRRIGATION COMPANY

Individuals undertaking collective action to provide themselves
with an irrigation ditch and management for their common property
may unite to form a company.3 ' Incorporated or not, these non-profit
organizations are known as mutual companies. 32 Historically in
western states, when a group of individuals aggregated themselves into
a mutual company, they pooled what had been separate water rights,
and were issued shares of company stock proportional to what each
had originally brought to the organization.33 Unlike private profit
seeking corporations that reward their investors with promise of cash
dividends, mutual companies offer non-cash dividends in the form of
at the right time, place, and in
controlled water deliveries-volumes
34
the proper amount.

North Poudre is an incorporated mutual company that presently
services approximately 30,800 acres of farmland through 212 miles of
canal and sixteen reservoirs. It is a non-profit, locally controlled
association operated on behalf of slightly more than 600 shareholders
The
representing agriculture, municipalities, and industry. 35
26. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, in Fort Collins, Colo.
(March 24, 1998).
27. Id.; see also Water Resources, City of Greeley, Water Resources History, at

www.ci.greeley.co.us; TMDL, supra note 1, at 10.
28. TMDL, supranote 1, at 3-4.
29. Id.
30.

Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supra note 26.

31. GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAw 282 (James N. Corbridge
Jr. & Teresa A. Rice eds, 1999).
32. Id.; WELLS A. HUTCHINS, MUTUAL IRRIGATION COMPANIES 4-5 (1929).
33. See HUTCHINS, supra note 32, at 4-5.

34. Id.
35.

See THE NORTH POUDRE IRRIGATION Co., ANNUAL

REPORT

3, 10

(2001)
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command area of North Poudre is comprised of bench lands north
and east of Fort Collins extending into Weld County.
When organized into its present form in the early twentieth
century, North Poudre issued 10,000 shares of stock.3 6 Each share
entitled its owner to draw 1/10,000th of the water available in a given
year, and assessed its owner 1/10,000th of the cost of running the
company. Since 1912, the company has delivered, on average, more
than four acre-feet-per-share annually (see Table 1)."
Year

Assessment per Share

Acre Foot per

Cost per Acre Foot

($)

Share

M$*

1912

5.00

3.1

1.61

1920

11.00

3.0

3.69

1930

8.25

3.1

2.66

1940

7.25

0.8

9.60

1950

12.00

1.8

6.66

1960

14.50

5.3

2.73

1970

20.00

7.0

2.86

1980

55.00

4.7

11.70

1985

100.00

11.5

11.11

1990

75.00

4.5

16.74

1995

75.00

3.9

19.23

1999

85.00

4.0

21.20

2000

50.00

4.6

10.96

2001

60.00

4.0

15.08

Average Annual Acre Feet per
Share

4.4

(Source: NPIC Annual Reports 1986; 2001)
*Actual dollars, not adjusted for inflation.
Table 1. Summary of costs and deliveries of water shares, North Poudre
Irrigation Company
Shareholders' annual assessments have covered the operational
costs of delivering water.
Operational costs have included
transporting, storing, and delivering water, supporting a small staff,
[hereinafter YEAR ANNUAL REPORT].
36. USDA BULLETIN No. 1026, supra note 6, at 39.
37. 1986
35, at 5.

ANNUAL REPORT, supra note

35, at 10-11; 2001

ANNuAL REPORT, supra note
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and constructing and maintaining facilities."
North Poudre is
operated by a five person, member-elected volunteer board of
directors.
The board employs a full-time operations manager to
oversee staff (see Figure 3). The operations manager and staff are
the only personnel receiving wages. Shareholders control North
Poudre by electing board members and voting their shares on policy
matters.

.__tI Shareholders/Water Users I

Figure 3. Organizational chart of North Poudre Irrigation Company.
One share of North Poudre has yielded variable volumes of water
depending on availability in the watershed and capacity to capture
flows (see Table 1). In the course of a typical water year, board
members assess the moisture content of watershed snow packs,
compare those amounts to previous records, and estimate spring
runoff." They then allocate water volumes per share, usually starting
conservatively in early spring and, as precipitation and run-off
conditions become better known with passage of time, additional acrefeet-per-share are added as conditions warrant.42 Each member of the

38.

2001

ANNUAL REPORT,

supra note 35, at 12-18.

39. See id. at 1.
40. Id.
41. MAASS & ANDERSON, supra note 10, at 299-300.
42.

Id.
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organization benefits proportionally to the number of shares owned in
wet years, and each loses proportionally in times of drought.
Halligan Dam (see Figure 2) captures water each winter season by
storage right.43 During storage season, November 1 to March 31,
North Poudre may move Halligan water to plains reservoirs or to fields
as early as February or March." It may also run as much water as
possible out of Halligan Reservoir at the end of the irrigation season to
stockpile water in its plains reservoirs over the course of the winter.5
An acre-foot of water moved to an alternate plains reservoir leaves an
acre-foot of space that good winter precipitation conditions can fill.
After draining Halligan as low as possible, the gate closes, and virtually
all river flow remains in the reservoir unless winter and spring flows
are so abundant that the reservoir "spills" before the new irrigation
season. Small amounts of water seep through or around the gates, but
essentially the river is dry below the dam from the end of October to
the moment a spill occurs or when North Poudre begins moving water
into its own supply canal and then also
commences water delivery to
46
the City of Greeley's Seaman Reservoir.
Originally, agricultural water users primarily owned North Poudre,
and it served such users. However, by 2001, the City of Fort Collins
owned more than fifty percent of the company's shares.47 In 1999, an
independent auditor reported that North Poudre delivered twentyfour percent of its supply to municipalities.4 8 Over half of the shares of
water are owned by Fort Collins; this city has leased its water shares
back to agriculturalists on a year-to-year basis waiting for the time when
the city will dedicate the shares to municipal needs. 9 In addition, Fort
Collins holds an option to purchase Halligan Reservoir as a hedge
against urban growth demands."
D. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY

Since incorporation in 1951, the Conservancy has operated
domestically and internationally to preserve natural areas, plants,
animals, natural communities, open space, and unique natural

43. TMDL, supra note 1, at 3-4; see USDA BULLETIN No. 1026, supra note 6, at 70.
44. TMDL, supra note 1, at 3-4.

45. Id. at 3.
46. Interview with Representative, The North Poudre Irrigation Company, Fort
Collins, Colo. (April 8,1999).
47. TMDL, supra note 1, at 3; the City of Fort Collins represents that it acquires
Colorado Big Thompson water through its 3,550 shares of North Poudre. City of Fort

Collins, Fort Collins Water Supplies, at www.ci.ft-collins.co.us/water/water-supplies.php.
48. 1999 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 6.
49. Interview with Representative, The North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra
note 46.

50. David Persons, City Pursuing Storage Upgrade at Halligan Site, THE COLORADOAN,
May 30, 2001, http://www.reclaimfc.org/news/policy/article-492.html; Mary Benanti,
Rapid Growth Complicates Plans, THE COLORADoAN,
April
1, 2001,
http://www.coloradoannews.com/census/kendall_0401 .html.
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features not otherwise protected."
The Conservancy has worked
toward its goal by developing local ties and knowledge and by using
resources already in place in the area of concern through conservation
easements, outright land purchase, and litigation avoidance. The
organization has striven to create partnerships with local, regional,
state, and federal agencies.52 It frequently has sold acquired areas to
the Bureau of Land Management, the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service"), and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") for continued protection under a Conservancy-assisted
management plan (see Table 2). 3 The Conservancy has, "through
ownership, conservation easements, and reselling land to public
agencies.... preserved 11.6 million acres in the United States."5 4 As
the country's largest conservation organization, and one of the largest
private landowners in the United States, the Conservancy now owns 1.3
million acres. 5 The Conservancy has 1.1 million members and
56
contributors and benefits from corporate donations and support. 7
The Conservancy reports annual revenues of as much as $780 million.
Percent of All
TNC-protected
Acres

Protection Strategy and Ownership

10

TNC-owned nature preserves

20

TNC leased or managed

40

Gift, sale, or assistance to local, state, or federal
government entities

15

Public land under enhanced conservation
management

7.5

Private ownership (other than TNC), protected
through permanently-conveyed development rights

7.5

Other conservation organizations and universities

Table 2. Strategic ownership of land within the United States protected by

The Nature Conservancy. Source: Weeks, 1997: 14-15.

51.

W. WILLIAM WEEKS, BEYOND THE ARK: TOOLS FOR AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO

CONSERVATION 14 (1997).
52. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, Boulder, Colo. (March
24, 2000).
53. WEEKS, supra note 51, at 14-15.
54. Jon Margolis, Remembering an Establishment Revolutionary, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS,
Sept. 11, 2000, at 16.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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"Greener" groups have criticized the Conservancy for having close
relationships with government agencies, developers, and ranchers
claiming that the Conservancy has "ultimately... more in common
with... developers" than environmentalists." Ranching, logging, and
development interests own much of the land the Conservancy sees as
needing protection. 9 These practical environmentalists have been
willing to bargain with commodity producer representatives to
incorporate their resource use activities within environmentally
sustainable management plans.0
One director stated, "Our
organizational ethic is pragmatic and solution-oriented. We want to
work with every community of people who live in rural areas. The
long-term conservation of areas depends on the people that live in and
around them."'"
Initially, the Conservancy concentrated on protecting relatively
small areas that were sustaining particularly rare or endangered
species. 2 More recently, however, the focus shifted to "protect more
biodiversity more securely" and to advance biodiversity objectives by
pursuing "large conservation projects.., to sustain ecological
processes." 3 This push to protect larger areas, called the "Last Great
Places Campaign," has envisioned the protection of approximately
thirty percent of the land that the Conservancy
designated as
64
"important areas" within the United States.
After securing tracts of land, the Conservancy formulates sciencebased management plans attempting to preserve biodiversity through
an ecosystem approach. 65 The intent is to ensure that, whether or not
the property continues under Conservancy ownership, the supervising
organization would manage the acquired land under an agreed-upon
plan."
A prominent characteristic of the "Last Great Places
Campaign" has been the incorporation of cooperative planning for
human economic needs along with continued management for
sustained biodiversity."
The Conservancy promotes eco-tourism
opportunities along with other creative and ecologically compatible
economic development."
In the mid 1980s, the Colorado chapter of the Conservancy
acquired 1,700 acres locally known as Phantom Canyon Ranch. 69 The
property consisted of a steep-sided canyon, which was isolated,
roadless, and verdant. In eroded channel bottom pools as deep as
58. Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

WEEKS, supra note 51, at 14-15.
Id.
Margolis, supra note 54, at 16.
WEEKS, supra note 51, at 4.
1I
Margolis, supranote 54, at 32.
WEEKS, supra note 51, at 34.
Id. at 34-39.
Id. at 101-29.

68.
69.

Id.
Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supra note 26.
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twenty-five feet, large rainbow and brown trout could flourish given
essential winter flows in what had the potential to become blue-ribbon
habitat. °
The canyon offered habitat of the highest quality for many Front
Range species of wildlife that have lost territory under the heavy
footprint of human settlement on the eastern slopes of Colorado.
Ecologically, the canyon represented an area of transition - an ecotone
- within which the dryland grasses of the eastern plains intermingled
with the lower elevation forests of the Rocky Mountains to the west.
Animal and plant species have typically been abundant in viable
ecotones. Viewed as a precious remnant of geologic time, with
meadow areas interspersed with woodlands punctuated by rocky outcroppings and laced by the river, Phantom Canyon Ranch provided a
glimpse of the Front Range ecosystem as it existed before colonization
and development by European settlers.7'

Figure 4. Foothills ecosystem, Phantom Canyon.

70. Id.
71. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, Fort Collins, Colo.
(February 4, 2000).
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Figure 5. Phantom Canyon mouth.

III. LAW AS CATALYST: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THREAT
A. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERAL RESERVED RIGHTS
DOCTRINE

Conflicts over water, as between federal environmental agendas
and water users organized under state appropriation doctrines, have
been simmering for decades all over the west. By the late 1960s and72
1970s, when Congress passed its spate of environmental legislation
specifically directing federal agencies to consider the impacts of their
actions upon the environment and to advance environmental
considerations, the question of federal acceptance of state water
adjudications became sharply posed. 73 The federal government had
two options to control and re-direct water policy in accordance with
the 1970s environmental agendas. The government could either work
within the purview of state appropriation doctrines, or invoke the
federal reserved rights doctrine for water uses connected with federal
72. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a
(2000); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000); National Forest
Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (2000).
73. See DAVID M. GILULAN & THOMAS C. BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION:
SEEKING A BALANcE IN WESTERN WATER USE 177-182 (1997); Janet C. Neuman &
Michael C. Blumm, Waterfor NationalForests: the Bypass Flow Report and the GreatDivide in
Western Water Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 6-11 (1999).
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reservations. In the context of the Poudre River, two struggles-one in
New Mexico and the other regarding Poudre River mountain
reservoirs on the Roosevelt-Arapaho National Forest-were pivotal.74
In the wake of the Congressional passage of the Endangered
Species Act ("ESA"), the FWS sought ways to implement this new
congressional mandate.75 In 1978, among its many efforts, the FWS
designated a fifty-one mile section of the Platte River in central
Nebraska, from Lexington to Chapman, as habitat critical to the
survival of the whooping crane, a species listed as endangered under
the ESA.7 ' The FWS found that the water users' diversions and
impoundments in the Platte River Basin clearly contributed to the
degradation of whooping crane habitat in central Nebraska. 7 The
water users had located many of these facilities on federal land within
the Platte River Basin and many had been the beneficiaries of federal
investment. 78 Water users in a federal nexus operated under permits
from appropriate federal agencies, such as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and the Forest Service.79 Following passage of
the ESA, any water facility permit renewal would necessarily involve
federal permitting agency review which, in consultation with the FWS,
would determine whether the permitted activity adversely impacted
any species listed under the Act. °o
The Poudre River is tributary to the Platte River main stem via
Colorado's South Platte River. A segment of the Platte River main
stem served as designated critical crane habitat." As a result, ESA
jurisdiction could extend to the mountain reservoirs within the
Roosevelt-Arapaho National Forest that impounded Poudre River
water, despite the fact that the ESA listed no endangered species in
eastern Colorado. 2 Seeing that the ESA, in respect to Nebraska
whooping crane habitat, could affect the Poudre River water
impoundments, North Poudre watched nervously, contemplating how
the ESA's reach might extend to Halligan Dam based on impacts to
wildlife in Phantom Canyon. 3

74. For a discussion on both examples, see generally GILLiLAN & THOMAS, supranote
73 and Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73.
75. See generallyJohn Echeverria, No Success Like Failure: The Platte River Collaborative
Watershed Planning Process, 25 WM. & MARY ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REv. 559 (2001)
(detailing efforts to integrate critical habitat concerns raised by the ESA into the Platte
River watershed planning process).
76. Id. at 563, 593.
77. Id. at 566-67, 569.
78. See generally EISEL & AIKEN, supra note 2, at 7-23 (discussing federal licensing of
Kingsley Dam on the North Platte River, and water projects at Lake McConaughy,
Lake Tamarack, and Pathfinder Reservoir).
79. See id. at 18-21.
80. Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 2, 7-11.
83. Interview with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra note
46.
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B. NEW MEXICO, THE GILA, AND RIo MIMBRES
In 1978, New Mexico's Gila National Forest became the focus of an
important volley in state and federal discourse pertaining to regulating
river flows designed to protect wildlife species and habitat.84 The New
Mexico case contemplated the question of federal reserved water rights
on federal lands.85 Reserved water rights were asserted at the time a
federal agency reserved appurtenant land rights, with a priority date
based on the date of reservation. 6 The Winters Doctrine87 limited
reserved water rights to the water quantit y necessary to accomplish the
federal purpose for the reservation.
However, in Arizona v.
Califorma,8 9 the Supreme Court expanded the Winters Doctrine to
apply not only to Native American Reservations, but also to all federal
reserved lands. 0 In Arizona, the Court upheld the federal agencies'
claims to water for Lake Mead Natural Recreation Area, Havasu Lake
National Wildlife Refuge, and the Gila National Forest." Subsequent
to this ruling, in the late 1970s, the Forest Service, with support from
the FWS, attempted to establish a reserved right for the Mimbres River
in the Gila National Forest.92 Federal agencies were, therefore, on the
march toward securing expanded instream flows by employing the
federal reserved rights doctrine.9
Following the 1963 decision in Arizona, several western states
initiated general adjudications to clarify and settle issues raised by
aggressive use of the reserved rights doctrine. 9 These states fought to
ensure that reserved rights issues would be adjudicated in state rather
than federal courts, and brought cases designed to narrow the
application of Arizona.95 In the Gila-Rio Mimbres adjudication, the
Forest Service claimed federal reserved rights based on Congress's
implied reservation of water that took place when it passed the
Creative Act of 1891 and the Organic Administration Act of 1897. 96 In
New Mexico, the Forest Service argued that instream flows were
compatible with the purposes of the Creative and Organic Acts and

84. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
85. Id. at 698.
86. GrLuLAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at 180.
87. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The Winters case considered
water rights for an Indian reservation in Montana. For over fifty years, courts only
considered reserved water rights in Indian water rights situations. The doctrine aptly
received its name from the Winters case.
88.

SeeArizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92.

United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 697-98 (1978).

93. For a discussion on the Forest Service action to secure instream flows see
GILLiLAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at 187-92.
94. Id. at 187; see also Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 6-8.
95. GILLIAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at 187; Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at
7-8.
96.

United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705-08.
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consistent with the reserved rights doctrine as established in Winters."
The special master appointed to the case found that water in the
national forest was, in fact, used for the purposes claimed by the Forest
Service and such uses fell under the scope of the reserved rights
doctrine. 98 However, the New Mexico District Court rejected the
findings of the special master, as did the New Mexico Supreme Court.99
The New Mexico Supreme Court held the Forest Service could not
claim federal reserved water rights for instream purposes.9 0 The
United States Supreme Court subsequently upheld that ruling."0 The
Court looked closely at the Organic Administration Act, chose to
construe its language narrowly, and concluded in a 5-4 split decision
that Congress only intended to establish national forests for the
purpose of improving and protecting those forests within their
boundaries, furnishing continuous supplies of timber, and securing
favorable water flow conditions for downstream users.10
In response to what was a setback for the federal position, the
Forest Service advanced other rationales for making water claims
under the federal reserved rights doctrine. New arguments centered
on water uses for fire fighting, fire protection, and flood, soil and
erosion control.0 Most especially, the agency developed an argument
for instream flows based on the primary purpose of watershed
protection and fluvial geomorphology. °4
Instream flows were
necessary, in this modified line of argument, to transport sediment
downstream and to maintain viable meandering stream channels
consisting of successive oxbow loops in order to best sustain
biologically diverse communities. 0 5 Essentially, enhanced stream flows
were needed for channel maintenance.
C. COLORADO-MOUNTAIN RESERVOIRS ON THE CACHE LA POUDRE

The Forest Service next tried to make claims on water under the
reserved rights doctrine in Colorado, where the agency had an
opportunity to review permits for storage reservoirs on the upper
reaches of the Poudre River. 6 The Cities of Greeley and Fort Collins
and the Water Supply and Storage Company, a mutual irrigation
association, owned reservoirs on the Roosevelt-Arapaho National
Forest and had permits allowing them to operate the reservoirs. These
permits came up for renewal in 1991.10' In the years leading up to the
97. GiLLLAN &BROWN, supranote 73, at 187-89; Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73,
at 8.
98. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 703-04.
99. Id. at 704.
100.

Id. at 704-05.

101. Id. at 718.
102. Id.
103. GILLLAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at 189.
104. Id. at 190.
105.

SeeNeuman &Blumm, supra note 73, at 10.

106. See GILLLAN &BROWN, supra note 73, at 191.
107. Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 11.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

renewal decision, the Forest Service was in the process of revising its
Roosevelt-Arapaho National Forest Plan.' 8 As part of that process, the
Forest Service signaled its intention to make access permits conditional
on the imposition of bypass flows in order to enhance the aquatic
environment and protect habitat for vulnerable species." 9 Forest
managers proposed minimum flows that would "bypass diversion
structures and remain in-stream,"" ° ensuring adequate water to protect
aquatic habitat. The FWS issued a biological opinion that enumerated
a variety of species dependent upon the flows of the Poudre River
headwaters, including local onsite species and species found far
downstream in the Nebraska reaches of the Platte River."' The list of
species dependent upon central Nebraska Platte River habitat over the
years had grown to include whooping cranes, piping plovers, least
terns, plant species, and the pallid sturgeon.112
Permit holders were concerned that the required bypass flows
would curtail their legal impoundment rights and threaten their ability
to capture and use their allotted amounts of water." 3 Thus, the bypass
flow requirements had the capacity to reduce the permitees' historic
impoundment yields."' Because state law bases water rights on historic
use, any loss to bypass of flows would be irreversible. It was critical to
preserve historic yields and the state appropriation doctrine from what
water users viewed as predatory federal policy. Yet, the Forest Service
and FWS viewed bypass flows as extremely desirable because they
promised to enhance habitat by retaining minimum flows in natural
watercourses.
Although the Poudre River bypass flow case would not get
underway in Colorado's Division 1 Water Court until early 1991, by the
mid-1980s Colorado water users had been set on edge by events
pertaining to New Mexico's Gila National Forest." 6 Furthermore,

108. Id.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.at5n.5.
111. Letter from Wilber N. Ladd, Jr., Regional Director of the Fish & Wildlife
Service, U.S. Dep't of Interior, to Elizabeth Estill, Regional Forester of the Rocky
Mountain Region, U.S. Forest Service, Final Biological Opinion for Impacts to
Federally Listed Endangered and Threatened Species in Colorado and Nebraska for
the Forest Service's Action for Authorization of a Special Use Permit to the City of
Greeley for Peterson Reservoir, at 1 (June 2, 1994) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Ladd Opinion].
112. Id. at 4-16.
113. Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 11-13.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Williams v. Midway Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n, 938 P.2d 515, 522 (Colo.
1997).
116. See NANCY GORDON, SUMMARY OF TEcHcNICAL TESTIMONY IN THE COLORADO WATER
DMVISbON 1 TRIAL, USDA FOREST SERVICE GEN. TECH. REP. RM-GTR-270, at 136 (1995);
see generally Thomas K. Snodgrass, Comment, Bypass Flow Requirements and the Question of
Forest Service Authority, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 641 (1999) (detailing the history of the
Roosevelt-Arapahoe controversy). Both of the above sources are excellent resources
accounting the United States v. Colorado opinion, W-8439-76 (Colo. Dist. Water Div. 1
Feb. 12, 1993).
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Colorado water users could clearly see the threat building by the
Forest Service's unfolding of "bypass flow" plans regarding the
Roosevelt-Arapaho."'
A brief summary of the Division 1 trial illustrates the mounting
uncertainty regarding the outcome of looming state-federal
confrontation in Colorado, one in which the Forest Service filed for
instream flows based upon interpretation of the Organic Act."'8 Such
uncertainty provided an incentive for North Poudre leaders to seek
sanctuary by creating conditions under which they could release small
winter flows into Phantom Canyon without damaging the interests of
its shareholders or giving credence to the federal "bypass" concept.
Beginning in early 1991 and concluding in 1992, the United States
Department of Justice, the Colorado Attorney General's Office, and
the lawyers representing local water users argued complex issues of law
and empirical fact surrounding federal claims of supremacy, as
compared to those of state and local water administration, regarding
the Forest Service's claim of reserved rights." 9
In what some have considered as the most important water case on
matters of federal reserved rights doctrine since United States v. New
Mexico,'" the reserved rights case' brought by the Forest Service in
Colorado Water Division 1, involving the Poudre and Platte Rivers,
became high drama that drew the interest of water users and
environmentalists nationwide.' 22 The trial was a high stakes affair
complete with droves of expert witnesses and considerable press
coverage. "Marked by extensive legal maneuvering [and technical
discussion, the proceedings became an] ... extended seminar on
principles of fluvial geomorphology and associated sciences," complete
with field trips.'
State advocates argued that the federal position on
water flow needs for critical habitat in Nebraska and biotic habitat
below mountain dams and reservoirs was an inappropriate preemption
of state water law.' 24 Additionally, they claimed that federal action
interfered with water allocation under state compacts, and Congress
never intended to interfere with state rights and obligations in the
manner advanced by the Forest Service. 5
The water court found that the Forest Service claims were not
necessary to fulfill the primary purpose of national forests and, in fact,
worked against fulfilling those purposes.
It decided the federal
117. See generally Snodgrass, supra note 116, at 645-53.
118. See Gordon, supranote 116, at 136 for chronology of the case.
119. GORDON, supranote 116, at i-ii.
120. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
121. United States v. Colorado, W-8439-76 (Colo. Dist. Water Div. 1 Feb. 12 1993).
122. GORDON, supranote 116, at i; GnuLAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at 191.
123. GILLAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at 191. See United States v. Colorado, W8439-76 at 15-18, 21-23, for a discussion on the field trips.
124. See generally Gordon, supra note 116, at 3, 9, 11-15 (summarizing historical and
policy arguments of federal and state advocates).
125. Id. at 8-15.
126. United States v. Colorado, W-8439-76 at 32.
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government should be allowed an opportunity to prove the necessity
of instream flows to secure favorable forest conditions; however, the
Forest Service did not meet that bar in this case." 7 The court also
ruled that the original intent of the Organic Act was to encourage
economic and social growth in the arid West by enhancing quantity
and quality of water available to appropriators, and
not to reduce
128
consumption of water by protecting instream flows.
Water users had again dodged the federal reserved rights bullet,
but would clearly have to seek ways to defuse the dangerous "no-holds
barred" western water wars that had ensnared them. The challenge yet
to be met was finding some way to accommodate environmental
agendas without using any part of federal reserved rights doctrine, or
betraying rights, priorities, and project yields under the state
appropriation doctrine.
D. THE CACHE LA POUDRE-QUIET DEFENSIVE CHANGE

In the mid-1980s, when North Poudre negotiated with the
Conservancy for releasing winter flows into Phantom Canyon, courts
had yet to determine the outcomes of the looming struggle over
mountain reservoirs. However, it seemed clear that when defeated in
New Mexico's Gila case," 9 the federal agencies would not, or could
not, abandon their quest for water under federal reserved rights
doctrine given their legal mandates. Individual court cases could be
won, New Mexico's Gila example 30 was heartening to water users. Yet,
there were always other opportunities for the Forest Service and FWS
to again take up their case. The Poudre River bypass flow case was
already looming.'' Each trial would be an expensive gamble, and such
expenses could easily escalate beyond a city's capacity or a non-profit
mutual company's modest means. Water users feared where an openended succession of legal battles might lead them. Something had to
be done to assuage this conflict between federal environmental
agendas and state water users trying to preserve their project yields and
the integrity of state prior appropriation doctrine. The Poudre River
Basin water users were on the cusp of taking precedent-setting steps
regarding the provision of instream flows. Two stories would unfold one on the main stem, a second on the North Fork.
On the main stem, events following the Division 1 water court
struggle deserve only brief mention. They update the on-going legal
and policy discourse centered on an innovative instream flow plan
addressing Forest Service environmental agendas without creating
legal precedent for bypass flows. The very word "bypass" had become
anathema to water users. In March of 1995, the City of Greeley, the
City of Fort Collins, and the Water Supply and Storage Company
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 24-30.
See id. at 1-4.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
Id.
See Gordon, supra note 116, at 136.
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signed a memorandum of understanding entitled "Joint Operations
Plan" ('JOP").132 Water users would release winter flows for fish and
wildlife habitat purposes, but these releases would be a product of the
JOP voluntary arrangement undertaken by water users.
This
agreement concluded more than five years of negotiations prompted
by the on-going threat of future litigation over winter flows
to
"enhance the aquatic environment of the Cache la Poudre River." 133
To serve Forest Service habitat needs, all signing parties agreed to
implement a set of water exchanges that would permit them
collaboratively to release ten cubic feet per second into the Poudre
River bottom throughout the winter months, benefiting a sixty-mile
stretch of the river.134 Experienced water managers viewed one
reservoir, in particular, as potentially difficult and dangerous to
operate under winter conditions.13 Therefore, the City of Fort Collins
agreed to supply the released winter water on the condition that the
other contributing parties repay it during summer season when Fort
Collins demand was at its peak. 36 The City of Greeley, farthest
downstream and virtually at the mouth of the Poudre, could place
released winter flows to beneficial use for its domestic needs and
thereby protect the water priorities of the three entities under
Colorado law.'37
Since cities consumptively use very little water in winter months,
virtually all their diversion would return to.the river. During late fall,
winter, and early spring months, demand of intervening agricultural
users would be non-existent and municipal demands mostly nonconsumptive.
Therefore, large fractions of the winter instream
releases would move though the system to central Nebraska and, along
the way, contribute to base flows upon which spring flood pulses could
ride for maximum positive impact on critical habitat. Each water user
contributed proportionately to the winter flows, and releases were
coordinated in a manner to protect each entitlement. '3
Utilizing the exchanges, there has been virtually no loss of project
yield to any party, and original users have retained their rights and
priorities. The effect of the arrangement has been to provide the
main stem of the Poudre River with winter instream flows without
legally accepting any part of federal reserved rights doctrine. The
legal language of federal bypass flows was assiduously avoided.

132. Joint Operations Plan Memorandum of Understanding 1 (March 22, 1995)
[hereinafterJoint Operations Plan] (On file with the Colorado State Engineer's Office
in Denver, CO); see also Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 12-13. As mentioned in
the text, parties to the JOP are the City of Greeley, City of Fort Collins, and Water
Supply and Storage Company.
133. Joint Operations Plan, supra note 134, at 1.
134. See id.
135. Interview with Representative, State Engineer's Office, Fort Collins, Colo.
(March 7, 2000).
136. SeeJoint Operations Plan, supra note 132, at 2.
137. See id. at 1.
138. Id.
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By June 1994 the FWS, after having consulted with the Forest
Service on the high mountain reservoirs, produced a biological
assessment of Poudre River water use facilities and their projected
negative impact on endangered and threatened species habitat in
central Nebraska."9 The opinion identified two distinct environmental
problems: (1) the negative impacts of reservoirs on aquatic habitat
immediately below storage reservoirs on the Poudre River; and (2) the
negative impacts on endangered species over 200 miles downstream in
Nebraska. "' - In July 1994, the Forest Service, after completing
environmental impact statements, issued the necessary permits for
continued operations of the storage facilities. 41 It processed each
permit application separately and granted each permit with specific
riverine habitat conditions attached. 42 The parties designed the entire
JOP to function within the larger political, legal, and environmental
context of endangered species needs on Nebraska's central Platte
River. 43
'
With the Division 1 case still pending, the Poudre River bypass flow
crisis became a political cause for water users, who in turn took the
matter to Congress.'1 They convinced then Senator Hank Brown (RColorado) to include a provision in the 1996 Farm Bill, imposing an
eighteen-month moratorium on further attempts to include bypass
flow conditions on federal permits, pending a study of the issue by a
Congressional Task Force.'45 That task force, clearly sympathetic with
preservation of the state appropriation doctrine, studied the
conflicting claims.'46 A narrow majority advocated the primacy of the4
state appropriation doctrine over federal land reserved rights claims.1 1
The task force recommended an eighteen-month moratorium on
federal agency employment
of bypass flow conditions in permit
48
renewal processes.1

Environmentalists and water users became bitterly polarized over
the issue. For the first time, however, water flowed down the Poudre
River during the winter season entirely under the sanction of Colorado
law and voluntary practice. The Forest Service accepted the Colorado
water user solution and proceeded to issue the required permits."

139. Ladd Opinion, supra note 111, at 1-34.
140. Id. at 20-23.
141. Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 12.
142. See Ladd Opinion, supra note 111, at 1-34. While the Ladd Opinion addressed
only one permit, the City of Greeley's Peterson Lake special use permit, the FWS
recognized that the Forest Service addressed numerous other permits. Id. at 1.
143. Interview with Representative, State Engineer's Office, supra note 135.
144. GIu1L. & BROWN, supra note 73, at 209.

145.
212.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 4-5; GILuLAN & BROWN, supra note 73, at
See Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 11-14.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 5-6.
Neuman & Blumm, supra note 73, at 12.
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IV. LAW AS CATALYST: SOLUTION
A. CONTEXT
The second Poudre basin instream flow story unfolded on the
North Fork. Since earliest settlement along the North Fork, ranchers
have owned and managed Phantom Canyon. Private interests posed
1 50
no challenge to North Poudre's management of Halligan Reservoir.
However, that would change in the early 1980s.
In the 1970s, a local speculator, also a member of the North
Poudre board, purchased the canyon property below Halligan Dam.' 5'
Given the energy crisis of the late 1970s and the federal government
incentives for investments in energy production, the speculator
planned to enlarge Halligan Dam and Reservoir for purposes of both
hydroelectric power production and enhanced supply of agricultural
and municipal water. 52 To this end, North Poudre successfully filed
and obtained a conditional right to enlarge storage at the Halligan site
- up to 30,000 acre-feet.'5 ' The speculator-shareholder, and then
owner of Phantom Canyon, financed the legal costs of securing the
conditional storage right in exchange for joint ownership of the
undeveloped additional storage rights with North Poudre.' 54
By 1982, it became clear that prospects for immediate enlargement
of Halligan were rapidly dimming; federal energy policy was quickly
shifting under guidance of the Reagan administration, and the rural
economy was falling into severe recession. Under considerable
financial pressure, the speculator sold his share of the conditional
water rights associated with the possible enlargement to the City of
Fort Collins, which by then was a large shareholder in North Poudre.'5
The City of Fort Collins anticipated its rapidly growing demands would
be well served in the foreseeable future by possession of the option to
enlarge North Fork water storage potentials.'56
At about the same time, the speculator put the greatest share of his
tract of Phantom Canyon land on the market."" Originally, there had
been interest by a coalition of public-spirited citizens, including
Colorado Governor Richard Lamm, to purchase the property for
preservation as a state park.5 8 When acquisition by the state did not

150. Interview with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra note
46; Interviews with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, Larimer
County, Colo. (May 25, 1998; July 26, 1999).
151. Interviews with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra note
150.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Persons, supranote 50.
156. Id.
157. Interviews with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra note
150.
158. EvANs & EvANs, supra note 5, at 150-51.
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materialize, the Conservancy stepped in to purchase the 1,700-acre
tract that included the steep-walled granite canyon, with an eye toward
protection 59of this relatively pristine remnant of east slope foothills
ecosystem. 1
B. INCENTIVES

In the context of the struggle over New Mexico's Gila National
Forest, the Forest Service clearly articulated its intention to press for
"bypass flows" as a condition of permit renewal on Poudre River
mountain reservoirs."O North Poudre now had a new neighbor
immediately downstream of Halligan Reservoir - a neighbor in
possession of unique habitat that was organized to advance an
environmental agenda as its central mission. North Poudre was not in
a federal nexus and had no fear of federal permitting problems. It
could take a "principled stand" on behalf of traditional utilitarian
water management values as encoded in the state appropriation
doctrine, and thereby refuse to consider any suggestion of altering its
traditional schedule of water release. Prudence, however, would
require more thoughtful contemplation of the situation.
When representatives of the Conservancy approached North
Poudre with a proposal to negotiate a way to arrange a small
continuous release of water through the winter, they found a reluctant,
but not entirely hostile, audience. Informants speaking on behalf of
North Poudre shareholders made it abundantly clear that prior to the
spate of federal environmental legislation of the 1970s, the struggle
over the Gila, or the looming fight over the mountain reservoirs, any
request for non-irrigation season instream flows would have been
handily dismissed."' Nevertheless, to refuse even an attempt at
negotiating a solution with an environmental organization that clearly
displayed a preference for negotiation over litigation, would have
risked bringing severe approbation upon the water users. To rigidly
deny a small stream of water sufficient to keep river bottom holes
connected and thereby serve fish and wildlife values in a special place
risked a lawsuit from less moderate environmentalists and would be a
source of embarrassment to at least one major shareholder, the City of
Fort Collins. Most urban citizens knew little of the intricacies of law
and water management, but could be expected to sympathize with a
modest call for water in the service of a precious place. After some
initial hesitation, negotiations began.

159. Phantom Canyon Preserve,supra note 3.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 106-12.
161. Interview with Representatives, North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra note
46; Interview with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra note 150;
Interviews with Representative, North Poudre Irrigation Company, Larimer County,
Colo. (March 28, 2000).

Issue I

LAWAS CATALYST

C. THE DEAL
The Conservancy and North Poudre had conflicting needs for the
North Fork's winter water. With the exception of extremely wet years,
North Poudre could put to beneficial use all the water it could legally
impound. However, North Poudre leadership could also see the value
of acquiring an environmental ally, and this was much more preferable
than having an influential opponent on the river. The Conservancy
had a need for flowing winter water in Phantom Canyon to improve
fish survival and reproduction rates and to restore some fraction of the
biotic web that depended on stream flows.
In addition, the
Conservancy wanted to establish good relations with their upstream
neighbor. The possibility of enlarging Halligan Dam and Reservoir
was of interest to the Conservancy, because such expansion would
invite scrutiny from a wide variety of stakeholders, including state and
federal agencies and local environmental groups. 162 The Conservancy
wanted to be involved in the earliest planning stages of any changes to
Halligan Dam to ensure protection and advancement of their
interests. 163 Thus, both organizations saw advantages in partnership.
Serious talks proceeded for more than a year prior to beginning
the arranged winter season releases in the fall of 1987.164 One essential
element of the agreement centered on how to protect shareholder
interests while, at the same time, releasing storage season water
through the canyon. Another fundamental component ensured that
all water would serve recognized beneficial uses and operate entirely
within the requirements of Colorado water law, without raising the
specter of water releases for environmental bypass flow purposes.165
Pre-water development winter season flows were estimated to have
been twenty to thirty cfs, during average-precipitation years. However,
such a rate could not be sustained and still fill Halligan Reservoir. In
the end, North Poudre agreed to release a continuous winter season
stream amounting to 2.5 cfs.'66 In the world of water, it is a rule-ofthumb that one cfs yields a volume of about one acre-foot in twelve
hours or two acre-feet per day. 1 67 Therefore, water flowing at 2.5 cfs
was estimated to produce about five acre-feet per day for the canyon.
Given that the month of March was traditionally an active time to
release water to North Poudre's plains reservoirs and through the
162. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supranote 71.
163. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supranote 52.
164. Interviews with Representatives, The North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra
notes 150 & 161; Interview with Representatives, The Nature Conservancy, supra note
26.
165. Interviews with Representatives, The North Poudre Irrigation Company, supra
notes 150 & 161; Interview with Representatives, The Nature Conservancy, supra note
26.
166. 1994 Agreement Extension between The Nature Conservancy and The North
Poudre Irrigation Company §§ 6(b), 7 [hereinafter "1994 Agreement"] (on file with
authors).
167. THOMAS DuNNE & LUNA B. LEOPOLD, WATER IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 799
(1978).
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canyon to Seaman Reservoir, the typical winter season releases would
occur over a span of about 120 days. Over the course of this period typically November through February - North Poudre would release
600 acre-feet of water from Halligan Reservoir to maintain habitat in
Phantom Canyon.
In exchange for providing continuous winter flows, North Poudre
secured a commitment whereby the Conservancy would repay twice
the amount of water lost to winter flow if Halligan Reservoir failed to
fill completely by July 1.161 If the Reservoir failed to fill, the amount of
shortage attributable to the canyon releases would vary, but not exceed
1,200 acre-feet.169 Conversely, in wet years when Halligan filled, the
Conservancy paid nothing. 70
The July deadline represented a
concession to the Conservancy. Had the deadline for filling Halligan
been established at the conclusion of the storage season, March 31, it
could have been possible that the Conservancy would be liable for
repayment even if May and June peak snowmelt flows filled the
reservoir. Therefore, the later date protected the Conservancy's
interests.
To satisfy its repayment commitment, the Conservancy each year
agreed to rent North Poudre water shares from company shareholders
on a willing lessor/lessee basis. 7' The City of Fort Collins was one
major source of rental shares because it had built up a reserve of
shares against future demand and drought protection. The city
historically rented its surplus shares back to agricultural72 producers,
and was a willing source of Phantom Canyon rental water.
Workings of northeastern Colorado water markets have been
described in detail. 173 In average to wet years, rental rates have equaled
the share assessment; in other words, owners have been happy to
simply avoid paying the annual assessment on what would otherwise be
an unused share. In dry years, rental rates rose to reflect their greater
value as demand exceeded supply. Like Fort Collins, many industries,
such as Eastman Kodak, purchased excess water shares as drought
insurance.7 The Conservancy counted on such water sources to
supply its needs in all but the driest years.
Extremely dry year scenarios place pressure on all users, but the
Conservancy will enter that marketplace to secure its Halligan
replacement water at the going price. Environmental organizations
are not generally viewed as wealthy, but the Conservancy is expected to
compete well against bids economically hard-pressed farmers could
offer for a share of water to grow corn or beans.
Repayment of water to North Poudre has been straightforward.
168. 1994Agreement, supra note 166, § 10(a).
169. Id. § 10.
170. Id.§9.
171. Id. §§ 8,12(b).
172. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supra note 26.
173. See generally MAASS & ANDERSON, supranote 10, at 303-07.
174. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supra note 26.

Issue 1

LA WAS CATALYST

After a winter season in which Halligan has not filled, the winter
release volume has been measured and is easy to calculate. The terms
of the agreement permit the Conservancy to repay North Poudre in
either money or water.15 The easiest method has been for the
Conservancy to simply rent the necessary share volumes and leave
them in the reservoir."6 Those unused volumes have then been
distributed to all shareholders.
North Poudre and the Conservancy forged the initial agreement
on a year-by-year basis. However, at the request of North Poudre, the
parties have never filed the agreement with any legal entity. 177 They
have continuously renegotiated and renewed the agreement up
through the present. As both North Poudre and the Conservancy
learned how to make improvements, they made changes in
operational details. In later years, the parties extended the terms of
the agreement to as much as three years.
Under the agreement,
either party could propose changes or terminate the agreement at the
conclusion of the water year in October.
In the second year, the Conservancy proposed that rather than
shutting Halligan Reservoir's gates suddenly at the end of irrigation
season, North Poudre could incrementally step-down flow over the
course of days. 7 9 The Conservancy also requested, and received,
incremental stages of step-up flows in February or March when the
North Poudre began moving water.8 The Conservancy, predictably,
desired these step up flows in order to more accurately mimic natural
flow patterns and minimize shock to fish and invertebrate insects,
which require time to adapt to changes in the flow regime. By the
third year, the parties fully integrated this new method of operation
into the agreement, and the Conservancy agreed to pay a set fee of $50
for each trip North Poudre had to make to incrementally and
manually adjust gates.'
In exchange for providing extended periods of reducing and
increasing flows at the beginning and end of each season, North
Poudre required the Conservancy to repay shareholders for "shrink,"
or water lost to seepage and evaporation, in the diversion tunnel and
canal over the step-down or step-up periods. 2 Most canal reaches are
earthen, thus, during low flow seepage loss is high. Water managers
175. 1995 Agreement Extension between The Nature Conservancy and The North
Poudre Irrigation Company §§ 7(b), (c) [hereinafter "1995 Agreement"] (on file with
authors).
176. Interview with Representative, The Nature Conservancy, supra note 26.
177. 1994 Agreement, supra note 166, § 12(f); 1995 Agreement, supra note 175,
§ 7(g).
178. Compare 1994 Agreement, supra note 166, § 1, with 1995 Agreement, supranote
175, § 1. The 1994 terms indicated a yearlong contract, whereas the 1995 terms
indicated a two-year long contract with automatic renewal if neither party gave notice
of cancellation.
179. 1994 Agreement, supra note 166, § 4; 1995 Agreement, supra note 175, § 2(a).
180. 1995 Agreement, supra note 175, § 2(c).
181. 1995 Agreement, supra note 175, § 7(d).

182. Id. § 3.
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throughout the world aim to move substantial volumes of water to
increase flow velocity and reduce rates of loss. Shareholders who
planned to sacrifice water to protect habitat values in Phantom Canyon
wanted compensation for their loss. The Conservancy agreed to
comply with this request and repay water lost in the incremental startups and shutdowns.

In the early 1990s another party entered the agreement. The City
of Greeley agreed to provide storage space in Seaman Reservoir for the
Phantom Canyon flows.'
Situated downstream (see Figure 3) from
Phantom Canyon preserve, Seaman Reservoir has a lower priority
storage right than Halligan, and fills primarily when Halligan overtops. r ' Except in the very wettest years, Seaman Reservoir has space
available to capture and hold more than the approximately 600 acrefeet that would be released from Halligan on behalf of the canyon
habitat. 16 This has made possible a simple water exchange to the
advantage of all parties." 7
First, the instream flow water is designated as being "on top" of the
reservoir, meaning in the unlikely event that Seaman would fill, the
Conservancy water would be pushed out and spilled downstream
first.'88 Under such wet conditions, Halligan would have filled and the
Conservancy would owe nothing to North Poudre. In less wet years,
space would be available in Seaman Reservoir. During the summer
irrigation season, fractions of the Conservancy water would be released
to North Poudre shareholders, such as the City of Fort Collins and
other industries, as needed. 88 Water stored in Halligan to serve those
shareholders would be left in the Halligan tank and credited to
repayment of any debt owed by the Conservancy."
In effect, the
Conservancy used these accumulated shares of water in Seaman
Reservoir as trading stock on the local market to repay North Poudre
for any winter flow debt. Thus, there are no losers under the
agreement.
The City of Greeley is fully protected because it has never been in
danger of forgoing its storage capacity. North Poudre is better off
because the water it would normally lose to winter flows actually goes
to North Poudre customers out of Seaman Reservoir, thereby allowing
for greater net Halligan catchment. The Conservancy retains the use
of its water trading stock, and uses it to reduce or eliminate any water
debt to North Poudre. Therefore, concern for enhancing Phantom
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1995 Agreement, supra note 175, § 6.
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Canyon habitat actually has left all parties, most especially non-human
living things, better off than before an environmental agenda entered
into water user arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION
In chemical reactions, a catalyst is an agent that induces a change
among other chemical elements without itself being changed. In the
deeply divided house of United States' water law, especially in the
West, a legal standoff between the federal reserved rights doctrine and
the state appropriation doctrine catalyzed a change of the instream
flow regime of Colorado's North Fork of the Poudre River.
For the first time since 1910, winter water began to steadily flow
through Phantom Canyon in the fall of 1987. This water stored by
Halligan Dam was not released for utilitarian consumptive uses,
although it would eventually serve such purposes. Winter season flows
were explicitly dedicated to improvement of natural habitat. Although
it served environmental needs in Phantom Canyon, the water from
Halligan Dam would not acquire legitimacy as an instream flow for
environmental purposes, but rather for eventually serving beneficial
uses tied to downstream priorities held by agriculture, cities, and
industry. Yet, this environmental water, justified in utilitarian terms,
has been no less life sustaining to the canyon's biotic web. The
consumptive uses of the environment in Phantom Canyon have been
virtually non-existent. Additionally, the instream flows serve human
demands that have become slightly more sustainable because a
traditional mutual company, pursuing utilitarian objectives, saw fit to
make an arrangement with an organization dedicated to the
stewardship of the natural environment.
In the end, both
organizations are in a better position to pursue their respective
agendas. Each has enhanced water availability and control. Without
applying the federal reserved rights doctrine, the organizations have
served environmental habitat values and integrated such values into a
changed regime of the river that has continued to operate under an
unchanged state appropriation doctrine.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the future, the United States government may be obligated to
replace water that is currently removed from the Colorado River via
the Main Outlet Drain Extension, otherwise known as the bypass flow,
and diverted into the Ci6nega de Santa Clara ("Cirnega"), a large,
open-water wetland in Mexico.' The Colorado River Basin Salinity
Control Act establishes replacement of the bypass flow as a federal
obligation. Originally diverted to ensure that Colorado River water
deliveries to Mexico satisfied 1972 salinity standards3 amending the
1944 Rivers Treaty, the bypass flow now sustains an important habitat
in the Colorado River delta.4 The Cirnega is home to thousands of
migratory and resident waterfowl, as well as the Yuma clapper rail and
the desert pupfish, both endangered species.'
At present, the bypass flow is replaced by water conserved through

1. Report from the Secretary of Interior, to select members of the U.S. Senate

Energy, Resource, & Appropriations Committee, Modifications to Projects of Title I of
the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act 11-12 (October 22, 2002) (Draft on file
with author) [hereinafter Draft Interior Report].
2.

43 U.S.C. § 1571(c) (2000).

3. Minute 242 set the 1972 Salinity Standards, see infra note 10.
4. TAYLOR 0. MILLER ET AL., THE SALlY COLORADO 24-25 (1986); Edward P. Glenn
et al., Status of Wetlands Supported by Agricultural Drainage Water in the Colorado River
Delta, Mexico, 34 HORTSCIENCE 39, 41 (1999).
5. DANIEL F. LUECKE ET AL., A DELTA ONCE MORE: RESTORING RIPARIAN AND
WETLAND HABiTAT IN THE COLORADO RIVER DELTA 17 (1999); see also National Marine

Fisheries Service, Southwest Regional Office, Federally Listed Threatened and Endangered
Species-California,Appendix E, at http://swr.ucsd.edu/limitlO/AppendixE.pdf.
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lining the Coachella Canal.' At such time the federal government can
no longer take credit for this conserved water, it must secure a new
source. Finding "new" water in the Colorado River poses significant
problems, because the river is already over allocated and its ecosystems
are already under stress. This paper examines several alternatives, and
identifies water leasing from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and
Drainage District ("Wellton-Mohawk District"), as the least ecologically
damaging way for the federal government to fulfill its obligation to
replace the bypass flow. Not only would this solution minimize harm
to the Cifnega and the Colorado River delta, but it is less expensive
than other alternatives currently under consideration by the Bureau of
Reclamation ("Reclamation").
II. BACKGROUND
A. SALT IN THE COLORADO RIVER

From its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains to the Gulf of
California, the Colorado River accumulates nine million tons of salt
annually.7 Natural sources contribute about half of the salt in the
river, but another thirty seven percent results from irrigated
agriculture, which returns salt to the river via agricultural return flow.8
The 1972 amendment of the U.S.-Mexico Rivers Treaty9 through the
adoption of Minute 2421" of the International Boundary and Water
Commission ("IBWC"), and the subsequent passage of the Colorado
River Basin Salinity Control Act of 197411 ("CRBSCA") were intended
to address Mexico's concerns over rising salinity levels in the Colorado.
Mexico's complaints about salinity in the Colorado River began
when agriculture within the Wellton-Mohawk District introduced
extraordinarily high volumes of salt to the river. 12 The WelltonMohawk District is located in Yuma County, Arizona along the Gila
River valley (see Figure 1). A division of the Gila Project, WelltonMohawk is located twelve miles east of the city of Yuma and extends
forty-five miles into the Gila River valley. In this region, irrigators
began pumping groundwater in 1906, and by 1934 many Wellton6. 1 BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, COACHELLA CANAL LINING
PROJECT, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1-7 (2001) [hereinafter COACHELLA

EIS].
MILLERETAL., supra note 4, at xiii.
8. Seeid.at5&fig.l.
9. Treaty Between the United States & Mexico Respecting the Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.MEX., 59 STAT. 1219, 1265.
10. Resolution on the Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International
Problem on the Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30, 1973, U.S.-Mex., 24 U.S.T.
1971, reprinted in MILTON N. NATHANSON, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, UPDATING THE HOOVER DAM DOCUMENTS, at XIII-10 through -12 (1978)
[hereinafter Minute 242].
11. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571-99 (2000).
12. MILLER ETAL., supra note 4, at 24.
7.
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Mohawk wells exhibited excessive levels of salt and the water table had
dropped dramatically.1 3 Many farms were abandoned until 1952, when
Reclamation brought Colorado River water to the area through the
Gila Project. 4 Unfortunately, poor drainage throughout the WelltonMohawk District resulted in the mixing of irrigation wastewater with
highly saline aquifer water. 5 The brackish groundwater eventually
rose to the surface of the agricultural fields, damaging acres of crops.
In the early 1960s, Reclamation tried to mitigate these problems
by
17
installing a drainage system at a cost of fourteen million dollars.
The drainage system pumped saline drain water, at approximately
6,000 parts per million ("ppm"), into the Gila River near its
confluence with the Colorado River, causing the Colorado River water
salinit level at the border to nearly double, from 800 ppm to 1,500
ppm. Delivery of the drain water to the Colorado River resulted in
overall increased salinity in the River and extensive damage to
agricultural fields downstream in the Mexicali Valley. 9 In 1965, the
United States and Mexico adopted IBWC Minute 218 to reroute
Wellton-Mohawk drain water away from the main stem of the Colorado
River to Mexico's Gulf of California via a newly constructed canal.20 An
extension to this new canal, known as the Main Outlet Drain
Extension ("MODE") , terminated in a below sea-level depression that
was formerly part of the Colorado River delta. Now that the bypass
flow has flowed there for several decades, it has revived some of the
delta's former ecosystem and currently sustains the Ci~nega.2
Presently,, the MODE delivers an annual average of 108,000 acre-feet of
water to the Ci~nega.23

13. Id.
14. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Dataweb, Gila Project, Arizona,
GeneralDescription, at http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/gila.html.

was first delivered to Wellton-Mohawk fields in 1952.
The Gila Project was later completed in 1957. Id.
15. MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 24.

Colorado River water

NATHANSON,

supra note 10, at 38.

16. Norris Hundley, Jr., The West Against Itself: The Colorado River-An Institutional
History, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 9, 38 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee

Brown eds., 1986).
17. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
SALINITY CONTROL PROJECT, TITLE I DIVISION, DESALTING COMPLEX UNIT, ARIZONA,

STATUS REPORT 146 (1977) [hereinafter SALINriY CONTROL PROJECT].

18. Id. at 2.
19.

MILLERETAL., supra note 4, at 24.

20. Recommendations on the Colorado River Salinity Problem, Mar. 22, 1965, U.S.Mex., 24 U.S.T. 1965, reprinted in NATHANSON, supra note 10, at XIII-3 through -4
(1978) [hereinafter Minute 218].
21. See SALINrIY CONTROL PROJECT, supra note 17, at 5. The MODE is in fact a
sequence of canals known (from upstream down) as the Main Outlet Drain, the Main
Outlet Drain Extension, and the Bypass Extension. Id. at 5, 53.
22. LUECKE ETAL., supra note 5, at 16.
23. Draft Interior Report, supra note 1, at 10.
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B. THE CIENEGA DE SANTA CLARA

The introduction of Wellton-Mohawk's saline drain water into the
Ci6nega de Santa Clara reclaimed some of the Colorado River delta. 4
Before development upstream diminished Colorado River flows in its
southernmost reaches, the Colorado River delta was a vast, productive
2
riverine and freshwater ecosystem in the midst of the Sonoran desert. 1
The eastern delta, the site of today's Ci6nega, was an active arm of the
Colorado River lined by native cottonwood and willow trees. 21
Colorado River development through the middle of the twentieth
century, most notably the filling of Lake Powell behind the Glen
Canyon Dam in the 1950-60s, deprived the delta of nearly all flows and
desiccated its ecosystems.2 7 While small flows have returned on the
river's main stem, much of the former delta remains dry.28
The significance of the Ci6nega de Santa Clara cannot be
overstated.

The 108,000 acre-feet of saline water, 2,800 ppm,

29

that

flows from MODE into the Ci6nega has not restored the predevelopment ecosystem, but it has brought significant life back to the
landscape. 30

A 50,000-acre open-water wetland dominated by cattails

and phragmites, the Ci6nega provides habitat for tens of thousands of
resident and migratory waterfowl, and harbors two endangered
species, the Yuma clapper rail and the desert pupfish.3 ' The Mexican
government established protection for the Ci6nega in 1993 when it
was included in the core area designation of the Biosphere Reserve of
the Colorado River delta and Upper Gulf of California.2 The local
community has developed a modest ecotourism enterprise, guiding
visitors on boats through the Ci~nega's open waters. 3
The Cidnega de Santa Clara is an inadvertent creation of efforts to
control salinity on the Colorado River. Its renewed ecological value is
important because it is also the former site of one of the world's great

24. LUECKEETAL., supranote 5, at 16.
25. See generally id. at 1.
26. Edward P. Glenn et al., Effects of Water Management on the Wetlands of the Colorado
River Delta, Mexico, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1175, 1178 (1996) [hereinafter
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY].

27.

See generally Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem

Conservation in the Colorado River Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 819, 820-29 (2000)

[hereinafter Two Nations].
28.

LUECKE ET AL.,

supranote 5, at 4.

29. Draft Interior Report, supra note 1, at 8.
30. LUECKEETAL., supra note 5, at 16.
31. See generally id. (describing in further detail the ecology of the Cidnega de Santa
Clara); see also CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, supra note 26, at 1176-83.
32. Wesley Marx, Border Waters, The SurpriseReturn of the Colorado River Delta, 17 CAL.
COAST & OCEAN Winter (2001-02), at www.coastalconservancy.ca.gov/coast&ocean/
winter2002/pages/six.htm.
33. See CARLOS VALDES-CAILLAS ET AL., INFORMATION DATABASE AND LOCAL OUTREACH
PROGRAM FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE HARDY RIVER WETLANDS,
RIVER DELTA, BAJA CALIFORNIA AND SONORA, MEXICO, at vii (1998)

in the Colorado River delta).

LOWER COLORADO

(discussing tourism
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desert river deltas, which has been destroyed as the Colorado River was
developed for consumptive use in the United States. 4 The United
States may be authorized to protect the Ci6nega by amendments to the
CRBSCA, which sanction funding for measures to replace incidental
fish and wildlife values foregone as salinity control programs are
implemented.3 6 Furthermore, the United States may be obligated, by
several treaties, laws, and agreements 3 ' and as a good neighbor, to do
it no harm.
m. FEDERAL OBLIGATION TO REPLACE BYPASSED WATER
By 1973, Mexico and the United States agreed to amend the 1944
Rivers Treaty with Minute 242,38 which set a salinity standard for
Colorado River water delivered to Mexico. 9 The CRBSCA followed in
1974, authorizing the work required to meet the provisions of Minute
242. The CRBSCA established replacement of bypassed water as a
federal obligation 4' and authorized a variety of projects including:
Irrigation-efficiency improvements for the Wellton-Mohawk
District;"
42
Lining forty-nine miles of the Coachella Canal;
Buyout and retirement of 10,000 acres of Wellton-Mohawk
43

land;

A protective and regulatory pumping unit (pumping of up to
160,000 acre-feet of groundwater north of the border to
;44
augment flows and for dilution)
34. LUECKEETAL., supranote 5, at 2, 4.
35. Act of July 28, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-20, § 1, 109 Stat 255 (1995) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1592(a) (6) (2000)); Act of Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-569,
§ 4, 98 Stat. 2933, 2933-44 (1984) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1595 (a)).
36. 7 C.F.R. § 702.2(a)(13) (2002). Neither the amendments nor the rules and
regulations discuss the applicability of this authorization to transboundary resources.
But see id. § 702.4(b) (listing lands to which the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control
Program is applicable, however, the statute fails to list transboundary lands).
37. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000) (prohibiting
federal agencies from 'jeopardizing" endangered or threatened species); Agreement
on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., art. 1, 35 U.S.T. 2917, 2918 (obliging the
United States and Mexico to "cooperate in the field of environmental protection in
the border area"); Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11084 (requiring the U.S. and
Mexico to "formulate and implement their planning so as to promote the conservation
of the wetlands" such as the Ci6nega de Santa Clara). Transboundary application of
the Endangered Species Act is uncertain. See Two Nations, supranote 27, at 849-50.
38. Minute 242, supra note 10.
39. See id. § 1(a) at 1972 ("The United States shall adopt measures to assure
that ...[water] delivered to Mexico upstream of Morelos Dam, have an annual
average salinity of no more than 115 ppm +/-30 ppm ...over the annual average
).
salinity of Colorado River waters which arrive at Imperial Dam .
40. 43 U.S.C. § 1571(c) (2000).
41. Id. § 1571(0(1).
42. Id. § 1572(a).
43. Id. § 1571(f)(2).
44. Id. § 1573(a)(1).
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Constructing the Yuma Desalting Plant to process the bypass
flow and return it to the Colorado River; 5 and
Funding construction of a bypass drain to the Cidnega de Santa
Clara."
Reclamation implemented all of these authorized projects except
the Yuma Desalting Plant ("YDP"). Reclamation constructed the plant,
however, it has never operated at full capacity. 47 Nevertheless, to date,
the United States has ably met the Minute 242 salinity standard. '
The United States completed lining the Coachella Canal in 1980.
The 130,000 acre-feet of water conserved annually from lining the
canal effectively became the replacement water that the United States
had previously removed from the Colorado River to meet the terms of
Minute 242. At some point in the future, the interim period during
which the federal government receives credit for water conserved by
the lining of the Coachella canal may come to an end.4 ' However,
environmental organizations,"
the Colorado River Board of
California," and the Colorado Water Conservation Board5 2 have
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1571(b).
46. Id. § 1571(d).
47. The YDP was operated briefly at one-third capacity in 1992 for testing. Martin
Van Der Werf, Drainingthe Budget to Desalt the Colorado, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, February
21, 1994, availableat http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Printable.Article?article_id=97.
48. DALE PONTIUS, COLORADO RIVER BASIN
WATER REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION 66 (1997).

STUDY, FINAL REPORT TO THE WESTERN

49. 43 U.S.C. § 1572(a) (2000) provides:
[T]he Secretary is authorized to construct a new concrete-lined canal or,
to line the presently unlined portion of the Coachella Canal of the Boulder
Canyon project, California, from station 2 plus 26 to the beginning of siphon
numbered 7, a length of approximately forty-nine miles. The United States
shall be entitled to a temporary use of a quantity of water, for the purpose of
meeting the salinity control objectives of Minute 242, during an interimperiod,
equal to the quantity of water conserved by constructing or lining the said
canal.
The interim period shall commence on the completion of
construction or lining said canal and shall end the first year that the Secretary
delivers main stream Colorado River water to California in an amount less
than the sum of the quantities requested by (1) the California agencies under
contracts made pursuant to section 617d of this title, and (2) Federal
establishments to meet their water rights acquired in California in accordance
with the Supreme Court decree in Arizona against California.
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
50. Letter from Jennifer Pitt et al., to Robert Johnson, Director, Lower Colorado
Regional Office, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior 2 (July 6, 2001)
(stating that ten environmental organizations believe that the interim period during
which the federal government can take credit for water conserved by the Coachella
Canal Lining continues, as California has not yet requested delivery of Colorado River
water in excess of the quantity delivered by the Bureau of Reclamation) (on file with
author).
51. Letter from Gerald R. Zimmerman, Executive Director, Colorado River Board
of California, to Robert W. Johnson, Regional Director, Lower Colorado Regional
Office, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior (Aug. 1, 2001) (on file with
author).
52. Memorandum from Randy Seaholm, Chief, Water Supply Protection, Colorado
Water Conservation Board, to the Colorado Water Conservation Board Members (July
17, 2001) (on file with author).
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argued that a close reading of the CRBSCA indicates this interim
period is not yet over. It is likely that at some point in the future, the
United States will be obligated to find a new way to replace the bypass
flow.
In addition to authorizing a number of projects that might be
developed to replace bypass flows, the CRBSCA authorizes
Reclamation to explore alternatives that demonstrate an economic
A 1984 amendment to the CRBSCA obligates
advantage. 3
Reclamation to use cost-effectiveness as the underlying criterion in
determining which salinity control units should be operated.5 4
The remainder of this paper analyzes three alternatives for
replacing the bypass flow, including two under consideration by
Reclamation: (1) operation of the YDP; and (2) offstream storage of
Colorado River water. 5 The third alternative the paper considers
combines the lease of water from Wellton-Mohawk District and
groundwater pumped from the Yuma Mesa Area.
IV. BYPASS FLOW REPLACEMENT ALTERNATIVES
A. LEASE OF WELLTON-MOHAWK WATER AND SECURING OF FEDERAL
RIGHTS TO YUMA MESA GROUNDWATER

One way for the United States government to replace the bypass
flow is to transfer water, either by lease or purchase, from farmers who
use the Colorado River to irrigate crops. This paper examines leasing
as one form of water transfer, but given the federal government's need
for a permanent source of water, it may also be important to consider
a permanent acquisition of water rights, such as through the purchase
and fallowing of land currently under irrigation and cultivation.
Water used by farmers in the Wellton-Mohawk District to grow
cereals and grains has relatively low economic productivity, suggesting
that some water users are likely to respond positively to an attractive
lease offer.5 6 It is important to note that a reduction of irrigation water
use in Wellton-Mohawk District would reduce the quantity of water
draining into the MODE. Protection of the Ci6nega ecosystem could
be accomplished by complementing a lease program with the addition
to the MODE of brackish groundwater pumped from the Yuma Mesa
groundwater mound (see Figure 1).

53. See 43 U.S.C. § 1574.
54. Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-569, 98 Stat. 2933.
55. Draft Interior Report, supra note 1, at 12-15.
56. See generally B. Delworth Gardner, The UntriedMarket Approach to Water Allocation,
in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 155 (Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown
eds., 1986) (discussing prospective water markets on the Colorado River).
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Figure 1: Map of the Colorado River in southern Arizona and northern
Mexico depicting various irrigation districts and infrastructure.
i. Leasing Water from The Wellton-Mohawk District
Reclamation might obtain bypass flow replacement water by
leasing water from agricultural Colorado River water users, known in
government parlance as "extraordinary conservation."57 Of the many
irrigation districts in the Colorado River basin, this paper proposes a
lease from the Wellton-Mohawk District, because of the low
productivity of this water and the ecological benefit it would provide.
The Wellton-Mohawk District has had rights on the Colorado River

57. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, YDP & Alternatives Meeting
Materials, Agenda (May 8, 2001, Las Vegas, Nev.) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Las Vegas Conference].
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to approximately 300,000 acre-feet, 58 requiring a diversion of over
400,000 acre-feet of water,59 dating back to 1952. 60 Having subsidized
the infrastructure that delivers and removes water, the federal
government charges the Wellton-Mohawk District a mere three dollars
per acre-foot of water delivered. 6' Without a true price signal for the
cost of water, farmers have little incentive to conserve and continue to
grow water-intensive crops of extremely low value.
While the Wellton-Mohawk District has publicly stated it is not
willing to sell or lease water,62 and in Arizona, no water transfers may
take place without approval of the governing irrigation district,6 it is
likely that an attractive offer would nevertheless stimulate a market
response. Figure 264 illustrates that the average annual net return 65 per
acre-foot of water for the least economically productive 108,000 acrefeet of water in Wellton-Mohawk District per year peaks at fifty-three
dollars. 6 Significantly, fifty-three dollars overestimates the economic
productivity of water because it is calculated for all water applied to an
58. Act ofJuly 30, 1947, Pub L. No. 80-272, 61 Stat. 628.
59. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, LOWER COLORADO RIVER
ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, APPENDIX I, IMPERIAL DAM TO MEXICO, ANNUAL WATER BALANCE 1

(2000). Diversion quantities are greater than consumptive use quantities, and because
Wellton-Mohawk's drain water does not return to the Colorado, the entire diversion is
removed from the river.
60.

NATHANSON,. supra note 10, at 38.

61.

BUREAU

OF

RECLAMATION,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

INTERIOR,

AMENDATORY

AND

CONSOLIDATED CONTRACT WITH WELLTON-MOHAWK IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE DISTRICT
FOR DELIVERY OF WATER, CONSTRUCTION OF WORKS, REPAYMENT, AND PROJECT POWER

SUPPLY 23 (Wellton-Mohawk District may collect an additional fee for power costs
incurred). See also Arizona Cooperative Extension Service, Arizona Field Crop Budgets
1999-2000, available at http://ag.arizona.edu/arec/ext/exthome.html [hereinafter
Arizona Extension]. Reclamation collected fees for water delivered until construction
costs were repaid.
62. Interview with Don Pope, Staff, Yuma Area Irrigators Association, in Las Vegas,
Nev. (May 8, 2001).
63. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST, EFFICIENCY,
EQUrTY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98 (1992).

64. Figure 2, created by Environmental Defense, illustrates the net dollar return by
acre-feet of water used for irrigation of specific crops in the Wellton-Mohawk District.
Net return is defined by the Arizona Extension Service. See Arizona Extension, supra
note 61. Acre-feet of water used for each crop is calculated by multiplying the acrefeet per acre used for a crop, id., by the acres of that crop irrigated in the WelltonMohawk District. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, CROP & WATER DATA,
WELLTON-MOHAWK IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE DISTRICT DATA (1996-1998) (on file with

author).
65. Arizona Extension, supra note 61. Net return is defined as returns over cash
operating expenses. Id. Returns are the sum of the contributions toward projected
income of all products produced by the cropping system, including possible subsidies.
Id. Income estimates are based on 5-year county averages for yields for most crops and
5-year state averages for commodity prices. Id. Operating costs include total cash land
preparation expenses (labor, chemical and custom application, farm machinery and
vehicles, irrigation water, and other purchased inputs and services), total harvest and
post harvest expenses (labor, chemical and custom application, farm machinery and
vehicles, custom harvest/post harvest, cotton ginning if appropriate, crop assessments,
and other materials), and pickup use. Id. Net return does not include costs for
overhead, land ownership, management, or risk. Id.
66. Id. see also text within footnotes 64 & 65.
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acre of a given crop, rather than the marginal return per acre-foot of
water used. However, terms of a water lease may specify that land must
be fallowed, in which case fifty-three dollars per acre-foot is the
appropriate value.
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The price for a water lease can be determined in a number of ways
including; (1) a standing offer; (2) individually negotiated contracts;
or (3) by a market-based procedure such as auctioning. Recently the
Wellton-Mohawk District objected to the sale of its Colorado River
water, which suggests that only the first of these three options is
feasible.6 ' Reclamation could test the willingness of Wellton-Mohawk
District farmers to sell their water by making a standing offer at a price
that reflects their net returns on Colorado River water increased by a
sufficient incentive. Over time, the economic benefit of a Colorado
River water lease may prove sufficiently attractive to Wellton-Mohawk
District farmers to overcome any objections.
Additional cost savings of a water lease to the Wellton-Mohawk
District would include reduced operation and maintenance costs
associated with retirement of Wellton-Mohawk District lands, which
could total millions of dollars annually. The energy required for
pump lift stations and maintenance on the 108 miles of conveyance
canals and tunnels is significant: the six pumping plants in the
Wellton-Mohawk Division require a total horsepower greater than
35,000 units.70 The energy cost to convey irrigation water uphill and
across the entire district for the year 2000 was approximately one
million dollars.7 One would reasonably expect a twenty five percent
reduction in Wellton-Mohawk District water use would also decrease its
power costs by $250,000 annually.
One significant consequence of reducing consumptive use of
Colorado River water at the Wellton-Mohawk District will be the
reduction of drain water flowing into the MODE.72 If water use at the
Wellton-Mohawk District decreases by twenty five percent, the bypass
flow volume will be reduced by the same percentage, approximately
30,000 acre-feet of water annually. 3 As discussed above, MODE water
sustains an important ecosystem in the Ci~nega, and its reduction or
elimination would cause unacceptable harm.74 One way to address this

67. See ZAcH WILLEY & ADAM DIAMANT, RESTORING THE YAKIMA RIVER'S ENVIRONMENT:
WATER MARKETING AND INSTREAM FLOW ENHANCEMENT IN WASHINGTON'S YAKIMA RIVER

BASIN 27 (1994).
68. Telephone Interview with William Swan, Attorney, June 21, 2001. Mr. Swan
worked at the Dep't of Interior for approximately eighteen years, including three years
as the Field Solicitor in Phoenix, Ariz.
69. There are various methods of determining this price incentive. This paper
refrains from discussing alternatives to avoid any premature biasing of the pricing
process. See generally Gardner, supra note 56.
70. See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Dataweb, Gila Project, Arizona,
EngineeringData, PumpingPlants, at http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/lcgilengdata.html.
71. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, SUMMARY OF REVENUE AND
PROGRAM EXPENSE, PARKER DAVIS PROJECT (Sept. 30, 2000).

72. Water flowing in the MODE is Wellton-Mohawk District drain water.

See

LUECKE ETAL., supra note 5, at 16.

73. Note that this assumes a linear relationship between Wellton-Mohawk District
diversions and MODE flows.
74. See LUECKE ET AL., supra note 5, at 4.
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impact to MODE flows is to supplement them with 25,000 acre-feet of
water pumped from the Yuma Mesa groundwater mound.
ii. Securing Federal Credit for Pumped Yuma Mesa Groundwater
To sustain the Cifnega de Santa Clara ecosystem, the present-day
quantity and quality of flows in the MODE must be maintained.7 5 It

may be acceptable to replace MODE flows diminished by the lease of
water from the Wellton-Mohawk District with 25,000 acre-feet per year

of groundwater pumped from the Yuma Mesa area.
Extraordinarily high rates of irrigation in the Yuma area irrigation
districts have created a mound of groundwater below the Yuma Mesa. 6
Under approximately 8,700 acres of land, the depth to groundwater is
7

less than six feet despite

extensive pumping in the region.
78

Groundwater salinity in the Yuma area averages 1,400 ppm.

The

Yuma Area Water Resources Management Group79 ("Water Resources
Group") proposed a 2.2 million dollar upgrade to the region's
groundwater pumping infrastructure in order to reduce groundwater

levels beneath 6,200 acres of the Yuma Valley.80 The Water Resources
Group proposed to divert pumped groundwater north through the
Yuma Mesa Conduit towards the Colorado River.81 Their proposal
would increase groundwater pumping over the most recent ten-year

average by 50,000 acre-feet per year for five years and 30,000 acre-feet
per year thereafter. 2 The Water Resources Group recommended that
Arizona trade 25,000 acre-feet per year of pumped groundwater for a
period of ten years, subject to renewal, in exchange for financial
75. See generally MILLER ET AL., supra note 4.
76. Interview with John Redlinger, Deputy Area Manager, Boulder Canyon
Operations Office, Bureau of Reclamation, in Las Vegas, Nev. (Aug. 28, 2001).
77. YUMA AREA WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT GROUP, PROJECT PROPOSAL:
IMPROVEMENT OF DRAINAGE OPERATIONS IN THE YUMA VALLEY 1 (May 2, 2001) (Final

Draft Prepared for YAWRMG Approval) [hereinafter FINAL DRAFT].
78. EDWARD KANDL & FRED COXEN III, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
INTERIOR, GROUND WATER STATUS REPORT, 1994, YUMA AREA, ARIZONA CALIFORNIA, at
A30 (1996) [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].

79. The Water Resources Group agencies include the Yuma County Water Users'
Association, Unit B Irrigation and Drainage District, North Gila Irrigation and
Drainage District, Cocopah Tribe, City of Yuma, Arizona Department of Water
Resources, Yuma Mesa Irrigation and Drainage District, Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation
and Drainage District, Yuma Irrigation District, Yuma County, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, and the International Boundary and Water Commission. FINAL DRAFT,
supra note 77, at 5.
80. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 77, at 1-3. The Water Resources Group proposal to
Reclamation is a lease of 25,000 acre-feet for ten years in exchange for a federal
investment of two million dollars. Id. at 1. Reclamation's operations and maintenance
costs would be $200,000 per year and the deal would be good for ten years. Interview
with John Redlinger, Deputy Area Manager, Bureau of Reclamation, supra note 76.
81. The Water Resources Group proposal includes the construction of a
trifurcation structure at the terminus of the Yuma Mesa Conduit, allowing pumped
groundwater to be diverted to the Colorado River, the MODE, or the YDP. For
reasons discussed in Part IV, treatment of pumped groundwater at the YDP may not be
feasible. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 77, at 2.
82. Id.
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support from Reclamation.13
For a modest $8.80 per acre-foot,
Reclamation can secure water to replace MODE flows diminished by
the lease of water from the Wellton-Mohawk District. Calculated
alternatively, it adds two dollars to the cost of an acre-foot of water
leased from the Wellton-Mohawk District.
However, before any changes are made to the Yuma area
groundwater pumping regime, Reclamation must evaluate the
environmental impacts with a full review as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act.14 Expected impacts include: (1) loss of
groundwater flows to the Gila River and the Colorado River main stem
in its limitrophe reach; (2) loss of groundwater flows to Mexico; and
(3) lowering of water tables in adjacent aquifers and surface waters.85
Further impacts include increased salinity in the Colorado River main
stem from the balance of groundwater pumped from the Yuma Mesa
area that Yuma Area irrigation districts will claim as return flows.86
Under this proposal, the salinity of Yuma Mesa groundwater is
expected to increase over time. The increased salinity of pumped
water will lead to increased water irrigation rates and increased need
for groundwater pumping."
Furthermore, increased groundwater
pumping will reinforce the extraordinarily high rates of water use for
irrigation in the Yuma area irrigation districts. If Reclamation were to
give Yuma Area irrigators incentives to conserve water, the reductions
in use might solve groundwater problems and reduce depletion of the
Colorado River main stem. Therefore, Reclamation must evaluate
these impacts and weigh them against the potential benefits of Yuma
area groundwater pumping.
The term of the arrangement in the Water Resources Group
proposal is also uncertain. Arizona's recent population growth is likely
to continue,8 and with it, Arizona's urban water demand. After the
ten-year term of the Water Resources Group's proposal, Arizona has
the option to refuse contract renewal with Reclamation. 89 Thus, it is
important that Reclamation evaluate the Water Resources Group
83. Id. at 1, 3.
84. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4332 (2000).
85. Reclamation considers the Yuma Mesa groundwater mound to be Arizona
groundwater rather than hydrologically connected to the Colorado River.
Furthermore, the United States and Mexico do not have agreements that govern the
management of transboundary groundwater resources. For a general discussion of
groundwater and the Colorado River, see David Getches & Charles Meyers, The River of
Controversy: Persistent Issues, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER 51, 60 (Gary D.
Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986).
86. Bureau Of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Application to Arizona
Department of Water Resources, Application For Permit to Transport Water out of
State, Narrative 3 (July 14, 2001).
87. John Redlinger, Deputy Area Manager, Boulder Canyon Operations Office,
Bureau of Reclamation, Presentation in Las Vegas, Nev. (May 8, 2001).
88. The U.S. Census Bureau projects Arizona's 2025 population at 6.412 million,
an increase of 1.614 million from the 2000 population of 4.798 million. See U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Total Population of States: 1995 to 2025,

http://www.census.gov/population/projections/state/stpjpop.txt.
89. FINAL DRAFr, supra note 77, at 3.
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proposal as a temporary source of water. Finally, the Water Resources
Group's proposal would facilitate the routing of pumped Yuma Mesa
groundwater to the YDP, which is problematic for reasons outlined in
the section below titled Yuma Desalting Plant.
Because the Water Resources Group has indicated some urgency
for increasing groundwater pumping in the Yuma Mesa area, it is likely
pumping may begin before the end of the interim period for which
the federal government receives credit for water conserved by lining
the Coachella Canal. Under these circumstances, Reclamation will
receive 25,000 acre-feet of water for which it has no obligation.
Reclamation would then be free to use this "new" water to augment
flows to the Colorado River delta in Mexico, as long as the addition of
this water to the main stem does not violate the Minute 242 salinity
standard."
iii. Ecological Advantages of Leasing Wellton-Mohawk Water and
Securing Federal Credit for Yuma Mesa Groundwater
There are two important ecological advantages to the leasing
alternative: (1) bypass flows will be replaced without creating new
storage for Colorado River water and the ecological damage created by
reduced flood flows to the Colorado River delta would be avoided; and
(2) salinity of flows to the Cidnega will be reduced.
Flood flows have restored considerable native habitat in the
Colorado River delta,9 and must be protected. The IBWC Minute
30692 commits the United States and Mexico to a collaborative process

to identify mechanisms to supply the delta with water to sustain its
ecosystems.93 The United States will violate the spirit of Minute 306 if
it takes actions to further reduce the probability of flood flows to the
delta." In addition, the Endangered Species Act may prohibit the
United States from diminishing flood flows to the delta."
Additionally, the groundwater pumped from the Yuma Mesa area
is slightly brackish at approximately 1,400 ppm.90 Reclamation analysis
indicates that addition of pumped Yuma Mesa groundwater to the
90. At such time that addition to the Colorado River main stem of pumped Yuma
Mesa groundwater would violate the salinity standard, it could be diverted to the
MODE to temporarily increase flows to the Ci~nega de Santa Clara. See also Minute

242, supra note 10.
91. LUECKEETAL., supra note 5, at 6-7.
92. Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, Minute 306: Conceptual Frameworkfor U.S.-Mex.
Studies for Future Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the
Limitrophe Section of the Colorado River and its Associated Delta (Dec. 12, 2000),
http://www.ibwc.state.gov//Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.

93. Id. at 2-3.
94. Minute 306 requires the United States to work with Mexico on the restoration
of Colorado River delta ecosystems. See id. at 2. Flood flows sustain important native

ecosystems in the Colorado River delta riparian corridor, and depleting these flows
threatens the ecosystems. See also Two Nations, supra note 27, at 832. Thus increasing
U.S. depletions will create greater obstacles to the objectives set forth in Minute 306.

95. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000).
96.

STATUS REPORT,

supra note 78.

Issue I

NEW WATER FOR THE COLORADO RVER

Colorado River main stem is likely to cause violations of the Minute
242 salinity standard during dry winter months. If the U.S. would
divert some groundwater pumped from the Yuma Mesa area, such a
diversion might reduce the probability of these violations and might
also reduce the salinity of flows to the Ci~nega. Water in the MODE
averages salinity levels of approximately 2,400 ppm;98 therefore,
calculations estimate that the annual addition of 25,000 acre-feet of
1,400 ppm water would reduce the salinity of MODE water to 2,200
ppm.
B. OPERATION OF THE YUMA DESALTING PLANT
Reclamation has proposed that it could replace bypass flows by
treating the bypass flow itself, or another source of brackish water, at
the Yuma Desalting Plant.Y The U.S. government completed the YDP
in 1992, with the capacity to produce 68,000 acre-feet of treated water
annually at a total cost of $258 million. Today the plant sits idle on
"ready reserve" status, costing approximately $5.1 million per year to
maintain.1 °
Reclamation estimates YDP operational costs at
approximately $26 to $34 million annually, resulting in a cost of
between $305 and $480 per acre-foot for treated water
At an average cost of $390 per acre-foot to desalt irrigation water,
the YDP is not a cost-effective salinity control measure by any standard.
If Reclamation is to comply with 1984 and 1995 amendments to the
CRBSCA, then operation of the YDP as a potential alternative must be
eliminated. Additionally, with annual costs of approximately $5.1
million to maintain on "ready reserve" status, °2 Reclamation should
strongly consider permanent decommissioning of the plant.
Decommissioning the YDP would cut the project's future losses and
may allow other, more cost-effective, salinity control measures to be
implemented.
i. Environmental Impacts of Yuma Desalting Plant Operation
Were the YDP to function at full capacity treating Wellton-Mohawk
District drain water, the Cidnega de Santa Clara would be destroyed
due to the reduced volume and increased salinity of the bypass flow in
the MODE. At full operating capacity, the YDP is designed to process
97,300 acre-feet of Wellton-Mohawk drain water, which has a salinity
level of 2,900 ppm, producing 68,500 acre-feet of plant product water,
at a salinity level of 295 ppm, and 28,800 acre-feet of reject water at a

97. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, YDP & Alternatives Meeting
Materials, 1996 + 30,000 AF New Valley Drainage Graph (1996).
98. Draft Interior Report, supra note 1, at 8.
99. Id. at 16-17.
100. Id. at 12.
101. Note that this figure includes amortized start-up costs of-$26.1 million. Id. at
13.
102. Id.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 6

salinity level of 9,400 ppm.0 Reclamation estimates return flow to the
Colorado River at 78,600 acre-feet of blended water; 68,500 acre-feet of
plant product water mixed with 10,100 acre-feet of Wellton-Mohawk
drain water.' 4 YDP reject water would be disposed into the MODE,
and the salinity of water flowing to the Cifnega would increase more
than threefold, compounded by an approximate seventy percent
decrease in flow quantity.
The cumulative effect of increased salinity and decreased flows
would have irreparably devastating effects on the Ci6nega. The
ecosystem will be destroyed as its water source is reduced and salinity
increases dramatically. As previously discussed, the Ci~nega provides
important habitat to significant bird populations, and harbors two
05
endangered species, the Yuma clapper rail, and the desert pupfish.
Harm to the Ci6nega's ecosystem will also impact local residents who
hunt, fish, and generate income by leading tours through the wetland.
C. OFFSTREAM STORAGE OF COLORADO RIVER FLOOD FLOWS

Reclamation has identified offstream storage of Colorado River
water as an alternative for replacing the bypass flow, and has discussed
0°6
the idea with the Arizona Water Banking Authority ("AWBA").
Reclamation claims authority to store water under the existing U.S. Central Arizona Water Conservation District ("CAWCD") settlement.' 7

Arizona has agreed to let Reclamation pay to store unused Central
Arizona Project ("CAP") water in exchange for the right to use this
water to replace the bypass flow.'00 At present, Arizona chooses not to
store all unused CAP water offstream because costs outweigh the
Because the terms of such an agreement between
benefits.'0 9
Reclamation and AWBA/CAWCD are under negotiation, the
economics of offstream storage are unknown. However, a recent deal
between Nevada and Arizona established a storage price of $200 per
acre-foot plus an additional fee to recover the water.
i. Environmental Impacts of Offstream Storage
Any increase in storage on the Colorado River will diminish the
probability of flood control releases from Hoover Dam, and will
consequently diminish flows to the Colorado River delta.

103. See Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Dataweb, ColoradoRiver Basin
Salinity Control Act, Yuma Desalting Complex Unit, EngineeringData, Facilitiesin Operation,
at http://dataweb.usbr.gov/html/lcydsengdata.html.
104. Id.
105. LUECKE ET. AL., supra note 5, at 6.
106. Las Vegas Conference, supranote 57.
107. Id.
108. Telephone Interview with John Redlinger, Deputy Area Manager, Boulder
Canyon Operations Office, Bureau of Reclamation (Aug. 1, 2001).
109. See CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 11-12 (2000).
110. Telephone Interview with John Redlinger, Deputy Area Manager, Bureau of
Reclamation, supra note 108.
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Reclamation's Record of Decision on the Interim Surplus
Guidelines,"' signed January 16, 2001, will result in considerable
reduction of flows
to the delta in order to supply California with
"surplus" water."2 The Environmental Impact Statement for the
Interim Surplus Guidelines was flawed in its failure to analyze the
impacts of reduced flows to the delta in Mexico." 3 Six environmental
organizations and more than 7,500 individuals submitted comments to
Reclamation objecting to the environmental damage to the Colorado
River delta 4expected upon implementation of the Interim Surplus
Guidelines.1
Offstream storage of Colorado River water will decrease the
probability of flows to the Colorado River delta, and will result in harm
to the native riparian ecosystem on the River's main stem." 5 The
forests that line the banks of the Colorado River below Morelos Dam
are comprised of native cottonwood and willow trees that require
periodic flooding." 6 These forests are a critical link for migrating
songbirds in the Pacific flyway, including the Southwestern willow
flycatcher, an endangered species." 7
Reduced flooding in the
Colorado River delta will also impose harm on the River's estuary and
the near-shore marine habitats that provide critical breeding area for
the totoaba, and the vaquita porpoise, both of which are also
endangered species."'
Furthermore, depletion of flows to the
Colorado River delta will further reduce the ability of local
communities, including the native Cucapfi, to continue their
traditional, river-based practices such as fishing." 9

111. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SURPLUS GUIDELINES,
STATEMENT (2001) [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDELINES].
112. See 1 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T
INTERIM SURPLUS CRITERIA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION,

FINAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

OF INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER
IMPACT STATEMENT 1-3 (2000)

[hereinafter SURPLUS CRITERIA].
113. Id. at 3.16-1 through -41 atmt.T.
114. INTERIM GUIDELINES, supra note 111, at 7-8. The environmental organizations
submitting comments included Environmental Defense, Southwest Rivers, the Pacific

Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security, the Center for
Biological Diversity, Friends of Arizona Rivers, the Glen Canyon Institute, Defenders of
Wildlife, the Sierra Club, and the Glen Canyon Action Network. 3 SURPLUS CRITERIA,
supra note 112, at B-16 through -20.
115. For more information about the Colorado River delta ecosystems, see LUECKE ET
AL., supra note 5.
116. Id. at 13-14.
117. Jacqueline Garcia-Hernandez et al., Willow FlycatcherSurveys in the ColoradoRiver
delta: Implicationsfor Management, 49J. ARID ENV'TS 161, 162 (2001).
118. LUECKEETAL., supra note 5, at 17.

119. Id. at 7-8.
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V. CONCLUSION
At some time in the future, Reclamation may no longer be able to
take credit for water conserved by lining the Coachella Canal and will
be obligated to find a new way to replace the bypass flow. At that time,
it must look carefully at economic and environmental costs of any
bypass flow replacement options. This paper demonstrates that by
leasing water from the Wellton-Mohawk District and securing
temporary rights from Arizona to pumped groundwater in the Yuma
area, Reclamation can replace the bypass flow with minimum
economic costs:
Source of Bypass Flow

Cost per acre-foot

Replacement

Leased Water
YDP Operation
Offstream Storage

$55 plus incentive
$305-480
$200 plus recovery costs

The leased water alternative also provides some environmental
benefit in the improvement of water quality in the Ci6nega. YDP
operation and offstream storage both will result in unacceptable harm
to Colorado River delta ecosystems.
The lower Colorado River, renowned for its diminished
'2
ecosystems, and dubbed in the popular press as "A River No More, 1
has experienced an unanticipated revival in its delta.
As the
importance of protecting the Colorado River delta gains wider
recognition, it becomes more likely that the water necessary will be
dedicated to sustain it. The question remains whether the requisite
changes can be made before the inevitable pressure for development
upstream deprives the delta's ecosystems of every last drop. r12 By
choosing a less costly solution, the United States can replace the bypass
flow without harming these ecosystems, demonstrate good will towards
Mexico, and preserve important species and habitat until the two
nations are ready to broker an agreement that protects them
permanently.

120. PHILIP FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE, THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST (1981).
121. See generally Two Nations, supra note 27. See alsoJennifer Pitt, Can We Restore the
ColoradoRiver delta?, 49J. ARID ENv'Ts 211 (2001).

THE RULE OF CAPTURE IN TEXAS: AN
OUTDATED PRINCIPLE BEYOND ITS TIME
ERIC OPIELA
I.

H.

III.
IV.

V.

Introduction ...................................................................... 88
A . A cton v. Blundell .................................................................
90
B. Acton In America-The English Rule Refined ................ 92
C. Houston & Texas CentralRailway Co. v. East..................... 94
D. The Rule of Capture in Texas After East......................... 96
E. Legislative Recognition of Absolute Ownership ............. 97
F. FriendswoodDevelopment Co. v. Smith Southwest
Industries, Inc. ...................................................................
98
G. Sipriano-The Ozarka Spring Water Case .......................... 100
Limitations on the Rule of Capture ..................................... 101
A . Malice and Waste .................................................................
101
B. Underground Stream s .........................................................
104
C. Surface Stream Interference ...............................................
104
D . Negligent Subsidence ..........................................................
105
Judicial Reluctance to Modify the Rule of Capture .............. 106
A . Reliance on the Rule ...........................................................
106
B. Legislative D eference ..........................................................
106
Takings Jurisprudence and Property Rights in Groundwater
Under Capture ...................................................................
108
A. Is the Right to Groundwater a Property Right? .................. 109
B. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority ........................................ 110
Recommendations For Change ............................................
111
A. Tort Reform: Recognize and Eliminate the Rule
of Capture as a Tort Defense .............................................. 111
B. Broaden the Exceptions to the Rule of Capture ................ 112
C. Abandon the Rule of Capture and Embrace
Reasonable U se ....................................................................
113
"When the well's dry, we know the worth of water."
-Benjamin Franklin'

t J.D. December 2002 University of Texas School of Law, B.A., 2000 University of
Texas at Austin.
1. Benjamin Franklin,
SCARCITY 166 (1992).

quoted in SANDRA POSTEL,

LAST OASIs: FACING WATER

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

I. INTRODUCTION
Early in our nation's history, virtually all states followed the English
rule of capture-which allows landowners to pump as much water as
needed from underneath their land, with no fear of reprisal from
neighbors whose wells are drained.
However, over time distinct
groundwater rules emerged. Western states embodied the Roman
concept of acquiring water rights by government grant in groundwater
law under the doctrine of prior appropriation, which offers vested
property rights to a specific quantity of water based on prioriy of
beneficial use-independent of the ownership of overlying land. In
the states adhering to common law doctrines of water use, four quasiriparian allocations doctrines arose: (1) the English rule of capture;
(2) the "American rule" of reasonable use; (3) the correlative rights
doctrine, which promotes shared access; and (4) the doctrine
proffered by the Restatement of the Law of Torts 2d section 858A,
which allows unrestricted beneficial use of groundwater, unless the
withdrawal causes unreasonable harm through the lowering of the
water table, the reduction of confined pressures, or if the withdrawal
has a substantial effect upon surface water.4
For more than one hundred years, Texans have taken water for
granted as a resource; a resource that, while in reality finite, most
thought to be infinitely abundant. Aside from the droughts of the
1930s and 1950s, Texas, an agricultural state dependent on water, had
enough for everyone.
However, the landscape of Texas began to change dramatically
from a largely rural, to a largely urban state during the second half of
the twentieth century. Growing demands of urban metropolises such
as San Antonio, Austin, El Paso and Juarez, Mexico strain both the
state's surface and groundwater supplies.5 As of 2000, the Rio Grande
River, the massive body of water that forms the border between Texas
and Mexico, never made it to the Gulf of Mexico. Due to excessive
pumping on both sides of the border, and drought conditions, the
river simply dried up more than 100 miles from its destination. San
Antonio has depleted the Edwards Aquifer, home to multiple
endangered species of aquatic life protected by the federal

2. The so-called English Rule is named as such since it is believed by most to have
originated in the famous 1843 English case of Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223
(Ex. Ch. 1843). It is less well known, however, that the principles of the English Rule
were first set forth in an American case, Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117 (1836).
Often cited by early American groundwater opinions, in the twentieth century its fame
has fallen in favor of the internationally better-known Acton case.
3. AM. SOC'Y OFCIVL ENG'RS, WATERREs. PLANNING & MGM'TDiv., THE REGULATED
RIPARAN MODEL WATER CODE: FINAL REPORT OF THE WATER LAWs COMMITEE, at v.

(Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 1997).
4. FLETCHERG. DRIscOLL, GROUNDWATER AND WELLS 672-73 (2d ed. 1986).
5. See generally Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: OptionsforManaging
the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 249, 250-54 (2001).
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Endangered Species Act of 1972,6 to the point of destroying
endangered species habitat, by relying on the Aquifer as its only source
of potable water.7 Similarly, in El Paso, at present rates of pumping,
the Hueco Bolson is in danger of exhausting all its available fresh
water, the only source for the thriving metropolitan area, in less than
twenty years.
In 1904, the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & Texas Central
Railway Co. v. East adopted the English rule of capture to govern Texas
groundwater law.9 In the nearly one hundred years since its adoption,
the rule of capture has evolved from a mere tort preclusion doctrine
into a vested property right, with troubling consequences for Texas'
ability to regulate groundwater use in an effort to preserve what is
quickly becoming its most scarce resource.'0 In order to understand
how Texas remains the only state that still follows this antiquated
doctrine, first the evolution of the rule of capture must be examined
from its beginnings in English law, to the outcomes it has supported in
Texas courts. Next, this article will illustrate the confusion Texas
courts have faced in trying to read principles of absolute groundwater
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
7. For a discussion of San Antonio's unique problems and the fight over the
Edwards Aquifer, see Matthew Carson Cottingham Miles, Water Wars: A Discussion of the
Edwards Aquifer Water Crisis, 6 S.C. ENVFL. L.J. 213 (1997).
8. See Kaiser & Skillern, supranote 5, at 300.
9. 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904). It is important to note. that while the rule of
capture governs Texas groundwater, the doctrine of prior appropriation governs
surface water in Texas, much like western states. Under this doctrine, surface water is
held in trust by the state for the benefit of all, subject to a state-granted right to use.
RONALD A. KAISER, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS WATER LAW: PROBLEMS AND NEEDS 19 (1987).
Those first-in-time are first-in-right to divert surface water, provided they apply it to a
beneficial use, apply for, and are granted a state-issued permit. Id. at 22. Ostensibly,
these surface water right grants are subject to cancellation if unused, but in practice,
this has rarely come into play. Id. For an extensive discussion of the development of
Texas surface water rights, see Ronald A. Kaiser, Texas Water Marketing in the Next
Millennium: A Conceptual and Legal Analysis, 27 TEX. TEcH L. REv. 181, 229-55 (1996)
[hereinafter Water Marketing]. In addition to these two major classifications, Texas also
has separate rules governing diffused surface water and underground streams.
Diffused surface water is that which does not flow in any defined watercourse or
surface body of water. Lewis v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co., 825 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex. App.
1992). Diffused surface waters are the property of the landowner until they enter a
natural watercourse, and become natural surface waters, discussed above. Id.
Underground streams are a final classification of water, distinct from percolating
groundwater, the subject of this article. While only distinguished from groundwater in
dicta, the door has been opened for Texas courts to consider subterranean streams as
waters held in trust by the state, much like natural surface waters. Denis v. Kickapoo
Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. App. 1989) (noting that if "water supplying the
spring flows to the outlet of the spring in a well-defined... subterranean channel," it
is treated as surface water). In order to meet this definition, the aquifer containing
the water has to have well-defined banks and beds. Id. at 236-37.
10. While Texas' water use decreased by nearly a million acre feet yearly since
1974, it is projected to grow by nearly two million acre-feet yearly by 2050. MARY
SANGER & CYRUS REED, TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAc

9 (2d ed. 2000). Texas' main

sources of ground water, its aquifers, are increasingly being mined, that is, pumped at
a rate not sustainable for continual use. Id. at 9-10. For example, the Ogallala aquifer,
bur nation's largest, was mined at the rate of 6.22 million acre-feet in 1995, while only
0.30 million acre-feet were returned through recharge. Id. at 10-11.
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ownership by surface owners into the tort preclusion foundation of
capture doctrine. To see the scope by which capture doctrine has
grown in Texas in the last century, this article will look at both the
limitations of the rule of capture, and exceptions that Texas courts
have drawn to the rule over the last century. This article will then
evaluate the Texas Supreme Court's reluctance to turn away from the
rule of capture, and what impact this reluctance has had on the
development of Texas groundwater preservation policy. Finally, this
article will look toward the future, and call upon the Texas courts and
the Texas Legislature to take the single most important step toward
guaranteeing the availability of water resources to all Texans:
reforming the rule of capture.
A. ACTON V. BLUNDELL

The 1843 English case of Acton v. Blundelt is the seminal
foundation of capture doctrine, and the basis of present-day Texas
2
groundwater law as formulated in East.1
In Acton, a mining company
dug coal pits on its property and pumped so much water from them
that a neighbor's wells, used to operate his cotton mill, ran dry.'3 The
miller sued for damages, arguing that his property rights in the
percolating groundwater that supplied his wells were entitled to the
same protections as those afforded holders of riparian rights in surface
streams. 4 The Acton court declined to extend the riparian rights
system to percolating groundwater, and held that any injury to an
adjacent landowner is "damnum absque inju
or
oss ...
which
does not give rise to an action for damages.""6
In formulating its holding, the Acton court applied the English
common law principle of property law, "cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad
ccelum et ad infernos" or "[t]o whomever the soil belongs, he owns also
to the sky and to the depths." 7 Initially, one might perceive that the
8
Acton court held that the rule of capture recognizes a property right."
Indeed, some commentators have taken the holding to mean just
that. 9 However, the justification the Acton court gives for the rule
indicates that the court was voicing a tort preclusion principle rather
than establishing a property right in groundwater. 20 The core holding
in Acton was "that the person who owns the surface may dig therein,
and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his free will

11.

152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. Ch. 1843).

12.
13.
14.
15.

Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1232 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1232-33.
Id. at 1235.

16.

BLAK'sLAw DIcONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990).

17. Id. at 378.
18. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235 ("We think the present case ... falls within that
principle, which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface").
19. See Kaiser & Skillern, supra note 5, at 263.
20. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233-35.
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and pleasure [,] ... inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the
description of damnum absque injurid, which cannot become the
ground of an action." 2' The Acton court advanced a number of
justifications for creating a new rule for groundwater instead of
following the riparian rights system suggested by the plaintiff.
Initially, the Acton court concluded that the rules governing
riparian rights were inadequate for governing groundwater disputes.
Riparian rights systems rely on all knowing the origin and course of a
flowing stream, as well as the uses to which each user puts his or her
share of the stream's flow.23 It recognized that at the time of its
holding, knowledge of the origin and flow of groundwater was not
readily determinable, making the application of riparian principles
difficult, if not impossible.24 Therefore, the court wrote, "there can be
no ground for implying any mutual consent or agreement... between
the owners of the several lands. ... ,,25 Thus, there was no basis for an
action in tort, as there was no duty between competing landowners.
Secondly, the Acton court noted that imposing such a duty would
impede commercial development, as once one user begins putting
groundwater to a particular use, all other uses, even those more
beneficial, would be precluded.26 The facts of the case likely led the
court to this conclusion, as the newer use plaintiff complained of was
seen as more beneficial to society, and would have to be abandoned if

21. Id. at 1235 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 1233.
23. See, e.g.,
The ground and origin of the law which governs streams running in their
natural course would seem to be this, that the right enjoyed by the several
proprietors of the lands over which they flow, is, and always has been, public
and notorious; that the enjoyment has been long continued .... indeed, time
out of mind-and uninterrupted; each man knowing what he receives and
what has always been received.... and what he transmits and what has always
been transmitted to the lower. The rule, therefore, either assumes for its
foundation the implied assent and agreement of the proprietors of the
different lands from all ages; or perhaps it may be considered as a rule of
positive law, the origin of which is lost by the progress of time; or it may not
be unfitly treated, as laid down by Mr. Justice Story,... 'as an incident to the
land;' and that whoever seeks to found an exclusive use must establish a
rightful appropriation in some manner known and admitted by the law.
Id.
24. See, e.g.,
But in the case of a well sunk by a proprietor in his own land, the water which
feeds it from a neighbouring soil, does not flow openly in the sight of the
neighbouring proprietor but through the hidden veins of the earth, beneath
its surface; no man can tell what changes these underground sources have
undergone, in the progress of time; it may well be, that it is only of
yesterday's date, that they first took the course and direction which enabled
them to supply the well: again, no proprietor knows what portion of water is
taken from beneath his own soil; how much he gives originally, or how much
he transmits only, or how much he receives: on the contrary, until the well is
sunk, and the water collected by draining into it, there cannot properly be
said, with reference to the well, to be any flow of water at all.
Id.
25. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233.
26. See id. at 1234.
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the court adopted riparian rights, rather than the rule of capture.
Finally, the Acton court justified its holding by addressing the
question of foreseeability. Since the flows of groundwater were
unknown, the liability that might follow if a landowner used more than
his share of the resource would be difficult to ascertain, and therefore
the landowner would lack notice that his or her activities would be
ruinous.2 8 By applying the tort principles of duty, breach, and
foreseeability to reach its holding, the Acton court was clearly not
recognizing a property right; rather it was merely addressing the
impracticality of recognizing a cause of action for well interference.
While later courts and commentators have taken the Acton holding
to mean the recognition of absolute ownership in groundwater, it is
obvious that one cannot claim absolute ownership in something so
fleeting as groundwater.'
First, the holding, by its nature, denies
ownership in groundwater by not providing a remedy for its
expropriation by others."0
Second, logically one does not have
absolute ownership in property by virtue of the fact that he or she is
not liable for any harm caused by its use.31 The reverse is also true: one
cannot escape liability by virtue of absolute ownership."
Stated
differently, since landowners do not have a duty to prevent harm when
pumping groundwater under the rule of capture, they can pump
freely. This right, however, can be destroyed by other landowners' free
pumping. Thus, the Acton ruling did not create a property right per se,
and clearly not a principle of absolute ownership.
B. ACTONIN AMERICA-THE ENGLISH RULE REFINED
Indeed, the first reported case citing Acton in America, Roath v.
Driscoll, the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1850 relied not on Acton as

27. Id. ("The well may be sunk to supply a cottage, or a drinking-place for cattle;
whilst the owner of the adjoining land may be prevented from winning metals and
minerals of inestimable value").
28. See id. at 1234-35.
29. Ronald A. Kaiser gives a particularly apt clarification of the groundwater
doctrine:
While Texas groundwater law is characterized as an absolute right for the
landowner, this is somewhat of a misnomer. A landowner does not have an
absolute right to the water beneath his land, but only has an absolute right to
capture it. The results of this rule can be illustrated with the following
example. Suppose landowner A's property overlies the source of percolating
groundwater that would normally flow under landowner B's property. Under
the absolute ownership rule, landowner A can capture all of the percolating
groundwater under his property, thereby depriving landowner B of any water
and B is without any legal remedy.
Water Marketing,supra note 9, at 258 n.433 (citations omitted).
30. See Corwin W. Johnson, The Continuing Voids in Texas Groundwater Law: Are
Concepts and Terminology to Blame?, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 1281, 1288-89 (1986).
31. Id. at 1289.
32. Id. at 1295 ("If we were to say 'ownership of property gives the right to do with
it as the owner please,' and reason from there, we would reach all sorts of absurd
results.") (quoting FrankJ. Trelease, Government Ownership & Trusteeship of Water, 45
CAL. L. REv. 638 (1957)).
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establishing an absolute right of ownership, but rather, in a lengthy
quotation from the Acton opinion, applied the Acton tort preclusion
principles elucidated above. 3 It was not until 1855, in Chatfield v.
Wilson, that the Supreme Court of Vermont cited Acton to forward the
concept of absolute ownership. 4 Even so, the Chatfield court did not

look to principles of property law, but rather the practical
considerations faced in identifying tortfeasors when groundwaters
were a "secret, changeable, and uncontrollable" part of the earth.
Indeed, that same year the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Wheatley v.
Baugh, cited Acton, to explicitly deny the concept of absolute
ownership in water, recognizing:
[W] ater, like air, is of such a nature that no one can have an exclusive

right in it. In the process of evaporation and condensation, it is sent,
in refreshing showers, all over the earth. In its descent to the ocean, it
necessarily passes from one to the other, and is intended for the
benefit of all. The right of each is more or less dependent upon that
of his neighbour. In this description of property, it is, therefore,
peculiarly necessary that each should be mindful of the necessities
and rights of the others. The owner of land on which a spring issues
from the earth, has a perfect rightto it against all the world, except
those through whose land it comes.
Despite this, the Indiana Supreme Court in 1860 moved closer
toward couching Acton solely in terms of absolute ownership in New

Albany and Salem R.R Co. v. Peterson.7 This was a railroad negligent
drainage case with facts similar to those facing Texas in its first
groundwater case nearly a half-century later, East. But, the Supreme
Court of Ohio, just one year later, in the 1861 case of Frazier v. Brown,
which was directly cited by the Texas Supreme Court in East,9 used
Acton, in conjunction with the previously cited American cases
interpreting it, to justify a holding denying property rights in
subterranean water, and set forth the core of the modern rule of
capture-that a landowner acquires a property right in subterranean

33. Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 542-43 (1850) (citing Acton v. Blundell, 152

Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233-35 (Ex. Ch. 1843)).
34. Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 54-55 (1855) (denying correlative rights in
groundwater) ("We think the practical uncertainties which must ever attend
subterranean waters is reason enough why it should not be attempted to subject them
to certain and fixed rules of law, and that it is better to leave them to be enjoyed
absolutely by the owner of the land, as one of its natural advantages, and in the eye of

the law a part of it, and we think we are warranted in this view by well-considered
cases.").
35. Id. at 54 ("The secret, changeable, and uncontrollable character of
underground water in its operations, is so diverse and uncertain that we cannot well
subject it to the regulations of law, nor build upon it a system of rules, as is done in the

case of surface streams.").
36.
37.
38.

25 Pa. 528, 533 (1855).
14 Ind. 90, 91-93 (1860).
Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).

39. Id. at 280-81.
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waters only when those waters are diverted, retained, or abstracted. °
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the 1862 case of Bassett
v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., first coined the term "absolute ownership" in
relation to Acton, and rejected the entire concept, holding:
No land-owner has an absolute and unqualified right to the unaltered
natural drainage or percolation to or from his neighbor's land. In
general it would be impossible for a land-owner to avoid disturbing
the natural percolation or drainage, without a practical abandonment
of all improvement or beneficial enjoyment of his land. Any doctrine
that would forbid all action of a land-owner, affecting the relations as
to percolation or drainage between his own and his neighbors' lands,
would in effect deprive him of his property; and so far from being an
application of the maxim,
"cujus est solum," would work a general
denial of effect to it. 4
In 1866, New York's highest court addressed the issue of absolute
ownership, referencing Acton and its progeny, and held, "[water] is the
same as land, and cannot be distinguished in law from land. So the
owner of the land is the absolute owner of the soil and of percolating
water, which is a part of, and not different from, the soil." However,
the Pixley court followed this sweeping statement, not with examples of
property cases, but rather by extracting various non-liability principles
from Acton and its American descendents, Roath and Chatfield.43 The
weakness of this case is particularly important to Texas, as the above
quotation found its way into the Texas Supreme Court's holding in
East, and set the stage for the confusion faced by Texas courts today as
they use two distinct definitions of the rule of capture: as a use of
groundwater for which no cause of action in tort, and as a vested
property right of absolute ownership.
C. HOUSTON & TEXAS CENTRAL RAILWAY CO. V.EAST
The Texas Supreme Court in the 1904 Houston & Texas Central
Railway Co. v. East decision adopted the Acton rule of capture and set
the stage for Texas' current problems in the arena of effective
groundwater management." As in Acton, the plaintiffs in East suffered
40. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 304-310 (1861) ("The question then is,
whether-in the absence of all rights derived either from contract or legislation-a
land owner can have any legal claims in respect to subsurface waters which, without
any distinct and definite channel, ooze, filter, and percolate from adjoining lands into
his own, when such waters are diverted, retained, or abstracted by the owner of such
adjoining lands in the use of his property, for any object of either taste or profit ... ?
Whatever points of casuistry may arise out of this question, cognizable in the court of
individual conscience, under the perfect law of Christian morals, we are of opinion
that the law of the land can recognize no such claims .... ).
41. 43 N.H. 569, 573 (1862). The court adds, "we are not aware that any of the
cases have followed this doctrine of absolute ownership rigidly to its logical conclusion
. " Id. at.. 575.
42. Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 526 (1866).
43. Id. at 526-32.
44. 81 S.W. 279, 280 (Tex. 1904).
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from well interference due to excessive pumping.45
The defendant railroad drilled wells on land adjacent to the
plaintiffs property and transported the water off for use elsewhere,
causing his well to run dry.46 Refusing to follow Acton, the court of civil
appeals reversed the trial court's judgment for the railway company
and held that a landowner's right to percolating groundwater is
qualified, not absolute, and limited by the concept of reasonable use.47
On further appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed, adopting the
Acton holding due to the public policy concerns expressed in the
English court decision:
(1) Because the existence, origin, movement, and course of such
waters, and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are
so secret, occult, and concealed that an attempt to administer any set
of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible. (2)
Because any such recognition of correlative rights would
interfere... with drainage and agriculture, mining, the construction
of highways and railroads.., and the general progress of
improvement in works of embellishment and utility.4

The East court did not merely recant the rationale of Acton. It
clearly discussed the case at bar in terms of a claim in tort.4 9 Only
briefly did the court in East even mention the concept of property in
its decision. Citing the above mentioned Pixley case, the East court
recognized a property interest at stake, but did not state that it
adopted the New York opinion as its own: "[s]o the owner of land is
the absolute owner of the soil and of percolating water, which is a part
of, and not different from, the soil. No action lies against the owner
for interfering with or destroying percolating or circulating water
under the earth's surface."" Perhaps due to this quote from the New
York courts in justifying it's holding, Texas courts have ever since been
confused regarding the application of the rule of capture as a tort
preclusion doctrine or a principle of absolute ownership.
Unfortunately, the rule of capture, post-East, has evolved in a different
direction than the East court clearly intended.

45. Id.
46. Id. Indeed the trial court held "that the use to which defendant puts its well
was not a reasonable use of their property .. " Id.
47. East v. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co., 77 S.W. 646, 647-48 (Tex. Civ. App.

1903), rev'd, 81 S.W. 279 (1904).
48. East, 81 S.W. at 281 (quoting Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861)).
49. Id. at 281-82 ("Exhaustion resulting from excavating and pumping for mining
purposes has been considered in several cases to give rise to no liability .... The
defendant here is making a reasonable and legitimate use of the water which it takes
from its own land, which use is not, in quality, different from, or in its consequences to
plaintiff more injurious than, many upheld in the decisions. There is no claim of
malice or wanton conduct of any character .. ").

50. Id. at 281 (quoting Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 526 (1866)).
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D. THE RULE OF CAPTURE IN TEXAS AFTER EAST
Initially, Texas courts saw the East decision in light of its grounding
in tort, and applied it to similar well interference cases. As early as
1923, courts used East to negate a nuisance claim of well interference."'
In Farb v. Theis, the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals reversed a
district court order enjoining the placement of a cemetery proximate
to water wells that were used for drinking.52 Plaintiffs alleged that
rainwater percolating through soil containing human graves polluted
their groundwater.53 Citing East, the court stated, "[i] t is now settled in
this state... that owners of the soil have no rights in subsurface waters
not running in well-defined channels, as against neighbors who may
withdraw them by wells or other excavations, even though this
withdrawal by the one results in the destruction of the other's water
supply."5 4 The Farb court went on to quote the Supreme Court of
Michigan in extending East to well corruption:
If withdrawing the water from one's well by an excavation

on

adjoining lands will give no right of action, it is difficult to
understand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of the adjoining

premises can be actionable, when there is no actual intent to injure,
and no negligence. The one act destroys the well, and the other does
no more; the injury is the same in kind and degree in the two cases.

It is not until 1927 that we see the first reported case in Texas
interpreting East in light of property, rather than tort law. 5' In Texas
Co. v. Burkett, the Texas Company had a contract to use spring waters
on Burkett's property.57 Burkett sued to recover upon the contract
and Texas Company claimed that the waters were not Burkett's
property and were therefore not his to sell.58 The Texas Supreme
Court ruled in favor of Burkett, and while not directly referencing
East, stated that percolating groundwater was "the exclusive property
of [the landowner], who had all the rights incident to them that one
might have as to any other species of property." 9 This statement,
combined with the previously mentioned cite to the New York Pixley
51. See Farb v. Theis, 250 S.W. 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (contemplating well
interference due to placement of cemetery near wells for drinking water). The court
cited East in one reported case prior to 1923, Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142,
1144 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). This case, too, only referred to East as standing for nonliability, however, distinguished it as only applying to subsurface interference, and not
the surface pollution complained of to hold defendant negligent for well interference.
52. Farb, 250 S.W. at 293.
53. Id. at 292.
54. Id. (citing East, 81 S.W. at 279).
55. Id. (quoting Upjohn v. Bd. of Health, 9 N.W. 845, 848 (Mich. 1881)). The Farb
opinion incorrectly references the quote as coming from the Supreme Court of
Indiana.
56. See Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (Tex. 1927).
57. Id. at 275.
58. Id. at 276.
59. Id. at 278.
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decision in East itself, has led Texas courts astray from the tort
preclusion core of East's holding ever since."
In Pecos County Water Control and Improvement District No. 1 v.
Williams, the court would not enjoin or assess damages against former
Texas gubernatorial candidate and millionaire, Clayton Williams, even
though his groundwater pumping obviously interfered with the flow of
a surface stream and caused harm to perfected surface water right
holders.1
The Plaintiffs alleged Williams extracted so much
groundwater for his ranch's irrigation operation that nearby
Comanche Springs ceased to flow at all. 6' Nevertheless, the Pecos court
held in Williams' favor, stating, "[i] t seems clear to us that percolating
or diffused and percolating waters belong to the landowner, and may
be used by him at his will." 3 The court went on to state that prior
cases "seem to hold that the landowner owns the percolating water
under his land and that he can make a non-wasteful
64 use thereof, and
such is based on a concept of property ownership.
E. LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP

With Texas courts after Burkett continually restating East as
embodying the absolute ownership principle, the Texas Legislature
jumped on the merry bandwagon and recognized ownership in
groundwater explicitly through statute. 65 The Texas Underground
Water Conservation Act of 1949 was the first such statute.66 It stated:
The ownership and rights of the owner of the land, his lessees and
assigns, in underground water are hereby recognized, and nothing in
this Section 3c shall be construed as depriving or divesting such
owner, his assigns or lessees, of such ownership or rights, subject,
however to the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to this
Section 3c. 6'

60. See, e.g., Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d. 21,
25 (Tex. 1978) (stating that Burkett applied the principle of "absolute ownership"); see
also Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 754, 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (recognizing the
embodiment of groundwater ownership in (now repealed) section 52.002 of the Texas
Water Code); City of Pleasanton v. Lower Nueces River Supply Dist., 263 S.W.2d 797,
800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (first reported case implicating East as declaring a "theory of
ownership of percolating waters.").
61. 271 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). At the time of the court's decision,
Williams had not yet run for governor.
62. Id. at 504-05.
63. Id. at 505.
64. Id.
65. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.002 (Vernon 2000) (recodified at § 36.002
(Vernon Supp. 2002)); Texas Water Code Amendments of 1985, ch. 133, § 5.01,1985
Tex. Gen. Laws 639; Texas Water Code, ch. 58, § 1, 1971 Tex. Gen. Laws 110; Texas
Water Code Act Amending Chapter 25, ch. 306, § 1, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 559.
66. Texas Water Code Act Amending Chapter 25, ch. 306, § 1, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws
559.
67. Id. § 1, § 3c(D).
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With minor amendment, this section, recodified at section 36.002
of the Texas Water Code, is still in effect today, and serves as yet
another ground upon which Texas courts have solidified the hold
absolute ownership has on the rule of capture in Texas. 8
F. FRvDSWOOD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY v SMITH-SOUTHWEST
INDUSTRIES, INC.

Second only perhaps in importance to the most recent cases
interpreting East, Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest
Industries, Inc. is illustrative in showing how Texas courts have been
confounded as to how the rule of capture should be applied-as a
principle of property law or as a tort preclusion doctrine.0 Friendswood
is distinguishable from the majority of Texas cases interpreting the
rule of capture in that the Friendswood plaintiffs did not complain of
well interference.
Instead, the plaintiffs brought nuisance and
negligence actions, alleging that the defendants' pumping caused
subsidence and withdrawal of subjacent support, and as such
interfered with the enjoyment and use of their property.7' Between
1964 and 1971, Friendswood Development Company and Exxon
Corporation developed a number of wells in the Bayport, Texas area,
from• which
they72 pumped large quantities of water for sale to other
•
industrial users. 2 Wells, completed in the area, caused a decrease in
the water table of over 325 feet, and led
to land subsidence in the
73
Baytown area of approximately five feet.
In many ways, Friendswood was the perfect test case to force the
Texas Supreme Court to resolve the tort/property capture
conundrum. The harm claimed was not merely a negligent withdrawal
or contamination well interference case; it presented a novel issue in
tort-whether the preclusion doctrine embodied in the East decision
could be used in a case involving negligent withdrawal of subjacent
support.71 On the other hand, it presented an important property
question: whether absolute ownership of groundwater can be truly
absolute if it can be visibly withdrawn, to the unfortunate end of the
destruction of the real property overlying it, with no cause of action or

TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002 (Vernon 2002) reads:
The ownership and rights of the owners of the land and their lessees and
assigns in groundwater are hereby recognized, and nothing in this code shall
be construed as deprivingor divestingthe owners or their lessees and assigns of
the ownership or rights, except as those rights may be limited or altered by
rules promulgated by a district. (Emphasis added).
See also Bartley v. Sone, 527 S.W.2d 750, 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (citing then-section
52.002 of the Texas Water Code).
69. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
70. Id. at 21-22.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 22.
73. Id. at 23.
74. FriendswoodDev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 24.

68.
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remedy for such taking.7 5 The Friendswood case also created a
competition between the laws of property and the laws of tort; can an
absolute right of property-the right to subjacent support-be
disregarded in favor of a doctrine of non-liability? Can this be done
ironically in the name of preserving a different property rightabsolute ownership in groundwater?
Unfortunately, the Texas
Supreme Court in Friendswood proved not up to the challenge and
answered both of the foregoing questions in the affirmative. 6 In doing
so it took the open window of opportunity for clarification of the East
rule and shut it in favor of rigid adherence to its misguided precedent,
muddying the waters of capture doctrine even more.
Initially, the Friendswood court acknowledged that the East rule
appeared to quickly resolve the issues at bar: any harm caused by
groundwater withdrawal is not actionable. This punt to non-liability
ignores the property concerns inherent in a loss of subjacent support
action-this was a case involving a noxious use of property, "not a case
involving conflicting
claims to the ownership or nontortious use of
,,78
water ....
Using East as a rubric for discussion, the Friendswoodcourt centered
on the common law limitations inherent in the rule of capture:
malicious intent and wanton waste.79 After quoting City of Corpus Christi
to state that the foregoing were the "only such limitations" adopted by
the East court, the Friendswood court referred to a 1969 English
subsidence case, Langbrook Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey County Council.8 °
Following the narrow common-law limitations on capture doctrine, the
Langbrook court stated, "[in such circumstances the principle of sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas [use your property so as not to injure the
property of another] does not operate... 'Is there any room for the
law of nuisance or negligence to operate? In my judgment there is
not.' '. With Langbrook as its justification, the Friendswood majority
proclaimed that since, under the rule of capture the defendants had
no duty to prevent harm caused by groundwater withdrawals, the
subsidence did not constitute an "unlawful invasion of the right of
another" or "breach of a legal duty.",2 While at the same time denying
a duty or breach of that duty on the part of the defendants, the
Friendswood court crafted a "new" duty and cause of action out of the

75. Id. at 25-27.
76. Id. at 29, 30.
77. Id. at 24-25.
78. Id. at 24. The Friendswood court seems to recognize this momentarily, but
quickly confuses the issue by couching it in terms of "reasonable use," a doctrine
dismissed in East. Id. at 24-25.
79. Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 26 (citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of
Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1955)).
80. Id. at 26, 28 (considering Langbrook Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey County Council,
3 ALL E.R. 1424 (Ch. 1969)).
81. Id. at 28 (quoting Langbrook Properties,Ltd., 3 ALL E.R. at 1440).
82. Id. (quoting Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 151 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. 1941) &
State v. Brewer, 169 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. 1943)).
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Texas legislature's regulatory powers over subsidence, and announced
that "after the date this opinion becomes final," if a landowner
negligently withdraws groundwater, leading 3to subsidence, "he will be
liable for the consequences of his conduct."
While dismissing a claim in tort, the Friendswood court complicated
its holding by including language that ventured into the realm of
property law. It referred to the rule of capture as a rule of property
law, not tort, stating, "[o] ur decision results from what we conceive to
be our duty to apply a rule of property law,"84 and later that " [ m] ost...
critics [of the rule of capture] ...recognize that it has become an
established rule of property law in this State .... At the same time,
the Friendswood court made clear that its holding was based solely on
East's tort preclusion doctrine: "[w]e follow the English rule and
Restatement of Torts § 818 (1939) in holding that defendants
8 6 are not
liable on plaintiff's allegations of nuisance and negligence."
Justice Pope, in his dissent, pointed out the absurdity of the
majority's claim that it was deciding a question of property law:
"8

The court has decided this cause upon the mistaken belief that the
case is governed by the ownership of ground water. Plaintiffs assert
no ownerships to the percolating waters pumped and extracted from
the ground by defendants. They make no complaint that their own

wells have been or will be pumped dry. They seek no damages for the
defendants' sale of the water. Plaintiffs' action calls for no change in
nor even a review of the English rule of "absolute ownership" of

ground water, the American rule of "reasonable use" of ground

water, nor the Texas rule of "nonwasteful" use of ground water. They
claim no correlative rights in the water. The Texas law of percolating
waters is not put in issue by this suit, and there is no occasion to
overrule that law either now or prospectively.

Justice Pope recognized the Friendswood majority's mistake in
continuing to muddle the property and tort aspects of the rule of
capture.

G. SIPRIANO-THE OZARKA SPRING WATER CASE
Despite the confusing holding in Friendswood, the Texas Supreme
Court has come full circle and returned to evaluating the rule of
capture as a tort preclusion doctrine in Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of
America, Inc.8" The facts of Sipriano were similar to those of East and
Acton; the plaintiffs alleged well interference due to negligent overpumping. 9 The defendants, who bottled Ozarka brand spring water,

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 30.
FriendswoodDev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 22.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31 (Pope,J, dissenting).
1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
Id. at 75-76.

Issue I

RULE OF CAPTURE

began pumping approximately 90,000 gallons of groundwater per day,
seven days a week from land adjoining the plaintiffs." As could be
predicted, the Sipriano court relied on East, and stated that no action
would lie for the harm claimed. 9' Couching its decision solely in terms
of tort law and not property, the court characterized the rule of
capture as "answer[ing] the question of what remedies, if any, a
neighbor has against a landowner based on the landowner's use of the
water under the landowner's land." 2 The answer, presupposed in light
of East and its progeny, is that no remedies are available.
The reluctance of Texas courts to address, once and for all, the
nature of the holding in East is an impediment to effective
groundwater management. While many have argued for the wholesale
abandonment of capture doctrine, East, and its confused offspring,93
this is but one option to consider as Texas struggles to address its
growing groundwater shortage. The rule of capture is still viable, in
part due to its exceptions.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE RULE OF CAPTURE
A. MALICE AND WASTE

As previously mentioned, under the common law, a landowner was
liable for his groundwater withdrawals only if he acted with intentional
malice or if he practiced wanton waste. 94 While ideal in the abstract,
both of these exceptions are ineffectual in practice, but for differing
reasons. The essential element of malice, intent, is notoriously hard to
prove95 and has never come into play in a reported Texas groundwater
case.
The waste exception, on the other hand, has been the subject of
considerable debate. From early on, Texas courts refused to apply the
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 76.
93. For a compelling synopsis of the many arguments against the rule of capture,
see Justice Hecht's concurring opinion in Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 81-83 (Hecht, J.,
concurring); Lana Shannon Shadwick puts Texas groundwater law under capture
bluntly:
[P] resent Texas groundwater law relegates groundwater resources to mere
incidents of private property. As such, it is subject only to ineffectual token
limitations and is thus rendered virtually unregulated. Restated, "[i]f a
person drills a well, and sucks his neighbor's dry, well that's fair game ......
A rule asserting that the "first man there, wins," is a loser environmentally.
Worse, from a jurisprudential standpoint, the law being grounded on early
English common law is, of itself, nothing more than a default position rooted
in ignorance.
Lana Shannon Shadwick, Note, Obsolescence, Environmental Endangerment and Possible
FederalIntervention Compel Reformation of Texas GroundwaterLaw, 32 S. TEX. L. REv. 641,
665 (1991) (citation omitted).
94. Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 21-22; City of Corpus Christi v. City of
Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1955).
95. See Kevin Smith, Comment, Texas Municipalities' Thirst for Water: Acquisition
Methods for Water Planning,45 BAYLORL. REv. 685, 709 (1993).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

96
However, after the Texas
rule of capture in the face of waste.
Supreme Court's decision in City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton,
waste was eviscerated of much of its meaning. 9 The case centered
around an agreement by which Corpus Christi extracted groundwater
at the rate of approximately ten million gallons per day and then
transported the water 118 miles down the bed of the Nueces River to
Corpus." Corpus Christi's methods for obtaining sufficient quantities
of water for its burgeoning municipal needs have long driven a rift
between the city and rural farmers and ranchers along the Nueces and
its tributaries, the Frio and Atascosa Rivers. The court opened a
loophole as large as Texas when it held that the common law waste
prohibition referred to waste in use and not in transport. 99 As a result,
the loss of sixty-three to seventy-four percent, averaging seven million
gallons per day, of groundwater in transportation did not amount to
waste under the definition of the court.'0 The majority in City of
Corpus Christi ignored the argument propounded by dissenting Justice
Wilson that even if waste is defined solely as waste in use, the water lost
during transportation is not used at all and is therefore waste as well.'
As happens so many times, the Texas Supreme Court has again
come full circle, this time using a broad definition of waste to limit the
rule of capture. In February 2002, the Texas Supreme Court issued an
opinion in Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, which has the potential to
transform the common law capture doctrine into a more effective
conservation tool than it heretofore had potential to become.0 2 While

96. See Cantwell v. Zinser, 208 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (stating that
while East did not pass upon the question of waste, "[w]aste ...is against the public
policy of this State," and "such right does not exist.").
97. City of Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 799-800.
98. Id. at 799-800.
99. Id. at 802.
100. Id. at 800, 803.
101. Id. at 806 (Wilson,J., dissenting).
102. 71 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2002). The Edwards Aquifer area is the only part of Texas
where the rule of capture has been superceded-only through the impetus of federal
legal action under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Todd H. Votteler, The Little
Fish That Roared: the Endangered Species Act, State Groundwater Law, and PrivateProperty
Rights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. L. 845, 851 (1998). Depletion of

the Edwards Aquifer has caused flows to decline in the Comal and San Marcos springs
feeding the Guadalupe River. Id.These springs are the habitat of eight federally-listed
endangered or threatened species. Id. The Sierra Club filed a lawsuit under the ESA
and as a result, the Texas Legislature passed the Edwards Aquifer Act. Id. at 856, 860.
The new law set up the Edwards Aquifer Authority for the purpose of regulating
groundwater withdrawals from the Aquifer, and to account for their impacts on
surface waters. Id. at 860. However, in 1996 the Act was declared unconstitutional, Id.
at 858, but the legislature refined the act through substantial amendment in 1995. Id.
at 866. When challenged again, the amended Act was upheld. Barshop v. Medina
County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 623, 638 (Tex. 1996).
While the Act was in litigation, the Sierra Club sued again, and the federal district

court enjoined groundwater withdrawals. Votteler, supra note 102, at 869. The Fifth
Circuit vacated the injunction. Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 798
(5th Cir. 1997). In response to the new litigation, the Texas legislature mandated that
the Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission (now the Texas Council on
Environmental Quality) consider the effects of proposed applications for new surface
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more closely watched due to its regulatory takings implications, the
Bragg decision has important ramifications for the common law waste
exception to the rule of capture, despite the fact that the opinion does
not reference the capture rule.
Glenn and JoLynn Bragg applied to the Edwards Aquifer Authority
("Authority") for permits to withdraw groundwater from two wells to
irrigate their commercial pecan orchards. 10 Pursuant to Authority
rules, its general manager recommended that the permit for one of
the wells be denied because the Braggs showed no beneficial use
within the rules' specified historical time period. 01 4 The general
manager also recommended that the Braggs' permit for the other well
be limited to two acre-feet of water for each acre historically irrigated,
which according to the Braggs, was an insufficient amount to sustain
their orchard.•'0 The Braggs did not immediately assert a takings claim
16
since the Authority had not yet taken a final administrative action.
The Braggs instead argued that under the Texas Private Real Property
Rights Preservation Act, the Authority was required to prepare a
takings impact assessment ("TIA"). 07The court held that no TIA was
necessary because groundwater permit rulemaking falls under the
"statutory authority to prevent waste or to protect the rights of owners
of interest in groundwater"'
exception of the Property Rights
Preservation Act. Furthermore, the court broadened the scope of the
waste exception by holding that the authority to prevent waste
"refers... to the broader concept of preventing waste by conserving,
protecting, and preserving the aquifer though the Legislature's
designated permit system."
For the first time, the Texas Supreme
Court bridged the gap between Texas' groundwater and oil and gas
laws; both being governed by the rule of capture, however, were
radically different due to the Texas Railroad Commission's ability to
regulate oil and gas withdrawals based on principles of conservation
and prevention of waste." 0
Bragg opened the door for future Texas legislatures to finally
empower locally elected groundwater conservation districts with the
water rights on groundwater and groundwater recharge. TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 11.151 (Vernon 2000). However this new scheme still leaves gaps in conjunctive
management: It does not address pre-existing surface use, nor the effects of
groundwater uses on surface uses.
103. Bragg,71 S.W.3d at 732.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 732-33.
108. Bragg,71 S.W.3d at 738; TEX GOV'T CODE § 2007.003(b) (11) (C) (Vernon 2000).
109. Bragg,71 S.W.3d at 736.
110. Id. ("This is similar to the concept of governmental action taken to prevent
waste of oil and gas and to protect the correlative rights of owners of interests in oil
and gas....") (citing R.R. Comm'n v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 688-89
(Tex. 1992) (holding that Railroad Commission could promulgate rules to prevent
waste and promote conservation, and was not required to determine questions of
waste by contested-case proceeding)).
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powers necessary to regulate groundwater withdrawals without
running afoul of the rule of capture. While the Bragg decision is of
concern due to its property rights implications, it shows a willingness
on the part of the Texas Supreme Court to work within the existing
framework to judicially promote groundwater conservation.
B. UNDERGROUND STREAMS

In addition to the common law exceptions of malice and waste,
Texas courts have held that the rule of capture does not apply to
underground waters running in defined channels."' Underground
streams, like surface streams, are considered to be public property,
held in trust by the state, and therefore, not subject to the rule of
capture." 2 However, underground waters are presumed to be
percolating and for the exception to apply, a prospective plaintiff must
prove that the alleged subterranean water course has all of the
characteristics of a surface stream: bed, banks forming a channel, and
current of water." 3 In Burkett, the court seemed to intimate that this
presumption could be rebutted if underground waters were "of
sufficient magnitude to be of any value to riparian proprietors, or
added perceptibly to the general volume of water in the bed of the
stream . . .
However, the court ignored this statement in Pecos
County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1 v. Williams, where
excessive groundwater withdrawals caused Comanche Springs to cease
flowing, in turn depriving surface water users of their state-granted
perfected surface water rights. "5 The Pecos plaintiffs claimed the
groundwater flowed in a defined channel, but the court, while failing
to specify what evidence would be sufficient to establish a well-defined
channel," 6 held that "plaintiff's allegations that because the pumping
of defendants' wells materially reduced and/or dried up Comanche
Springs [does not alone]
prove the existence of a well defined
' 7
underground channel."
.

C. SURFACE STREAM INTERFERENCE

As seen in Pecos, Texas courts have also denied protection against
interference with surface water rights by groundwater pumping.
Groundwater deposits are often hydrologically connected to surface
waters. As a result, excessive pumping can diminish stream flows and,
in some cases, cause a hydrologically connected surface stream to
111. See e.g., Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235, 236-37 (Tex. App. 1989).
112. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon 2000).
113. Tex. Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (Tex. 1927); Denis, 771 S.W.2d at 236-37;
Pecos County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503,
506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
114. Burkett, 296 S.W. at 278.
115. Pecos County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 271 S.W.2d at 503.
116. Id. at 507 ("We do not attempt here to lay down a rule for pleading such a
fact .....
117. Id.
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cease flowing altogether. However, under the rule of capture, surface
water users do not have a cause of action against groundwater
pumpers." 8 For example, in Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., the court held
that landowners were not liable to downstream riparian right holders
for withdrawing groundwater that contributed to the stream's flow."9
In Denis, the defendant landowner captured spring waters on his
property, measured the amount captured, discharged the water into
Kickapoo Creek, and then withdrew the same amount one mile
downstream. 2 The landowner's springs, however, naturally created
the principle source flow for Kickapoo Creek, and, without his
"diversion," which really only consisted of controlling the flow and
measuringT it through a well and piping apparatus, would have fed into
the creek.*"
The Denis court referred to the rule of capture as a rule of
1 and held that because the landowner captured the waters
property22
before they surfaced, he gained ownership of the waters.2 2 Burkett's
stream volume exception 24 was dismissed by the Denis court as
inconsistent with the rule of capture under East.125
D. NEGLIGENT SUBSIDENCE
In Friendswood, the Texas Supreme Court crafted another
exception to the rule of capture, by imposing future liability for
negligently causing subsidence. 2 6 This exception has allowed for the
creation of local subsidence districts2 1 with power to regulate pumping
in an effort to prevent subsidence. Regulatory actions by these districts
that cabin the rule of capture, such as fees based on pumping volume
and well permitting
within their jurisdictions, have been upheld by
2
Texas courts. 1

118. See id.
119. 771 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Tex. App. 1989).
120. Id. at 236.
121. Id.
122. Id. ("groundwater percolating beneath the soil is the property of the owner of
the surface who may, in the absence of malice, appropriate such water while on his
premises and make whatever use of it as he pleases.").
123. Id. at 239.
124. See text accompanying notes 102-04.
125. Denis, 771 S.W.2d at 238.
126. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.
1978).
127. See, e.g., Act Creating the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., ch. 284,
§ 1, 1975 Tex. Laws 672.
128. See Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75
(Ct. Civ. App. 1978), affd, 563 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1978).
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III. JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO MODIFY THE RULE OF
CAPTURE
While the rule of capture has been soundly denounced by critics
and Texas courts alike, little change has been made to the doctrine by
either the judiciary or the legislature since East.'29 The justifications
provided by the court in East no longer exist.1 30 The appeal of the
doctrine has waned greatly as science and progress have allowed us to
better understand how underground waters flow. In light of capture
doctrine's roots in tort, the only true justification for its continued

existence is gone. If not for the lone holdout, Texas, the doctrine
would be gone as well. 3 '
A. RELIANCE ON THE RULE

Initially, Texas courts adhered to the rule of capture by proffering
reliance as a justification.3 ' As Texas moves into an era of ever
increasing water management problems, reliance becomes a faint
rationale for maintaining an antiquated doctrine. While a landowner
may rely on the rule to absolve him of liability for pumping his

neighbor's well dry, the rule will also fail to protect him if his well
should be pumped dry by his neighbor. Some of capture's most
ardent supporters, including some of those who have built their
livelihoods in reliance on the rule, such as farmers, ranchers, and
industry, faced, with the unquenchable thirst of neighboring
33
municipalities, are now its most vocal opponents.1

B. LEGISLATIVE DEFERENCE
Most recently, Texas courts have offered legislative deference as a
rationale for maintaining the status quo. The Texas Constitution tasks
the legislature with passing laws to protect and conserve the state's

129. See, e.g., FriendswoodDev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 28-29 ("We agree that some aspects
of the English or common law rule as to underground waters are harsh and
outmoded, and the rule has been severely criticized since its reaffirmation by this
Court in 1955."); see alsoJoe R. Greenhill & Thomas Gibbs Gee, Ownership of Ground
Water in Texas; The East Case Reconsidered, 33 TEX. L. REV. 620, 630 (1955) (Texas
groundwater law after East "invite [s]considerable strengthening and improvement.").
130. Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280-81 (1904).
131. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 81-82 (Tex.
1999) (Justice Hecht in his concurrence stated, "Thirty five years [after Texas adopted
the rule of capture] only eleven of the eighteen western states still followed the rule of
capture; after two more decades, only three western states still followed the rule. Now
there is but one lone holdout: Texas.") (citation omitted).
132. Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 29 ("the rule has been relied on by
thousands of farmers, industries, and municipalities ....).
133. "Since the advent of the ESA, some of the most vocal opponents of government
intervention have become ardent supporters of regulation because such an approach
may eventually provide certainty through the creation of firm water rights." Ralph
K.M. Haurwitz, Maurice Rimkus: Coming Around on Water Reform, AUSTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Dec. 28, 1997, at A15, cited inVotteler, supra note 102, at 876.
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Texas courts have understandably been cautious

to upset the framework established close to a century ago.'35 In the
1999 Sipriano case, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly punted to the
legislature stating, "[i] t would be improper for courts to intercede at
this time by changing the common-law framework within which the
Legislature has attempted to craft regulations to meet this state's
groundwater-conservation needs."'36 Since Sipriano came "on the heels

of Senate Bill 1" in which the Texas Legislature granted local
groundwater conservation districts increased authority to regulate
groundwater, the court thought it "more prudent to wait and see"
3
to develop. 1
rather than upset the new framework before it had time
Unfortunately, while the Texas Supreme Court has restrained itself
from judicial activism, lower Texas courts have not done the same. In
the 2001 South Plains Lamesa Railroad, Ltd. v. High Plains Underground
Water Conservation District No.1 case, the groundwater conservation
district revoked one permit issued under the Senate Bill 1 framework
and denied another because the amount pumped by the landowner
was disproportionate to his tract size.' The court of appeals held the
district's action invalid because the legislature had not specifically
authorized groundwater conservation districts to conduct rulemaking
regarding the size of the tract to be drained by a well, even though
section 36.101 of the Texas Water Code allowed the district to make

rules to prevent waste.
Texas courts have made it clear that the legislature is the preferred
choice for any modification of the rule of capture. Yet, at the same
time they have impeded efforts at legislative change. 4 ' While the
134. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 59(a) ("The conservation and development of all of the
natural resources of this State ... and the preservation and conservation of all such
natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and
duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto.").
135. It is important to note, however, that prior to Senate Bill 1, the Texas
Legislature had only made two exceptions to the rule of capture. In 1975, the
Legislature created the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District to limit
withdrawals from the Gulf Coast Aquifer, after excessive pumping caused serious
property damage through subsidence by as much as ten feet. RIcK CALLAWAY, HARRISGALVESTON COASTAL SUBSIDENCE DISTRIcT: A
LIMITATIONS OF POWERS AND PROGRESS 1 (1986),

REPORT ON ITS CREATION,

POWERS,

cited in Todd H. Votteler, Raiders of the
Lost Aquifer? Or, The Beginning of the End to Fifty Years of Conflict Over the Texas Edwards
Aquifer, 15 TUL. ENVrL. L.J. 257, 270 (2002). The constitutionality of the District was
upheld in Beckendorff v. Harris-Galveston Costal Subsidence Dist., 558 S.W.2d 75, 77
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977). The second exception was the creation of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority, see supra text within note 102.
136. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80.
137. Id. at 79-80.
138. South Plains Lamesa R.R., Ltd. v. High Plains Underground Water
Conservation Dist. No. 1, 52 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Tex. App. 2001).
139. Id. at 778-79.
140. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 83 (Hecht, J., concurring) ("Does the Court intrude on
the Legislature's constitutional responsibility and duty by maintaining the rule of
capture or by abandoning it? It is hard to see how maintaining the rule of capture can
be justified as deference to the Legislature's constitutional province when the rule is
contrary to the local regulation that is the Legislature's 'preferred method of
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Texas Supreme Court early in the twentieth century created the
problem posed by a property law-based interpretation of the rule of
capture, the legislature compounded the problem soon after by
writing this flawed interpretation of the East decision into positive
law. " ' Nearly a century of caselaw and even statutory recognition of
groundwater as property poses another legal obstacle for those wishing
to modify the rule of capture-the possibility of a takings claim against
the state for destruction of the property right in groundwater
ownership.
IV. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
GROUNDWATER UNDER CAPTURE
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.""' The right to own and enjoy one's property is one of
the fundamental rights on which our system of law and government
rests. When the state takes private property for public use, the owner
of that property has the right to be compensated for such taking and
to be paid damages as just compensation for the taking. The Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides a direct cause of
action for its violation, and 14in
fact, is the only express money damages
3
remedy in the Constitution.
In Hage v. United States, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims held that
the Fifth Amendment protected water rights.'" Hage involved a claim
for just compensation for the taking of water rights in a surface stream
that ran through an area under United States Forest Service
jurisdiction. 4 1 In that case, the court soundly rejected the position put
forward by the government that water rights were not protected
against uncompensated taking by the Fifth Amendment, stating
instead that:
Amici provides no reason within our constitutional tradition why
water rights, which are as vital as land rights, should receive less
protection.... This court holds that water rights are not "lesser" or
"diminished" property rights unprotected by the Fifth Amendment.
Water rights, 4like other property rights, are entitled to the full protection of the
Constitution.1 6

groundwater management."').
141. TEX. WATER CODEANN.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

§ 36.002 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2002).

143. For an informed discussion of property rights and takings jurisprudence, see
NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING
GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1997),

144.
145.

35 Fed. CI. 147, 172 (1996).
Id. at 150.

146.

Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
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Regulation of surface waters in Texas, however, has withstood
takings challen es because, in Texas, the state is the defacto owner of
surface waters. " To have a right to surface waters, and only a
usufructuary one at that, one must apply for and obtain a permit. In
contrast, under the rule of capture in Texas, landowners have a
property right to absolute ownership in groundwater." Where any
state permitting or regulatory system grants rights with respect to
surface waters that do not previously exist, any regulation on
groundwater would limit rights supposedly vested
to the landowner,
49
making a takings challenge much more viable.1
A. IS THE RIGHT TO GROUNDWATER A PROPERTY RIGHT?

Todd H. Votteler, in his article on the Edwards Aquifer and
property rights, argues that under the rule of capture, a right to
underground water lacks the defining characteristics of a property
right: universality, exclusivity, transferability, and enforceability."'
Ironically, the regime so many have advocated as protecting private
property rights in groundwater, when allowed to run its natural course,
leads to the downfall of usable free-market property rights in
groundwater. In addition, the statutory language enacted by the Texas
Legislature that explicitly recognizes ownership in groundwater also
includes a proviso that the state can limit and alter this ownership and

147. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon 2000); see also In re Adjudication of
the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe River Basin, 642
S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) (holding that termination of surface water rights was not
an unconstitutional taking).
148. Despite numerous statements to this effect in both caselaw and statute, the
Texas Supreme Court in Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 630-31 (Tex. 1996), "assum[ed] without deciding" that
landowners have a property right in groundwater, and went on to state that in order to
succeed at a takings challenge, a prospective plaintiff would have to first establish that
he had a property right in groundwater.
149. For a specific discussion of the takings problem in regard to state
appropriation, see Stephen E. Snyder, Comment, Ground Water Management: A Proposal
for Texas, 51 TEx. L. REv. 289, 314 (1973) (noting that state appropriation of
groundwater might be an unconstitutional taking). In order to establish a state-wide
permitting system for groundwater, it would have to go the costly route of exercising
eminent domain, an unlikely path. See Roger Tyler, Underground Water Regulation in
Texas, 39 TEx. B.J. 532, 538 (1976).
150. SeeVotteler, supra note 102, at 875:
In the Edwards Aquifer, none of these characteristics have been present
under the rule of capture. There was no universality because entitlements
could not be specified under a system where a pumper's use of water was
vulnerable to extraction by a neighbor. Exclusivity did not exist. During
periods when pumping was not needed, well owners did not have the option
of leasing or selling the water to which they had access.
Similarly,
transferability did not exist. Even if a well owner was paid not to pump water,
nothing prevented another landowner from drilling a new well into the
Aquifer to begin pumping. Thus a transfer would be rendered meaningless
because the purchaser was not protected from excessive pumping by other
users. Finally, there could be no enforceability of a property right for all of
the reasons stated above. There was no effective way to prevent one pumper
from encroaching on another individual's property right.
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the rights associated with it."' This analysis begs the question, what
practical interest in groundwater is exactly "owned" by a landowner?
B. BRAGG V. EDWARDS AQUIFERAUTHORITY
The success of a takings challenge to groundwater regulation
remains uncertain. Just this Spring, in Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer
Authority, the Texas Supreme Court punted the issue by holding that a
statutory exception for waste under the Texas Private Real Property
Rights Preservation Act made it unnecessary for the Authority to
perform a mandatory Takings Impact Assessment (TIA) required
under the Act. 52 However, a takings challenge under the Act will
likely be unsuccessful for the same reasons that a TIA was not required
in Bragg. A groundwater conservation district, as a political subdivision
of the state, can promulgate regulations restricting the use of
groundwater under its "authority to prevent waste""" both in statute
and under the common law capture doctrine. Texas' rule of capture
only recognizes a right to groundwater that is put to non-wasteful uses;
with no right to the groundwater that is regulated, one cannot claim a
regulatory taking. Despite the waste loophole to a regulatory taking
based on the rule of capture recognized in Bragg, the sun has not set
on the viability of a takings claim over groundwater regulation in
Texas. The critical question still left unanswered by Texas courts is the
degree of rights and ownership in groundwater under the rule of
capture, in any truly exists.
While a complete examination of regulatory takings jurisprudence
as it relates to groundwater in Texas is beyond the scope of this
discussion, it is important to note that Texas courts' perversion of the
East principle into a property right has opened the door to costly
regulatory takings claims the moment any state agency chooses to
enforce any regulation limiting the use of groundwater.'54 Any
legislative modification of the rule of capture is also not likely to
escape takings scrutiny.

151. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2002); see also Kaiser &
Skillern, supra note 5, at 250-51 ("The notion of private property rights in groundwater
is so entrenched in both landowner and legislative psyche that any attempt to regulate
the pumping of groundwater provokes significant political and legal opposition.")
(citation omitted).
152. 71 S.W.3d 729, 738 (Tex. 2002).
153. TEx GOV'T CODE § 2007.003(b) (11) (C) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2002).
154. For a more complete discussion of regulatory takings and groundwater rights
under Texas' rule of capture, see generally Stephanie E. Hayes Lusk, Comment, Texas
Groundwater:Reconciling the Rule of Capture with Environmental and Community Demands,
30 ST. MARY's L.J. 305 (1998).
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
As stated earlier, Texas follows the capture doctrine for
groundwater, yet follows the western doctrine of prior appropriation
for surface water.'5 Unfortunately, the rules of capture and prior
appropriation encourage incompatible behaviors by water users,
depending on the source from which one draws water.
This
contributes to the deleterious effects of droughts by treating surface
and groundwater as separate legal entities while ignoring the
fundamental hydrologic connection between them. The existing legal
framework in Texas serves as a disincentive to efficient conjunctive
use, and is a complicating factor for those tasked with managing
Texas' surface and groundwater resources.'57 The following discusses
three ways in which Texas can respond to these problems.
A. TORT REFORM: RECOGNIZE AND ELIMINATE THE RULE OF CAPTURE
AS A TORT DEFENSE

Texas courts should recognize that the rule of capture has its roots
in tort law rationales that no longer exist, and eliminate it as a defense
to well interference claims.
This would have the effect of
implementing a reasonable use system in Texas, as it would force
landowners to answer to their neighbors when they begin to mine
aquifers rather than engage in sustainable use practices.
The
legislature's preferred method of groundwater management, local
groundwater conservation districts, would work hand-in-hand with a
judicial abrogation of capture in identifying the carrying capacity of
aquifers and setting reasonable use pumping limits.
The Texas Supreme Court clearly has the ability to modify the rule
of capture. First, the rule was brought to Texas judicially in East.'58 In
addition, the court has modified the rule before and intimated that it
would, when necessary, in the future. 9 The court's statement in
Sipriano is particularly apt: " [w] e do not shy away from change when it
is appropriate. We continue to believe that 'the genius of the common
law rests in its ability to change, to recognize when a timeworn rule no
longer serves the needs of society, and to modify the rule
155. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
156. 1 do not argue for the institution of prior appropriation in Texas groundwater.
Lessons learned in the western states militate against establishing prior appropriation
across the board in Texas. For an informed discussion of the problems faced when
applying priority to groundwater resources, see A. Dan Tarlock, PriorAppropriation.
Rule, Principle, or Rhetoric?, 76 N.D.L. REv. 881, 900-07 (2000), compare Lana Shannon
Shadwick, supra note 93, at 702-03 (advocating the establishment of prior
appropriation in Texas).
157. See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosisof Western Water Policy: Have FederalLaws
and Local DecisionsEclipsed the States'Role, 20 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 3, 28-29 (2001).
158. Sipriano v. Great Springs Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tex. 1999)
(Hecht, J., concurring).
159. E.g., Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30
(Tex. 1978).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

6

accordingly." 1
By judicially reforming Texas' tort doctrine, the court would not
be acting within the province of the legislature. The Texas Legislature
would still be free to enact conservation measures to fulfill its
constitutional mandate. However, conservation legislation can only go
so far in preventing harm due to over-pumping and providing
remedies for those harmed by overdrafts. In fact, without judicial
modification of the capture doctrine, most, if not all, use limitations
passed by the legislature or local groundwater conservation districts
would be subject to regulatory takings claims.
A judicial reinterpretation of the East decision, and the English
Rule upon which it is based, would also preclude potential takings
claims, as one could not claim a property right in groundwater if one
was not recognized in the common law of Texas. Justice Scalia, in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,indicated that no compensation
may be required if the regulation in question would have the same
effect as limitations on use due to state or common law nuisance
doctrine, even if the regulation deprived the landowner of all
economically viable use of his property. 62 If the Texas Supreme Court
abrogated the rule of capture altogether and imposed liability for
harm to other groundwater users, it could enjoin or limit groundwater
pumping that constituted a nuisance. After such an abrogation,
regulations limiting pumping or even prohibiting it altogether would
have the same effect as a judicial recognition that the prohibited
pumping was a nuisance and would, therefore, not constitute a
regulatory taking.
B. BROADEN THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF CAPTURE

Realizing the politically charged nature of any discussion over
eliminating the rule of capture altogether, the Texas Legislature or the
Texas Supreme Court might find it more practical to improve the rule
by broadening its exceptions. As noted earlier, the rule of capture
does not absolve a groundwater user of liability if he acts maliciously,
commits waste, negligently causes subsidence, or pumps from a welldefined underground stream. Adding to this laundry list of exceptions
might allow for targeted solutions to specific problems in groundwater
management as they arise, without upsetting the relied-upon
framework currently in place.
The Texas Supreme Court has already begun to move in this
direction with the Bragg decision, in which it held that the
Legislature's duty to prevent waste was broader than denying specific
160. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80 (quoting Guiterrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312,
(Tex. 1979)).
161. This assumes that the legislature would work in concert with the courts and
create a property right in groundwater through statute. At the very minimum,
legislature should amend TEX. WATER CODE § 36.002 to conform with
interpretation of Eastas establishing a tort and not a property principle.
162. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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wasteful uses, but also included the "broader concept of preventing
waste by conserving, protecting, and preserving the aquifer." 6 ' It
could easily be inferred from this statement that any use, not explicitly
permitted under the comprehensive groundwater management
scheme recently adopted by the legislature, is presumptively
prohibited as against the conservation, protection, and preservation of
an aquifer.
An additional exception in need of expansion is the well-defined
stream exception. Science has advanced to the point that we now know
that groundwater and surface waters are often part of the same
hydrologic system. The narrow current nature of the exception
creates a right to groundwater that is superior to surface water rights.
In order to level the playing field, surface water right holders who are
harmed should be able to either enjoin or obtain damages from
groundwater users in the event of excessive pumping, if they prove
that the groundwater negligently withdrawn is hydrologically
connected to the surface water body from which they draw.
These are just some examples of potential expansions to the rule
of capture's exceptions that would improve Texas' ability to better
manage its groundwater resources.
C. ABANDON THE RULE OF CAPTURE AND EMBRACE REASONABLE USE
The most drastic change Texas could make would be to abandon
the rule of capture altogether and follow the lead of Arizona in
establishing reasonable use doctrine for groundwater management.64
In 1980, Arizona radically reformed its groundwater regulation system
by assuming state control over regulaton. 165 At the same time, it
protected the rights of existing water users. 6 Under the Arizona
system, municipalities can withdraw enough water to meet the demand
in their extant service areas, but67 cannot extend service into additional
areas without agency approval.1

A principal advantage to adopting the reasonable use doctrine lies
in the fact that it sidesteps the takings issue by continuing to recognize
a right of ownership in the groundwater underneath a landowner's
property, and merely limits the amount of water one can withdraw to
what is reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the surface estate.
In addition, the reasonable use doctrine is justifiable under the state's
police power, especially in comparison to other alternatives, such as
California's correlative rights doctrine.'
Texans' natural aversion
toward centralized state control would necessitate vesting the powers
163. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729, 736 (Tex. 2002).
164. 1980 Groundwater Management Code, ch. 1, §§ 35, 86, 1980 Ariz. Legis. Serv.
A-607, -637 to -638 (West 1980).
165. Philip R. Higdon & Terence W. Thompson, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater
Management Code, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621, 634-35 (1980).
166. Id. at 650 (discussing grandfathered rights for irrigation and other uses).
167. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 45-493 (2001).
168. SeeJohnson, supra note 30, at 1290-91.
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of determining what are, and what are not, reasonable uses in the
hands of the extensive network of locally elected groundwater
conservation districts established under Senate Bill 1.
Texas has experience with rules and regulations similar to those of
reasonable use in the arena of oil and gas regulation. Mineral interest
owners in Texas have absolute ownership of the oil and gas
underneath their land. 69 However, the Texas Railroad Commission
can enforce well spacing rules, field production limits, and other
measures designed to maximize beneficial use and protect the
correlative rights of neighbors.'
Texas courts, the Legislature, and
the public are familiar with these concepts, and these concepts are
easily transferable to the groundwater context. Legislative adoption of
reasonable use would also foster the establishment of groundwater
conservation districts in those areas that have been lax at creating
them since Senate Bill l's passage." Formal adoption of reasonable
use as the law of the land in Texas would also provide the opportunity
to strengthen the powers already granted to districts that discourage
out-of-district transfers and excessive pumping, as well as encourage
districts to work together to develop aquifer-wide, consistent schemes
of management." 2 The beauty of reasonable use is that it protects
rural interests while allowing for responsible smart growth on the part
169. Browning Oil Co., Inc. v. Luecke, 38 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. 2000).
170. Id. at 633.
171. See Snyder, supra note 150, at 314. "the legislature created a mechanism for
regulating groundwater.., but gave all the power to those who use groundwater.
While the people given the power have hesitated to regulate themselves, the state's
water problems have been growing." Id. at 289. In addition to the problems
associated with creation, funding problems have plagued some districts. One
commentator explains the problem, "it has not been uncommon for the voters to elect
to participate in a district, but refuse to tax themselves to provide for such services;
and there is no way provided by the law to reduce a district's responsibilities to its
financial capacity to support such services." Shadwick, supra note 93, at 675 (quotingJ.
CHALMERS,

SouTHwEsTERN

GROUNDWATER

LAW: A TEXTUAL

AND BIBIOGRAPHIC

INTERPRETATION 90 (U. of Ariz. Office of Arid Land Studies, Resource Information
Paper No. 4, 1974)). One district (Goliad County UWCD) that failed to approve an ad
valorem tax has not even had the funding to conduct a preliminary study of the
carrying capacity of the shallow aquifer underlying its jurisdiction.
172. Particularly troublesome is the current provision in the Texas Water Code that
restricts districts from having the power to regulate wells that are outside their district,
even though such wells draw from and deplete groundwater resources shared between
multiple districts. Johnson, supra note 30, at 1283. This allows neighboring districts
with conflicting interests to "race to the bottom" and allow as much pumping as
possible without regard to effects on its neighbor district. An example of this type of
battle is currently being fought out between San Antonio and the groundwater
conservation district just to its south, the Evergreen Underground Water Conservation
District ("UWCD"). An outcropping of the Carrizo Aquifer lies in Bexar County, just
outside the city limits of San Antonio, and outside the boundaries of the Evergreen
UWCD. San Antonio currently derives its water solely from the Edwards Aquifer,
which is federally protected. Desperate for another source of groundwater, the Bexar
Metropolitan Water Authority bought the land overlying the outcropping and is
sinking a well field for Carrizo augmentation of their water supply during droughts.
San Antonio successfully fought back an Evergreen annexation election for the area in
Spring 2002 and Atascosa and Wilson County farmers who depend on the Carrizo's
water are powerless to do anything about it.

Issue I

RULE OF CAPTURE

of water-hungry municipalities. 3
The rule of capture has grown from a simple tort preclusion
doctrine into a two-headed Hydra that also purports to recognize a
property right in groundwater. This flawed interpretation of the
capture doctrine stemming from East, threatens to disrupt Texans'
best attempts at ensuring that enough groundwater exists for their
beneficial use. Texas courts and the Texas Legislature must slay the
absolute ownership head of the Capture Hydra once and for all. To
not do so will guarantee that Texas will continue to face shortages and
misallocation of its newest most precious resource-its groundwater.

173. For articles advocating this view, see Robert A. McCleskey, Comment, Maybe Oil
and Water Should Mix-At Least in Texas Law: An Analysis of CurrentProblems with Texas
Ground Water Law and How Established Oil and Gas Law Could Provide Appropriate
Solutions, 1 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 207 (1994); Wendy M. Block & Frederick S.
Richardson, A Case of the Blues: The Inequity of GroundwaterRegulation in Texas, 7 PLAN. F.
42 (2001).

ARTICLE UPDATE
THIRD UPDATE TO
COLORADO WATER LAW AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law
information, the editors periodically include updates of works
previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the
third update to Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, AppendixColorado Water Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,' selected by the
Honorable GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr.
Park County Water Pres. Coalition v. Columbine Assoc.
"Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns 'the court's authority to deal
with the class of cases in which it renders judgment.'. . . [W]e have
held that subject-matter jurisdiction vests in the water court upon the
timely filing of the application and publication of the resume notice."
Park County Water Pres. Coalition v. Columbine Assoc., 993 P.2d 483, 488 (Colo.
2002) (citations omitted).

"The reasonableness of the notice is determined by applying an
inquiry standard-whether the notice is sufficient to reveal to potential
parties the nature of the claim being made, so that such parties can
determine whether to conduct further inquiry into the full extent of
those claims so a determination can be made whether to participate in
the proceedings."
Id. at 489-90 (citation omitted).

"'Consequently, alleged deficiencies invalidate the resume only if
the resume taken as a whole is insufficient to inform or put the reader
on inquiry of the nature, scope, and impact of the proposed
diversion."'
Id. at 490 (citation omitted).

1. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U.
DENY. WATER L. REv. 223 (1999) and the second update is at 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REv.

111 (2000).
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"Here, the notice stated the location and points of diversion, the
proposed structures, the amount of water claimed, and the proposed
beneficial uses. The content of the published resume provided all of
the information required by section 37-92-302 (3) (a). Appellant argues
Qhat it did not have notice and would have opposed the 83CW360
application if it had known that Aurora was the applicant. However,
Park County Coalition and the residents of Park County had sufficient
notice. The information provided was consistent with that required by
statute, and the application clearly stated that the storage right might
affect the residents of Park County."
Id. (footnote omitted).

Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co.
"Essential functions of change of water right proceedings are to:
(1) identify the original appropriation's historic beneficial use; (2) fix
the historic beneficial consumptive use attributable to the
appropriation by employing a suitable parcel-by-parcel or ditch-wide
methodology; (3) determine the amount of beneficial consumptive
use attributable to the applicant's ownership interest; and (4) affix
protective conditions for preventing injury to other water rights in
operation of the judgment and decree."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 33 P.3d 799, 807 (Colo.
2001) (citation omitted).

"Water engineers play an important role in change of water right
and augmentation plan proceedings.
When serving as expert
witnesses, their tasks typically include establishing: (1) the historic
beneficial consumptive use of the appropriations at issue; and (2) the
protective conditions that will maintain the conditions of the stream
upon which decreed water rights depend in order to prevent injury."
Id. (citation omitted).

"The 1981 amendment to section 304(6) extended the mandatory
inclusion of a retained jurisdiction provision to judgments and decrees
for changes of water rights, in addition to plans for augmentation....
... As a result of these amendments, the current version of section
304(6) addresses six features of a judgment and decree involving
changes of water rights and augmentation plans: (1) the judgment and
decree for changes of water rights and augmentation plans must
contain a retained jurisdiction provision for reconsidering the
question of injury to the vested rights of others; (2) the water judge
has discretion to set the period of retained jurisdiction; (3) the water
judge has discretion to extend the period of retained jurisdiction; (4)
the water judge's findings and conclusions must accompany the
condition setting forth the period of retained jurisdiction; (5) all
provisions of the judgment and decree are appealable upon their
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entry, including those relating to retained jurisdiction or extension of
retained jurisdiction; and (6) the water judge has discretion to
reconsider the injury question."
Id. at 808 (citation omitted).

"The General Assembly intended that the retained jurisdiction
provision of the decree would function as a test period for operation
of the change or augmentation plan, in order to test the prediction
and finding of non-injury the water court made upon entry of the
judgment and decree. If other water rights thereafter experience
water shortages resulting from failure to implement the protective
conditions, or because the protective conditions adopted in the
judgment and decree did not sufficiently protect against injury, the
water judge on a sufficient showing of injury reopens the inquiry into
protective conditions or, in the alternative, extends the period of
retained jurisdiction so that the test period can operate longer. In
contrast, historic consumptive use is capable of evidentiary resolution
in the process of considering and entering the judgment and decree;
exercise of the retained jurisdiction provision is not the context for
reopening these determinations."
Id. at 811.

"We conclude that the retained jurisdiction feature of section 3792-304(6) reflects two stages of future injury analysis, the first based in
some measure on predicting future effects, the second based on
operational experience. Because the water court has determined noninjury at the time of decree entry, the persons seeking to invoke
reconsideration of the injury question under the decree's retained
jurisdiction provision have the initial burden of establishing that injury
has occurred to their water rights from placing the change of water
right or augmentation plan into operation. Upon such a showing, the
burden of showing non-injury shifts to the decree holder. The water
judge may require additional or modified protective conditions to
prevent injury upon determination that such injury exists. The water
judge may also extend the period of retained jurisdiction as long as
necessary to ascertain the nonoccurrence of injury from operation of
the change or augmentation plan. If a person has met the initial
burden of establishing injury within the meaning of the retained
jurisdiction provision, and the decree holder does not meet the
burden of demonstrating non-injury, the water court abuses its
discretion if it refuses to require additional or modified protective
conditions to prevent the injury, or refuses to extend the period of
retained jurisdiction to ascertain the non-occurrence of injury."
Id. at 812.

"As we held in Midway Ranches, the consumptive use methodology
and allocations the Water Court adopts in a noticed and actually
litigated change case normally apply to subsequent change cases
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involving the same water rights. The fundamental object of a change
proceeding is to secure to owners their allocated share of historic
beneficial consumptive use determined by an appropriate parcel-byparcel or ditch-wide methodology, while protecting against injury to
other water rights when the change of water right or plan operates in
the surface and tributary groundwater stream system."
Id. at 814 (citation omitted).

Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co.
"We now hold that the owner of property burdened by a ditch
easement (hereinafter 'burdened estate') may not move or alter that
easement unless that owner has the consent of the owner of the
easement (hereinafter 'benefited estate'); OR unless that owner first
obtains a declaratory determination from a court that the proposed
changes will not significantly lessen the utility of the easement,
increase the burdens on the owner of the easement, or frustrate the
purpose for which the easement was created. We further clarify that
the right to inspect, operate, and maintain a ditch easement is a right
that cannot be abrogated by alteration or change to the ditch."
Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo. 2001).

"Because ditches are important, so too are the rights attendant
upon a ditch easement. The holder of a ditch easement has the right
to inspect, operate, maintain, and repair the ditch."
Id. at 1232 (citations omitted).

"Accordingly, we find ourselves at the onset of the 21st century
with competing land uses in Colorado proliferating and somewhat
unclear common-law precedent as to the interlocking rights of estates
benefiting from easements and those estates burdened by them. On
the one hand, Cherrichignostates unequivocally that a burdened estate
owner may not move a ditch easement without the consent of the
benefited estate owner. On the other hand, Stuart indicates it can be
done if the burdened owner provides an adequate substitute."
Id. at 1234 (citations omitted).

"We observe that the development of the common law on point
appears to serve two purposes: first, that ditch easements are a
property right that the burdened estate owner may not alter absent
consent of the benefited owner; and second, that there may be some
circumstances in which such alteration would work no harm to the
benefited owner and would greatly serve the burdened owner."
Id.

"The Restatement articulates the balance between burdened and
benefited estate holders as follows:
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Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, . . . the owner
of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the
location or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's
expense, to permit normal use or development of the servient estate,
but only if the changes do not
a) significantly lessen the utility of the easement,
b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use
and enjoyment, or
c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created."
Id. at 1235-36 (citation omitted).
"Clearly, the best course is for the burdened owner and the
benefited owner to agree to alterations that would accommodate both
parties' use of their respective properties to the fullest extent possible.
Barring such an agreement, we do not support the self-help remedy
that Club exercised here. When a dispute arises between two property
owners, the court is the appropriate forum for the resolution of that
dispute and-in order to avoid an adverse ruling of trespass or
restoration-the burdened owner should obtain a court declaration
before commencing alterations. If a burdened owner seeks to move or
alter a ditch easement and the benefited owner refuses to consent,
then the burdened owner may seek a declaratory determination from
a court that the alteration does not damage the benefited
owner(s) ......
Id. at 1237-38.
"In evaluating damage, or the absence of damage, the trial court
must not only look at the operation of the ditch for the benefited
owner, but also look at the maintenance rights associated with the
ditch. If the maintenance rights of the owner of the ditch easement
are adversely affected by the change in the easement, then such
change does not comport with the Restatement requirements.
Furthermore, the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be
of the same quantity, quality, and timing as provided under the ditch
owner's water rights and easement rights in the ditch. A water right
operating in combination with the collection of rights and obligations
are vested property rights. They cannot simply be replaced with the
mere 'delivery' of a fixed quantity of adjudicated water. Ditches are
linear delivery systems that function as a part of a whole."
Id. at 1238 (citation and footnote omitted).
"Nonconsensual, unilateral alterations jeopardize valuable vested
property rights both in the easement and in the water rights exercised
by means of the ditch."
Id.
"We... clearly disapprove of... any
burdened estate owners in the future."
Id. at 1239.

unilateral alterations

by
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Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer
"Colorado's prior appropriation system centers on three
fundamental principles: (1) that waters of the natural stream,
including surface water and groundwater tributary thereto, are a
public resource subject to the establishment of public agency or
private use rights in unappropriated water for beneficial purposes; (2)
that water courts adjudicate the water rights and their priorities; and
(3) that the State Engineer, Division Engineers, and Water
Commissioners administer the waters of the natural stream in
accordance with the judicial decrees and statutory provisions
governing administration.
The right guaranteed under the Colorado Constitution is to the
appropriation of unappropriated waters of the natural stream, not to
the appropriation of appropriated waters."
Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo. 2001)

(citations omitted).
"Adjudication and administration are essential to protection of
water rights. The reason for adjudicating a water right, whether an
appropriative water right under state water law or a water right created
under federal law, is to realize the value and expectations that
enforcement through administration of that right's priority secures."
Id. at 1148-49 (citations and footnotes omitted).

"Both responses [Fellhauer and the 1969 Water Right
Determination & Administration Act] centered on: (1) reinforcing the
adjudication and administration of decreed water rights in order of
their priority; and (2) maximizing the use of Colorado's limited water
supply for as many decreed uses as possible consistent with meeting
the state's interstate delivery obligations under United States Supreme
Court equitable apportionment decrees and congressionally approved
interstate compacts."
Id. at 1150 (citation omitted).

"The General Assembly chose to implement a policy of maximum
flexibility that also protected the constitutional doctrine of prior
appropriation. Through the 1969 Act, the General Assembly created a
new statutory authorization for water uses that, when decreed, are not
subject to curtailment by priority administration. This statutory
authorization is for out-of-priority diversions for beneficial use that
operate under the terms of decreed augmentation plans....
Plans for augmentation allow diversions of water 'out-of-priority
while ensuring the protection of senior water rights.' Decreed water
rights receive a replacement water supply that offsets the out-ofpriority depletions. ... 'Depletions not adequately replaced shall result
in curtailment of the out-of-priority diversions.'"
Id. (citations omitted).
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"A person desiring to divert out of priority through the device of
an augmentation plan must file an application with the water court for
approval."
Id. at 1153 (citations omitted).

"In City of Florence, 793 P.2d at 151, we held that the General
Assembly intended to differentiate exchanges from augmentation
plans. Under section 37-83-104 and sections 37-80-120(2) through 3780-120(4), an exchange is a water management practice the State
Engineer administers between decreed points of diversion. When a
junior appropriator makes a sufficient substitute supply of water
available to a senior appropriator, the junior may divert at its
previously decreed point of diversion water that is otherwise bound for
the senior's decreed point of diversion. Four critical elements of an
exchange are that: (1) the source of substitute supply must be above
the calling water right; (2) the substitute supply must be equivalent in
amount and of suitable quality to the downstream senior appropriator;
(3) there must be available natural flow at the point of upstream
diversion; and (4) the rights of others cannot be injured when
implementing the exchange.
Justice Erickson, in his City of Florence concurring opinion,
explained the primary distinction between an exchange and a plan for
augmentation. The operator of an exchange may obtain a conditional
or absolute decree with a priority for the exchange. The State
Engineer may allow an exchange in absence of a decree confirming it.
If the exchange is adjudicated, it receives the priority date of its
appropriation, without application of the postponement doctrine,
pursuant to section 37-92-305(10). Adjudication of an exchange
assigns it a priority vis-a-vis other exchanges operating in the affected
stream reach.
In contrast, an augmentation plan operates to replace depletions
to the water supply of the natural stream upon which appropriations
depend and allows a diversion outside of the priority system; an
adjudication is required to authorize such a diversion and no priority
results."
Id. at 1155 (citations omitted).

"The consistent thread of Colorado law conjoining appropriation,
adjudication, and administration-which we have reviewed in this
opinion-establishes that, to have standing to challenge another's
water use on the basis of an alleged injury to one's water right, the
challenger must both possess a water right and obtain a decree for it."
Id. at 1156.

"'[W]ithout a judicially decreed priority date, a water right owner
has no right to request the Division Engineer to call outjunior users in
order to satisfy its own use.' Administrative action, forbearance of
enforcement, or State Engineer acquiescence in water use practices
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does not substitute forjudicial determination of use rights ....
Decreed appropriations are entitled to maintenance of the
condition of the stream existing at the time of the respective
appropriation. Lacking an adjudication of its rights, Empire Lodge
did not possess a legally cognizable right to invoke, in court, the futile
call doctrine or enlargement doctrines against the Moyers' water use.
These are rights that only decreed water rights holders have standing
to assert. Exercise of the State Engineer's enforcement discretion does
not obviate the requirement that those making water uses must obtain
a decree adjudicating their rights if they desire to have standing to
enforce them."
Id. at 1156-57 (citations omitted).

"The Moyers, on the other hand, had standing to allege injury to
their decreed water right due to Empire Lodge's out-of-priority
diversions and to seek an injunction to curtail Empire Lodge's out-ofpriority diversions.... [T]he Moyers invoked a decreed water right
and alleged injury to the right, sufficient for standing purposes to
contest Empire Lodge's undecreed water use."
Id. at 1157 (citation and footnote omitted).
"The change of water right and augmentation plan statutes provide
that applications for approval of the water use practices they
encompass are mandatory, not discretionary. They are designed to
provide notice and the opportunity for potentially affected decreed
water rights holders to participate in proceedings in order to protect
their rights. The purpose of these adjudication proceedings is not to
confirm an undecreed pre-existing change of water right or out-ofpriority diversion, but rather to: (1) authorize, deny, or condition the
change of water right or the out-of-priority diversion; and (2) allow
water rights holders like the Moyers to assert and protect their decreed
water rights."
Id. at 1158-59 (citations omitted).
"It is the role of the General Assembly, not the State Engineer or
the courts, to provide amendments to the current statutes if additional
State Engineer approval authority is desirable."
Id. at 1159.
Note- Subsequent to the announcement of Empire Lodge Homeowners'
Assoc., the General Assembly enacted Act of May 23, 2002, ch. 151, § 1,
2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 459, 459-63 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 3792-308 (2002)) (addressing substitute water supply plans).

Mount Enuons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte
"The Aspinall Unit water rights are generally subject to Colorado

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

law and are further specifically subject to a subordination obligation.
The River District assigned the state adjudicated water rights for the
Unit to the BUREC on the condition that in-basin projects on the
Gunnison and its tributaries above the Unit could deplete at least
60,000 acre-feet of water. This obligation was an outgrowth of
negotiations between the River District, local interests, the United
States, and the Colorado Water Conservation Board to accommodate
development of water resources in the natural basin of the Gunnison
River. The water court has found, and this court has confirmed, that
such understanding resulted in a binding, enforceable agreement.
The effect of the subordination is to make water available for
appropriation that BUREC could otherwise call for the Unit in the
exercise of its absolute water rights."
Mount Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested Butte, 40 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Colo.
2002) (citation omitted).

"The State strives to distribute the resource in ways that respect
historical uses without thwarting growth or entrepreneurial
development. One of the cornerstones of this state's water policy is
that the resource be administered to maximize its beneficial uses.
An applicant may commence the process of developing a
beneficial use by filing for a conditional right, defined by statute as 'a
right to perfect a water right with a certain priority upon the
completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation.'
A
conditional right is a right that serves to hold the place of the
appropriator in the 'first in time, first in right' system in effect in
Colorado. If the appropriator diligently puts the water to beneficial
use, the conditional right can mature into an 'absolute' water right,
with a priority that dates back to the initiation of the conditional
right."
Id at 1257-58 (citations omitted).

"Thus, as a prerequisite to receiving a conditional
applicants must show water is available that can be diverted."

decree,

Id. at 1258 (citation omitted).

"Typically, to satisfy the 'can and will' test, new appropriators must
convince the water court that their diversion will cause no harm to
senior appropriators: i.e., that water is available. In the Gunnison
basin, however, to satisfy the water availability test, a new, in-basin
appropriator must only convince the water court that a portion of the
60,000 acre-foot depletion allowance remains unused. Because we
have already determined that this amount was made available for inbasin users, the remaining question for the water court is only what
amount, if any, of the 60,000 acre-feet remains. This in turn depends
on the exercise of absolute decrees for in-basin, junior uses above the
Unit. We hold that the absence of a contract between Applicant and
BUREC does not preclude satisfaction of the 'water availability' test of
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the 'can and will' doctrine."
Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).

SL Group, LLC v. Go West Indus., Inc.
"Notice of proceedings to determine water rights is now provided
through the special statutory procedure set forth in section 37-92302(3).
In lieu of personal service, the statute's resume-notice
procedure is designed to put all interested parties of pending water
rights proceedings, to the extent reasonably possible, on inquiry notice
of the nature, scope, and impact of a proposed decree by requiring the
preparation of a monthly resume of applications from pertinent
information provided by the applicants, which the water clerk must
then publish in local newspapers of general circulation and mail to
potentially affected parties. In aid of the clerk's mailing obligation,
every application is required to state the name and address of the
owner or reputed owner of the land upon which any structure is or will
be located, upon which water is or will be stored, or upon which water
is or will be placed to beneficial use."
SL Group, LLC v. Go West Indus., Inc., 42 P.3d 637, 640-41 (Colo. 2002) (citations
omitted).

"The statutory scheme further protects the due process concern
for notice by, in effect, tempering the finality of a water decree in
limited circumstances involving nonparticipants whose rights are
adversely affected. Even substantive (as distinguished from merely
clerical) errors in a judgment and decree may be corrected by the
water judge upon petition within three years by any person whose
rights were adversely affected by the adjudication and who failed to file
a protest through mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect."
Id. at 641 (citation omitted).

"In the adjudication proceeding at issue here, it is clear that Go
West did not identify SL as the owner of property upon which water
from the West Shavano Extension was being used or include any
reference to SL in its application. It is also clear that the water clerk
did not mail a copy of the resume to SL. In SL's petition for
reconsideration pursuant to section 37-92-304(10), filed a year and a
half after the final decree, SL alleged that it was unaware of the
application until a year after the decree. SL's petition further alleged
not only that it and its predecessors continuously used water from the
West Shavano Extension from long before the 1989 abandonment
decree until the time of the petition, and that its historical irrigation
practices had been adversely affected by the decree granted to Go
West, but also that it owned the land upon which the historical use
offered in support of Go West's 1938 priority actually took place."
Id. at 641-42.
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"Under the circumstances of this case, the adjoining landowner's
failure to otherwise become aware of the application and file a timely
protest must be considered excusable within the meaning of section
37-92-304(10)."
Id. at 642.

Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden
"We have stated time and again that the need for security and
predictability in the prior appropriation system dictates that holders of
vested water rights are entitled to the continuation of stream
conditions as they existed at the time they first made their
appropriation. From this principle springs the equally well-established
rule that a change of water right cannot be approved if the change will
injuriously affect the vested rights of other water users. 'A classic form
of injury involves diminution of the available water supply that a water
rights holder would otherwise enjoy at the time and place and in the
amount of demand for beneficial use under the holder's decreed
water right operating in priority.'
To ensure that this most fundamental condition on the right to
change the use of a water right is satisfied, a change in use must be
accomplished '(1) by proper court decree,' (2) only for 'the extent of
use contemplated at the time of appropriation,' and (3) 'strictly
limited to the extent of formal actual usage.' ...
Implicit within these basic precepts of our prior appropriation
system is the elementary and straightforward principle that a change in
the use of a water right cannot effect an enlargement in the use of that
right."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241, 245-46 (Colo. 2002)
(citations and footnotes omitted).

"Safeguarding junior appropriators' right to immutable stream
conditions in the face of a change from agricultural to municipal use
requires that there be parity in the consumptive use of the right before
and after the change-and that this parity endures."
Id. at 246 (citation omitted).

"Because enlargement of use constitutes a change in circumstance
sustained upon evidence that did not exist at the time of the original
change proceeding, claim preclusion does not bar relief therefor."
Id. at 247 (citations omitted).

"Nor does it bar a water court from determining the extent of
historic use under the water right in ascertaining whether there has
been an injurious enlargement.
Of course, where historic
consumptive use has been determined in a previous proceeding
relitigation of that element will not be permitted."
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Id. (citations omitted).

"Wheeler determined that 4.66 c.f.s. of Priority 12 water could be
diverted and utilized by Golden continuously during the irrigation
season without injury to junior appropriators so long as Golden did
not use this water to irrigate more than 225 acres of lawn or apply
more than 53% of this water to lawn irrigation. Because Wheeler's
calculations formed the basis of the 60s decrees, we hold that both of
these limits serve to define the permissible use Golden may make of its
Priority 12 water. Thus, we hold that Golden may irrigate up to 225
acres of lawn with up to 53%, or 900 acre-feet, of its Priority 12
entitlement....
... Appellants presented unrebutted and credible evidence that
Golden applies 1.78 acre-feet of water on each acre of lawn. Given this
application rate, Golden irrigated approximately 267 acres of lawn
with Priority 12 water. This is 42 acres more than Wheeler anticipated
would be irrigated with Priority 12 water, and is therefore an
expansion of use. However, Golden has never applied more than 476
acre-feet of Priority 12 water to lawn irrigation in any given year.
Therefore, the water court correctly concluded that Golden has not
impermissibly expanded its use of Priority 12 water by applying a
greater amount of Priority 12 water to lawn irrigation than Wheeler
anticipated in the 60s proceedings.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand this
case to the trial court with instructions that it enter an injunction
prohibiting Golden from irrigating more than 225 acres of lawn with
its Priority 12 water or from applying more than 900 acre-feet of
Priority 12 water to lawn irrigation."
Id. at 255-56.

City of Thornton v. City & County of Denver
"Section 37-92-305(3) expressly requires augmentation plans be
made with due regard for the rights of other appropriators of the same
water source.
A water court proceeding for approval of an
augmentation plan is mandatory and can be approved only if there is
'no-injurious effect' to a vested water right. Where injury is likely to
occur, terms and conditions may be included in decrees for
augmentation plans to prevent injury. If the substituted water is 'of a
quantity and quality so as to meet the requirements for which the
water of the senior appropriator has normally been used,' the
proposed substitution must be accepted."
City of Thornton v. City & County of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019, 1025 (Colo. 2002)
(citations omitted).

"Current statutory law delegates most authority over water quality
issues to the WQCC [Water Quality Control Commission]. The
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general assembly enacted the WQCA [Water Quality Control Act] in
response to the federal Clean Water Act. The purpose of the WQCA is
to prevent injury to beneficial uses made of state waters, to maximize
the beneficial uses of water, and to develop water to which Colorado
and its citizens are entitled, and, within this context, to achieve the
maximum practical degree of water quality in the waters of the state
consistent with the welfare of the state.
Thus, the Act sought to provide the maximum protection for water
quality possible without threatening the prior appropriation system
and the state's policy of maximum beneficial use of the water....
Although the WQCA gives the WQCC general authority over water
quality issues, the WQCA is not intended to interfere with the water
court's role in adjudicating water rights administered by the State
Engineer. Section 25-8-104(1) of the WQCA explicitly provides that:
No provision of this article shall be interpreted so as to supercede,
abrogate, or impair rights to divert water and to apply water to
beneficial uses in accordance with sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of
the constitution of the state of Colorado, compacts entered into by
the state of Colorado, or the provisions of articles 80 to 93 of title 37,
C.R.S., or Colorado court determinations with respect to the
determination and administration of water rights.
We read these provisions of the WCQA to allow the WCQA to work
within the context of the prior appropriation system."
Id. at 1028-29 (citations and footnotes omitted).

"The WRDAA [1969 Water Rights Determination and
Administration Act] explicitly requires the water court to consider
water quality issues in the case of an augmentation plan in which water
is being actively substituted into a stream for the use of other
appropriators. The substituted water must be of a quality and
continuity to meet the requirements for which the water of the senior
appropriator has normally been used."
Id. at 1030 (citations omitted).

"Despite the general assembly's assignment of water quality issues
to the WQCC, the language of the WQCA clearly expresses a legislative
intent for water quality issues to remain within the purview of the water
court as set forth in the WRDAA. Section 25-8-104(1) explicitly states
that the water court retains authority over the question of whether
material injury to water rights exists and the remedy for such injury.
Injury occurs under the WRDAA where the water provided by an
augmentation plan is not of a quality and quantity so as to meet the
requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has
normally been used. The WRDAA and the WQCA therefore preserve
the common law standard that the introduction of pollutants into a
water supply constitutes injury to senior appropriators if the water is
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no longer suitable for the senior appropriator's normal use because of
the substitute supply."
Id. (citations omitted).

"The legislature provided for both a determination of non-injury
to senior appropriators at the time of the initial decree approving an
augmentation plan, and a period of retained jurisdiction during which
the water court could reconsider its initial determination of non-injury
in light of the actual operation of the plan. Although Thornton
initially agreed that it would not be injured by the use of Bi-City
effluent in Denver's Augmentation Plan, the stipulation governed only
the water court's initial determination of non-injury to Thornton
during the first stage of the injury analysis. The second stage of the
injury analysis occurs later, once an augmentation plan becomes
operational. The question of operational injury remained open for
reconsideration at the second stage of the injury analysis under the
retained jurisdiction provision."
Id. at 1031 (citations omitted).

"In the interest of finality, the water court sets the period of
retained jurisdiction at the period of time it finds necessary to
preclude or remedy any injury that may emerge once the
augmentation plan becomes operational. The retained jurisdiction
provision therefore provides the water court with flexibility to
implement programs that maximize the beneficial use of water without
sacrificing the vested water rights of Thornton and other senior
appropriators.
Retained jurisdiction should be invoked where the actual
operation of an augmentation plan reveals that substituted water is
unsuitable for a senior appropriator's normal use of the water in
comparison to the quality of the water it would otherwise receive at its
point of diversion if the augmentation plan had not been instituted."
Id. at 1032 (citations omitted).

Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch
"[B]ecause the declaratory judgment act is to be liberally
construed; because resolution of property ownership issues affecting
water use rights is established in our case law as a proper matter for
water court determination; and because PCSR has stated that,
whatever action we might take with respect to its pending conditional
decree application appeal, it intends to rejoin the property ownership
issue by re-filing its application, we find that the case before us is not
moot."
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 699 (Colo.
2002) (footnote omitted).
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"Some states that allocate their surface water by the principles of
prior appropriation nevertheless allocate ground water by a rule of
capture that permits overlying landowners to possess the ground water
appearing under their land without regard to the effect of its
extraction upon other ground water and surface water users.
However, such a rule of capture defies hydrologic reality and impairs
the security and reliability of senior water use rights that depend on an
interconnected ground and surface water system. Colorado law
contains a presumption that all ground water is tributary to the surface
stream unless proved or provided by statute otherwise."
Id. at 701-02 (citation and footnotes omitted).

"The extent of underground storage available for artificial
recharge without interfering with the aquifer's natural recharge
capacity or injuring senior ground or surface water rights is a central
issue in any proposal to use an aquifer for artificial recharge and
Some aquifers may be more suitable for storage of
storage....
artificially recharged water than others.
Whether a particular aquifer can accommodate a proposed
conjunctive use project is a factor to consider in a Water Court decree
application in Colorado and the determination will turn upon the facts
of the case."
Id. at 703 (citations omitted).

"The General Assembly's authorization for conjunctive use projects
implements basic tenets of Colorado water law that the legislature has
clearly enunciated: (1) a natural stream consists of all underflow and
tributary waters; (2) all waters of the natural stream are subject to
appropriation, adjudication, and administration in the order of their
decreed priority; (3) the policy of the state is to integrate the
appropriation, use, and administration of underground water tributary
to a stream with the use of surface water in such a way as to maximize
the beneficial use of all of the waters of the state; and (4) the
conjunctive use of ground and surface water shall be recognized to the
fullest extent possible, subject to the preservation of other existing
vested rights in accordance with the law."
Id. at 704-05 (citations omitted).

"Construing the General Assembly's wording and intent and
effectuating evident legislative purposes, we determine that the
General Assembly has authorized the issuance of decrees for artificial
recharge and storage of water in an aquifer when the decree holder
lawfully captures, possesses, and controls water and then places it into
the aquifer for subsequent beneficial use. The applicant bears the
burden of demonstrating that the aquifer is capable of being utilized
for the recharge and storage of the applicant's water without
impairment to the decreed water rights of senior surface or ground
water users who depend upon the aquifer for supply."
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Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).

"Based upon the principles of Colorado law embodied in the
statutes and our case law, the applicant would have to meet conditions
to utilize an aquifer for storage of artificially recharged water. The
applicant, at least: (1) must capture, possess, and control the water it
intends to put into the aquifer; (2) must not injure other water use
rights, either surface or underground, by appropriating the water for
recharge; (3) must not injure water use rights, either surface or
underground, as a result of recharging the aquifer and storing water in
it; (4) must show that the aquifer is capable of accommodating the
stored water without injuring other water use rights; (5) must show
that the storage will not tortiously interfere with overlying landowners'
use and enjoyment of their property; (6) must not physically invade
the property of another by activities such as directional drilling, or
occupancy by recharge structures or extraction wells, without
proceeding under the procedures for eminent domain; (7) must have
the intent and ability to recapture and use the stored water; and (8)
must have an accurate means for measuring and accounting for the
water stored and extracted from storage in the aquifer."
Id. at n.19.

"Advancing the national agenda of settling the public domain
required abandonment of the pre-existing common-law rules of
property ownership in regard to water and water use rights. Reducing
the public land and water to possession and ownership was a
preoccupation of territorial and state law from the outset. A new law
of custom and usage in regard to water use rights and land ownership
rights, the 'Colorado Doctrine,' arose from 'imperative necessity' in
the western region. This new doctrine established that: (1) water is a
public resource, dedicated to the beneficial use of public agencies and
private persons wherever they might make beneficial use of the water
under use rights established as prescribed by law; (2) the right of water
use includes the right to cross the lands of others to place water into,
occupy and convey water through, and withdraw water from the
natural water bearing formations within the state in the exercise of a
water use right; and (3) the natural water bearing formations may be
used for the transport and retention of appropriated water. This new
common law established a property-rights-based allocation and
administration system which promotes multiple use of a finite resource
for beneficial purposes."
Id. at 706 (citation and footnote omitted).

"Upon adoption of Colorado's constitution, the state struck an
accommodation between two kinds of property interests-water use
rights and land rights-by requiring the owners of water use rights to
obtain the consent of, or pay just compensation to, owners of land in,
upon, or across which the water right holders constructed dams,
reservoirs, ditches, canals, flumes, or other manmade facilities for the
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diversion, conveyance, or storage of water.
But, this requirement does not extend to vesting in landowners the
right to prevent access to the water source or require compensation
for the water use right holder's employment of the natural water
bearing surface and subsurface formations on or within the
landowners' properties for the movement of its appropriated water."
Id. at 708 (citation and footnote omitted).

"In deference to the laws of nature, which we held to be
foundational in Yunker v. Nichols, Colorado law does not recognize a
land ownership right by which the Landowners can claim control of
the aquifers as part of their bundle of sticks. To the contrary, '[a]s
knowledge of the science of hydrology advanced, it became clear that
natural streams are surface manifestations of extensive tributary
systems, including underground water in stream basins,' and passage
of appropriated water through the natural streams is part of the
Colorado law of water use rights. However, Article XVI, section 7 does
subject the construction of artificial water facilities on another's land
to the payment of just compensation and grants a right of private
condemnation for the construction of such waterworks.. .
Id. at 709 (citations omitted).

"In sum, the holders of water use rights may employ underground
as well as surface water bearing formations in the state for the
placement of water into, occupation of water in, conveyance of water
through, and withdrawal of water from the natural water bearing
formations in the exercise of water use rights....
We reject the Landowners' claim that the cujus doctrine provides
them with a property right to require consent for artificial recharge
and storage of water in aquifers that extend through their land."
Id. at 710 (citations and footnote omitted).

"[A] n applicant for a conditional decree to utilize available aquifer
storage space must demonstrate that it will capture, possess, and
control water lawfully available to it and, without injury to other water
rights, will artificially recharge that water into the aquifer, such as
through a constructed injection well or structure built on the land's
surface.
To obtain an absolute decree for aquifer storage, the
applicant must artificially recharge the water into the aquifer pursuant
to a decreed water use right for storage and subsequent beneficial
use."
I& at 712.

"In so providing, the General Assembly preserved the requirement
of proceeding by eminent domain for the construction of waterworks
facilities under section 37-87-101(1), including artificial recharge
structures and wells, when such features are located on or in another's
land without consent.
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Article XVI, section 7, Article II, sections 14 and 15, and section 3787-101 (1) establish a private right of condemnation of private property
through eminent domain for 'those interests in real property
reasonably necessary for the construction, maintenance, or operation
of any water storage projects.' ...

In the case before us, the proposed project facilities include
constructed wells, dams, recharge reservoirs, and other water works,
but the project does not include the location of any artificial features
on or in the Landowners' properties. Thus, PCSR would not need the
consent of the Landowners or an easement, nor would it have to pay
just compensation to them, and no trespass occurs simply as the result
of water moving into an aquifer and being contained or migrating in
the course of the aquifer's functioning underneath the lands of
another."
Id. at 713-14 (citations omitted).

"Allowing property owners to control who may store water in
natural formations, or charging water right use holders for easements
to occupy the natural water bearing surface or underground
formations with their appropriated water, would revert to common-law
ownership principles that are antithetical to Colorado water law and
the public's interest in a secure, reliable, and flexible water supply
made available through the exercise of decreed water use rights. It
would disharmonize Colorado's historical balance between water use
rights and land ownership rights. It would inflate and protract
litigation by adding condemnation actions to procedures for obtaining
water use decrees. It would counter the state's goals of optimum use,
efficient water management, and priority administration."
Id. at 714 (citation omitted).

State Engineer v. Bradley
"Diversions are implicitly limited to an amount sufficient for the
purpose for which the appropriation was made, without waste or
excessive use. A diversion of water decreed for irrigation purposes is
limited by the 'duty of water' with respect to the decreed place of use.
In addition, diversions are implicitly limited in quantity by historic use
at the original decreed point of diversion.
The actual historic
diversion for beneficial use could be less than the optimum utilization
represented by the duty of water in any particular case, either because
the well or other facility involved cannot physically produce at the
decreed rate on a continuing basis, or because that amount has simply
not been historically needed or applied for the decreed purpose.
In the past, we have explained this limitation by noting that 'over
an extended period of time a pattern of historic diversions and use
under the decreed right at its place of use will mature and become the
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measure of the water right for change purposes.'
State Engineer v. Bradley, 53 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo. 2002) (citations and footnote
omitted).

"The acreage under irrigation is a common basis of measuring the
use of water in the adjudication of priorities, but if the same acreage is
also being irrigated by water from appropriations other than the one
for which a change is sought, some measure of the applicable
appropriation's historic contribution to the duty of water is necessary
to determine its historic use and ensure that the appropriation will not
be enlarged by the change."
Id. at 1170 (citation omitted).

"Bradley's property has been served by at least three distinct water
sources for over sixty years. The record contained no suggestion that
the well had ever been the sole source of water for the acreage in
question, even during the two years since the implementation of the
center-pivot sprinklers. Though he made no attempt to quantify the
contribution of his surface water rights to the overall duty of water on
the irrigated acreage, the record indicated that the ground water
appropriation, for which the change was sought, was used only in a
supplemental capacity, being applied each year only later in the
growing season, after the available surface water ran out. Because
Bradley's application requested enough water from the new point of
diversion to irrigate, by itself, 128 acres of the same 150 acre-field, his
burden required, at the least, a demonstration that historic diversions
from the corner well amounted to approximately eighty-five percent of
the water historically applied to the entire field. The record failed to
support, and was almost certainly inconsistent with, such a
determination.
The inadequacy of the applicant's presentation was not due merely
to a lack of precision or accuracy in quantifying historic use. It
resulted from a conceptual failure to distinguish actual historic use
from the face amount of the decree, and therefore a failure to even
attempt to establish the historic use of the well-water, separate and
apart from historic use of the applicant's surface water. In approving
the request, the water court appears to have conflated the historic use
of the land as a whole with the historic use of the groundwater.
Admirable as the applicant's attempt to improve the efficiency of his
irrigation technique may have been, a water right is a property right,
which can be sold or further changed once it is established. An
enlargement of the applicant's right would at the very least have the
effect of advancing his priority to any additional water over that of
junior appropriators, and in the overappropriated systems of the San
Luis Valley it would necessarily be injurious to other vested rights."
Id. at 1170-71.

Issue 1

ARTICLE UPDATE

Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Properties
"Both sections 301(4) (a) (I) and 305(7) use the word 'shall' and
are therefore mandatory. If section 301 (4) (a) (I) is applied, as it was in
this case, without the required notice of section 305(7), such an
application would render the notice provision of section 305(7)
inoperative to accomplish the legislative intent of preventing loss of a
conditional water right.
The only interpretation that provides
harmonious effect to the language and legislative intent of both
section 301(4) (a) (I) and section 305(7) is to require that the water
court provide notice to an owner of a conditional water right before
the right expires or is canceled-even when the holder of the right
fails to file within the statutory time period an application for a finding
of reasonable diligence. The water court's failure to give notice only
extends the time period in which the diligence application may be
filed. It does not relieve the applicant of its burden to prove that
reasonable diligence occurred during the six year diligence period.
Therefore, we hold that the water court may not cancel a
conditional water right and the conditional water right does not expire
without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration under
section 305(7)."
Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Properties, 54 P.3d 908, 912 (2002) (citation
omitted).

West Elk Ranch v. United States
"Indeed, the General Assembly eliminated a 'wait and see'
approach to determining conditional water rights. Instead, it opted to
require an applicant to show in the conditional decree proceedings
that it 'can and will' complete the appropriation of water with
diligence and within a reasonable time before a court may issue a
conditional decree."
West Elk Ranch v. United States, No. 02SA93, slip op. at 6 (Colo. Dec. 2, 2002).

"Here, we have to determine if West Elk has made the requisite
showing that it 'can and will' develop the water pursuant to its plan.
Because the Forest Service's denial of the SUP eliminates the only
alternative available to West Elk, this case is more similar to FWS than
to In re Gibbs.
West Elk argues that it still may obtain a permit; however, there is
no evidence in the file indicating a pending appeal or other
proceeding that will potentially result in the issuance of an SUP to
West Elk.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, and the
regulations that implement the Act, grant the Forest Service the
authority to issue Special Use Permits for National Forest land.
Applicants must seek a permit from the Forest Ranger or Supervisor
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with jurisdiction over the affected area, but the application itself does
not convey any use rights. Upon receipt of the application, the Forest
Service does an initial screening for minimum requirements. If the
applicant cannot meet the minimum standards, the Forest Service will
deny the application without further consideration. Here, the Forest
Service District Ranger denied West Elk's SUP application because it
failed to meet a minimum requirement that the SUP cannot conflict
or interfere with National Forest uses. Upon review, the Supervisor
agreed.
Without an SUP, West Elk cannot put the water to beneficial use.
West Elk presented insufficient evidence to the water court to
demonstrate a substantial probability that it will eventually obtain an
SUP.
Accordingly, the water court properly granted summary
judgment against West Elk."
Id. at 9-11 (citations and footnote omitted).
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PICCHU, A CIVIL ENGINEERING MARVEL, American Society of Civil

Engineers, Reston, Va. (2000); 136pp; $49.00; ISBN 0-784-40444-5,
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RUTH M. WRIGHT AND ALFREDO VALENCIA ZEGARRA, THE MACHU
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A
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GUIDEBOOK,
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Boulder, Colo.
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REVIEWED BYJUSTICE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.'

Coloradoans Ken and Ruth Wright have teamed with Peruvian
archeologist Alfredo Valencia to place back in working order the
sixteen fountains of Machu Picchu. You can see for yourself by visiting
Machu Picchu and by reading these books.
The Inca were master water handlers. They chose Machu Picchu
as a ceremonial center because the mountains and the river spoke to
them of life-giving power. The Urubamba River, far below, snakes
triangular around the base of Machu Picchu and Huayna Picchu
mountains. A saddle between these peaks cradles the temples, the
rock shrines, the dwelling places, and the agricultural terraces that
dance between the clouds in early morning and emerge to sunlight by
noon.
Water is at the center of it all. Wright and Valencia's paleohydrologic studies reveal how the Inca predicated the design and
construction of Machu Picchu upon the flow of a spring. From high
on the side of Machu Picchu Mountain, a canal brings water across an
agricultural terrace to the first fountain just above the Temple of the
Sun. From there, sixteen fountains splash, spout, and sing down a
staircase to the Temple of the Condor.
You can see for yourself. A foldout archeological map of Machu
Picchu is inside Ruth's and Alfredo's Machu Picchu Guidebook. Study it.
See how the Inca trail leads into the upper and lower agricultural
' Greg Hobbs is a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. Ken Wright is
Principal Engineer of Wright Water Engineers, Inc, Denver, Colorado. Ruth Wright, a
former member of the Colorado General Assembly, is a Board Member of the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District. Alfredo Valencia is a Professor of
Archeology at the Universidad de San Antonio Abad in Cusco, Peru.
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terraces. Notice how the Inca Canal cuts across the drainage moat to
bisect the western and eastern urban sectors. Spot the Sacred Rock at
the start of the Huayna Picchu trail, where Quechua families still hug
the visible manifestation of Pachamama, the earth mother.
Now you are ready for your self-guided tour. Just inside the
entrance gate, climb to the Guardhouse. Pause to see how the water
supply canal passes right by food storehouses. Cross the Inca trail
coming in from Cusco and stand beside the Guardhouse. Below you
stretches the whole of this incredible cradle of civilization; the lovely
green of the main plaza where llama and alpaca graze; the Inca stones
rising on either side to form the ceremonial and residential edifices;
and the crop-growing terraces on the flanks of the cradle falling away
to the Urubamba River.
Step-by-step, Ruth and Alfredo talk you, in the Machu Picchu
Guidebook, through these wonders. Plan on spending several days
there. You will have the joy of misty mornings and sun-streaked
afternoons. The day-train trippers will be gone. Wind through the
Rock Quarry. Pause in the quiet of the Unfinished Temple. You can
take the time to side hike to the Sun Gate, Machu Picchu Mountain,
the Inca Drawbridge, and Huayna Picchu Mountain. Talk with other
visitors. The world is here for good reason.
Ruth and Alfredo immensely aid the visitor's Machu Picchu
experience. They bring new information to old understandings:
There are many different ways to experience Machu Picchu. We
hope this guidebook will give you the tools to do it in your own way.
In the last several decades, much has been learned about the Inca in
general and Machu Picchu in particular. Since the Inca had no
written language, scientists have had to 'read' their artifacts, their
stones, their temples, and their mummies to establish their place in
history. Recent information and new analyses of earlier findings are
shedding additional light on these truly remarkable people and their
culture.

The Machu Picchu Guidebook starts with an introduction to the
history and topography of Machu Picchu. Chapters follow dedicated
to the Guardhouse and the Terrace of the Ceremonial Rock; the
Western Urban Sector; the Eastern Urban Sector; Various Sites on the
Way Out; and Side Trips. Marvelous detail attends every page. The
accompanying photographs are many and well shot. They draw your
attention to the features described in the text.
Pay particular attention to the numerous huacas. These are the
Inca sacred places, typically consisting of naturally-situated or humanplaced rocks cut to the shape of surrounding peaks. These people
loved their mountains.
Don't be afraid to make some wrong turns as you orient yourself.
The structure of the Machu Picchu Guidebook divides Machu Picchu into
hemispheres. You start by going down from the Guardhouse to the
Main Gate to the Temple of the Sun; then you turn laterally to the
residence of the Inca and back through the Western Urban Sector up
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to the Rock Quarry, the Sacred Plaza, and the Intiwantana. Then you
proceed clockwise past the Sacred Rock and Unfinished Temple into
the Eastern Urban Sector, finishing at the Temple of the Condor.
Making the walk in this way takes you away from the staircase of the
sixteen fountains early on. You encounter the staircase and the
fountains again when you reach the Temple of the Condor much later.
Sometime during your multi-day visit to Machu Picchu, you will want
to follow the staircase in one continuous movement down from the
Main Gate to see, feel, and hear the sixteen fountains flow sinuously.
The May 2002, issue of National Geographic Magazine contains yet
another map of Machu Picchu derived from the Wright-Valencia
partnership. This map shows how magnificent Machu Picchu must
have looked with its thatched roofs uplifted to the condor sky.
Underneath your feet at every turn is the invisible sixty-percent of
Machu Picchu. In their Civil Engineering Marvel, Ken and Alfredo
describe the genius of Machu Picchu's foundational structure. The
Inca edifices and agricultural terraces stand the test of time because of
careful drainage and methodical trench work. The visible fortypercent of Machu Picchu rests on mountain bedrock and the skill of
people who learned through ancestral experience how to counter
earthquake and erosion's despoiling effect with solid foundational
footings.
Ken and Alfredo deduce from their studies that the Inca did not
irrigate the agricultural terraces at Machu Picchu, though they did
elsewhere. Here, the rainy season and supplemental importation of
agricultural products met the needs of the small resident population
and the influx of those attending rituals. The Inca ruler Pachacuti
began Machu Picchu as a ceremonial retreat in A.D. 1450. It likely
ceased normal operation by A.D. 1540 due to the collapse of the Inca
Empire under Spanish invasion.
Ken and Alfredo explain that Machu Picchu's durability stems
from high quality professional workmanship:
Machu Picchu's technical planning is surely the key to the site's
longevity and functionality. The Inca's careful use of hydraulic,
drainage, and construction techniques ensured that the retreat was
not reduced to rubble during its many years of abandonment. These
techniques, combined with a strong knowledge of hydrology, were
what made it a grand and operational retreat high in the most rugged
of terrain.
The Civil Engineering Marvel is easily readable, yet contains much
study and analysis of Machu Picchu's structural accomplishment. Ken
and Alfredo devote chapters to (1) setting, geology, climate, and site
selection; (2) city planning and engineering infrastructure; (3)
hydrogeology, collection works, water requirements, and water
supplies; (4) hydraulic engineering, water supply canal, and fountains;

(5) drainage infrastructure, surface runoff and drainage criteria,
agricultural terraces, and urban sector; (6) agriculture, hand-placed
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soil, crop water needs, and adequacy of nutrient production; (7)
building foundations and stone walls; (8) construction methods, rock
quarry, transporting and lifting rocks, using wood and vegetation, roof
structures, canal stones, floors and plaster, bridges, and tools of the
trade; (9) cultural background and Inca heritage; and (10) a walking
tour of the engineering works (Ruth's contribution to this book).
Dr. Gordon McEwan, excavator of Pikillacta and Chokepukio,
illuminates the cultural background of the Inca in a fine chapter he
contributes to the Civil Engineering Marvel (chapter 9). He further
explains in a June 2002 National Geographic Magazine article how the
Inca culture built upon the Wari culture (A.D. 600-1000).
At
Pikillacta, the Wari relied on an aqueduct whose portals also served as
their gateways and guard ways to the Cusco Valley. Dating from B.C.
200, the Pukara and the Tiwanaku peoples conducted water for
pragmatic and religious purposes.
The Inca were religious and practical people. They revered the
earth, the mountains, and the sky, as their descendants the Quechua
still do. On mountain torsos, they saw visages of the serpent, the
puma, and the condor. Rocks and dead ancestors were equally alive to
inform and inspire the Inca by daily consultation in community. They
were expert engineers, architects, and water workers. Joseph and
Pharaoh-like, they dreamed of drought and famine; so, they stored the
plentiful crop against the certitude of impending scarcity. The Inca
exacted a tax in the form of labor. In return, the community
benefited from stored food and ritual celebrations.
In the third summer of a North American western drought
(A.D.2002), with the published work of Ken, Ruth, and Alfredo in
hand-I could see it too-how water actually works at Machu Picchu
for domestic water supply, aesthetic, and spiritual needs. The Inca
water containment and delivery structures join those of the Mayans at
Tikal, the Anasazi at Mesa Verde, and the Hopi at their mesas, and
other Native American communities, in a centuries-old mosaic of water
use in the Western Hemisphere.
In scarcity lies the opportunity for community. The native peoples
of the Americas practiced the art of water works construction out of
ingenuity and necessity, praying to the gods for rain to fill their earthconstructed hope against despair.
The native peoples also
demonstrated that water supply planning and infrastructure is a core
responsibility of those who would govern in the public interest.
Westerners always come round to the practical and symbolic value of
water for people and the environment.
I especially like the fountains.
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SIXTEEN FOUNTAINS
Down a granite staircase sixteen
Fountains carry the spring
Falling from the Sungate, high on
Machu Picchu mountain
You can hear the mountain-singing
Hands of master craftsmen
Scoring stone with hammer rock and
Praying Pachamama
To the temple of the arcing
Sun,jetting water out
When water runs for rock and men
And all is feminine.
(To Ken Wright and Alfredo Valencia, page 32
of your Machu Picchu, A Civil EngineeringMarvel)

Greg Hobbs 7/2002

BOOK NOTES
JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS
DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT, 1880s-1930s,

University of Oklahoma Press, Norman,
$39.95; ISBN 0-8061-3210-8, hardcover.
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Indian Reserved Water Rights details the emergence of the Winters
Doctrine in the context of Indian law and western water law in the
early twentieth century. Shurts suggests the prior appropriation system
worked to the disadvantage of many non-Indian settlers and farmers,
as vested water rights interfered with attempts of junior appropriators
to irrigate and develop arid western lands. Winters recognition of
reserved water rights on federal Indian lands based on the date of
reservation effectively divested many senior water rights. As a result,
the reserved water rights doctrine provided a means of developing
both Indian and non-Indian lands where water was scarce or entirely
unavailable under the prior appropriation regime.
Chapter One provides the historical and geographical context for
the Winters litigation. Shurts contends Montana's Milk River was overappropriated by the late 1800s. During a drought in 1905, public-land
settlers diverted the entire flow of the Milk River above Fort Belknap
Indian Reservation ("Reservation"). The United States brought suit to
protect then inchoate water rights on the Reservation. The Winters
court reserved a significant portion of the Milk River's natural flow for
the Reservation. Shurts argues non-Indian control of irrigable Indian
lands and downstream non-Indian parcels raises the issue of whether
the non-Indian farmers and ranchers were actually the intended
beneficiaries of water made available under the reserved rights
doctrine.
Chapter Two outlines the legal context of Winters. Although the
priority system dominated the West, Shurts points out numerous
examples of settlers, miners, lawyers and politicians who actively
denounced the priority system as allowing unfair, private
monopolization of a vital and limited resource. Many believed a
riparian system would allow for more comprehensive and coordinated
development of western water resources. Shurts argues that by 1905,
Montana applied the riparian doctrine in administering water rights
on federal and tribal lands within the state. Further, federal and
Montana State court decisions recognized federal law as creating
federal water rights on federal lands. Finally, Indian treaty rights
provided an additional means of asserting water rights outside the
prior appropriation system. Thus, Shurts concludes the Winters
decision was not a legal anomaly, but a logical outgrowth of legal and
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social contexts surrounding the litigation.
Chapter Three examines initial reaction in Montana to the Winters
decision through newspaper accounts and other contemporary
documents.
Shurts contends only farmers upstream from Fort
Belknap were actually alarmed by the courts recognition of the United
States' reserved water right in Milk River. Towns along and below the
Reservation saw Winters as an opportunity, because it required
upstream users to leave most of the Milk River's natural flow for Indian
land irrigation, benefiting Indian and non-Indian farmers alike. In
addition, the Reservation would require a facility to store and deliver
the river's floodwaters to irrigable Reservation lands, thus providing a
constant water supply to the entire area. Shurts concludes that the
majority of Milk River water users stood to gain from Winters
recognition of a reserved right for the Reservation. As a result, towns
in the lower valley never opposed the initial government lawsuit or any
subsequent Winters litigation.
Chapter Four follows the Winters decision through federal court of
appeals, arguing the legal theory behind the Winters doctrine was
virtually unrecognized by any federal government agency. While the
original government complaint in Winters emphasized riparian federal
and treaty rights on the Reservation, ignoring prior appropriation
claims, the 1902 Reclamation Act and development of the West turned
on rejection of riparian doctrine. Further, the United States was
enmeshed in Colorado v. Kansas, claiming the riparian doctrine did not
apply in western states. Shurts argues this illustrates how complicated
local and national issues often overshadow Indian water rights claims
in federal litigation.
Chapter Five returns to the Milk River Valley after the court of
appeals affirmed the Winters decision. Shurts points out the newly
recognized reserved rights were widely understood as flexible based on
irrigable reservation acreage, not only by the court and the federal
government, but by local newspapers as well. Shurts contends the real
problem with the Winters decision was one of implementation rather
than interpretation, detailing numerous conflicts over how to quantify
the reserved rights claims. Efforts to expand the right included a
proposal by a sugar company to lease Indian lands for cultivation of
sugar beets.
Conversely, appropriators enjoined by the Winters
decision attempted unsuccessfully to curtail reserved water rights by
severing irrigable lands from the Reservation by an Act of Congress.
Chapter Six considers the Winters doctrine as part of the federal
allotment program, attempting to quantify reserved rights for
individual Indian farmers, thereby extinguishing tribal rights to
reserved waters.
Shurts focuses on the Blackfeet Reservation
Allotment Legislation of 1906, arguing the legislation attempted to
turn Indians into small-tract farmers, by effectively using federal
reclamation water based on priority under state law. Shurts contends
these legislative acts basically nullified federal Indian reserved rights,
converting them into appropriative state water rights.
Chapter Seven looks at the United States Supreme Court's decision

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 6

in Winters. Shurts finds the opinion did nothing to explain whether a
reserved right inhered in the federal government, the Indian tribe, or
both. Further, the decision failed to provide any basis for quantifying
reserved water rights claims. In the Milk River Valley, the decision did
nothing to alter the ongoing battle between upper Milk River
appropriators and Indian and non-Indian landowners in the lower
Valley. In a larger legal context, Shurts suggests ambiguities in the
opinion provided ample grounds for misunderstanding and
misinterpretation, allowing proponents of the prior appropriation
doctrine to question the validity and legal implications of Winters for
decades.
Chapter Eight examines the diverse approaches to water allocation
in the West that made the Winters decision possible. Delving into the
backgrounds of the lawyers and judges involved in shaping the Winters
doctrine, Shurts concludes prior appropriation was understood as one
means among many for allocating scarce western water resources.
Winters provided flexibility to develop land interests and further
governmental policies outside constraints of the priority system,
consonant with contemporary understanding of the role of water
allocation systems in developing the West.
Chapter Nine explores how the Winters doctrine fared in the years
following the Milk River litigation, looking at federal attempts to
perfect Indian water rights on the Uintah reservation in eastern Utah
from the late 1800s to 1914. Shurts argues the government failed to
capitalize on the potential of Winters, abandoning the reserved right
doctrine, and making a series of largely unsuccessful attempts to
perfect Indian water rights under Utah's prior appropriation system.
By 1911, the federal government concluded there was little chance of
attaining sufficient water rights to allow development of Indian lands
on the Uintah Reservation under Utah state law, and looked to the
Winters doctrine as a possible solution.
Chapter Ten explains the reemergence of Winters after 1914 as part
of an ongoing federal attempt to pursue Indian water rights outside of
state appropriative regimes. Shurts suggests the absence of reserved
rights lawsuits by the federal government following the Winters
decision failed to flesh out the legal contours of reserved rights
doctrine. Thus, issues related to Indian water rights were addressed
neither by Congress nor the courts for nearly a decade following
Winters. Shurts details a series of water disputes on reservation lands
that prompted the Department of Interior and other federal agencies
to push for national legislation recognizing Indian water rights. By
1913, the Indian Office initiated Indian water rights lawsuits in
virtually every western state under the reserved rights doctrine. In
addition, the Department of Justice began to consider the broader
implications of Winters in obtaining water for acquiring water for
Reclamation projects and other federal purposes.
Chapter Eleven returns to the Uintah Reservation to explore how
the nationwide reassessment of Winters focused Indian water rights
litigation in Utah on the issue of federal reserved rights. Shurts
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analyzes the Winters-based approach to water rights litigation, following
two federal court cases from preliminary filing of claims through entry
of a final decree recognizing priority rights for reservation lands based
on the date of reservation.
Chapter Twelve provides a detailed analysis of the Uintah
Reservation cases. Shurts concludes the primary function of Winters in
the Uintah litigation was to manipulate inflexible state priority
allocations. Thus, Winters allowed western legislators and developers to
use water not only to reclaim irrigable Indian lands, but also to apply
reserved water to non-Indian lands as part of a comprehensive
reclamation vision for the West.
Indian Reserved Water Rights provides an in-depth historical study of
the complex social and political forces behind the Winters doctrine.
Although prior appropriation remains the dominant force in western
water law, this volume demonstrates that other alternatives exist to
address difficult questions of water use and allocation in the modern
West.
Alan Curtis

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Klump v. United States, 30 Fed. Appx. 958 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(upholding the Federal Claims Court decision to dismiss a Fourth
Amendment and state law claim for lack ofjurisdiction, granting
summary judgment for the government because the Fifth Amendment
taking claim was precluded, and holding that: (1) impoundment and
sale of trespassing cattle does not effect a Fifth Amendment taking;
and (2) the government acting in its proprietary capacity did not effect
a Fifth Amendment taking of water rights).
Luther Klump, an Arizona rancher, held a grazing permit for
48,000 acres of Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") land known as
the Badger Den Allotment. The permit restricted grazing in the HX
Dam Protection Area and allowed for seasonal grazing in the Ryan
Seeding Pasture. In 1990, the BLM cancelled the permit after Klump
In April 1993, the BLM
repeatedly ignored the restrictions.
impounded Klump's cattle and sold them at auction, and paid Klump
the proceeds minus costs in accordance with BLM regulations.
Klump challenged the cancellation of the grazing permit. Both
the administrative judge and the Interior Board of Land Appeals
("IBLA") sustained the permit cancellation. The IBLA decision was
appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona
and then to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Klump argued before both courts that the BLM restrictions on his
grazing permit were invalid because it violated his water and grazing
rights. Klump further argued that the BLM cancellation of his permit
was a Fifth Amendment taking of his property rights without due
process and just compensation.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Klump's arguments. The Ninth Circuit ruled that: (1) Klump
had no legally cognizable water or grazing rights in the HX Dam
Protection Area or in the Ryan Seeding Pasture; (2) the grazing
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permit's restrictions did not violate Klump's water or grazing rights;
and (3) in view of Klump's intentional violation of the grazing permits
restrictions, the BLM had properly canceled the permit.
In April 1995, Klump filed his action in the court of federal claims,
alleging the BLM impoundment and sale of his cattle violated the
Fourth Amendment and Arizona state law and that BLM had taken his
livestock, water rights, grazing permit, livelihood, and ranch in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. In his complaint, Klump sought
compensation and damages in excess of $176 million.
In its November 4, 1997 decision, the court of federal claims
dismissed the Fourth Amendment and state law claims for lack of
jurisdiction. In addressing the Fifth Amendment claim the court held
that the BLM did not affect a taking when it impounded and sold
Klump's cattle and granted summary judgment for the government.
The court concluded that the cancellation of the grazing permit
complaint was barred due to issue preclusion arising from the prior
litigation in federal district court in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit.
On July 13, 1998, the court of federal claims issued its decision on
Klump's claim that the BLM's actions amounted to a taking of his
entire ranch and fee lands.
The court determined that issue
preclusion barred this claim because it was rejected initially in Klump's
challenge of the grazing permit cancellation and in a subsequent
action by the United States to quiet title to the Badger Den Allotment.
The final decision of the federal claims court over Klump's claims
was made on June 8, 2001. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of the government on Klump's claim that the BLM's actions
amounted to a taking of his water rights. Klump appealed these
judgments to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.
The appellate court upheld the federal claims court decision that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear Klump's Fourth Amendment and state law
claims. The court of appeals held that monetary damages are not
available for Fourth Amendment claims and the federal claims court
only had jurisdiction over cases in which the Constitution or a federal
statute required the payment of monetary damages. Therefore, the
court lacked jurisdiction.
The appellate court turned next to Kump's Fifth Amendment
takings claims and upheld the federal claims court decision of
summary judgment for the government. Klump was precluded from
claiming the BLM's actions were a taking and that his lack of a permit
was not a bar to his cattle grazing rights. The court of appeals
reasoned that Klump had already litigated and lost both of these
claims, and their resolution was essential to the final judgment.
Therefore, Klump was precluded from relitigating the claim and
summary judgment for the government was proper.
The appellate court went on to note that if the grazing permit
claim were not precluded, the claim for damages would still fail
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because a grazing permit is not a compensable property right. The
appellate court stated that the Taylor Grazing Act, the express terms of
the lease, and relevant case law all affirm that a grazing permit is not a
compensable property interest.
Furthermore, the appellate court affirmed the holding that the
impoundment and sale of Klump's cattle was not a taking. Regulation
of property rights does not 'take' private property when an individual's
reasonable investment-backed expectations can continue to be
realized as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions.
The BLM's actions were consistent with Klump's reasonable
investment-backed expectations. The appellate court reasoned that
the BLM permit conditions and numerous warnings put Klump on
notice that the BLM would seize and sell his cattle. Accordingly,
Klump had no reasonable expectation that his cattle could trespass on
federal land.
The appellate court upheld the federal claims court decision that
the BLM had not affected a Fifth Amendment taking of Klump's water
rights and claims. The Appeals Court held that while sovereign acts
may give rise to a Fifth Amendment taking, mere assertions of a right
of property do not. In obtaining the water rights to the Badger Den
Allotment, the BLM acted in its proprietary capacity and received the
same treatment under state law as a private owner.
Jason Turner
Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding: (1)
the impact of a challenged regulatory taking must be evaluated in
terms of its effect on the landowner's parcel as a whole in
consideration of wetlands regulation; and (2) the determination of the
fair market value of property allegedly taken inherently factors in
inflation).
Dolores, Stanley, and Albert Walcek, and Regina Ammons
("Walceks") sued the United States, claiming the government's
regulation of their property constituted a taking. The United States
Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint on the merits. The
Walceks appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal District.
The Walceks purchased 14.5 acres of real property in 1971. In
1972, 13.2 acres of the property became subject to regulation under
section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") as federally regulated
wetlands. In 1988, the Walceks submitted a series of applications to
the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for authority to fill and
develop the land pursuant to section 404 of the CWA. In 1993, the
Corps denied approval of the Walceks' development plans, and
proposed alternatives, which the Walceks considered economically
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unviable.
The Walceks filed a complaint before the Court of Federal Claims
in 1994. In the complaint, the Walceks alleged a permanent taking
based on the Corps's denial of their permit request, and also that the
decision rendered useless the economic value of their property. In
1996, after the Walceks filed their complaint, the Corps issued a
permit to the Walceks, which authorized the development of 2.2 acres
of the property. The Walceks were not satisfied with the conditioned
permit, whereby they were required to keep eleven acres undeveloped,
and persisted with the complaint.
The Court of Federal Claims limited the trial to the issue of
whether the 1996 permit affected a regulatory taking. Although the
Walceks never formally amended their complaint to address the 1996
permit, the trial court tried the issue by the implied consent of the
parties. The Walceks argued that the 13.2 acres of wetlands on their
property constituted the relevant parcel for reviewing a possible
categorical regulatory taking. Because the 1996 permit allowed 2.2
acres of development and did not deny the Walceks all economically
beneficial use of the land, the court held that no categorical taking
occurred. However, the court noted the Walceks could have shown
the regulation effected a taking according to the factors articulated in
Penn Central Transportation v. City of New York ("the Penn Central
Factors"). Absent a categorical taking, the Penn Central Factors
permit a property owner to prove that a regulation affected a taking
pursuant to specific factors. But, after comparing the Walceks' facts
with the Penn Central Factors, the court concluded the wetlands
regulations of the Walceks' land pursuant to the 1996 permit effected
no compensable taking.
On appeal, the Walceks maintained that a recent United States
Supreme Court decision provided grounds for treating the eleven
acres in question the Corps prohibited development on as the relevant
parcel for the regulatory takings analysis. The Walceks alternatively
argued that the Federal Court of Claims improperly applied the Penn
Central Factors, and therefore erred in concluding the 1996 permit
did not constitute a taking.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal District
declined to consider the Walceks' argument that the relevant parcel
for the takings analysis was the eleven acres the 1996 permit required
be left undeveloped. The court refused to consider this issue on the
grounds that it had not been raised in the court below. It also found
no error in the lower court's analysis of the Penn Central Factors, or in
the conclusion that the Walceks suffered no compensatory taking.
Further, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's refusal to
adjust the value of the Walceks' property for inflation before
determining whether the Walceks would be able to realize a profit
under the 1996 permit. The court held that the proper determination
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of the fair market value of property inherently factors in inflation, and
any additional adjustments would be unreasonable. Thus, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the Walceks' complaint.
Mark Shea
SECOND CIRCUIT
Altman v. Town of Amherst, No. 01-7468, 2002 WL 31132139 (2nd Cir.
Sept. 26, 2002) (holding that a determination of whether a point
source discharge of properly used pesticides into waters of the United
States requires an NPDES or SPEDS permit will remain undecided
until the EPA interprets whether the Clean Water Act includes this
type of discharge).
Michael and Susan Altman ("Altmans"), residents of Amherst, New
York, commenced a suit against the Town of Amherst ("Amherst") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of New York
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, civil penalties, and attorney's
fees for violations of permit requirements of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The Altmans alleged that Amherst violated the CWA by
spraying pesticides for mosquito control in federal wetlands without a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit or
a State Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("SPDES") permit.
Amherst argued they only needed a permit from the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation ("DEC") to spray
pesticides for mosquito control when the city discharged the pesticides
directly into United States' waters. After a failed settlement attempt,
Amherst filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted
Amherst's motion. It held that no issues of material fact existed and
that pesticides, when used for their intended purpose, do not
constitute a pollutant as defined by the CWA. Further, the court
decided that the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA") more aptly applied to this particular situation. Finally, it
granted Amherst's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
Amherst only needed a DEC freshwater permit to spray pesticides.
The Altmans appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit raising three issues: (1) FIFRA did not foreclose,
preempt, or supercede the permit requirements under section 402 of
the CWA; (2) state and federal acquiescence to Amherst's discharges
without a CWA permit was unlawful; and (3) good-faith use of
pesticides even for their intended purpose did not make the spray
something other than a pollutant according to the meaning of the
CWA. The appellate court vacated the decision and remanded the
case to the district court.
The CWA permit requirements apply when a party discharges a
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pollutant from a point source into waters of the United States. The
appellate court focused on the fact that the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") had not articulated a clear interpretation of current
law dealing with whether pesticides used properly and released over or
into waters of the United States triggered the requirement of an
NPDES or SPDES permit. It determined that the question would
remain open until the EPA decided the issue.
The district court acted with an incomplete record and failed to
consider threshold questions of law. The court suggested that the
Altmans amend their complaint to join federal and state agencies
necessary to resolve this issue. The appellate court also issued five
guidelines for the district court. First, the district court needed to
consider whether freshwater wetlands in New York are "waters of the
United States." Second, the district court should examine whether the
use of the particular pesticides in this case constituted the "deliberate
discharge" of pollutants into the waters of the United States. Third,
the district court must determine if Amherst properly used the
pesticides for their intended purpose. Fourth, the district court
needed to determine whether any of the pesticides applied,
discharged, or sprayed by Amherst were pollutants as defined by the
CWA. Fifth, the district court must use persuasive authority of recent
case law from the United States Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit.
Adriano Martinez

FOURTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 39 Fed. Appx. 870 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a Supreme Court decision subsequent to a plea
agreement and consent decree entered into by appellants and the
United States did not eliminate the federal government's jurisdiction
and did not legalize the conduct underlying appellant's criminal
conviction because the decision dealt with a provision of 33 C.F.R. §
328.3(a) (3) that the government had not used to assertjurisdiction for
the plea agreement or the consent decree).
This appeal arose out of a denial by the Maryland United States
District Court of Interstate General Company's ("IGC") petition for
writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate. As grounds for its writ
and motion to vacate, IGC argued the Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC') legalized the conduct underlying
IGC's criminal conviction. Thus, appellants claimed they did not
violate the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by filling in certain wetlands
because SWANCC eliminated the federal government's jurisdiction
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over those wetlands. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
disagreed, affirming the district court's ruling and holding SWANCC
did not change the decisional law applicable to appellant's case.
In September 1995, the United States began parallel criminal and
civil proceedings against IGC, St. Charles Associates ("SCA"), and
James J. Wilson, chief executive officer of both companies ("IGC and
SCA"). The complaints charged IGC and SCA with violating the CWA
by discharging fill material onto four parcels of wetlands in St. Charles
without obtaining a permit from the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). In February 1996, ajury convicted the IGC and
SCA on four felony counts of knowingly discharging fill material into
wetlands protected by the CWA.
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed IGC's convictions and
remanded the matter for a new trial because the district court, in
instructing the jury, had relied on 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) as a possible
basis for the Corps' jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Corps
had exceeded its congressional authorization under the CWA in
promulgating § 328.3(a)(3).
Consequently, the court held
§ 328.3(a) (3) was invalid and the district court's instruction based on
that regulation was erroneous.
After remand, the parties settled both the criminal and civil aspects
of the controversy. IGC pled guilty to a single felony count and paid
$1.5 million in fines. The parties also signed a consent decree, which
required IGC to pay a civil penalty of $400,000 and to implement a
wetland remediation plan. In return, the government dismissed all
charges against Wilson and SCA. The district court sentenced IGC
and entered the consent decree in November 1999.
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court decided SWANCC, and IGC
filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis and a motion to vacate
the consent decree under Rule 60(b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court denied both applications, and IGC
appealed.
Federal courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a) to grant a
writ of error coram nobis vacating a conviction after completion of a
sentence. However, this extraordinary relief should be granted only if
an error "of the most fundamental character" has occurred, and no
other remedy is available. Although historically, this common law writ
was used to correct fundamental errors of fact, it may also be issued to
correct fundamental errors of law. Such an error may occur when
there is a significant change in the law following a conviction.
As with coram nobis, a threshold question under Rule 60(b) (5) is
whether there has been a significant change in the law since the
conviction in question. It is appropriate for a court to grant a Rule
60(b) (5) motion if the court is convinced that its prior decision was
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. According to
the Supreme Court, this may occur when the party seeking relief from
an injunction or consent decree can show a significant change either
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in factual conditions or in law. Here, IGC argued that SWANCC
significantly changed the law applicable to its conduct.
The Fourth Circuit held that both IGC's guilty plea and the
consent decree assumed that the Corps had jurisdiction under the
CWA to regulate the St. Charles wetlands. The court next noted,
however, that the Corps no longer asserted jurisdiction under
§ 328.3(a) (3) because United States v. Wilson declared that subsection
of the regulation invalid. Instead, the court opined, the Corps
asserted jurisdiction over the wetlands because they were adjacent to
tributaries of traditional navigable waters. It noted that the parties
acknowledged the factual predicate for the Corps' jurisdictionspecifically, that the St. Charles wetlands were adjacent to tributaries of
traditionally navigable waters.
IGC argued that SWANCC eliminated jurisdiction over wetlands
adjacent to waters that were not traditionally navigable, even if those
waters eventually flowed into traditional navigable waters. According
to IGC, SWANCC limited the Corps' jurisdiction to: (1) traditional
navigable waters; and (2) wetlands immediately adjacent to traditional
navigable waters. Consequently, IGC argued that SWANCC eliminated
the Corps' jurisdiction over the disputed wetlands, so discharging fill
into them without a permit did not violate section 404(a) of the CWA.
The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by IGC's contentions,
holding the only clear change in law made by SWANCC was a narrow
one. At issue in SWANCC was the Corps' jurisdiction over an isolated
intrastate body of water. The court further held that the Corps' in
SWANCC based its jurisdiction solely on § 328.3(a)(3), the only
subsection covering isolated bodies of water. Thus, the Supreme
Court declined to hold that isolated ponds wholly located within two
Illinois counties fell under section 404(a)'s definition of "navigable
waters" because they served as habitat for migratory birds.
The Fourth Circuit noted that the wetlands at issue were adjacent
to the headwaters of small streams that flowed into Port Tobacco
Creek, Piney Branch, or Mattawoman Creek, and concluded these
wetlands were adjacent to tributaries of traditional navigable waters.
In sum, because the Fourth Circuit had already invalidated
§ 328.3(a) (3) in its entirety in United States v. Wilson, an opinion issued
before either the plea or the consent decree, SWANCC effected no
Accordingly,
relevant change in decisional law in this circuit.
(3) and, in
of
§
328.3(a)
validity
only
the
SWANCCs holding addressed
the present case, the Corps' jurisdiction did not rest on subsection
(a) (3). Rather, the Fourth Circuit opined, the Corps' based its
jurisdiction on §§ 328.3(a) (1), (a) (5), and (a) (7) for purposes of the
guilty plea and the consent decree.
In denying IGC's writ of error coram nobis and motion to vacate, the
Fourth Circuit stated that IGC would have had to show there had been
a fundamental or significant change in the law governing the subject
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case. IGC failed to do so. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order denying IGC's petition for writ of error coram
nobis and motion to vacate the consent decree.
Gloria M. Soto
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Hamilton v. Myers, 281 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that
individuals rightfully possessing prior property interests in lakes, now
held in public trust, own the submerged land beneath the lake and the
air above, to the low water mark point, as measured at the time the
lake transferred into public trust).
Jamie and Bonnie Hamilton ("Hamilton") filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against the
Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency, its executive director, and
several employees in their official and individual capacities ("TWRA").
Hamilton sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the TWRA,
and compensatory and punitive damages against the employees, in
their individual capacities. Hamilton alleged that TWRA and its
employees violated Hamilton's due process rights by unlawfully
searching and seizing Hamilton's boat, duck blind, and decoys from
Reelfoot Lake at the orders of the TWRA regional office. Additionally,
Hamilton sought declaratory relief pronouncing that Hamilton owned
a property interest in Reelfoot Lake. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of TWRA, finding sovereign immunity
barred Hamilton's claims, and that in the alternative, Hamilton did
not own a property interest in Reelfoot Lake because the lake was held
in public trust. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
that the employees in their individual capacities were immune from
suit because the employees' actions were reasonable and protected as a
discretionary function. However, the court reversed the district court's
judgment on the other claims. It held that Hamilton owned a
property interest in Reelfoot Lake under Tennessee law, and
remanded the case to determine whether the Hamiltons had standing
to enforce their property rights, and to resolve disputed issues
regarding the measurement of the property interest.
In 1788, the State of North Carolina granted Colonel Doherty,
Hamilton's predecessor in interest, a deed of real property. In 1810,
an earthquake caused the formation of Reelfoot Lake, thus
submerging part of the land included under the original 1788 grant.
Hamilton's deed extended to the ordinary low water mark of Reelfoot
Lake. Since the Doherty grant included the entire portion of land
described in the original 1788 deed, Hamilton asserted Doherty's
riparian rights over the lakebed, 200 yards past the shore of the Lake,
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and argued that this territory was outside the TWRA's management.
Hamilton marked this 200-yard territory by a light pole, and often
moored a boat to the pole for hunting purposes. On November 16,
1996, Hamilton moored a camouflaged boat, duck blind, and duck
decoys to the light pole. TWRA officers were on duty searching for
unregistered blinds, including blinds erected under asserted riparian
ownership. The TWRA officers inspected Hamilton's boat and blind,
and did not find a registration tag. Reporting the boat and blind to
their supervisors, the TWRA regional office ordered removal of the
boat and blind. The employers removed the items found at the pole
from the lake. Subsequent to removal of the items, TWRA discovered
registration numbers on the boat. The TWRA denied Hamilton's
requests for immediate return of the items, yet they returned them ten
days later.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed whether
sovereign immunity barred Hamilton's claims. The district court ruled
the claims were barred because the effect of Hamilton's claims of
ownership in a lake held in public trust would effectively shift control
and all benefits of that part of the lake to Hamilton. The district court
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, which ruled that the Coeur d'Alene Tribe could
not assert a riparian property interest over an entire lake because it
effected Idaho's sovereignty. The court of appeals reversed the district
court and distinguished Idaho, holding that an individual possessing a
prior deed for land submerged under a lake may acquire riparian
rights over the water, above the land and obtain complete ownership
of the portion of a lake, provided the state retains ownership over part
of the lake. The court reasoned that because Hamilton was only
asserting control and ownership 200 yards off shore, the property
interest was not so broad that it would strip Tennessee of control over
Reelfoot Lake. Therefore, the TWRA was not immune from suit
because Hamilton asserted damages would not infringe upon
Tennessee's sovereignty.
The court of appeals then applied Tennessee state law to
determine whether Hamilton owned a riparian right in the lake. The
court held that individual property rights in Reelfoot Lake had already
been established in State ex. rel. Cates. In that case, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that the public trust in the lake was only
applicable to the lakebed, waters, and air outside of the grants issued
to Doherty in 1788. Applying this precedent, the court determined
that Hamilton had standing to bring suit and enforce their property
rights established in the Doherty grant if the boundaries of Hamilton's
asserted property interest was reasonably identifiable. The court
examined Hamilton's deed and found that the property interest
extended to the ordinary low water mark of the lake. Consequently, it
found that the boundaries of the deed were reasonably identifiable
because the land conveyed by the deed was not completely submerged
currently, or at the time the lake was conveyed into public trust.
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Because the lands could be identified, the court held that Hamilton
owned the submerged lands below the low water mark at the time the
lake was conveyed into public trust in 1913. The court of appeals then
remanded this issue to the district court to determine the level of the
low water mark in 1913.
Holly Shook

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002) (dismissing
Missouri Soybean Association's claims of potential harm to its
members resulting from the Environmental Protection Agency's
stricter controls of the use of challenged waters in Missouri because
the claims were too remote and speculative).
Plaintiff, Missouri Soybean Association ("MSA") sued the United
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's list of
pollution-impaired waters because some of the waters included lacked
documentation of pollution. MSA's complaint focused on potential
harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the use of the
challenged waters. The court consolidated MSA's suit with the Sierra
Club, Ozark Chapter's and the American Canoe Association, Inc.'s
("environmental plaintiffs") earlier lawsuit also challenging the EPA's
approval of Missouri's 1998 list claiming such list was under inclusive.
The EPA and the environmental plaintiffs settled their dispute
through a consent decree approved by the district court.
MSA moved for partial summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The EPA filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming MSA lacked standing and ripeness, and, in the
alternative, moving for summary judgment on the merits of the
challenged water classification dispute. The court assumed MSA had
standing, but found MSA's suit was not ripe for adjudication. Thus, it
denied MSA's motion for partial summary judgment and granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the EPA, dismissing MSA's suit
with prejudice. MSA's appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
States compile lists of impaired by, first, pursuant to the CWA,
identifying and prioritizing those waters within its boundaries that do
not meet the its water quality standards. Next, states submit the list of
impaired waters, known as the section 303(d) list, to the EPA for
approval. Finally, once the EPA approves the list, the impaired waters
undergo scientific study to establish the total maximum daily load
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("TMDL") of specifically identified pollutants that may be released
without violating state water quality standards.
In preparing its 1998 list, Missouri divided its waters into three
categories: (1) category one waters were impaired and scheduled for
full TMDL development; (2) category two waters were scheduled for
further monitoring because the water quality data was outdated and
less reliable; and (3) category three waters were declared as impaired
but with no practical remedy available because the pollution resulted
from minerals, nutrients, or sediment naturally occurring in the water.
Post classification, Missouri excluded the Missouri and the Mississippi
rivers ("big rivers") from its list, finding no water quality contaminant
violations. Subsequently, the EPA added several waters to Missouri's
list and declared the waters in all three categories impaired, requiring
Consequently, the Missouri Clean Water
TMDL development.
Commission added the big rivers to Missouri's section 303(d) list,
claiming the pollutant was "habitat loss" due to "channelization." The
EPA approved Missouri's revised list.
MSA claimed the EPA should have disapproved Missouri's section
303(d) list because the category two waters and the big rivers lacked
the required documentation of pollution to be listed as impaired.
MSA also asserted that the premature listing of the challenged waters
injured its members through: (1) potential changes in land
management practices; (2) limitations on crop growth and rotation;
(3) limitations on sale and use of fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides;
(4) decreases in property values; (5) increases in farming costs; and
(5) the inability to plan for and rely on the use of certain waters and
land caused by CWA's requirements.
On appeal, MSA first contended the district court erred when it
concluded that MSA's challenge was not ripe because it did not show
that EPA's approval of Missouri's 1998 list affected MSA's members in
any concrete way. The Eighth Circuit considered the suit's ripeness
for adjudication, stating the ripeness doctrine flows both from the
Article III cases and controversies limitation. The court further noted
that the ripeness doctrine also flows from prudential considerations
for refusing to exercise jurisdiction. Moreover, the ripeness doctrine
seeks "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties." Thus, for a case to be ripe for decision, it must be fit for
judicial resolution, and the parties must experience hardship in the
event the court withholds consideration of the case's merits.
The court concluded that MSA's claims were speculative and not
ripe for judicial resolution, for although MSA's complaint focused on
potential harm to its members resulting from stricter controls of the
use of the challenged waters, the more stringent controls on water use
would not occur until after TMDLs were developed and implemented.
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Even then, the court noted, it would remain uncertain whether TMDL
development or regulatory implementation would adversely impact
the members. Thus, it was clear the EPA's approval of Missouri's 1998
list failed to affect MSA's members in any concrete way.
The court next considered MSA's contention that because the EPA
challenged jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss and not a motion for
summary judgment, the court should hold MSA to a relatively modest
standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings. MSA argued that
under the liberal pleading standard; its assertion of potential decreases
in property values stated a current harm sufficient to present a ripe
claim. Although the court agreed that it should hold MSA to a modest
standard of asserting jurisdiction in its pleadings, it found that MSA's
complaint did not support this contention. The court noted the
complaint described a "potential... decrease in property values
and/or property rights as a result of Clean Water Act requirements."
Considering this language in context, the court found that the "as a
result of Clean Water Act requirements" clause was consistent with
MSA's other claims of harm that could occur after the implementation
of TMDLs. Further, the court found that MSA's argument that even if
harm had not yet occurred, but was certainly impending also failed,
stating the "potential" diminution of property values was not a
sufficiently immediate or sizeable threatened harm to warrant judicial
intervention.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision finding
that MSA's claims of harm were too remote to be anything other than
speculative and not ripe for judicial resolution, however it dismissed
the suit without prejudice for lack ofjurisdiction.
Gloria MariaSoto
NINTH CIRCUIT
San Francisco BayKeeper v. Whitman, 287 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming that the United States Environmental Protection Agency
did not have a non-discretionary duty to establish water pollution
standards for the State of California since the constructive submission
doctrine, which triggers the Environmental Protection Agency's nondiscretionary duty to act, did not apply when California submitted
some total maximum daily loads).
Environmental group San Francisco BayKeeper ("BayKeeper")
appealed a summary judgment decision by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California dismissing BayKeeper's
claim that the State of California ("California") failed to both
implement an adequate water pollution control program and establish
total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs"). BayKeeper argued California
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the Clean Water Act's

("CWA")

time

requirement for submitting TMDLs, which thereby created a nondiscretionary duty for the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to submit TMDLs on behalf of California. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
BayKeeper's primary argument relied on section 303(d) of the
CWA, which allowed the EPA thirty days to approve or disapprove
identified TMDLs. TMDLs quantify the maximum level of pollutant a
water body can receive each day without violating water quality
standards. This section required the EPA to establish TMDLs for a
state when the EPA disapproved the state's submission. BayKeeper
argued that California's failure to submit TMDLs triggered the EPA's
duty to submit TMDLs for California on the theory of constructive
submission. Under this theory, a state's complete failure to submit
TMDLs triggered the EPA's non-discretionary duty to act.
The court rejected' this argument and refused to view failure to
submit as constructive submission. Constructive submission required a
clear and unambiguous decision not to submit any TMDLs, and in this
case, California's first TMDL submission in 1994 came more than
fifteen years after the initial deadline for submission. Since 1994
however, California submitted at least eighteen TMDLs and
Since
implemented a schedule for completing submission.
California's initial submission, the state has dedicated substantial
resources to its TMDL program. Based on California's actions, the
court determined that the constructive submission doctrine was not
viable.
BayKeeper alternatively argued unreasonable delay under the
Administrative Procedure Act ("Act"). Under section 706(1) of the
Act, courts can compel agency action if it is unreasonably delayed.
The court also rejected this argument and explained that a claim of
unreasonable delay follows from an agency's statutory duty. As
reviewed in the earlier argument, the EPA had no statutory duty to act,
which destroyed BayKeeper's claim of unreasonable delay.
Stefania Niro

Tillamook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 288 F.3d
1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of motion for preliminary
injunction to prevent a municipal water supply reservoir expansion
project, holding that the Army Corps of Engineers conducted an
adequate investigation and determined the impact to the environment
was minimal).
The City of McMinnville ("City") developed a plan to expand its
water supply reservoir in order to prevent an expected water shortage
between 2002 and 2020. The expansion included placement of
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dredge into navigable waters, the Nestucca River, which required the
City's Water and Light Commission ("Commission") to obtain a
section 404 permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The
expansion would raise the existing dam by thirty feet and increase the
storage capacity of the reservoir. The Corps issued initial and final
environmental assessments ("EA"), as required under a section 404
permit. Both the Corps' initial and final EAs concluded a finding of
no significant impact ("FONSI").
Tillamook County ("County")
brought an action against the Commission in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon, seeking a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, claiming the Corps failed to
adequately comply with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") when it issued the
'section 404 permit. The court denied both the County's request for a
temporary restraining order and motion for a preliminary injunction.
The County appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing
that the Corps' FONSI was arbitrary and capricious.
The County argued that the Corps should have prepared an
environmental impact statement ("EIS") under the NEPA.
Alternatively, the County argued that if there was no requirement for
the Corps to prepare an EIS, the Corps failed to adequately evaluate
alternatives and describe mitigation measures for the reservoir
expansion.
The appellate court clarified that it would only reject a decision
not to prepare an EIS if an agency committed a clear error of
judgment. NEPA required the Corps to make an environmentally
informed decision-and for major federal actions with significant
impacts to the environment-required the Corps to prepare an EIS.
The court determined that if an agency issued a FONSI, then there is
no requirement for an EIS. Its role was solely to ensure the Corps
considered the environmental impacts, not to interject itself within the
Corps discretion. Since the Corps' final EA concluded a FONSI, there
was no requirement for an EIS.
Furthermore, the court determined that if an agency adopted
mitigation measures in response to identified impacts, the agency did
not have to prepare an EIS. The court rejected the County's argument
that the Corps failed to adequately evaluate alternatives and describe
mitigation measures. The court determined that the Corps considered
and rejected a number of alternatives to the reservoir expansion.
Additionally, the court explained that the Corps' mitigation plan
satisfied the requirement of developing proposed mitigation measures
to a reasonable degree. There was no requirement for precise details
of those proposed measures. The court determined that the Corps'
assessment of the reservoir expansion was adequate to comply with
NEPA and the CWA.
Stefania Niro
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Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding the
Environmental Protection Agency's statutory interpretation of its
authority to impose total maximum daily loads on waters containing
only nonpoint source pollution).
Betty and Guido Pronsolino ("Pronsolinos") filed suit pursuant to
sections 702 and 704 of the Administrative Procedure Act in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
They challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
authority to impose total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") on rivers
only polluted by non-point sources and sought a determination of
whether the Clean Water Act ("CWA") authorized the Garcia River
TMDLs. The district court granted summary judgment to the EPA.
The Pronsolinos appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972. Section 303 of the CWA
required each state to identify the waters within its boundaries for
which the required effluent limitations are not stringent enough to
establish applicable water quality standards. Section 303(d)(1)(C)
required states to-establish TMDLs on the waters it identified within its
boundaries. In 1992, the EPA set TMDLs on the Garcia River in
California pursuant to this provision of the CWA.
In 1998, the Pronsolinos and other landowner along the Garcia
River applied for harvesting permits. The EPA granted the permits,
but required the landowners to comply with certain restrictions,
including the TMDLs previously set by the EPA. The Pronsolinos
subsequently filed suit.
The EPA argued the court should defer to their interpretation of
the CWA regulations based on Chevron, which held that an agency's
statutory interpretation is entitled to such deference if "Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and... the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of law." The Pronsolinos did not contest
the EPA's rulemaking authority, but instead argued that the EPA failed
to exercise it here. The Pronsolinos argued the EPA should receive no
deference because it inconsistently interpreted section 303(d). The
court interjected a middle standard of deference set out in Skidmore,
where deference was determined according to the agency's
persuasiveness.
With regard to the EPA's rulemaking and interpretation of the
laws, the court determined that the Chevron standard applied because
of the delegated authority of the EPA to interpret the CWA. Even still,
the court decided it should apply, at a minimum, deference under
Skidmore. However, the court found both standards resulted in the
same decision. It held the EPA's regulations of TMDLs applied
regardless of how the water body received its pollution. Disagreeing
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that the EPA had inconsistently interpreted the statute at issue, the
court found that the EPA interpreted the statute today exactly as it did
initially.
The Pronsolinos contended the EPA upset the balance of the
federal and state control created by the CWA by establishing TMDLs
for waters impaired only by nonpoint source pollution. The court
disagreed and determined the Garcia River TMDLs served as an
informational tool for the creation of the state's implementation plan,
which Congress independently and explicitly requires. Thus, the court
found no merit in the federalism argument.
Ultimately, the court upheld EPA's reasonable interpretation of
the CWA, finding that the EPA did not exceed its statutory authority in
identifying the Garcia River pursuant to section 303(d) (1) (A) and
establishing the Garcia River TMDLs, even though the river was
polluted only by non-point sources of pollution.
Staci A. McComb
Ka Makani 'O Kohala Ohana Inc. v. Dep't of Water Supply, 295 F.3d
955 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the minimal economic involvement of a
federal agency does not satisfy the National Environmental Policy Act's
"major Federal action" requirement mandating an environmental
impact statement).
Ka Makani '0 Kohala Ohana ("Ka Makani"), a citizen's coalition,
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
requesting injunctive relief against the Hawaii Department of Water
Supply ("DWS") and other federal and county agencies and officials
pending the completion of a federal environmental impact statement
("EIS").
The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, DWS. Ka Makani appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the district court's
decision granting summary judgment to DWS.
DWS began planning the Kohala water project in 1987. The water
project would transfer as much as 20 million gallons of groundwater
per day from the northern part of Kohala to the southern part of
Kohala. The project involved two governmental agencies, the United
States Geological Survey ("USGS") and the United States Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The USGS provided
partial funding for the project and participated in a series of
preliminary studies, which assessed the groundwater availability. In
1988, the DWS and the USGS entered into four Joint Funding
Agreements, which divided the costs of the studies. HUD involved
itself after Congress passed an appropriations bill allotting $500,000 to
the County of Hawaii for an EIS. HUD provided application materials
and advice, including a recommendation restricting the scope of the
activities. Narrowing the scope of the project exempted it from the
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National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") requirements, thus
expediting the grant approval process. When HUD approved the
grant, the funds were only to be used for preliminary purposes.
The DWS took $30,000 in grant funds in 1995 to pay for the
contractors working on the state EIS. This was the only time the DWS
drew upon the grant funds. In 1998, the DWS placed the Kohala
project on hold, but it assured HUD the project would resume.
Finally, in 1999, the DWS reallocated the funds to another project in
South Hilo.
Since NEPA did not have a separate judicial review provision and
the suit involved legal issues, the appellate court relied on the
reasonableness standard of review. The court noted that controlling
weight is given to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent.
NEPA only required an EIS if "major Federal actions significantly
affect the quality of the human environment." Because there is no
clear standard for determining what constitutes "major Federal
action," the analysis relies on the degree and nature of the
involvement. Here, the court weighed the amount of funds actually
spent on the project, the total amount of federal funding, and the total
estimated cost of the project and concluded that HUD and USGS's
involvement did not constitute "major Federal action." The court also
found that there could not be any "major Federal action" because of
the lack of decision-making power, authority and control HUD and
USGS possessed over the project. Furthermore, the DWS always
maintained final decision-making power over the project.
Ka Makani also argued that HUD's own provisions required an
EIS. The court found that HUD did not need to conduct an EIS if the
grant is a special purpose grant, as it was in this case. Furthermore,
the court held it illogical to conduct an EIS over the entire Kohala
project.
Staci A. McComb
Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that notice of alleged Clean Water
Act violations regarding a particular source is sufficient for all similar
claims derived from that same source in a citizen suit, and past cited
violations, along with evidence of present violations, is sufficient to
establish an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act).
The Community Association for Restoration of the Environment
("CARE") brought a citizen suit against Henry Bosma and his two dairy
operations ("Bosma") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Bosma violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") by discharging pollutants and manure into
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navigable waters without a permit. The court ruled in favor of CARE
finding that it provided Bosma with adequate notice of CARE's intent
to sue, and that CARE had established that Bosma's operation met the
definition of an ongoing violation as required under the CWA. Bosma
appealed both district court rulings to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the judgment and held that the
court did not commit "clear error" in finding that CARE provided
sufficient notice and proved an ongoing violation existed.
Bosma owned and operated two dairies. Each dairy contained
approximately 3,000 head of cattle, and met the definition of a
concentrated animal feeding operation ("CAFO") under the CWA.
The Act describes a CAFO as a point source, and CAFO operators are
required to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. The Washington Department of Ecology ("DOE")
regulates CAFOs. For many years, Bosma had a record of discharge
problems, and refused three requests by DOE to obtain the required
NPDES permit. In January 1977, Bosma obtained a general NPDES
dairy permit from DOE for one of the dairies, and later modified the
permit to include both dairies in 1998.
A person seeking to bring suit under the citizen suit provision of
the CWA must give sixty days notice of his intent to sue to the alleged
violator, the administrator, and the state so that the violator has a
chance to comply and avoid litigation. In October 1997, CARE sent
notice of its intent to sue Bosma for twelve allegedly illegal discharges.
Within sixty days, CARE filed a complaint in the district court alleging
the original violations listed in the mailed notice, and thirty-two
additional violations. Bosma argued that the original notice alleging
twelve violations was insufficient notice of CARE's thirty-two additional
violations, however, the appellate court found that CARE's notice was
adequate and provided Bosma with sufficient information so that
Bosma had knowledge of the point source where the alleged violations
occurred.
The CWA regulates the discharge of pollutants, and defines
discharge of pollutant as any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance from any point source. CARE alleged that Bosma, as a
point source, violated the CWA over thirty times by allowing the
manure from his two dairies to drain illegally into a drainage system
that eventually drained into navigable waters. Moreover, CARE
asserted that Bosma's manure fields were part of the point source
under the CWA and that the discharge of manure was included under
the CWA. The appellate court found that CARE's notice sufficient for
all alleged violations because the violations were all derived from the
same point source, and the multiple violations constituted several
instances of a single violation.
The CWA requires that notice provides sufficient information so
that the alleged violator can identify the alleged actions and the dates
of violation, the persons responsible, and the name and contact
information of the person giving notice. Focusing on the statute, the
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court of appeals looked to the words "sufficient information" and
determined that Bosma received adequate notice. It determined that
the purpose of notice is to prevent litigation and allow the violator to
correct the problem. Then the court interpreted point source to
include manure fields, reasoning that the purpose of the CWA is to
regulate all discharges, including those coming from land near a
drainage ditch. This conclusion, paired with ample evidence that
Bosma was aware the drainage ditch drained into navigable waters,
provided Bosma with notice of all closely related claims in regards to
the drainage ditch. Thus, notice to a person or company in violation
may serve as notice for all similar claims derived from the same source.
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's finding that
CARE proved the existence of an ongoing violation. It considered
multiple violations over time as an ongoing violation unless Bosma
could prove that there was no likelihood of repeating the violation.
Repetition may be inferred by the trier of fact, or implied when
additional violations occur after the plaintiff filed suit. The court of
appeals rejected Bosma's argument that CARE had not presented
sufficient evidence to show he actually committed the alleged
violations, and that therefore, future violations could not be inferred.
It found CARE had proven the existence of past violations by
providing evidence of date-specific violations. The court also inferred
an ongoing violation in light of the particular facts of the case. The
DOE had cited Bosma for numerous violations in the past and Bosma
refused to obtain a permit for many years. Additionally, CARE
provided testimony, photos, and video footage showing that Bosma
placed deposits of manure in proximity to the water after CARE filed
suit. The court of appeals concluded that evidence of past violations,
in conjunction with evidence of existing violations, was a basis for a
reasonable person to infer that there may be continuing violations.
Because Bosma failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary,
the court affirmed the district court's decision.
Holly Shook
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that: (1) individual farmers and state agencies showed
a genuine issue of material fact as to risk of injury-in-fact to confer
Article III standing; and (2) claim and issue preclusion did not bar
action against the Bureau of Reclamation).
Two farmers in the Central Delta Area of the San Joaquin River
("San Joaquin") and two California State Agencies ("State Agencies")
sued the Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR") and pursued a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of California to prevent flooding of fisheries unless the
BOR reserved sufficient water to meet salinity standards downstream.
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After the district court denied the TRO, the parties submitted crossmotions for summary judgment. The district court granted the BOR's
motion, finding the farmers and State Agencies lacked standing to sue
and that claim and issue preclusion barred their action. The district
court then granted permission for an interlocutory appeal to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to address standing and claim and
issue preclusion rulings.
The BOR operated the Central Valley Project in California, which
took water from mountain sources and delivers it to beneficial uses.
The New Melones Unit within the Central Valley Project consisted of a
dam on the San Joaquin that diverted water into the New Melones
Reservoir. California water rights permits issued in 1973 allow for
various uses of this dammed water. The amount of water released for
these uses affected the salinity level downstream, which in turn
affected certain types of crops. The Vernalis standard identified
acceptable salinity levels in the SanJoaquin.
In 1992, Congress passed the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act ("Act"), which included three important directives for the New
Melones Unit: (1) flooding fishery areas at twice the normal level; (2)
BOR management of 800,000 acre-feet of water for the fisheries; and
(3) supplementing water used for the fisheries. The BOR accordingly
adjusted its operations to divert water from New Melones Reservoir to
flood the fisheries in compliance with the Act, and the farmers and
State Agencies brought this action.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first addressed whether the State
Agencies and farmers had standing to sue. The State Agencies'
standing depended on whether the farmers could allege a sufficient
injury-in-fact to give them standing as individuals. The Ninth Circuit
articulated a three-prong standing test: (1) an injury-in-fact; (2) a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;
and (3) a likelihood that the court could redress the alleged injury.
The Ninth Circuit focused its inquiry on the injury-in-fact requirement
after finding the farmers' alleged injury was fairly traceable to the
BOR's decision to release the waters, and that the court could redress
the injury by ordering the BOR to use different methods to comply
with the Act.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme Court's
ruling in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, which held the threat of injuryin-fact was sufficient to confer standing. In applying this rule, the
Ninth Circuit found the individual farmers alleged a sufficient injuryin-fact by showing they faced a significant risk the crops they planted
would not survive if the BOR flooded the fisheries in compliance with
the Act. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the BOR's argument the
individuals must allege statutory violations to show injury-in-fact,
noting other circuits have held individuals can sue before the harm or
statutory violation occurs. It also disagreed with the BOR's claim the
farmers' harm was merely contingent, finding that while obligated to
consider contingencies, the possibility the BOR could change its
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course of conduct was not sufficient to prevent a showing of injury.
The Ninth Circuit found that because the individuals alleged a
sufficient injury-in-fact to confer standing, the State Agencies also had
standing since their members could sue in their own right.
The Ninth Circuit also addressed the BOR's second argument that
claim and issue preclusion resulting from previous administrative and
judicial proceedings regarding the New Melones Unit management
barred the action. The Ninth Circuit stated claim preclusion applies
where: (1) prior litigation involved the same parties or parties in
privity; (2) prior litigation involved the same claim or cause of action;
and (3) a final judgment on the merits terminated the prior litigation.
Applying this rule, the Ninth Circuit found claim preclusion did not
bar the current action because courts will narrowly construe the scope
of the prior litigation to the "same transactional nucleus of facts."
Since the prior actions challenged BOR releases under different New
Melones plans, and not under the New Melones plan as adjusted to
comply with the Act, the Ninth Circuit held claim preclusion did not
bar the action.
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the BOR's claim that issue
preclusion barred the action.
The Ninth Circuit noted issue
preclusion applies where: (1) a judgment on the merits resolved the
issue in question in a prior suit; (2) the second action involves the
same parties or parties in privity; and (3) the second action is based on
the same cause of action. The Ninth Circuit held issue preclusion did
not bar the action, stating the "same cause of action" requires
"identical" and not "merely similar" issues litigated. Because the Ninth
Circuit found the prior action here was only similar because it
challenged BOR operations from 1995 to 1997, and the current action
challenged BOR operations under a different management plan in
1999, issue preclusion also did not bar the action.
JaredB. Briant

TENTH CIRCUIT
Bufford v. Williams, No. 00-6055, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13235 (10th
Cir.July 2, 2002) (holding that failure to establish a pollutant's point
source is insufficient grounds to prove a Clean Water Act violation).
Norman and Zula Bufford ("Buffords") sought to prevent
wastewater allegedly originating at Crescent Wastewater Facility,
operated by Williams, from leaching onto their property, located
adjacent to the facility. The Buffords claimed that the facility's
groundwater interceptor trench was a pollutant point source
damaging their property. The parties filed simultaneous summary
judgment motions in the District Court for the Western District of
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Oklahoma. The court held for Williams, because the Buffords failed
to establish that Williams' alleged pollutant discharge violated the
Clean Water Act. The Buffords appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the judgment for Williams because the
Buffords failed to show a causal connection between the facility and
pollutants found on their property.
The wastewater treatment facility contained a three-tiered
retention lagoon and a land applicator. As water flowed through the
lagoons, its waste was broken down, and upon reaching lagoon No.
three, the water was suitable for, and was subsequently used for the
facility's irrigation. Its high quality water required no Oklahoma
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("OPDES") permit. The
lagoons were "no discharge" ponds, evidently without leakage.
Oklahoma law required irrigation rates to not exceed the crop's ability
to absorb the wastewater's nutrients, therefore the application
maximized evaporation and crop uptake and minimized water pooling
on the application field. Because soil also filtered wastewater, the
probability for groundwater contamination was "minimal." Cracks in
the sewer lines in 1994, and a 1999 tornado both required direct
discharges from lagoon No. three to the application field, yet tests
revealed the water's high quality was no threat to livestock or
agriculture, because it was of higher quality than discharge from many
facilities working under OPDES permits.
In 1998, the Buffords hired an expert to perform a Limited
Environmental Site Investigation on their property. The Buffords
raised cattle and used their land for grazing. Elevated fecal coliform,
total organic carbon, and chemical oxygen demand levels indicated
the presence of biodegradable organic materials. However, fecal
coliform existed in both human and cattle waste, and it was impossible
to differentiate their source. The expert admitted he: (1) did not
observe the wastewater facility's water enter the Buffords property; (2)
did not enter the wastewater facility; (3) did not sample water from the
interceptor trench or treatment lagoons; (4) did not know details
concerning the land application system, or whether it was operating
when he took samples; and (5) did not know the facility's groundwater
level. Yet, nevertheless he assumed that the facility was the sampled
water's source.
The court found that Buffords' expert affidavits failed to provide
evidence that the trench was a point source, or that fecal coliform
originated at the facility. Damage to the Buffords' property was
unlikely due to the fact that the wastewater lagoons held water longer
than necessary to destroy fecal coliform, and it was also quickly
destroyed in the environment. Williams provided evidence that the
trench was an outlet for naturally occurring groundwater, however,
not at outlet for the lagoon or irrigation system's discharge. The court
found that the test evidence "reveal [ed] nothing" about the pollutants'
source, thus, the Buffords failed to establish that the interceptor
trench was a point source violating the Clean Water Act. Further, area
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surface elevations reflected that eliminating the interceptor trench
would not have decreased flow to the Buffords' property. Therefore,
the appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial because the
Buffords did not meet their burden of proof.
Robert Lykos

United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170 (10thCir. 2002)
(holding that section 8 of the Reclamation Act and federal compact
and treaty obligations not directly implicating interstate equitable
apportionment issues do not create federal question jurisdiction).
In 1986, Elephant Butte Irrigation District ("EBID") filed suit
against the United States and other parties in the New Mexico state
district court, claiming senior appropriative rights on the Rio Grande
River from Elephant Butte Dam to the Texas state line. EBID sought a
stream adjudication and an injunction preventing the New Mexico
State Engineer from allowing appropriation of Rio Grande River water
until completion of the adjudication. Following three unsuccessful
attempts to have EBID's suit dismissed, the United States and Texas
("United States") filed a declaratory judgment action in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico to quiet title to Rio
Grande Reclamation Project ("Project") water. The district court
found it had discretion to dismiss the United States' suit under the
Colorado River doctrine based on substantial similarities between the
state and federal court actions. Alternatively, the Brilihart doctrine
gave the district court discretion to grant declaratory relief to the
United States' where similar claims were at issue in parallel state court
proceedings. The district court dismissed the suit. The United States
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Project runs through New Mexico and Texas, beginning in
northern New Mexico at Elephant Butte Reservoir. A 1906 treaty
obligated the United States to provide Project water from the Rio
Grande River totaling 60,000 acre feet per year to Mexico. The United
States argued the quiet title action involved Project water used to meet
delivery obligations under the Rio Grande Compact ("Compact") and
the 1906 treaty with Mexico. Both the Compact and the Project
involved equitable apportionment of interstate waters pursuant to
federal law. Because the United States' claims involved a federal
question, requiring the district court to assert jurisdiction, the
appellate court improperly dismissed the suit on five counts.
First, the United States asserted Brilihart discretion applied only to
declaratory judgments, not quiet title actions. Thus, the district court
lacked discretion to dismiss the United States' claims. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Quiet Title Act was the
exclusive means for challenging the United States' title to real
property. The court held that although the United States sued under
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the Quiet Title Act, Brillhartapplied, because the United States sought
only declaratory relief.
Second, the United States contended district courts had discretion
to dismiss actions only where federal and state court proceedings were
parallel. Because the New Mexico state court proceedings involved
different parties, and the United States' rights in Project water were
not at issue, neither Brillhart nor Colorado River applied. The court
held Colorado River required only substantial similarity between parties
and issues to trigger district court discretion to dismiss a federal action.
Further, under Brilihart,district courts have even greater discretion in
granting declaratory judgments where parallel state proceedings exist.
Third, the United States claimed the federal action implicated
section 8 of the Reclamation Act and obligations under the Compact
and the 1906 treaty with Mexico, creating federal questions and
requiring the district court to assert jurisdiction. The court held
section 8 of the Reclamation Act prevented reclamation project
acquisitions and water distributions from interfering with interstate
equitable apportionments. Because the instant case did not involve an
interstate equitable apportionment dispute, Section 8 was inapposite.
The court found both the 1906 treaty and Compact raised questions of
federal law. However, the federal action did not require consultation
of either the Compact or the 1906 treaty, thus no question of federal
law arose.
Fourth, the United States argued the interstate and international
character of the Project favored a federal forum. The court agreed
adjudication of rights in an interstate stream raised questions of
federal common law, but held the United States' suit for declaratory
relief did not involve the issues of equitable apportionment between
states. Effectively, the United States asserted title to Project water
under applicable state, not federal law. Because the United States'
claims did not implicate federal common law, the suit did not favor a
federal forum over state court proceedings.
Fifth, the United States asserted Project rights and federal law
exclusively governed obligations under contracts between the United
States, New Mexico, and Texas. The court found the United States'
complaint failed to mention existence or relevance of any federal
contract or to cite any specific contractual language bearing on the
title dispute. Thus, the United States' claims raised no contractual
issue under federal law. The court held the district court did not
abuse its discretion in withholding judgment over the United States'
declaratory action, but vacated the dismissal, remanding for
consideration of whether a stay in the federal proceedings was a
preferable remedy.
Alan Curtis
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d
1364 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (affirming violation of the Clean Water Act when
a pump station operated without a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit, and vacating an injunction to stop
pumping due to significant public consequences).
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") and the Friends of the
Everglades ("Friends") brought a citizen suit against the South Florida
Water Management District ("Water District") in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging the Water
District violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
pollutants without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision that the Water District was in
violation of the CWA and therefore had to obtain an NPDES permit
within a reasonable amount of time.
The South Florida Water Management District managed the
Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project through the
operation of levees, canals, and water impoundment areas. The C-il
Canal ran through the C-1I Basin and collected water run-off. The S-9
pump station then pumped this water through pipes into the Water
Conservation Area-3A ("WCA-3A"). The water pumped by the S-9
station into WCA-3A contained pollutants, in particular, higher levels
of phosphorus than the naturally occurring level in the WCA-3A.
On appeal, the parties disputed whether the pumping by the S-9
pump station of the already polluted water constituted an addition of
pollutants to navigable waters from a point source. The CWA
prohibits the discharge of pollutants from a point source into
navigable waters without an NPDES permit.
The Act defined
"discharge of a pollutant" as the addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from a point source. It also defined "point source" as any
confined conveyance, including but not limited to a pipe, from which
pollutants are discharged.
The parties agreed that the S-9 pump station and associated pipes
constituted a point source that discharged phosphorus, a pollutant.
However, the Water District argued that the S-9 pump did not itself
introduce additional pollutants, but rather the pumped water was
already polluted. The court rejected the Water District's argument
and concluded that an addition from a point source occurs if the point
source is the cause-in-fact of pollutants released into navigable waters.
Here, the pollutants would not have entered the second body of water
but for the S-9 pump station. Therefore, the S-9 pump station was the
cause-in-fact of the additional phosphorus to the WCA-3A.
The appellate court then reviewed the district court's decision to
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enjoin the operation of the S-9 pumping station until the Water
District obtained an NPDES permit. The court stated that when
determining whether an injunction is proper, a court should not only
"balance the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
them," but also "pay particular regard for the public consequences" of
the injunction. Without the operation of S-9, the western portion of
the county would flood in a matter of days, causing damage to, and
displacement of, a significant number of people. Therefore, the court
vacated the judgment awarding an injunction but ordered the Water
District to obtain an NPDES permit within a reasonable amount of
time.
Lisa M. Thompson

Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
appellate courts have jurisdiction to review modifications of consent
decrees, and that such modification is improper when there has been
no change in law or fact subsequent to the party's agreement to the
consent decree).
This case arose when the Sierra Club, along with various other
environmental organizations ("Sierra Club"), sued the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and several of the EPA's directors,
including Mr. Meiburg. Sierra Club asked that the court order the
EPA to implement total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs"), which the
EPA was required to establish under a previously established consent
decree. The Sierra Club originally brought the case in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which found
for Sierra Club. The EPA appealed, alleging the district court's
holding improperly modified the consent decree. The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, and remanded the case to the
district court.
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") established a statutory and
regulatory scheme for lowering pollution levels in waters of the United
States. The CWA addresses both point source pollution, which comes
from a discernable point where pollutants are discharged, and nonpoint source pollution. When both point source and non-point source
pollutants affect waterways, the CWA requires states to list each
affected waterway in the state, and to set water quality standards for
each. If a waterway does not meet those standards, the CWA requires
states to determine TMDLs for the waterway, specifying the maximum
daily amount of each pollutant that can pass through the waterway
without violating the water quality standards. The CWA gives the EPA
approval authority over both the list of polluted waterways and the
corresponding TMDLs. If the EPA disapproves, the CWA requires it to
issue its own list or its own TMDLs. The EPA has, for the most part,
delegated authority for implementing TMDLs to the states.
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In 1994, the Sierra Club sued the EPA. The Sierra Club asserted
that Georgia had established TMDLs for only two of approximately 340
polluted waterways, and that these two were insufficient to meet the
requirements of the CWA. The Sierra Club wanted to force the EPA to
take responsibility for establishing and implementing TMDLs in
Georgia. In Sierra Club v. Hackinson, the district court granted 'the
Sierra Club summary judgment, and entered an injunction requiring
the EPA to establish and implement TMDLs in Georgia. The EPA
appealed this ruling. While the appeal was pending, the parties
agreed to a consent decree, which required the Sierra Club to establish
(but not implement) TMDLs in Georgia on a fixed schedule. At the
time of this suit, the EPA was on schedule for establishing TMDLs in
Georgia. However, Georgia had not implemented the TMDLs, nor
had they otherwise incorporated them into their pollution
management plans.
Seeking to improve water quality in Georgia, the Sierra Club
attempted to re-open the consent decree and to force the EPA to
While the case progressed, Georgia
implement the TMDLs.
implemented the TMDLs, and the EPA moved to have the case
The Sierra Club argued that Georgia's
dismissed as moot.
implementation plans were again insufficient to meet the
requirements of the CWA. The district court denied the motion, and
ruled that the EPA was obligated under the consent degree to assure
the adequacy of Georgia's implementation plans. The EPA's appeal
resulted in this case.
As a threshold issue, the court noted it only had jurisdiction if the
district court's order modified the consent decree. Modification
occurs, irrespective of the title given to the order by the district court,
when the order changes the legal relationship between the parties.
The court looks to the plain terms of the consent decree to determine
the legal relationship of the parties prior to the order. Here, before
the district court order, the EPA had a duty only to establish TMDLs.
After the order, the EPA had both a duty to establish TMDLs and a
duty to assure the TMDLs were adequately implemented. This added
duty changed the legal relationship between the parties. Thus, the
court ruled it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the district court
order.
Modification of a consent decree is only appropriate when: (1) a
significant change in factual conditions or in law has occurred; and (2)
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstance. The court noted there had been no change in the law
since the consent decree, nor had there been a change in factual
circumstances. The relevant regulations of the Act were unchanged
since the consent decree was formalized, and the lethargy of Georgia's
implementation was likewise unchanged. Neither condition necessary
for modification of the consent decree was present, yet the district
court order imposed new duties on the EPA. Accordingly, the court
held the district court had improperly modified the consent decree.
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The decree only required that the EPA establish TMDLs. Because the
EPA had established TMDLs, the district court should have sustained
EPA's motion to dismiss the case as moot. The Eleventh Circuit
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.
James Siegesmund
Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Env't, Inc. v. Closter Farms,
Inc., 300 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding the Clean Water Act did
not require that farm obtain a permit to discharge water from its water
management system into lake).
Fishermen Against the Destruction of the Environment, Inc.
("FADE") brought a Clean Water Act ("CWA") suit against Closter
Farms, Inc. ("Closter Farms") alleging that Closter Farms discharged
pollutants into Lake Okeechobee without a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. After trial, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found
the pollutants either fell within agricultural exemptions not requiring
a permit under the CWA or were covered by other permits, and
entered judgment for Closter Farms. FADE appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Closter Farms operated a sugar cane farm adjacent to Lake
Okeechobee. Closter Farms leased its land from the State of Florida,
and the lease required Closter Farms to operate a water management
system. The water management system provided drainage for Closter
Farms' lands, as well as for an airport, a wastewater treatment plant, a
county park, a vacant lot previously occupied by a tractor sales
operation, and a county road, all adjacent to Closter Farms. The water
management system took excess water from Closter Farms' irrigation
canals and pumped it into Lake Okeechobee.
Closter Farms argued it was not required to obtain a permit for two
reasons.
First, the CWA exempted discharge from agricultural
operations from the NPDES permit requirement. Second, the
adjacent properties that share the water management system all had
NPDES permits for their lands. The district court found FADE failed
to establish discharge of a non-exempt pollutant and entered
judgment for Closter Farms.
Reviewing the district court's decision de novo, the appellate court
identified two implicit findings in the district court's ruling. First, any
pollutants that originated on Closter Farms' property fell within the
agricultural exemptions of the CWA. Second, either an existing
NPDES permit or exemptions to the permitting requirements covered
pollutants that originated elsewhere.
Agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from
irrigation agriculture are exempted from the CWA permitting
requirements. FADE alleged Closter Farms' discharges were neither.
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The court found three sources of the discharged water: (1) rainfall;
(2) groundwater withdrawn into the canals from the areas being
drained; and (3) seepage from the lake. Additionally, it found that
each of these sources fell within the CWA exemptions as either
"agricultural storm water discharge or "return flows from irrigation
agriculture." Closter Farms was thus not required to obtain a permit
for any waters discharged into Lake Okeechobee that originated on its
lands.
Finally, the court found insufficient evidence in the record to
conclude that Closter Farms discharged non-agricultural pollutants
into Lake Okeechobee. The only testimony that supported such a
conclusion was from an environmental manager with the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection. Without identifying any
studies or research, the manager tentatively concluded that runoff
from the waste treatment plant, the county road and the county park
The court found such evidence
likely contributed pollutants.
insufficient to conclude these sources discharged any pollutants,
affirming the district court's ruling.
Brian L. Martin

Georgia v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that parties can intervene as a matter of right
when the parties have a legally protected interest in water quantity,
such as, the right to an equitable apportionment of water flowing
through the interstate stream and the right to hydropower
production).
The State of Georgia ("Georgia") sued the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia to compel increased releases of water
from a reservoir managed by the Corps. The district court denied a
motion to intervene submitted by State of Florida ("Florida") and
Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. ("SeFPC"). The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and held that both Florida
and SeFPC could intervene as a matter of right.
The Chattahoochee River originates in Georgia and becomes the
Apalachicola River at the Florida Border. The Flint River joins with
the Chattahoochee and the Apalachicola Rivers to form the
Florida,
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin ("ACF Basin").
share
the
water
supply
of
these
interconnected
Georgia and Alabama
rivers, and in 1997 enacted the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
("ACF") Compact. The ACF Compact required the states to negotiate
water allocation, however, no agreement was ever reached. In the
1940s, Congress authorized the Corps to build and manage the Buford
dam across the Chattahoochee River. The resultant lake, Lake Lanier,
is within the ACF Basin and thus subject to the ACF Compact. In 2000,
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Georgia made a request to the Corps for increased water releases from
Buford Dam and increased withdrawals from Lake Lanier to
accommodate the municipal and industrial needs of Atlanta. After the
Corps failed to respond for nine months, Georgia filed suit against the
Corps. Subsequently, Florida and SeFPC filed a motion to intervene.
The district court denied both motions to intervene. The appellate
court reviewed de novo.
The issue before the appellate court was whether the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provided for intervention as a matter of right for
Florida and/or SeFPC. Before a party can intervene as a matter of
right, it must: (1) make a timely motion to intervene; (2) show that it
has an interest in the subject matter of the suit; (3) show that its ability
to protect that interest may be impaired by the disposition of the suit;
and (4) show that the existing parties in the suit cannot adequately
protect that interest.
Florida made a timely motion to intervene and thereby satisfied
the first requirement. Turning to the second requirement, the court
concluded that Florida possessed the required interest in the subject
matter of the litigation. Even though the remedy sought by Georgia
would occur within Georgia's borders, it would have a practical effect
on the quantity and quality of the Apalachicola River, water to which
Florida had a right under the ACF Compact. Additionally, the court
concluded that irrespective of the ACF Compact, Florida had a
protectable interest because a state has a right to an equitable
apportionment of water flowing through an interstate stream located
within its borders.
In reference to the third requirement, the court concluded that
Florida's interest would be impaired by disposition of the suit because
Florida did not have access to the two alternative means suggested by
Georgia-the ACF Compact negotiations and filing an original action
in the United States Supreme Court. Florida did not have a clear and
compulsory right to be heard by the Supreme Court, nor did Florida
have a remedy under the ACF Compact since a water allocation
agreement had not been finalized. Under the last requirement, the
proposed intervener must show that the existing parties could not
adequately represent their interest, but this burden is minimal. The
court of appeals concluded the Corps could not represent Florida's
interest because the Corps had no independent stake in the quantity
of water reaching the Apalachicola River.
The appellate court also allowed SeFPC, the hydropower
purchaser, to intervene as a matter of right because it also met the four
criteria for intervention. First, SeFPC had a legally protectable interest
in the production of hydropower at the dam because the amount and
power of water that SeFPC received from Buford Dam would be
diminished if Georgia's request was granted. Secondly, a ruling in this
case would have a stare decisis effect on SeFPC's separate suit (filed
several months prior to the subject case) against the Corps; therefore,
the court concluded that SeFPC's interests would be impaired by the
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denial of intervention. Thirdly, the Corps could not adequately
represent the purchaser's economic interests, and lastly, the motion to
intervene was timely.
Lisa M. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Diablo Grande, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that plaintiff satisfied standing and
subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the Clean Water Act, and
classifying general construction activity as a point source).
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance ("CSPA") was a
California nonprofit public benefit corporation with an estimated
membership of 10,000. Diablo Grande, Inc. ("Diablo") was a limited
partnership building a golf resort on 29,500 acres of land west of
Patterson, California. CSPA filed suit against Diablo for violating the
conditions of their General Permit for Storm Water Discharges
Associated with Construction Activity ("General Permit") in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California. CSPA
claimed this violation introduced pollutants to Salado Creek. CSPA
sought an injunction ordering Diablo to: (1) operate its construction
in compliance with their state permit; (2) provide CSPA with proof of
its compliance with the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for a one year
period; (3) contribute payments to a court-approved environmental
remediation fund; (4) pay civil penalties on a per day of violation basis;
and (5) pay CSPA's attorneys' fees. Both sides filed motions for
summary judgment pertaining to: standing; subject matter jurisdiction;
the definition of "navigable water of the United States"; and defining
what material facts were required of a party asserting a violation of the
CWA.
CSPA asserted the following three arguments: (1) its members had
standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests at issue were
germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) neither the claim nor
the relief requested required individual member participation. CSPA
brought its complaint on behalf of associate members. Since Diablo
could not show that at least one of CSPA's members would not have
standing in this suit, the court found that CSPA had standing to sue. It
also held that CSPA's state purpose did not need include a certain
activity in order for that activity to be germane to CSPA's purpose. It
followed that enforcement of the CWA was sufficiently germane to
CSPA's purpose to justify standing. Diablo alternately argued that
CSPA lacked standing because there was no evidence of any fish in
Salado Creek. However, CSPA offered evidence establishing the
presence of both bluegill and bullhead fish in the creek and
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ultimately, that the creek fed into the San Joaquin River, which
indisputably contained sport fish. Thus, Diablo's standing arguments
failed.
Diablo argued that CSPA failed to comply with the CWA's notice
requirement, and therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
However, the court found that CSPA's notice letter met the CWA
notice requirements because it: (a) was sent more than sixty days
before filing to sue; (b) identified Diablo as the responsible party; (c)
provided CSPA's full name, address, and telephone number; (d)
identified the locations and dates of the violations. As a result,
Diablo's summary judgment motion on the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction failed.
Further, CSPA's expert witness showed
impermissible turbidity levels in Salado Creek were present at the time
notice was given, and that this trend would likely continue in
correlation with Diablo's construction.
Diablo next argued that Salado Creek was not a navigable water of
the United States and therefore was not covered under the CWA. The
court held under certain circumstances, where a tributary flowed into
navigable water, that tributary was capable of spreading environmental
damage and should also be considered a navigable water of the United
States for purposes of the CWA. Diablo argued that Salado Creek
should be classified as non-navigable groundwater because it flowed
through an underground pipeline on its way to the SanJoaquin River.
The court rejected this argument and held that Salado Creek was a
tributary of the San Joaquin River, despite the fact that, in certain
areas, it flowed through an underground pipe. Therefore, Diablo's
motion for summary judgment failed on the issue of whether Salado
Creek was to be classified as navigable water of the United States.
Finally, Diablo argued that CSPA provided no evidence showing
their discharge fit into the classification required and defined by the
CWA. They based this on CSPA's inability to name a point source
discharge of any pollutants. The court clarified that courts have
previously recognized construction as a point source activity. As a
result, CSPA sufficiently defined a point source as required under the
CWA. The court also held that CSPA did not need to prove that
Diablo's discharge violated the Act at the summary judgment stage of
litigation. Instead, they need only show that there was a genuine issue
of material fact for dispute at trial. Therefore, the court rejected
Diablo's final motion for summary judgment because CSPA defined a
point source as required by the CWA, and CSPA was not required to
prove that the discharge was a violation of the CWA at this stage of
litigation.
Michael Sheehan
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Colorado Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1190
(D. Colo. 2000) (holding Colorado water quality standards only apply
to discharges of pollutants and not to withdrawals or appropriations of
water; further holding section 313 of the Clean Water Act does not
waive the United States' sovereign immunity when the federal agency
was not itself the polluter in violation of the Clean Water Act).
Colorado Wild unsuccessfully exhausted its administrative
remedies and brought suit against the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service") challenging its approval of a Master Development
Plan ("Plan") for Arapahoe Ski Basin Area in The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. Defendant-Intervener
Dundee Realty operated the ski area, and through the Plan, sought to
increase its artificial snowmaking operations by diverting water from a
tributary of the Snake River. The court heard the Forest Services'
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Colorado Wild contested the Forest Service's approval of the Plan
for Arapahoe Basin Ski Area located in the White River National Forest
near Dillon, Colorado. The Plan would allow Dundee Realty to divert
water from the North Fork, a tributary of the Snake River, in order to
increase its artificial snowmaking operations. As a relatively clean
water source, the tributary assisted to dilute the concentration of toxic
metals within the Snake River.
Colorado Wild contended that
diverting water from the North Fork would increase the pollutants in
the Snake River aggravating the Snake River's water quality problems.
Colorado Wild alleged three causes of action against the
Defendants: (1) violation of the National Forest Management Act
("NFMA"); (2) violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"); and (3)
violation of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). It argued the
Forest Service failed to observe and enforce the maintenance of state
water quality standards in Colorado in violation of NFMA and 36
C.F.R. §§ 219.10(e) and 251.56(a)(1)(i)(C).
NFMA requires the
Forest Service to ensure that all activities it allows comply with state
water quality standards under 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). The Forest Service
contested this cause of action, asserting that Colorado does not
regulate water quality standards, and therefore Colorado Wild failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court first pointed out that Colorado regulates water quality
and water quantity through two separate entities. Under the Water
Quality Control Act, the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission
and the Water Quality Division ("Water Quality Agencies") regulated
water quality. However, Colorado water courts administer water
quantity via the prior appropriation system. The court also looked at
the legislature's intent in creating the Water Quality Agencies and
emphasized the Colorado legislature "made clear its intention that the
Water Quality Agencies' authority cannot be exercised in a manner
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that significantly compromises the appropriative rights of present or
future water users." Based on the legislative intent and the statute
itself the court concluded that, under Colorado law, water quality
standards only apply to discharges of pollutants and not to
appropriations of water. Colorado Wild's claim, which was based solely
on the allegation that withdrawals of water from the North Fork would
increase the pollutants in the Snake River, failed to show any violation
of Colorado state water quality standards, and therefore failed.
Next, Colorado Wild argued the Forest Service violated NFMA by
failing to comply with the CWA. The court rejected this argument and
observed the distinct roles the federal government and state
governments have under the CWA. Under the CWA, the EPA
monitored point source discharges of pollutants into navigable waters
while states were responsible for implementing water quality standards
for intrastate waters. The court found that the appropriation of water
was not a discharge of pollution within the meaning of the CWA, and
thus rejected Colorado Wild's claim that the Forest Service violated
NFMA by failing to comply with the CWA.
In its second cause of action, Colorado Wild argued the Forest
Service violated section 313 of the CWA.
The Forest Service
challenged this claim, contending the United States' sovereign
immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
In
response, Colorado Wild asserted section 313 of the CWA waived the
United States' sovereign immunity. The court examined the text of
section 313 and recognized a federal agency waived sovereign
immunity only when one of its facilities or activities resulted in the
discharge of pollutants. However, the court held section 313 did not
waive sovereign immunity where, as here, the federal agency was not
itself the polluter in violation of the CWA. Since the United States was
immune from suit, the court was without subject matter jurisdiction.
The court held Colorado water quality standards only apply to
discharges of pollutants and not to appropriations of water. Thus, the
court dismissed Colorado Wild's cause of action alleging violations of
NFMA for failure to state a claim. The court further held the Forest
Service was immune from suit, since it was not the actual polluter in
violation of the CWA.
Lucia Padilla
Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D.
Colo. 2002) (holding judicial resolution of a claim that a mining
company violated the Clean Water Act would not interfere with the
company's discharge permit application pending before a state
administrative agency).
El Paso Gold Mines, Inc. ("El Paso") operated a gold mine in
Teller County, Colorado. Sierra Club brought suit against El Paso in
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the United States District Court for the District of Colorado alleging
the company violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
pollutants into navigable waters without a permit. Sierra Club filed a
partial motion for summary judgment based on its compliance with
the statutory prerequisites for initiating a citizen suit under the CWA.
El Paso, in response, filed both a motion to dismiss or to stay and a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The former motion
challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and the Buford abstention. The latter motion
claimed Sierra Club failed to meet the statutory prerequisites to sue.
El Paso also filed a second motion for partial summary judgment
alleging it was neither the owner nor operator of the mine shaft
discharging the pollution. The court granted Sierra Club's motion for
partial summary judgment and denied all of El Paso's motions.
El Paso's mine was located in the Cripple Creek watershed and
Mining District. Cripple Creek was a tributary of Fourmile Creek that
was tributary to the Arkansas River. The Mining District contained a
series of underground drainage tunnels. One of those tunnels, the
Roosevelt Tunnel, lay directly underneath El Paso's mine and
discharged into Cripple Creek. El Paso, at the time of the suit, did not
have a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit to discharge pollutants into, or from, Roosevelt Tunnel into
Cripple Creek. As a result, Sierra Club brought suit against El Paso,
claiming the mining company violated the CWA by discharging zinc
and manganese into the Roosevelt Tunnel and Cripple Creek without
a permit.
El Paso's motion to deny or to stay the case alleged the court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction, under the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and the Buford abstention, because the company had a
discharge permit application pending before the Colorado Water
Quality Control Division ("CWQCD").
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court can stay an
ongoing judicial proceeding so that an administrative agency, rather
than the court, may resolve issues that fall within the special
competency of that agency. In analyzing El Paso's claim that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction precluded subject matter jurisdiction,
the court distinguished the facts of this case from two federal cases
where the courts declined jurisdiction.
In both cases, an
administrative agency issued either an order or a permit while the
citizen suit was pending. In the first case, the court declined
jurisdiction because the court might have subjected the defendants to
conflicting orders. In the second case, the court declined jurisdiction
because the agency's resolution of technical issues might preclude the
need for federal action.
In this case, the court did not decide an issue within the special
competency of the CWQCD; the court only decided whether El Paso
discharged pollutants from a point source into navigable waters. The
court found that resolution of Sierra Club's claim would neither
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require the resolution of technical issues within the special
competency of the CWQCD nor interfere with the orders of the
CWQCD. As a result, the court found the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction inapplicable.
Under the Buford abstention, a federal court must decline to
interfere with administrative proceedings if state court review is
available and: (1) the court must decide difficult and especially
important questions of state law whose resolution transcends the case
then at bar; or (2) the court's review would disrupt state efforts to
establish a coherent public policy. El Paso argued a court decision
regarding the permitting of mining tunnel discharges could create a
conflict in statutory interpretation, interfere with CWQCD
proceedings, and undermine the State of Colorado's attempt to
establish a policy for the regulation of mining tunnel discharges. The
court rejected El Paso's argument and denied the company's motion
to dismiss or stay because there was no evidence in the record about
action CWQCD took on the permit, nor state or federal orders
regarding the discharges.
The court next decided the parties' cross-motions for partial
summary judgment regarding the statutory prerequisites to initiating a
CWA citizen suit. Sierra Club asked the court to affirm its compliance
with the jurisdictional prerequisites. El Paso alleged Sierra Club failed
to identify the pollutants discharged, the point source, or how El Paso
added pollutants to the Roosevelt Tunnel.
The court's analysis addressed two issues. First, El Paso claimed
Sierra Club's notice was not specific enough in its description of the
pollutants, their sources, and how the discharges increased pollution
in the Roosevelt tunnel. The court, citing Public Interest Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., dismissed El Paso's claim holding that Sierra
Club's failure to identify specific pollutants did not deprive the court
of jurisdiction. The court found Sierra Club's notice adequate
because the organization told El Paso what the point sources were and
explained how pollution from those sources migrated into navigable
waters. Second, the court addressed El Paso's understanding of Sierra
Club's notice, by analyzing El Paso's actions after Sierra Club gave
notice. Relying on two federal decisions which held that notice was
adequate when an alleged violator took specific remedial action in
response to notice of the alleged violation, the court found that El
Paso's formation of a limited liability corporation and application for
an NPDES permit constituted sufficient understanding of the
allegations and remedial action sufficient to deem the notice
adequate. As a result, the court denied El Paso's motion and granted
Sierra Club's.
El Paso's second motion for partial summary judgment claimed the
company was neither the owner nor operator of the mine shaft
because the company sold the property to a third party two months
prior to receiving notice from Sierra Club. In response, Sierra Club
alleged El Paso retained an easement over and through the property.
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The organization's response cited El Paso's application to CWQCD,
which stated that the company's property included a mineshaft
connecting to the Roosevelt Tunnel. As a result, the court found there
remained a genuine issue of material fact regarding El Paso's
ownership interest in the mineshaft and denied El Paso's motion.
Merc Pittinos

United States v. Lamplight Equestrian, No. 00 C 6486, 2002 U.S. Dist.
L XIS 3694 (N.D. II. Mar. 8, 2002) (holding that the Army Corps of
Engineers has the authority to regulate wetlands with an intermittent
connection to interstate or navigable waterways).
The United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") filed suit in
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against
Lamplight Equestrian ("Lamplight") for using fill material to build a
road in a wetland area without a permit. Lamplight claimed the Corps
lacked authority to regulate the area due to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC'), which reduced the scope of
the Corps' authority. Lamplight also claimed that an earlier permit
entitled it to build the road. Each party filed a motion for summary
judgment. The court granted the Corps' motion for summary
judgment against Lamplight.
The disputed wetland was located on Lamplight's property north
of the headwaters of Brewster Creek. The creek connected to the Fox
River, which flowed into other interstate waterways. In considering the
motions for summary judgment, the district court decided that the
only relevant issue pertained to the jurisdiction of the Corps.
The Corps argued that despite the Supreme Court's ruling in
SWANCC, the Corps' authority to regulate the wetland remained
intact. Six lower court decisions holding that SWANCC only narrowly
reduced the Corps' power substantiated this argument. The Corps
claimed that administrative regulations included wetlands within the
scope of the Corps' authority, so long as they could affect interstate
commerce. To affect interstate commerce, a wetland or like area must
lie adjacent to a navigable waterway. In this case, an unbroken line of
water connected the wetland area and Brewster Creek, a tributary of
the Fox River, which in turn fed other waterways, crossing state
boundaries. Thus, the Corps possessed the necessary authority to
regulate the wetland.
The district court agreed with the Corps. Its analysis of the
Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC followed other narrow readings
in the reduction of the Corps' authority. Significantly, the district
court decided that the crucial distinction between this case and the
SWANCC case was the degree of isolation of the regulated area. In
SWANCC, the waters in question lacked a direct connection to a
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navigable waterway. The decision explicitly upheld the authority of
the Corps to regulate areas with a significant nexus to navigable
waterways.
The district court next addressed the dispute regarding the
connection between the wetland and the Fox River. Lamplight
disputed the connection, claiming that the drainage ditch running
from the wetland ended fifty feet east of a swale carrying water to
Brewster Creek. However, Lamplight conceded that, at points, a
continuous stream of water existed between the wetland and the swale,
especially during wet seasons. The deposition testimony of one of
Lamplight's shareholders substantiated this finding. The court found
persuasive a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, HeadwatersInc. v.
Talent IrrigationDistrict, where intermittent connections to a navigable
waterway established Corps jurisdiction. Following this rationale, the
court determined that since pollutants discharged into areas
connected to navigable waterways eventually reach those waterways;
the Corps must be able to regulate the initial discharge. Thus, because
the wetland connected to a navigable waterway, it was subject to the
Corps regulation.
The district court found Lamplight's argument did not have merit
when it asserted that a 1993 permit gave the requisite authority to
build the road. The permit authorized Lamplight to build a parking
area and a pond, not a road. In addition, the permit specifically stated
that if the specifications of the construction project changed in any
way, Lamplight needed to contact the Corps to ensure compliance
with regulations and to determine if Lamplight needed to procure
additional permits. As a result of its findings, the court granted the
Corps' motion for summary judgment, and denied Lamplight's
motion.
JaredEllis
Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. O'Bannon, 189 F. Supp. 2d 893 (N.D. Ind.
2002) (holding that the defendant did not violate Clean Water Act
when a fish hatchery was partially drained causing abnormal water flow
and discharge of mud in the river).
Property owners sought review in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Indiana of an administrative entry of
summary judgment in favor of the Fawn River State Fish Hatchery
("Hatchery"). The court rejected all of the property owners' claims
and entered an order in favor of the Hatchery.
The Fawn River is located in the northeast region of Indiana. The
Hatchery, located on the river near Orland, Indiana, raised
smallmouth bass, walleye, muskies, channel catfish, and rainbow trout
for stocking Indiana's lakes and rivers. The Indiana Department of
Natural Resources ("IDNR") owned and operated the Hatchery. The
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Fawn River was dammed in order to form a 1.8-acre supply pond,
which in turn supplied water to the Hatchery's rearing ponds.
As early as 1996, workers at the Hatchery noticed rust on the dam
structure that threatened its structural integrity. After discussing the
problem with a local welder, the directors of the Hatchery proposed a
repair project to the IDNR. The project involved partial draining of
the dam reservoir in order to repair the rusted areas below the surface.
The IDNR approved the project and the Hatchery obtained funding.
On May 18, 1998, property managers at the Hatchery began to
draw-down the supply pond by opening a control gate in order to
repair the dam. The draw-down resulted in an increase of water to the
Fawn River, which in turn caused great amounts of sediment to be
moved and re-deposited farther downstream. Property owners with
land along the Fawn River claimed the Hatchery's actions violated
sections 402 and 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). According to
the property owners, 100,000 cubic yards of sediment became mud,
which clogged the river, destroyed fish and wildlife, and violated the
CWA.
Section 402 of the CWA establishes the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"). Under section 402, the
Environmental Protection Agency may issue permits authorizing the
discharge of pollutants in accordance with specified conditions.
Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States,
which are regulated under section 404 of the CWA, are exempt from
The property owners claimed the
the NPDES permit process.
Hatchery was required to obtain a section 402 permit before
discharging fill material and pollutants into the Fawn River.
Section 404 of the CWA provided an exception to the NPDES
permit for pollutants that are discharges of dredge or fill material into
waters of the United States. Though not requiring a section 402
permit, in order to discharge dredge or fill material into the waters of
the United States, a section 404 permit is required from the Army
Corps of Engineers. The property owners argued that, if the Hatchery
was not required to obtain a section 402 permit, they were certainly
required to obtain a section 404 permit before lowering the dam gate
and releasing water into the Fawn River. The Hatchery did not obtain
either permit.
The first issue the court addressed was whether the acts constituted
the "discharge of dredged material" as defined in the CWA in order to
trigger a section 404 analysis. The property owners argued the surge
of water added to the river and dredged the bottom of the river,
disturbing the riverbed and causing mud to be introduced into the
river and redeposited downstream. The property owners thereby
asserted the mud in the river was "dredged material." The Hatchery
proposed a narrow definition of "dredged material." The Hatchery
argued that the term dredge only contemplated intentional
mechanized acts of digging up soil or other material and therefore the
mud was not "dredged material." In concluding the term "discharge
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of dredged materials" included dredging that occurred by means of
hydraulics, regardless of intention, the court considered 66 Fed. Reg.
4550, 4554, which specifically stated "there is no support under the
CWA for the position that a discharge must be an intentional act."
The court reasoned the statutory language of the CWA and clarifying
regulations do not indicate an intent by the legislature to limit the
definition of "dredge" to mechanized methods and therefore
hydraulic dredging likewise requires a section 404 permit unless
exempted under further provisions. The Hatchery was therefore not
required to obtain a section 402 permit.
The court then considered whether the Hatchery was exempt from
the section 404 permit requirement by an exception for acts of
maintenance. The Hatchery argued they lowered the dam solely for
the purpose of inspecting the dam control gates and to perform
maintenance to a related intake valve, therefore any discharge of
dredged materials occurred solely as a result of this maintenance. The
property owners countered that "maintenance does not include any
modification that changes the character, scope, or size of the original
fill design" pursuant to the CWA, and thus, since the draw-down
lessened the amount of water in the Hatchery, the discharge did not
meet the maintenance exemption because it exceeded the scope of
the original fill design. The court rejected the property owners'
argument and held the Hatchery's acts constituted acts of
maintenance and therefore were exempt from section 404 permit
requirements, provided the Hatchery avoided the CWA's section 1342
recapture provision.
Section 1342(f) (2) provides an exception to the maintenance
exception of section 404 permit requirements for discharges of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters incidental to any activity
where the flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired or
the reach of such waters be reduced. The property owners argued the
addition of 100,000 cubic yards of sediment in a five-mile stretch of the
Fawn River changed the use of the river by rendering it unusable for
recreation as it became mud. The Hatchery argued that the recapture
provision did not apply because any discharge of dredged materials
was incidental to the dam maintenance and did not have as its purpose
changing the use of the Fawn River.
Sarah A. Hubbard
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United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 788
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (holding civil penalties were not warranted for
failure to obtain permits before discharging peat bog drainage water
where pollutant was a natural result of legitimate commercial activity,
discharge did not exceed appropriate effluent limitations, authorities
were aware of activity, peat harvester made application for permit and
proceeded diligently to obtain permit, and authorities did not tell
harvester to cease mining pending approval of permit).
The United States brought a Clean Water Act ("CWA") action
against Michigan Peat in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, claiming: (1) discharge of pollutants by
peat bog drainage water without National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permits; (2) discharge of dredged or
fill material into wetlands without permits; and (3) violation of an
administrative compliance order issued by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). The EPA sought to impose a three
million dollar civil penalty against Michigan Peat. The EPA alleged
that Michigan Peat discharged peat bog drainage water containing
pollutants through ditch outfalls into the Black River Drain without an
NPDES permit required under the CWA. After denying Michigan
Peat's motion for summary judgment, the district court found
Michigan Peat was obligated to obtain permits but the imposition of
civil penalties for failure to obtain permits was not warranted.
The EPA asserted that Michigan Peat should be penalized for its
long-time failure to report its effluent discharges to the state as
required by the CWA, which warranted the penalty based on the
quantity of pollutants that Michigan Peat discharged.
The court held civil penalties were not warranted for Michigan
Peat's failure to obtain the permit before discharging the pollutant
because: (1) the pollutant was a natural result of legitimate
commercial activity; (2) the discharge did not exceed appropriate
effluent limitations; (3) the permitting authorities were fully aware of
the activity; (4) Michigan Peat applied for a permit and proceeded
diligently to obtain the permit once they found out they needed one;
and (5) the licensing agencies did not tell Michigan Peat to stop
mining or to change its current method of peat mining pending
approval of the permit.
The court first found that peat was a commercially useful product
found only in peat bogs and, therefore, mining a peat bog was a
legitimate commercial activity. Because peat mining was a legitimate
commercial activity, the digging of drainage ditches and construction
of haul roads was a legitimate activity as part of a peat mining activity.
Discharge was part of the peat mining process and the court found the
Michigan Peat
discharge did not exceed effluent limitations.
discharged no more than normally produced from mining a great deal
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of peat. The court found no substantive harm to the environment.
During the period that Michigan Peat operated without a permit
and during the permit application process, the permitting authorities
became fully aware of the activity. As soon as the permitting authority
notified Michigan Peat, it filed for, and diligently pursued, a permit.
In its 1994 permit application to the state of Michigan, Michigan Peat
presented a plan to return the mined areas to a wetland state
containing large bodies of open water. The process of reclamation
occurs when human intervention replaces one type of wetland with
another type of wetland that provides different functions and values
The EPA, however, disagreed and
than the original wetland.
requested restoration of the area to the extent practicable to the
original bog-like condition with the same functions and values. The
court held that disagreement with a regulatory demand was not an
avoidance of the permitting authorities.
The EPA, during the application process and fully aware of
Michigan Peat's activities, never advised Michigan Peat to close down,
never suggested modification in the peat mining activities, and never
sought a court order to close down Michigan Peat's operations. The
court found that because no governing agency attempted in any way to
alter or stop Michigan Peat's operations during the application process
Michigan Peat should not be penalized for its activities.
Julie S. Hanson
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great Spring Waters of
Am., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 853 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (holding the Water
Resources Development Act of 1986 does not imply, either explicitly or
implicitly, a private right of action to enjoin the diversion or
exportation of Great Lakes waters outside the Great Lakes basin).
Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, Grand Traverse Band
of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, and Little River Band of Ottawa
Indians ("Tribes") brought suit against Great Spring Waters of
America, Inc. ("GSWA") and John M. Engler, Governor of Michigan
("Engler"), in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Michigan to enjoin GSWA from exporting waters from the
Sanctuary Springs ("Springs") in Mecosta County, Michigan under a
provision of the Water Resources Development Act ("WRDA"). GSWA
and Engler moved for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6). The court granted the dismissal,
concluding the WRDA provision disfavors a creation of a private cause
of action.
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ")
granted GSWA a license to pump 400 gallons of water per minute from
the Springs. GSWA maintained two wells on the Springs site, each
capable of pumping up to 200 gallons per minute. The Springs
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aquifer flowed into Osprey Lake, which, in turn, flowed into a stream
that flowed into the Little Muskegon River and Muskegon River
watersheds, both of which were tributaries of Lake Michigan. While
acknowledging that GSWA's parent company, the Perrier Group of
America, Inc., possessed title to real property in Mecosta County,
including water rights to the Springs, the Tribes asserted their rights as
riparians and users of Lake Michigan and its tributaries under the
1836 Treaty of Washington.
The Tribes sued under a provision of the WRDA that prevented
the diversion or exportation of water from any portion of the Great
Lakes within the United States, including any tributary within the
United States, for use outside the Great Lakes basin, unless all eight
Great Lakes Governors approve such activity. The Great Lakes states
include Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
New York, and Wisconsin under the WRDA. Based on depositions of
two GSWA employees, the Tribes alleged in their complaint that
GSWA intended to ship bottled water from the Springs, a "portion" of
the Great Lakes within the United States, for sale in Iowa and
Kentucky, areas "outside the Great Lakes basin." The Tribes claimed
GSWA's diversion and exportation of the Springs water required not
only Engler's approval under the WRDA, but the other seven Great
Lakes governors as well.
In the answer to the complaint, Engler admitted that GSWA's wells
would likely reduce the flow of waters into Lake Michigan. However,
he maintained that no "legal, practical or environmental significance"
resulted from the reduced flow, and the pumping activity would not
cause a "diversion" of the Great Lakes waters.
As GSWA moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the court construed the
factual matters set forth in the complaint in a light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. However, the case did not turn on the facts and
arguments set forth in the complaint and answer. Instead, the issue
before the court was whether the WRDA afforded the Tribes the right
to sue to enjoin a diversion or exportation of Great Lakes waters when
Engler unilaterally acted without the approval of the other seven
governors of the Great Lakes. The Tribes claimed that since the other
seven Great Lakes governors failed to act, the WRDA entitled them to
bring a private cause of action.
The court noted the WRDA contained no language that created an
express right of action on behalf of anyone to enforce this provision.
Furthermore, the legislative history offered no guidance on how to
enforce the provision. The court examined the precursors to the
WRDA, as well as subsequent amendments, in order to discern the
policy issues surrounding the legislation.
The court then applied a four-factor test to determine if an
implied private cause of action existed allowing the Tribes to defeat
the motion to dismiss. First, the Tribes must be members of a special
class the act intended to benefit. Second, the court must determine
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whether the legislature intended, expressly or implicitly, to create or
deny such a remedy. Third, the court must conclude if the remedy was
consistent with the statutory scheme.
Finally, the court must
determine if the subject of the suit was one traditionally relegated to
state law, making a private federal enforcement action inappropriate.
The court decided that the WRDA benefited the general public,
but did not allow for a special class of users, i.e., riparians or treatyholders, to assert additional privileges or benefits. The WRDA gave
the Great Lakes states governors the authority to make decisions
collectively to protect the water and enforce the prohibition against
diversion and exportation of the resource. In bolstering deference to
the Great Lakes governors decision making, the court noted that
allowing private suits could frustrate any uniform policies or goals
implemented by the governors concerning conservation issues.
Additionally, the court pointed out the lack of "private right of action"
language and concluded the exclusion of the language was deliberate,
considering such private suit action verbiage exists in a recent
provision of the WRDA.
Completing the analysis set out above, the court found that private
suits were inconsistent with the statutory scheme, again alluding to
deference to the governors. The court agreed with the Tribes that the
subject of the suit falls under a federal interest, as opposed to state.
However, the court disagreed that the compelling interests revolved
around regulating Indian affairs. Instead, the court categorized tribal
rights as peripheral, and emphasized interstate commerce issues
associated with the Great Lakes.
Additionally, the court noted three fact situations where the
current legislative scheme might prove inadequate. As this case
demonstrated, what is to be done if the governors fail to take any
action when diversion or exportation of the Great Lakes occurs? A
second potential problem was the lack of an explicit enforcement
mechanism for the governors to use in supervising a wayward
governor. The third cause for concern was the lack of Congressional
delegation of authority to an officer in the executive branch to
intervene if a governor chose to act in a manner that served his/her
interests, but stood in opposition to federal interests in Great Lakes
waters.
Melissa L. Gordon

Am. Littoral Soc'y v. EPA, 199 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying
summary judgment for conservation groups alleging arbitrary and
capricious decision making because the Environmental Protection
Agency could demonstrate good cause for each of its decisions).
American Littoral Society ("Littoral") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the
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Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to compel it to implement
the Clean Water Act ("WA"), alleging that the State of New Jersey
("New Jersey") had failed to do so. The CWA delegated to the states
the primary responsibility for setting and achieving Water Quality
Standards ("WQS"). New Jersey set WQSs per the CWA, but failed to
identify areas not complying with those standards. It also failed to
establish guidelines for the amount of pollution a body of water could
absorb before failing WQS compliance. The court denied all of
Littoral's motions for summary judgment, but granted summary
judgment to EPA on the issue of failure to consult under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Littoral's fifth amended complaint alleged violation of section
706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") due to
decisions that were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. It also alleged violation of
section 706(1) of the APA due to unreasonable delay, and violation of
section 7 of the ESA for failure to confer with the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior, as an agency should when its action is
likely to jeopardize a species proposed for listing under ESA, or will
destroy or adversely modify its habitat.
Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to identify areas that do
not or probably will not meet WQSs, even with effluent limitations and
other controls. States must then rank these areas by priority and
submit the resulting section 303(d) list to the EPA. Littoral argued
that NewJersey omitted sixty waters from the list, and that the EPA did
not have the authority to approve the list in its seemingly incomplete
state. The EPA answered that Littoral lacked standing and that
administrative records supported the EPA's decision to exclude those
waters. The court held that Littoral easily met the low threshold for
environmental plaintiffs seeking standing, but that the EPA had a
justifiable reason for every omission, and was therefore not arbitrary
and capricious in its decision to omit the waters from the section
303(d) list.
Littoral next alleged that EPA's omission of anti-degradation
waters from the list was arbitrary and capricious.
Federal law
mandated that all states adopt and implement antidegradation
standards to ensure water quality for existing uses. Waters, which fail
to meet WQS under section 303 of the CWA, must appear on states'
section 303(d)
lists.
along with
pertinent
antidegradation
requirements. Littoral argued that the absence of any such water on
New Jersey's section 303(d) list proved that New Jersey omitted all
waters failing the WQS. Because Littoral failed to specifically name a
single water of this description, the court rejected its argument and
held that the EPA's action was not arbitrary and capricious with
respect to anti-degradation waters.
Littoral followed with an allegation of constructive submission and
unreasonable delay. For most of the last decade, the EPA required
states to submit section 303(d) lists and establish total maximum daily
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loads and total maximum daily thermal loads (collectively "TMDL") in
every even-numbered year. NewJersey's failure to submit TMDLs, and
EPA's refusal to disapprove of this practice, constituted unreasonable
delay of agency action, according to Littoral.
To prove this
contention, Littoral needed to show "constructive submission" on New
Jersey's part by demonstrating that New Jersey neither submitted
TMDLs nor planned to remedy its non-compliance. The court held
that New Jersey had submitted some TMDLs and planned to remedy
its failure to comply. While hardly exemplary, New Jersey's record was
nonetheless sufficient for the EPA to prevail on the charge of
unreasonable delay.
The court held that Littoral's fourth count, regarding the EPA's
alleged failure to comply with section 7 of the ESA was moot, as events
had transpired which irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation. By February 2001, the EPA had initiated consultations with
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine
Fisheries Service as mandated by the ESA. While the court recognized
that a narrow exception to the doctrine of mootness could exist in
cases where a wrong is capable of repetition but evades review, Littoral
failed to satisfy this two-prong test.
Curtis Graves
Baker Farms, Inc. v. Hulse, No. 5:01-CV-315-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2002) (holding a federal court lacks subject
matterjurisdiction in adjudicating claims involving a state's property
interests without the consent of that state).
Baker Farms ("Baker"), a Texas corporation, operated its farm and
livestock business on a 188-acre leased property in Floyd County,
Texas. A railway roadbed divided this property into north and south
parcels. In 1992, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department ("TPWD")
purchased the railway roadbed and converted it into Caprock Canyon
State Park and Trailway ("Trailway") for public recreation. Baker
contacted Jeoffrey Hulse, Park Manager of the Trailway, regarding
Baker's right to access the water well located on the Trailway. Hulse,
along with employee Ronny Gallagher, refused Baker's effort to lay
new electric lines to access the well water.
Baker filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against Hulse and others, seeking injunctive
relief prohibiting any further interferences with Baker's property
interests in the water well and crossway. In addition, Baker sought to
recover costs incurred in the drilling of an alternative water well on its
leased property, punitive damages totaling $100,000, and attorney's
fees. Defendants moved to dismiss the cause of action due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted this motion and
dismissed the case without prejudice.
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Baker alleged their property interest was an appurtenant
prescriptive easement to the water well and crossway located on the
Trailway.
Baker argued TPWD's purchase of the Trailway was
contingent upon all previously established interests, including
easements of record or otherwise. Baker asserted the previous owner,
who drilled the water well on the Trailway in 1964, transferred the
prescriptive easements with the property when he leased it to Baker.
The employees of TPWD, however, disputed the existence of Baker's
prescriptive easement.
The court stated a suit is against the sovereign if "the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or
interfere with the public administration," or if the effect of the
judgment would be "to restrain the Government from acting or to
compel it to act." Furthermore, a federal court does not have
authority to hear claims involving a state's property interest without
that state's expressed consent. The instant case revolved around
Baker's disputed easement rights to the water well and crossway on the
Trailway. The State of Texas had record title to the Trailway and was
responsible for its operations. The court contended that if Baker had
a prescriptive easement, it would clearly be exercising authority over
the public domain, restricting the State of Texas' property interests,
and violating state sovereignty under the Eleventh Amendment.
Therefore, since the State of Texas' property interests were
implicit in this claim and the State of Texas had not consented to
adjudication in a federal court, the court did not have the requisite
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case.
Jessica L. Grether
Trout Unlimited v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 187 F. Supp.
2d 1334 (D. Utah 2002) (holding moot plaintiffs challenges to
completed pipeline and water plant construction projects, and holding
Army Corps of Engineers' review appropriate in addressing water
quality issues related to those projects).
Plaintiffs, including the Utah Council of Trout Unlimited and
concerned environmentalists ("Trout Unlimited"), challenged the
Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") decision to approve permits for
construction of a water treatment plant and two pipeline projects in
Summit County, Utah. Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps' approval
of the construction projects violated various federal regulations,
including the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), the National Environmental Preservation Act ("NEPA"),
the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), and the Federal
Wildlife Coordination Act ("FWCA"). Trout Unlimited appealed the
Corps' decision in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, and requested the court remand the agency action. The court
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denied Trout Unlimited's motion for remand.
The construction permit applicants planned to build a water
treatment plant and two pipelines to supply additional drinking water
to the county and to aid in snowmaking operations of local ski resorts.
At the time of Trout Unlimited's challenge to the Corps' decision, two
of the construction projects were underway, rendering certain claims
on those projects moot, claims for procedural remedies
notwithstanding. The claims on the final project remained ripe.
Trout Unlimited's complaint listed six specific violations of federal
regulations, alleging that: (1) the Corps issued nationwide permits
("NWPs") for the construction projects instead of individual permits,
which would invoke a stricter standard of review; (2) the Corps failed
to analyze the projects' impacts on water quality of the nearby
watershed; (3) the Corps failed to evaluate alternatives to the proposed
projects; (4) the Corps failed to evaluate the projects using a NEPA
analysis; (5) the Corps failed to comply with the FWCA, raising
concerns about local trout species; and (6) the Corps failed to address
concerns the projects would jeopardize nearby historic properties.
First, Trout Unlimited challenged the Corps' issuance of NWPs as
opposed to individual permits. Given the project's distance from, and
relatively minimal impact on, nearby East Canyon Creek, the Corps
issued the more general NWP. The CWA grants the Corps authority to
regulate "discharges of dredged and fill material into wetlands"
through permitting systems, and allows the Corps to issue the more
general NWPs in certain situations to maximize agency efficiency. The
Corps determined that all three construction projects would have
minimal impact on East Canyon Creek, thus eliminating the need for
an intensive evaluation or NEPA review. The court held the Corps'
determination to issue NWPs in lieu of individual permits was
satisfactory.
Second, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps failed to analyze the
projects' impact on water quality. The Utah Department of Water
Quality ("DWQ") originally indicated it intended to withdraw
certification on the pipeline projects because the affected portion of
East Canyon Creek fell within the CWA's definition of impaired waters.
In response, the permit applicants revised the construction plans in
order to lessen the impact on the Creek. The DWQ reviewed the
revised plans and reversed its earlier stance. In examining permit
applications, the Corps must defer to state certification of the project.
Section 401 of the CWA requires permit applicants to obtain
certification from the state to ensure compliance with CWA standards.
If a state certifies a proposal, the Corps need not analyze water quality
issues further. The court held the Corps' reliance on the DWQ's
certification served as sufficient analysis of water quality impacts, and
thus dismissed Trout Unlimited's second contention.
Third, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps failed to analyze
alternatives to the proposed projects. The court dismissed this claim,
holding since the Corps analyzed alternatives to NWPs when the
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permits were first created, no federal regulation required the Corps to
conduct further analysis.
Fourth, Trout Unlimited alleged the Corps violated NEPA in
failing to analyze the proposed construction projects using NEPA
review. Again, the court dismissed the argument, holding NEPA
review occurred at the time of the creation of the NWPs, with the
Corps analyzing a relevant class of activities at the time it issued the
permit. When applying an NWP to a proposed activity, NEPA does not
require further review of the project.
Fifth, Trout Unlimited's claim under the FWCA alleged the Corps
failed to address concerns about the projects' impacts on local trout
species. The court first pointed out the FWCA does not include a
private right of action for citizen suits, but addressed the issue to
determine whether the Corps' actions were arbitrary and capricious,
and thus in violation of the APA. The Corps' regulations require the
agency to give "full consideration" to other agencies' concerns, yet
under FWCA, requirements the Corps can rely on information from
permit applicants in evaluating compliance with FWCA. The court
found while the Fish and Wildlife Service initially expressed concern
over the projects, the permit applicants addressed the concerns in an
Thus, Trout
environmental assessment provided to the Corps.
Unlimited failed to meet its burden of proving the Corps acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner.
Finally, the court addressed Trout Unlimited's allegation the
Corps' actions violated the NHPA by failing to evaluate possible
impacts on historic properties. Under the NHPA, state historic
preservation offices must assist federal agencies in the review
processes. The Utah State Historic Preservation Office determined the
proposed projects would not affect historic properties. The court
found the Corps' reliance on such determination reasonable, and
dismissed Trout Unlimited's claim under the NHPA.
The court thus denied Trout Unlimited's appeal and motion to
remand agency action, and entered judgment for the Corps.
KatharineJEllison

United States v. Newdunn Assoc., 195 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(holding the United States Army Corps of Engineers' 1986 regulations
expanding the definition of "waters of the United States" and
extending its jurisdiction over these waters exceeded the grant of
authority to the Corps by Congress under the Clean Water Act).
On June 12, 2001, Newdunn Associates ("Newdunn") and its
contractors began discharging fill material onto its property, grading
its property, and excavating ditches on its property. Newdunn
conducted these activities without a permit under section 404 of the
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Clean Water Act ("CWA") or an individual or general Virginia
Protection Permit under sections 62.1-44.15:5 and 62.1-44.5 of the
Virginia Code. The United States filed suit against Newdunn in the
United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("VDEQ") also filed
suit against Newdunn in Virginia State Court for not obtaining state
permits. The VDEQ's action was removed to the United States District
Court and consolidated the two actions against Newdunn because it
found VDEQ had relied on the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
assertion of jurisdiction to bring its claim. At issue was whether the
Corps had jurisdiction over Newdunn's property under the CWA and
its 1986 regulations interpreting the Act.
Newdunn owned a parcel of land in Newport News, Virginia. At
times, run-off generated by rain exited the property through drainage
ditches. The water ran through more than three miles of ditches and
arms of non-navigable runs until it intersected with Stony Run, which
was a navigable-in-fact watercourse. In September 1999, Newdunn
requested and obtained ajurisdictional determination from the Corps.
The determination confirmed Newdunn's property contained thirtyeight acres of non-tidal forested wetlands. Under the Corps' 1986
regulations, the Corps had jurisdiction under the CWA over wetlands
that were sufficiently connected to "waters of the United States." The
September 1999 jurisdictional determination confirmed the Corps had
jurisdiction over the wetlands on Newdunn's property.
The district court, however, found this determination to be
incorrect, holding that the Corps failed to meet its burden under its
1986 regulations of proving the wetlands on Newdunn's property were
sufficiently connected to "waters of the United States" to fall within its
jurisdiction. The Corps argued a "surface water" or "hydrological"
connection existed between the wetlands on the property and "waters
of the United States." However, the court rejected this argument
because the 1986 regulations make no mention of such connections.
The court also reasoned that upholding the Corps' argument would
lead to arbitrary findings ofjurisdiction.
The court found even if the Corps had met its burden, the 1986
regulations exceeded the 1972 Congressional grant of authority in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs. The Corps first
promulgated regulations for the CWA in 1974 under authority granted
by Congress. The Corps revised its regulations in 1975, 1977, and
1986. These revisions continually expanded the definition of "waters
of the United States" and consequently, expanded the CWA's
jurisdiction over these waters. Prior to SWANCC, courts generally
allowed the CWA's jurisdiction to expand under the Corps'
regulations. However, SWANCC limited the Corps' jurisdiction under
the CWA to actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands
adjacent to each. This limitation is consistent with the Corps' original
1974 interpretation of its jurisdiction under the CWA. Thus, because
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the wetlands on Newdunn's property were not adjacent to navigable
waters, the court found the Corps had no jurisdiction over the
property.
Lastly, the court found sections 61.1-44.5 and 62.1-44.15:15 of the
Virginia Code were coextensive with the CWA because they based their
state jurisdiction on that of the CWA and likewise defined "wetlands."
Also, the VDEQ's actions indicate it consistently based its jurisdiction
over Newdunn's property on the Corps' jurisdiction over the property.
Therefore, since the Virginia statute and the CWA were coextensive,
and because VDEQ relied on the Corps' jurisdiction for its own
jurisdiction-given the court's finding the Corps had no jurisdiction
over Newdunn's property-the court held VDEQ also had no
jurisdiction over Newdunn's property. As such, the court entered
judgment for Newdunn.
Kate Osborn
Lands Council v. Vaught, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Wash. 2002)
(holding that absent a finding that injunctive relief would cause
irreparable harm, a permanent injunction is the proper remedy for
violation of the National Environmental Protection Act's procedural
requirements).
In late 1998 and early 1999, the United States Forest Service
("Forest Service") prepared an Environmental Impact Statement to
address a Douglas fir bark beetle outbreak and various ecosystem
imbalances in the Colville National Forest ("CNF") and Idaho
Panhandle National Forest ("IPNF"). The Forest Service released the
Final Environmental Impact Statement ("FEIS") on June 14, 1999, and
adopted some of its proposals. The resulting Douglas Fir Bark Beetle
Project ("Project") would impact 19,000 acres of forested land in the
IPNF and 4,300 acres in the CNF. The Project called for logging 145
million board-feet of trees.
The Lands Council administratively appealed a Forest Service's
decision to implement the Project, however, the Appeal Deciding
Officer denied it in September 1999. The Lands Council then
brought suit against the Forest Service in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington, alleging violations of the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), National Environmental
Protection Act ("NEPA"), National Forest Management Act ("NFMA")
and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The district court denied their two
motions for preliminary injunction, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued a temporary injunction pending appeal. The Lands
Council then amended its original complaint, which is the subject in
the instant case.
The district court considered this amended
complaint, ruling on cross motions for summary judgment brought by
the Lands Council and the Forest Service Chief. The Lands Council
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renewed its petition for injunctive relief.
The court granted summary judgment to Lands Council on five
issues and to the Forest Service on four. The court held that the
Forest Service's decision to move forward with the Project violated
NFMA, because the agency failed to demonstrate consistency with CNF
and IPNF old-growth standards. Additionally, it found the Forest
Service also violated NEPA in three instances, and the court implicated
the agency's FEIS in each case. First, the court criticized the FEIS for
lacking necessary predictions and analyses with respect to water
quality. Next, the court held that the FEIS failed to consider past
timber harvests and those occurring on adjacent lands in its
projections for the CNF portion of the Project, which constituted an
arbitrary and capricious NEPA violation. In a parallel holding, the
court stated that the FEIS lacked data on private logging and on the
cumulative impacts on habitat or wildlife within the Coeur d'Alene
Ranger District portion of the Project, and was likewise arbitrary and
capricious. The court entered a similar holding with respect to the
Priest Lake Ranger District Project segment.
The Forest Service prevailed on other NFMA and NEPA allegations
by persuading the court that its old-growth forest data were adequate,
and that habitat monitoring could suffice in lieu of the customary
population monitoring. With respect to water quality, the court held
that the Forest Service did not violate CWA or NFMA, and was not
arbitrary and capricious. Likewise, the agency did not violate NFMA
with respect to fisheries, because the Project was consistent with the
appropriate CNF and IPNF standards. Finally, the court held that the
Forest Service's Cumulative Impact Analysis did not violate NEPA,
because the Forest Service did not use flawed data. Moreover, its FEIS
considered matters such as grazing and off-road vehicles to an extent
that satisfied the court.
Turning to the issue of permanent injunction, the court held that
violating NEPA's procedural requirements called for that remedy
whenever injunctive relief itself would not cause irreparable harm.
The Forest Service urged the court to enter declaratory judgment but
deny injunctive relief, reasoning that such a holding would benefit the
public while notifying the agency of matters needing correction in
future projects. The court declined to proceed in that manner,
holding that it would render its decision an advisory opinion.
The Forest Service was unable to cite a single case in which the
Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin a violation of NEPA's procedural
requirements. Consequently, the court permanently enjoined the
Project at least until such time as the Forest Service complied with all
applicable laws.
Curtis Graves
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Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 206 F. Supp.
2d 782 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (granting mining company and Army Corps
of Engineers' motion for clarification of an injunctive order enjoining
the issuance of fill permits for waste disposal, denying mining company
and Corps' motion for a stay pending appeal, denying citizen group's
motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, and denying
citizen group's motion for further injunctive relief).
In early 2002, the citizen group Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth ("Commonwealth") brought an action against
Colonel John Rivenburgh, Robert Flowers, and Michael Green
("Engineers") of the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps").
Commonwealth alleged the Engineers violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), and the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by issuing permits authorizing
the filling of waters of the United States with waste from surface coal
mining. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
concluded issuance of section 404 permits for the purpose of waste
disposal was contrary to the spirit and letter of the CWA and ultra vires.
On May 8, 2002, the district court enjoined the Engineers from issuing
permits under section 404 of the CWA that have no primary use other
than the disposal of waste, and specifically enjoined the Engineers
from issuing mountaintop removal overburden valley fill permits solely
for waste disposal.
In the present case, Kentucky Coal Association, Pocahontas
Development Company, and AEI Resources ("Mining Companies")
were joined as intervener-defendants. The Engineers and the Mining
Companies requested clarification of the May 8, 2002 injunction and
moved for a stay pending appeal. Commonwealth moved to dismiss
for failure of the Engineers to join Beech Fork Processing ("Beech
Fork") as a party and also moved for further injunctive relief against
the Engineers.
The district court granted the Engineers and Mining Companies'
request for clarification of its May 8, 2002 injunctive order. The court
explained the scope of the injunction was not nationwide, it applied
only to the Engineers and enjoined them from issuing section 404
permits from the Huntington District business office. The district
court also stated the injunction enjoined the issuance of section 404
permits for all activities with no primary purpose other than the
disposal of waste, including mountaintop removal overburden disposal
in valley fills resulting from coal mining, but not including dredging
and dredged spoil disposal. The court explained that permanent
injunctive relief was necessary for three reasons: (1) Commonwealth
showed at trial it did not have an adequate legal remedy; (2)
irreparable environmental harm would result absent an injunction;
and (3) section 706(2) of the APA requires courts to hold unlawful
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and set aside agency action found to be contrary to law or outside the
agency's statutory authority. At trial, the court determined the Corps
and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") acted contrary to
the spirit and letter of the CWA and ultra vires through their
rulemaking authority. The Corps and the EPA created a rule defining
"fill material" that allowed the dumping of waste into streams as long
as the disposal resulted in filling the waters of the United States. The
court found this practice unlawful in light of the CWA and halted the
practice, as required by the APA. The court then denied the
Engineers and Mining Companies' motion for a stay pending appeal,
finding the Engineers and the Mining Companies failed to make a
strong showing they would prevail on appeal on the merits of the case.
The Engineers and the Mining Companies submitted six arguments in
support of their position, not one of which persuaded the court.
The court held the Engineers and Mining Companies failed to
demonstrate irreparable harm would have occurred absent a stay. The
Engineers and Mining Companies argued coal mining depended on
the disposal of waste in section 404 fills. However, the court
determined waste disposal fills were not necessary for coal mining, but
rather were a cheaper alternative to reconfiguring the permits to avoid
the placement of waste in waters of the United States. The court also
determined irreparable harm to the environment could result if it
granted the stay; and a stay could cause harm to the public since it
would substantially harm the environment. Thus, the court denied the
Engineers and the Mining Companies a stay pending appeal because
they failed to substantially show they would prevail on appeal or suffer
irreparable harm absent a stay. The court denied Commonwealth's
motion to dismiss for the Engineers' failure to join Beech Fork as a
necessary party. The court held a necessary party is one who has a
legally protected interest in the litigation, not merely a financial
interest or an interest of convenience. Beech Fork had only financial
and convenience interests in the adjudication. The court therefore
held Beech Fork was not a necessary party, and that dismissal of the
action was improper.
The court also denied Commonwealth's motion for further
injunctive relief requiring the Engineers to revoke authorization to
Beech Fork to dispose of waste rock and dirt in waters of the United
States. The court found the permanent injunction as previously
ordered could not be extended to individual permit holders.
Kate Osborn
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STATE COURTS
ALABAMA
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., No.
1000563, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 76 (Ala. March 1, 2002) (holding that the
Alabama Department of Environmental Management's procedures
implemented in response to mandates of the Federal Antidegradation
Policy were within the definition of a rule under the Alabama
Administrative Procedures Act and the Alabama Environmental
Management Act).
The Alabama Department of Environmental Management
("ADEM"), attempting to comply with Federal Antidegredation Policy
("FAP") requirements, revised its statewide antidegradation policy but
failed to include methods or procedures for implementing the policy.
As a result, the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation ("LEAF")
sued ADEM in Montgomery Circuit Court alleging that ADEM, in its
revision, adopted rules that failed to comply with the requirements as
defined by the Alabama Administrative Procedures Act ("AAPA") and
the Alabama Environmental Management Act ("AEMA") for
promulgating new rules. ADEM, relying on Alabama Department of
Transportation v. Blue Ridge Sand & Gravel, Inc., which held standard
specifications adopted by the Alabama Department of Transportation
were not rules, moved for summary judgment and prevailed. LEAF
appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed without opinion.
The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The FAP requires states to develop and adopt a statewide
antidegradation policy, and to identify methods for implementing the
policy. Minimum requirements mandated by FAP include consistency
with the following: (1) protecting existing uses of instream water and
protecting the level of water quality necessary to protect existing uses;
(2) maintaining and protecting the quality of waters exceeding levels
necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife, but if a
lower level is found necessary by a state, the state must assure water
quality adequate to fully protect existing uses; (3) assuring water
quality and uses are not lowered below existing statutory and
regulatory requirements; and (4) maintaining and protecting high
quality waters where those waters constitute an outstanding national
resource.
The Alabama Supreme Court distinguished this case from Blue
Ridge Sand & Gravel, Inc. on two grounds. First, the implementation
procedures promulgated by the ADEM constituted a regulation or
statement of general applicability that implemented or prescribed law
or policy, or that described the procedure or practice of an agency,
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bringing the regulations within the definition of a rule. ADEM's
procedures constituted a rule because they implemented the state's
antidegradation policy, proscribed Alabama's pollution policy, and
described the application procedure and requirements for discharge
permits. Second, ADEM's procedures did not fit within an exception
to the definition of a rule because they were not specifically required
by statute, by existing rule, or by federal policy.
While the FAP imposes minimum requirements, or maximum
pollution levels, it does not specifically mandate what pollution levels
Alabama allows. It merely states that if Alabama allows pollution, the
allowable levels must not exceed those stated in the federal
requirements; Alabama must decide and promulgate allowable levels
and must establish criteria for discharge permits.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") likewise did not
require Alabama adopt specific procedures, forms, or economic
analyses. The EPA only required ADEM to adopt implementation
procedures within federal parameters.
Since the court found ADEM's procedures to be rules within the
meaning of the AAPA and the AEMA, ADEM violated the rulemaking
provisions of the AAPA and the AEMA. Thus, the court reversed
summary judgment in favor of ADEM and remanded for further
proceedings.
Rachel M. Sobrero

CALIFORNIA
Arreola v. County of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (allowing recovery when flood control project failed due to
counties' deliberate act of non-maintenance and state's deliberate
obstruction of floodplain).
James Arreola and approximately 300 property owners (Arreola")
sued in inverse condemnation and tort when the Pajaro River broke
through its levee during a storm, causing massive property damage.
Arreola brought his claim against the County of Santa Cruz, Santa
Cruz County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, the
County of Monterey, the Monterey County Water Resources Agency
("counties") and the State of California.
Both the counties and the state appealed from a trial court ruling
in favor of Arreola. The counties appealed on whether: (1) the trial
court properly analyzed the reasonableness of the counties' actions;
(2) inadequate maintenance of a public project can support an inverse
condemnation claim; (3) the trial court erred in defining "design
capacity" of a flood control project; (4) there was sufficient evidence to
support the findings of liability; and (5) the trial court erred in relying
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heavily on Arreola's draft in writing its Statement of Decision. The
state appealed on the following issues: whether (1) the state's liability
for an inverse condemnation claim required a showing of
unreasonableness when claim arose neither from a flood control
project, nor from surface water discharge; (2) the state had a duty to
avoid obstructing a floodplain; (3) Government Code section 830.6
provided immunity for the state; and (4) the counties' actions were a
superseding cause. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District of
California heard the case.
In 1947, the counties signed a resolution giving their assurance to
conform to federal maintenance guidelines for a flood control project
within their jurisdictions. The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
completed the project in 1949. The Corps designed the project to
have a capacity of at least 19,000 cubic feet per second ("c.f.s."), with
some evidence that the project could accommodate up to 23,000 c.f.s.
for brief periods of time. Canal maintenance required regular
mechanized clearing of vegetation and sandbars. The counties
regularly undertook mechanized clearing until 1972, when conflicts
with the California Department of Fish and Game caused the counties
to cut back to only sporadic mechanized clearings. Officials from the
counties and the state made many complaints and warnings that the
project's flood control capacity was deteriorating, and the project
required mechanized clearing. The state built a highway overpass,
utilizing an earthen embankment containing two forty-eight-inch
culverts to accommodate flows of ninety-eight c.f.s. In March 1995, a
storm overwhelmed the project, and the river broke through the levee.
When the waters reached the highway embankment, the culverts could
not accommodate the flows, and the embankment dammed the flow,
exacerbating the flood area, and causing ponding and sediment
deposit.
The court began its analysis with a background on inverse
condemnation. The court reiterated that the Albers v. County of Los
Angeles court held the constitutional requirement ofjust compensation
revolves around whether the owner of the damaged property would
contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking if left
uncompensated. Generally, a public entity is strictly liable when its
action proximately causes an injury to real property. However, the
court noted an exception to the Albers general rule of strict liability.
The so-called Archer exception arose under water law doctrines, and
held that landowners had the right to inflict damage upon others'
property in situations of flood control (the common enemy doctrine)
and discharge of surface water in a natural watercourse (the natural
watercourse rule). The court noted the Archer immunity and the
constitutional takings doctrine created a tension between competing
interests.
The court then described the two cases that devised a solution to
the competing doctrines. The Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
Dist. court held an injured plaintiff could recover under inverse
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condemnation when a public agency's unreasonable design,
construction or maintenance was a substantial cause of the plaintiffs
damages. Locklin v. City of Lafayette fleshed out a six-part test to
determine: (1) the overall public purpose of the project; (2) the
extent to which reciprocal benefits offset plaintiffs loss; (3) the
availability of feasible, lower-risk alternatives; (4) the severity of
plaintiff's damage in relation to plaintiffs risk-bearing ability; (5) the
extent to which damage was a normal risk; and (6) the degree to
which damage is distributed over wide group of beneficiaries. The
court held the trial court correctly applied the Locklin factors in
determining that the counties acted unreasonably.
The court denied the counties' assertion that the trial court
erroneously applied the Locklin balancing test. The counties argued
the relevant public action was not the substandard maintenance of the
project, but rather the initial plan of maintenance the counties
adopted in 1947. The court examined the question of whether lack of
maintenance could be the basis for liability in inverse condemnation.
Relying primarily on Bauer v. County of Ventura, the court found lack of
maintenance was grounds for an inverse condemnation claim so long
as there was a deliberate act to undertake the particular plan or
manner of maintenance. The court found factual evidence that the
counties' lack of maintenance was a deliberate act. The court
concluded by noting that under a Locklin analysis, the lack of
maintenance was unreasonable, and therefore it was appropriate to
assess liability to the counties.
The court then denied the counties' arguments that the trial court
erroneously defined the project's design capacity. The counties
argued that any additional capacity over 19,000 c.f.s. was not part of
the project's design capacity, and failure as a result of flows over 19,000
c.f.s. did not create liability against them. The court found this
argument inapposite. It found that in fact, the Corps designed the
project to continuously accommodate 19,000 c.f.s. with temporary
capacity of 23,000 c.f.s. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
defining the design capacity as 19,000 c.f.s. with an additional 4,000
c.f.s. of temporary capacity.
The court also found no merit in the counties' argument that flows
exceeded project capacity. The jury found the flood did not exceed
the project's capacity. The court applied a deferential standard of
substantial evidence review and found substantial evidence to support
such a finding.
Finally, the court turned to Arreola's claim against the state. The
state contended the trial court did not use the proper reasonableness
standard. The court found no standard of reasonableness applied to
claims against the state. The reasonableness requirement stems from
water law principles of flood control and surface water discharge. In
this case, the action of the state that caused damage was neither flood
control nor surface water discharge. It was the construction of a
public highway that caused the damage. Without the water law
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privilege, the state was strictly liable for inverse condemnation and tort
damages. Affirming the trial court's decision, the court found that if
not compensated, Arreola would contribute more than his proper
share to the public undertaking of highway construction.
Moreover, the court found the state had a duty to avoid
obstructing the floodplain, and the state violated that duty. It used
foreseeability to determine duty, and found facts supporting the
conclusion that the highway's obstruction of floodwater was not only
foreseeable, but was foreseen. The state was aware of reports from the
Corps that a hundred-year storm could generate 43,500 c.f.s. and
overwhelm the project. Additionally, it was also aware the culverts
could not handle the resulting flood.
Since the damage was
foreseeable and foreseen, the state had a duty to avoid the damage,
and breached that duty when it built the highway to inferior standards.
The court continued its analysis by holding that Government Code
section 830.6 was not a defense for the state. In order to have
immunity under section 830.6, the state needed to show that its design
was reasonable. The court found that state's design of the highway
with ninety-eight c.f.s. culverts was unreasonable given the state's
awareness that a hundred-year flood could generate up to 43,500 c.f.s.,
far over the project's capacity.
The court finished its analysis by denying the state's argument that
failure of the project was a superseding cause. The court reasoned in
order for cause to be superseding, it must be unforeseeable. In this
case, the failure of the project was not only foreseeable, but also
foreseen. Therefore failure of the project could not be a superseding
cause.
James Parrot

California v. Murrison, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that notification to the Department of the Fish and Game is
required where a diversion of water occurs).
Scott Edgar Murrison ("Murrison") placed rocks and gravel across
Big Creek, a small creek in Trinity County, to divert ninety-five percent
of the water flow from the creek to a diversion ditch. The Fish and
Game Code ("Code") stated that it was unlawful for any person to
substantially divert or obstruct the natural flow or substantially change
the bed, channel, or bank of any river, stream, or lake without first
notifying the Department of the Fish and Game ("DFG") of the
activity. The State of California brought suit against Murrison for
violation of the Code. The Superior Court of Trinity County found
that Murrison substantially altered the creek without complying with
the Code, enjoining Murrison from further diversion, and assessing
civil penalties. Murrison appealed to the Court of Appeals of
California, claiming his water right could not be limited by the Code,
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the government could not take his water rights without compensation,
the injunction against him was too broad, and civil penalties should
not have been assessed. The court affirmed.
Murrison's water rights dated back to 1870-1912. He argued that
his water right predated the Code and was therefore exempt from its
requirements. The court of appeals found, however, that water rights
predating the Code are not exempt from regulation. It is within the
state's police power to create reasonable regulations to protect the
wildlife of the state.
Murrison argued he was not diverting new water but rather
maintaining his waterworks and was exempt from the Code. The court
found that Murrison's action was not maintenance, but rather a
substantial diversion that required DFG notification.
Murrison also argued that the state could not take his water right
without just compensation. The court found that Murrison's takings
claim was not ripe. Murrison did not bring a takings claim at the trial
court level and was not restricted from making the claim on appeal.
The court stated, however, that they found no restrictions on
Murrison's right to divert water. Murrison was only required to notify
the DFG of his diversion. Had Murrison given notice, the DFG may
have approved the diversion without any restrictions.
Murrison claimed the trial court should not have assessed a civil
penalty. The court found the Code allows penalties in excess of what
Murrison received and justified the penalty based on Murrison's
actions coupled with the nature of the diversion and damages.
Colleen M. Cooley
Hartwell Corp. v. Santamaria, 38 P.3d 1098 (Cal. 2002) (holding
public utility commission's jurisdiction does not extend to suits against
non-regulated utilities and industries, nor to suits alleging violations of
state and federal water-quality standards).
Multiple consumers brought actions in two superior courts against
regulated water providers ("RWPs"), non-regulated water providers
("NRWPs"), and multiple industrial companies for damages and
injunctive relief from alleged water contamination.
The parties
claimed that the water utilities provided them unsafe drinking water
causing death, personal injury, and property damage. The California
Court of Appeals held one of the two superior courts erred: (1) in
staying the proceedings instead of ruling on the merits; (2) by failing
to grant the RWPs' Public Utilities Code section 1759 motion to
dismiss; and (3) by failing to deny the industrial companies' and the
NRWPs' section 1759 motions to dismiss. The appeals court also held
the second superior court was correct in granting the RWPs' motion to
dismiss and denying the NRWPs' and the industrial companies'
motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court of California granted
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petitions for review filed by the RWPs, the NRWPs, the industrial
companies, and the consumers.
The Supreme Court held while section 1759 preempts claims
alleging insufficient water regulation standards, it does not preempt
damage claims against RWPs alleging violations of federal and state
drinking water standards, nor does it preempt any claims against
unregulated entities, specifically the NRWPs and the industrial
companies.
The court began its analysis with a background of the jurisdiction
of the public utility commissions ("PUC"), and the effects section 1759
had on the PUC's jurisdiction and the industrial companies.
Normally, no court except an appeals court or a supreme court has
jurisdiction to review, reverse, correct, or annul any PUC order or
decision. However, Public Utilities Code section 2106 creates a cause
of action in any court for damages resulting from a public utility's
unlawful act or neglect of a positive duty. The court resolved the
inherent conflict between these two sections by applying the three-part
test from San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court ("Covalt"). This
conjunctive test bars an action in superior court if: (1) the PUC had
authority to set and enforce regulatory standards; (2) the PUC
exercised that authority; and (3) the superior court action would
hinder or interfere with the PUC's exercise of regulatory authority.
The court then analyzed section 1579's effect on the claims against
the RWPs. The court found all actions against the RWPs passed the
first Covalt prong. The PUC had authority because: (1) it regulated
public health and safety through public utilities, and therefore
regulated water quality; (2) it regulated rates and set budgets for water
treatment, and therefore water quality; and (3) it had statutory
authority to set water quality standards not inconsistent with state
standards, which the court reasoned to mean the PUC could set any
standard above state levels which it deemed appropriate.
The court further found all actions against the RWPs passed the
second Covalt prong because the PUC exercised its authority. The
PUC exercised its authority in a number of ways, including: regulating
rates; issuing guidelines for water quality improvement projects; and
issuing a decision that conforming to drinking water standards would
require investment of $50 million to $200 million over several years.
Finally, the court found some of the consumers' actions passed the
third Covalt prong, while others did not. The actions that did not pass
were those that asserted the water quality standards were inherently
faulty. The court reasoned that superior court review of the water
quality standards themselves would hinder and interfere with the
PUC's exercise of regulatory authority by directly reviewing an order
or decision of the PUC. Therefore, section 1759 preempted claims
alleging faulty standards. However, the court found section 1759 did
not preempt claims that asserted faulty compliance with existing
standards. The court reasoned the PUC only had mechanisms for
prospective remedial programs, but no mechanism by which
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consumers could obtain relief for past violations. Since the PUC had
no jurisdiction to hear suits seeking damages for faulty compliance,
section 1759 did not bar consumers' suits based on such damages
because there was no direct review, reversal, correction, or annulment
of the PUC's order or decision. The court concluded section 1759 did
not bar those claims based solely on faulty compliance.
The court then disposed of consumers' claim for injunctive relief
to provide clean water. The court reasoned an injunction, based on a
finding different from that of the PUC, would clearly conflict with the
PUC decision-making and regulatory functions. The court contrasted
an injunction as a form of prospective remedial relief with ajury award
of damages. The court concluded section 1759 preempted injunctive
relief.
The court then turned its attention to the NRWPs and the
industrial companies. The NRWPs and industrial companies argued
three points. First, they argued section 1759 encompassed both utility
and nonutility parties. Second, that section 1759 and Covalt applied
broadly to subject matters and issues before the PUC, not just to
actions against regulated utilities. Finally, they argued some of the
RWPs' water was from the same supply as the NWRPs. Thus a jury
award undermined the PUC's report that the drinking water was safe
by directly reviewing, reversing, correcting, or annulling the PUC's
decision.
The court dismissed the first argument by reasoning the
California Constitution restricts the PUC's duties to regulated utilities.
Therefore, suits against unregulated utilities and non-utilities could
not possibly interfere with the PUC's official regulatory duties. The
court dismissed the second argument by noting the NRWPs and the
industrial companies cited no case law to support their argument. The
court noted the NRWPs and industrial companies cited isolated
statements from cases in an attempt to bolster their position. The
court read the statements within the broader context of the cases and
found the statements actually supported the position that section 1759
and Covalt applied only to cases against regulated utilities. The court
dismissed the third argument by noting the PUC had no jurisdiction to
hear cases against NRWPs. Therefore, the PUC's jurisdiction would
suffer no injury if the superior court addressed the case. Moreover, if
the superior court had no jurisdiction, the cases would have no forum
at all.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court on the
preemption issues only, and affirmed the remainder of the appellate
decision. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
James Parrot
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Milliken v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., No. E029724, 2002 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 2541 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2002) (holding an
environmental impact report is adequate if it: (1) properly describes a
project's environmental setting and scope; (2) adequately analyzes a
project's impact on groundwater quality; (3) adequately analyzes a
reasonable range of alternatives and properly rejects each alternative;
and (4) is consistent with the applicable zoning and land use laws).
The plaintiff, Bradley Milliken, appealed a Superior Court of
Riverside County order to the Fourth Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeals. The order denied Milliken's petition for
a writ of mandate to prohibit the defendant, the Coachella Valley
Water District ("District"), from certifying an environmental impact
report ("EIR") and expanding its Water Reclamation Plant ("Plant").
Milliken appealed from an order that denied a writ of mandate to
set aside the actions of the District in certifying an EIR and approving
plans to expand its Plant. The District proposed to increase the Plant's
wastewater collection, reclamation, and disposal capacity from 2.5 to
5.0 million gallons per day ("mgd"): In order to achieve the proposed
increase, the District planned to upgrade the Plant's facilities and
build two more percolation ponds. The proposed location for the
ponds was a 105-acre parcel north of the Plant and on the upstream
side of a United States Bureau of Reclamation flood control dike.
Milliken's family owned a date farm and residence north of the Plant
site and southeast of the pond site. A portion of Milliken's land was an
agricultural preserve under the Williamson Act.
The Plant originally consisted of a 1.0 mgd aerated lagoon
treatment facility with on-site percolation pond disposal. In 1995, the
District completed construction of a 2.5 mgd extended aeration facility
with tertiary and biosolids handling facilities at the Plant. The District
proposed several upgrades including headworks, an aeration basin and
blower, two secondary clarifiers, and a pump to transport treated
effluent (recycled wastewater for irrigation) to new ponds. The
District intended the project to provide treatment of increased sewage
flows until 2017.
Milliken appealed the District's certification of the EIR to the court
based on five arguments: (1) the EIR failed to adequately describe the
project's environmental setting; (2) the EIR failed to describe the
project's true scope as a segment of a larger unstated project; (3) the
EIR failed to analyze the project's potential impacts on water quality;
(4) the EIR failed to consider alternatives and rejected each alternative
based only on cost; and (5) the project's purpose was inconsistent with
zoning and land use laws and would have significant impacts on land
use.
The court began its analysis by stating Milliken had the burden of
proving the EIR was inadequate. In response to Milliken's first claim,
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the court stated the EIR adequately described all land uses in the area
of the Plant. Further, the EIR contained extensive information about
the area's weather and wind conditions. The court then concluded
the EIR specifically described Milliken's land, the exact location of
Milliken's residence in relation to the Plant and the pond site, and the
wind conditions near the project. The EIR also acknowledged one
alternative pipe line might cross Milliken's property and that some of
Milliken's property had been removed from agricultural reserve status.
Milliken relied on two other cases where the court held an EIR as
inadequate. However, the court distinguished the prior cases, where
the court found EIR lacked sufficient explanation or detail regarding
the surroundings, from the present case and concluded the EIR
sufficiently described in detail the project's environmental setting.
Second, Milliken asserted the project's true scope was 20.0 mgd,
not 5.0 mgd as stated in the EIR. The District argued any expansion of
the Plant above 5.0 mgd was not foreseeable, thus no analysis of the
effects of future expansions was needed. Milliken provided no
evidence to show the EIR understated the project or concealed the
ultimate capacity of 20.0 mgd. The EIR based its estimated scope on
population growth according to census tract figures, which were not
disputed by Milliken.
Furthermore, Milliken claimed the project sized its headworks for
8.5 mgd. According to Milliken, the headworks size proved the
ultimate capacity of 20.0 mgd. Contrary to Milliken's assertions, the
court concluded the 8.5 mgd headwork proposed by the District did
not necessarily mean the Plant expansion was planned to be 20.0 mgd.
The court found Milliken overestimated the importance of the 8.5
mgd headworks and ignored evidence the Plant's overall operating
capacity was 5.0 mgd. Milliken claimed a 1993 interoffice District
memorandum showed the true scope of the project was 20.0 mgd.
The court held Milliken misread the 1993 memorandum and later
interoffice communications clarified Milliken's misunderstanding.
Milliken also claimed the average daily influent to the Plant increased
by 222 percent between 1994 and 1999, which proved the true scope of
the project was 20.0 mgd. The court dismissed Milliken's second
argument and stated the evidence did not prove the 222 percent
growth rate would continue in the future.
Third, Milliken maintained the EIR did not adequately analyze the
possible contamination of the groundwater in the area of the Plant,
including water in Milliken's well. In contrast, the District claimed the
EIR adequately analyzed possible groundwater contamination and the
EIR properly concluded the project would have no significant impact
on the groundwater quality. The court reasoned an EIR's analysis
should be specific enough to allow informed decision making and
public participation. The EIR should also include information about a
project's environmental impacts and reasonable alternatives. Based on
test results from a monitoring well and an irrigation well, the EIR
concluded there would not be a significant affect on the quality of the
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groundwater.
Further, there was no evidence of effluent
contamination in Milliken's well. The court held the EIR adequately
analyzed the project's affect on groundwater surrounding the Plant
and substantial evidence supported the EIR's conclusions.
Milliken also argued the EIR failed to include evidence of past
groundwater contamination at the Plant.
Results of quarterly
groundwater tests were part of the public record, even though the EIR
and administrative record did not include the results. The court
found Milliken failed to prove the EIR's lack of test results misled the
District, the public, understated any problem, or was prejudicial.
Fourth, Milliken claimed the EIR did not adequately analyze
alternatives to the project and the District chose this project based only
on its low cost. An EIR must provide sufficient information about each
alternative in order to permit evaluation, analysis, and comparison to
the proposed project. The EIR analyzed seven alternatives to the
proposed project and thoroughly explained the reasons why each
alternative was rejected. The court held the EIR adequately analyzed a
reasonable range of alternatives. The court found that the District
rejected each alternative for an environmental or a technological
reason, rather than cost alone.
Finally, Milliken asserted the project would significantly impact
land uses, since it was inconsistent with Riverside County's and the City
of Indio's zoning ordinances, and the Riverside County
Comprehensive General Plan. The county zoned the Plant and pond
site under the W-2 zoning ordinance. Uses permitted under the W-2
zoning included: water works facilities (public and private) for the
primary purpose of production and distribution of water for irrigation
purposes, public utility uses such as structures and installations
necessary for conservation, and development of water (dams,
pipelines, water conduits, tanks, reservoirs, and wells).
Milliken
argued the project was inconsistent with the W-2 zoning, because the
project did not produce and distribute water for irrigation purposes.
Milliken also claimed the project was not necessary to the conservation
and development of water. According to Milliken, the project's main
purpose was wastewater disposal. The court found the project would
expand the Plant's capacity to produce and distribute recycled water
for irrigation and conservation.
The court held Milliken's
interpretation of uses under W-2 zoning was too narrow. Accordingly,
Milliken failed to show the project's inconsistency with the city's
ordinance.
Milliken then presented an argument the project was inconsistent
with the Western Coachella Valley Plan ("WCVP").
The WCVP
provides rivers, floodways, lakes, and reservoirs are limited to open
space and limited recreational land uses. Since the pond site would be
located in a floodway, Milliken claimed the percolation ponds did not
preserve or maintain open space. However, the court held Milliken
disregarded section 1.5 (a) of the WCVP, which provided several
reasons a public service facility may be consistent with all land use
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designations under the WCVP. The reasons included: the facility
would not create a land use problem, the site had adequate
circulation, water distribution, sewage collection and utility service,
and the location would notjeopardize public health, safety and welfare
or the facility was necessary to ensure public safety and welfare. The
project satisfied all the requirements under the WCVP, therefore the
court held it was consistent with the WCVP.
The court affirmed the District's decision and concluded the EIR
adequately described the project's environmental setting and scope,
adequately analyzed the project's impacts on groundwater quality and
reasonable alternatives, and Milliken failed to show the project was
inconsistent with zoning or land use laws.
Susan Curtis
State ex reL. Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Schoendorf, No. H022039,
2002 WL 972147 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (holding: (1) a claim of
adverse use cannot be supported where a water right was used with
implied permission that was never expressly disclaimed; and (2) a
property owner may only rely on an overlying water right to extract
water from the ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert
surface flow to which the owner has no riparian right).
The Schoendorfs appealed an action alleging they illegally diverted
surface flow of a spring from land owned by the State of California.
Schoendorf claimed prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring.
On summary adjudication, the Monterey County Superior Court ruled
in the state's favor. Schoendorf appealed, alleging the trial court
erred in failing to infer adverse use and improperly adjudicating their
overlying right claim. The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth
District affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The surface flow of the spring arose on the state's land and only
reached Schoendorf's property by means of a springbox and pipeline.
From 1944 to 1954, Schoendorf's predecessor in interest used this
diversion to supply their property with water. The state gained title to
the waters of the spring and surrounding land in 1962. In 1996,
Schoendorf installed a new springbox and pipeline on the state's land
after acquiring neighboring property.
In 1999, the state brought an action against Schoendorf alleging
they were illegally diverting water from the spring. The state also
claimed sole riparian rights to the spring because without the
diversion, no water from the spring would reach Schoendorf's
property. The state sought removal of the diversion and restoration of
its property, as well as a declaration that Schoendorfs diversion was
illegal. Schoendorf filed a cross-complaint seeking declaratory relief.
They alleged a prescriptive right to the spring based on adverse use by
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their predecessor in interest. Additionally, they claimed an overlying
right to the spring because their property overlaid the water that is the
spring's source. The state moved for summary judgment, claiming
Schoendorf asserted no defenses to the state's causes of action, and
their claims of prescriptive and overlying rights to the spring were
without merit. In opposing the motion, Schoendorf argued the state
did not establish Schoendorfs use of the spring was permissive.
Although claiming an overlying right, Schoendorf did not allege this
right provided a defense to the state's claims or constituted an
independent ground for their own causes of action. The trial court
granted the state's motion and subsequently entered judgment
declaring that Schoendorf had no right to the spring. The judgment
also prohibited Schoendorf from diverting water from the spring.
In their appeal, Schoendorf claimed the trial court erroneously
failed to infer adverse use of the spring by long term occupants of the
property ("Lopez family"). They argued even if evidence suggested
the owners knew the Lopez family used the spring, the use was adverse
because it occurred without the owner's express permission. In
affirming the trial court's ruling, the court relied upon well-established
principles of California law. A party claiming tide by prescription
bears the burden of proving the use was open, notorious, continuous,
adverse, and uninterrupted for a period of five years. If property is
used with express or implied permission of the owner, the use is not
adverse. Schoendorf only presented evidence suggesting the Lopez
family used the spring without express permission, not that this use
was adverse.
Undisputed evidence established that the state's
predecessor in interest ("Brown") was aware the Lopez family used the
springbox and pipeline to divert spring water to their property. At one
time, Brown employed members of the Lopez family, and even had
them maintain the Browns' pipelines, including the pipeline in
question. Brown also directed Mr. Lopez to dismantle other pipelines
carrying water elsewhere. The court considered these facts strong
evidence to support the trial court's inference that Brown permitted
the Lopez family to use the spring.
Schoendorf also claimed that even if permissive use was established
between 1944 and 1954, the state did not prove permissive use at any
other time. Rejecting this argument, the court again relied on a wellestablished principle of state law: "Where a use is initially permissive, it
remains so unless its permissive character is expressly disclaimed."
Schoendorf offered no evidence the Browns ever disclaimed
permissive use of the spring. The state established that use of the
spring was permissive at least as early as 1944, and remained so until
the state acquired the land in 1962.
Also at issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
summarily adjudicating Schoendorf s counterclaim asserting an
overlying right to the spring water. Schoendorf argued the state never
expressly sought adjudication of Schoendorf's overlying rights claim
and this claim was relevant to the relief sought by the state. In
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affirming the trial court's ruling, the court briefly noted that in its
summary judgment motion, the state asserted there was no merit to
Schoendorf's causes of action. The court also concluded the trial
court was not required to resolve the overlying rights claim because it
was not a matter of controversy and immaterial to both parties' causes
of action and relief sought.
A landowner possesses exclusive riparian rights to a spring if the
natural flow of the spring does not cross the boundaries of the land on
which it is located. Similar to a riparian right, an overlying water right
is appurtenant to land; however, an overlying right only confers the
right to extract water from the ground underneath the owner's land.
The court stated that an overlying right does not permit a landowner
to trespass onto a neighbor's land to divert water from a spring to
which the landowner has no riparian right. Therefore, the court
reasoned if Schoendorf did possess an overlying right to extract water
from underneath their own land, that right would not entitle them to
divert that water from the state's property. Neither would this right
allow Schoendorf to avoid an action to remediate a wrongful diversion.
Hence, the overlying rights claim was immaterial to the state's causes
of action. Further, Schoendorf only alleged the overlying rights claim
entitled them to extract groundwater, not that this right entitled them
to install the springbox and pipeline. The state never challenged
Schoendorf's right to extract groundwater from underneath the state's
property; therefore, this claim was not a matter of controversy. Thus,
the court also concluded the overlying rights claim did not provide a
basis for Schoendorfs causes of action and declaratory relief sought.
In sum, the court affirmed the lower court's determination that
Schoendorf did not have a prescriptive right to the state's spring,
because under California law, using property with implied permission
is not considered adverse use, and permissive use remains so until
expressly disclaimed. The court also held the trial court properly
adjudicated Schoendorf's overlying right claim. In doing so, the court
reaffirmed prior California decisions holding that a property owner
may only rely on an overlying water right to extract water from the
ground beneath the owner's property, not to divert surface flow to
which the owner has no riparian right.
ArthurR. Kleven
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COLORADO
SL Group, L.L.C. v. Go West Indus., Inc., 42 P.3d 637 (Colo. 2002)
(holding SL Group's failure to protest defendant's application in a
timely manner may be excused if plaintiff can demonstrate its
untimeliness was due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect
pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-93-304).
SL Group ("SL") and Go West Industries ("Go West") owned
adjoining properties, which once consisted of an undivided parcel
owned by Philip and Francis Lawhead. Water Court, Division Four
granted Go West's application for an absolute surface water right
based on a historic appropriation for irrigation dating back to July 1,
1938. Subsequently, the water court dismissed SL's verified petition
for reconsideration to correct substantive errors in judgment. The
water court judge did not consider the merits of its previous
adjudication involving Go West, but instead dismissed the petition
based solely on the ground that SL failed to demonstrate that its
failure to timely protest Go West's application was due to mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect. SL appealed the water court's
order dismissing its petition directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
SL and Go West's adjoining properties were located in a remote
desert area approximately one hour outside of Nucla, Colorado. In
March of 1998, Go West filed its application for surface water rights to
the Meadows Ditch Extension to West Shavano Creek alleging prior
appropriation for irrigation dating back to July 1, 1938. In the
application, Go West listed the United States Forest Service ("USFS")
as the owner of the land upon which the point of diversion was located
and named itself as the owner of the land on which the stock pond was
located. Go West made no similar reference in its application to SL.
Pursuant to state statute, the water clerk published a resume of the
application in a local newspaper and mailed a copy to the USFS. On
February 22, 1999, the water court approved the referee's ruling
granting Go West an absolute water right to stock water and irrigation
from the West Shavano Extension.
Approximately a year and a half later, on September 5, 2000, SL
filed a Verified Petition for Reconsideration. SL asserted it was
entitled to receive notice and in fact was not aware of the application
and subsequent adjudication in favor of Go West. Essentially SL
argued the property Go West described in its application encompassed
SL's property and the stock pond was actually located on SL's
property.
SL further argued its failure to timely petition the
application was due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect
within the meaning of Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92304(10).
Go West challenged the petition for reconsideration,
contending SL failed to show excusable neglect. Without a hearing,
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the water court dismissed SL's petition, concluding publication was
proper and that there was no showing of mistake, inadvertence, or
excusable neglect within the meaning of the law.
Under Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-302(3), the clerk of
the water court must prepare a monthly resume of water applications,
publish the resume in local newspapers of general circulation, and
mail it to parties who may be potentially affected by the adjudication.
The Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that strict compliance with
the notice provisions is required in order to satisfy due process. The
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969
("WRDAA") provides that any person whose fights were adversely
affected and who failed to file a protest due to mistake, inadvertence,
or excusable neglect may petition to correct substantive and/or
ministerial errors in ajudgment and decree within three years, further
evidencing the WRDAA's commitment to giving parties proper notice.
A party's conduct is excusable when "the surrounding circumstances
would cause a reasonably careful person similarly to neglect a duty."
The court further explained that determining whether conduct is
excusable involves a balancing of equities, including inter alia, the
danger of prejudice to the non-moving party, the length of the delay
and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, and the good faith of
the movant.
The court then looked at the facts surrounding Go West's
application. Go West did not identify SL as the owner of the property
which used water from the West Shavano extension or refer to SL
whatsoever in its application. In addition, SL never received the
resume and did not have knowledge about the application until a year
after the decree. Based on these facts, the court held SL sufficiently
showed its failure to protest the application in a timely manner was
due to mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect pursuant to state
statute, and that the water court abused its discretion in dismissing
SL's petition for reconsideration.
The court reversed the water court's order dismissing SL's petition
for reconsideration and held SL's failure to timely file its petition to
Go West's application was due to mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect within the meaning of the law.
Lucia Padilla
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 44 P.3d 241
(Colo. 2002) (holding both acreage irrigated and actual volumetric
use were relevant in determining whether a water user impermissibly
expanded use of its decreed rights).
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company ("Farmers") sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the City of Golden
("Golden") impermissibly enlarged use of decreed water by increasing
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both total acreage and the diverted percentage of decreed fights
devoted to lawn irrigation. Golden argued that a change of use
proceeding already fully litigated the terms and conditions of the
decrees necessary to protect junior appropriators, thus precluding any
volumetric change in Golden's decreed rights. The District Court,
Water Division One agreed, entering judgment for Golden. Farmers
appealed. The Colorado Supreme Court held Farmers' claim of
increased lawn irrigation constituted an allegation of changed
circumstances sufficient to overcome Golden's assertion of claim
preclusion and remanded. The water court held Golden did not
impermissibly expand use of its decreed rights, using no more water
for lawn irrigation than contemplated in the original change-of-use
proceedings. The court did not consider Farmers' claim that Golden
increased lawn acreage irrigated with decreed water, because the claim
failed to address the crucial question of whether Golden's use of water
exceeded its decreed rights. Farmers appealed.
Golden obtained two water rights decrees in 1961 and 1964,
allowing diversion of 4.66 cubic feet per second continuously from
Clear Creek each year from May 1 to October 1. Golden acquired
several senior water rights, seeking to change use from agricultural
irrigation to municipal purposes. Based on an engineering study
comparing Golden's actual municipal consumption with consumptive
use for agricultural irrigation, the court determined Golden used 50%
of its municipal supplies for domestic purposes with the remainder
devoted to lawn irrigation. The court determined lawn irrigation was
75% to 95% consumptive. In contrast, household uses were only 1.5%
consumptive. To protect junior appropriators, the court limited
Golden's use of decreed water for lawn irrigation to 53% of water
diverted. Further, the decrees barred watering more than 225 acres
during any irrigation season. In 1994, Golden used 55% of water
diverted to irrigate 267 acres of lawn.
The Colorado Supreme Court held the original restrictions on
Golden's decreed rights balanced historic consumptive use with future
use, preventing injury to junior appropriators. The decree conditions
effectively imposed volumetric limits of 900 acre-feet ("af") on
Golden's use of decreed rights for lawn irrigation from May 1 to
October 1. Therefore, if Golden used more than 53% of diverted
water for lawn irrigation, or irrigated more than 225 acres, it
impermissibly enlarged use of decreed water. Based on trial evidence
presented by Farmers, the court determined Golden watered 267 acres
in 1994, violating this condition of the decree.
Conversely, the 53% limit on use of diverted water for lawn
irrigation contemplated Golden's full use of its decreed rights. In
1994, Golden actually diverted less than half of its entitlement. Thus,
the water court determined Golden's use of 55% of diverted water for
lawn irrigation did not violate the terms of the decrees because actual
irrigation use did not exceed the 900 af limit. The court remanded
with instructions the water court enter an injunction prohibiting
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Golden from watering more than 225 acres or applying more than 900
af to lawn irrigation.
Alan Curtis

City of Thornton v. City of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2002) (the
water court erred in refusing to hold a hearing or extend the period of
retained jurisdiction over the City and County of Denver's plan of
augmentation when the operation of the plan created a cognizable
issue of injury to the City of Thornton's senior water rights due to a
change in water quality).
In May 2000, the City of Thornton ("Thornton") timely petitioned
the District Court, Water Division 1 to invoke its retained jurisdiction,
claiming that recent operation of the City of Denver's ("Denver")
augmentation plan increased pollution at Thornton's diversion
structure and therefore made normal use of the water for municipal
use unsuitable. Thornton asked the water court to extend the period
for retained jurisdiction until Denver and Thornton resolved another
dispute involving Denver's use of Bi-City effluent. Denver presented
the argument that only the Water Quality Control Commission
("WQCC") under the Water Quality Control Act ("WQCA") could
determine injury as a result of quality and the water court had to limit
their analysis to quantity issues. The water court accepted Denver's
argument and refused to extend the period of retained jurisdiction
upon a finding that a better understanding of the detrimental water
quality effects was not the type of injury the general assembly intended
the retained jurisdiction statute to address. Furthermore, the water
court decided that controversies in the water court required final
resolution, and to allow jurisdiction to be retained based upon the
outcome of a subsequent dispute would frustrate this requirement.
Thornton appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the water court erred in
deciding to not retain jurisdiction over the Denver augmentation plan
as a result of Thornton's claim of injury due to water quality. The
court reversed the water court's decision and remanded the case back
to the water court.
In 1991, Denver sought an augmentation plan ("Plan") to offset
out-of-priority depletions caused by the diversion of South Platte River
water to irrigate Overland Park golf course. This augmentation plan
proposed to substitute Denver's Bi-City ("Bi-City") treated effluent for
the out-of-priority South Platte River diversions.
Thornton and other water users on the South Platte filed
statements of opposition to the augmentation plan application filed
with the water court. The other water users stipulated out of the
controversy, however, Thornton remained in the case because of their
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concerns over the quality of water discharged from Bi-City and the
subsequent increase in pollutants at their diversion point downstream
of the discharge. In March 1993, Thornton and Denver agreed to the
terms and conditions for the augmentation plan and in May 1993 the
water court entered a decree granting Denver's augmentation plan.
The water court entered this decree upon an initial finding of no
injury, however, upon requests from both Denver. and Thornton and
pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-304(6) decided to
retain jurisdiction over the plan's operation.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed Colorado law that
augmentation plans can only be approved by the water court if the
augmentation plan's terms and conditions are sufficient to mitigate
injury (either in quantity or quality) to senior appropriators. The court
also determined that the law in Colorado allowed the water court to
retain jurisdiction to temporarily reserve their final determination of
injury to senior appropriators as the result of augmentation plan
operation due to uncertainties. This allowance was predicated upon
the water court's initial finding of no injury as a result of the operation
of the augmentation plan to senior appropriators. The court noted
that typically this analysis in Colorado centered on quantity concerns
(discrepancies in time, place and amount) instead of quality concerns.
The court further determined that the Water Right Determination
and Administration Act ("WRDAA") and precedential case law
established that the prior appropriation doctrine prohibits the
discharge of pollutants into streams where doing so makes the water
unusable for the normal uses of senior appropriators. In short, the
court determined that pollution was prohibited if it caused injury to
senior appropriators. It concluded that the WQCA clearly expresses
intent by the General Assembly to prevent water pollution and refers
to the need to protect beneficial uses of water through the WQCC
adoption of guidelines. Furthermore, the court resolved that the
WQCA expressly reserves the determination of injury to senior
appropriators to the water courts. Additionally, it found that the
WRDAA requires that only the water court approve augmentation
plans that will not injuriously affect the rights of a senior appropriator.
The court concluded that both the WQCA and the WRDAA guarantee
the right of a senior appropriator to a substitute water supply suitable
for their normal use of water prior to the implementation of the
augmentation plan.
Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, the court concluded
that the water court erred in not extending the retained jurisdiction
period, or in the alternative, holding a hearing on Thornton's claim of
injury. The court determined that the actual operation of Denver's
Plan created a cognizable issue of injury due to water quality not
anticipated by Thornton at the time of the initial decree. Further, the
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court decided that the stipulation initially agreed to by Thornton on
the suitability of the Plan did not preclude the water court from
reconsidering this injury.
William H. Fronczak
Park County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's
Ranch, 45 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2002) (holding proposal to artificially
recharge ground water aquifers that underlie various landowners
property would not result in a trespass claim, require consent, or
require condemnation with compensation to the landowners).
Park County Sportsman's Ranch ("PCSR") filed an application for
a conditional water right, plan for augmentation and exchange
("applications") involving the extraction and subsequent recharge of
water into the South Park formation for augmentation, storage and
beneficial uses with District Court, Water Division 1. Park County
Board of County Commissioners, James B. Gardner, and Amanda
Woodbury ("Landowners") in Park County objected to the PCSR
applications and also filed for declaratory judgment relief in Park
County District Court claiming that the placement of water in storage
above or below the surface of their land absent their consent
constituted a trespass pursuant to the cujus doctrine-to whomever
the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and the depths. The water
court received the declaratory judgment motion from the district court
vis-i-vis a change of venue and denied the action. The water court
stated that the landowners had not alleged that PCSR's proposal
invaded or compromised the use, benefit, or enjoyment of their
properties in any way. Furthermore, the water court determined that
recharge activities involving the movement of ground water underlying
the landowner's property did not constitute a trespass and that PCSR
was not required to obtain consent from the landowners or
condemnation and payment of compensation. Upon request from the
landowners, the water court ruled in favor of PSCR and the
landowners appealed that ruling to the Colorado Supreme Court on
the issues of whether: (1) the appeal was not rendered moot by
subsequent decision of water court denying PCSR's application for a
conditional decree; (2) the landowners have a property right under
the cujus doctrine to require that PCSR obtain their consent before
recharging aquifer; and (3) PCSR is required under the Colorado
Constitution or state statutes to seek consent of landowners or pay
landowners just compensation.
The court initially determined the action on appeal was not moot
because resolution of property issues affecting water rights are proper
for the water court to determine, and PCSR's applications were
predicated upon resolution of these issues.
Regarding the landowners' trespass claim, the court determined
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that they did not have absolute ownership of everything below the
surface of their properties. It further found that water, surface and
ground, in Colorado is a public resource and holders of decreed water
rights have the right to pass the appropriated water through natural
surface and subsurface drainages.
Contemplating, the conjunctive use projects, the court determined
that these types of projects were water projects that utilize the natural
water bearing formations and that the General Assembly, in
authorizing the use of aquifers in the storage of artificially recharged
water pursuant to a decreed conjunctive use project, supplanted the
landowner's common-law property ownership theory (the cujus
doctrine). The court determined that Colorado statutes encouraged
the issuance of conditional decrees for water in underground aquifers
artificially recharged, if the applicant can and will lawfully capture,
possess and control water for beneficial use, which it then artificially
recharges into the aquifer. This determination is predicated upon the
finding that the decree will not cause injury to senior appropriators.
The court then analyzed the relationship between water use rights
and land use rights. It recognized that Colorado, since its inception,
has abandoned the common law theory of ground water belonging to
the overlying landowner. The court determined surface water and
ground water are public resources, that the right to use water also
includes the right to cross the lands of others to place the water to use,
and that natural water bearing formations can be utilized to transport
and retain water. The court also determined that surface landowners
do not have the right to claim as property rights, surface water, ground
water, the use rights thereto, or the water bearing capacity of natural
formations. Then, the court concluded by rejecting the landowners'
claim that the cujus doctrine provides them with a property right
requiring consent for artificial recharge and storage of water in
aquifers that extend through their land. Furthermore, the court
concluded that within Colorado water is not a mineral and therefore
the laws of minerals and property ownership are inapplicable to water
and water rights.
Finally, the court rejected the landowners' claim that the Colorado
constitution and statutes require condemnation with compensation
before an applicant could obtain a right to store water in the aquifers
underlying their lands. The court concluded that condemnation with
compensation was only applicable for reservoirs or storage artificially
constructed on or in land. The court also concluded that reservoirs in
this context refer to damming water, not water artificially recharged
into an aquifer. Finally, the court concluded that allowing property
owners to control who may store water in natural formations, or
charging water right holders for easements to occupy natural water
bearing formations would upset Colorado's historical balance between
water use rights and land use rights. However, the court noted that
the use of natural water bearing formations (either surface or ground)
does not allow a water user to alter the natural drainage pattern,
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increase the water levels beyond the ordinary high water mark or
tortuously interfere with surface uses due to the increase in ground
water levels.
William H. Fronczak
Application for Water Rights in Rio Grande County ex rel. State Eng'r
v. Bradley, 53 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2002) (holding an applicant
requesting a change in point of diversion of an existing water right did
not meet his burden of proving the change would not cause injury or
enlarge the right where the right was historically used in combination
with other rights, and holding applicant did not present sufficient
evidence to differentiate and quantify historical use of the individual
right for which the change was requested).
David W. Bradley ("Bradley"), in an effort to improve the irrigation
of his farmland, sought to construct a well intended as an alternate
point of diversion for an existing water right. After the State Engineer
refused to issue a well permit, Bradley filed an application with the
water court for Water Division No. 3, requesting a change in point of
diversion. The water referee denied the application on the grounds
that Bradley failed to meet his burden of proving the amount
requested at the new point of diversion did not exceed the historic use
of the right. Bradley filed a protest, and the State Engineer and
Division Engineer for Water Division No. 3 ("state") intervened. At a
hearing before the water court, neither Bradley nor the state offered
evidence sufficient to quantify the historic use of the right.
Nonetheless, the water court found Bradley met his burden of proof
regarding historic use and ordered the state to issue the requested
permit. On hearing the state's appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court
concluded the record did not support the water court's ruling. The
court reversed the water court's order and remanded the case for
possible further fact-finding or modification of the application.
Under Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-305(3), a water
court must approve an application for a change of water right if the
change will not injure the owners or users of other decreed rights.
The court emphasized an owner may only change a water right; the
owner may not enlarge the right beyond the amount of historic use.
As used by the court, "historic use" referred to the "historic
consumptive use" of a right; the amount of the appropriation
consumed by the application to the decreed beneficial use. Unless the
application to beneficial use consumes one hundred percent of the
amount originally decreed or historically diverted, the historic use is
necessarily less. Even where historic use is less than the amount
originally decreed or historically diverted, the measure of a water right
for change purposes is the amount of historic use. Thus, when
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requesting a change in point of diversion, the amount of water
decreed to the new point may be limited to the quantity of historic use
at the original point of diversion. Accordingly, quantification of
historic use is necessary to ensure a right will not be enlarged.
As an applicant, Bradley bore the burden of proving the requested
change would not cause injury. The court stressed this burden
included proving the requested change would not enlarge the right
beyond the scope of its historic use. However, Bradley never
presented evidence to the water court that the historic use at the
originally decreed point of diversion equaled the amount requested at
the new point of diversion. Bradley requested a decree for the full
amount of the original decree, 1200 gallons of water per minute, at the
new point of diversion. Under the planned irrigation scheme, this
amount would irrigate approximately eighty-five percent of his
cropland. As a result, he needed to prove the original point of
diversion supplied at least eighty-five percent of the water historically
used in irrigating that land. Bradley irrigated his property by three
sources: two surface water rights and the groundwater right for which
he requested the change.
Undisputed evidence indicated the
groundwater right was never the sole means of irrigation. In any given
year, Bradley irrigated by some combination of the three rights.
In support of his application, Bradley offered evidence suggesting
the proposed amount to be diverted at the new well would not be
greater than the overall amount used for irrigation in the past.
However, he did not quantify the percentage the groundwater right
contributed to this overall amount. Because of this failure to
differentiate and quantify the historic use of the individual right, and
the undisputed evidence indicating he never used the right in full, the
court found no support for the conclusion that Bradley satisfied his
burden of proof.
Moreover, the court believed these facts
demonstrated a "near certainty" the requested change would enlarge
Bradley's original right. The court reasoned enlarging Bradley's right
would, at the least, advance his priority to any additional water over
that ofjunior appropriators. In Colorado's overappropriated San Luis
Valley, advancing Bradley's priority would necessarily injure the users
of other vested rights. Consequently, the court reversed the water
court's order and remanded the case.
In reversing the water court, the court reaffirmed an applicant
requesting a change of an existing water right may not enlarge that
right beyond the quantity historically used. In addition to proving the
change will not injure other users, an applicant also bears the burden
of proving the change will not enlarge the right. Where an applicant
historically irrigated by a combination of water rights, differentiating
and quantifying the historic use of a right to be changed-whether by
direct gauging or deduction-is essential to meet this burden.
Arthur P Kleven
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Double RL Co. v. Telluray Ranch Props., 54 P.3d 908 (Colo. 2002)
(holding: (1) the water court may not cancel a conditional water right
without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration to the
owner of the water right, even when the owner fails to file an
application for a finding of due diligence; and (2) the water court's
failure to give notice only extends for the time period in which the
diligence application may be filed).
The Water Division of the District Court of Colorado, Division 4
cancelled Double RL's ("Ranch") conditional water right after it failed
to file an application for a finding of reasonable diligence before the
statutory deadline. The Ranch made a motion to vacate the order,
which the court denied. The Ranch appealed the water court's
decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.
In 1994, the Ranch received a decree for a conditional water right.
While reviewing this water right in 2001, the Ranch learned that its
application for a finding of due diligence was past due. Colorado
Revised Statutes section 37-92-301 (4) (a) (I) requires that the owner of
a conditional water right file an application for a finding of reasonable
diligence every six years from the date the water right is decreed. If
the owner fails to file the application, the court considers the water
right abandoned and will cancel it. Because the Ranch failed to file
the required diligence application in 2000, the water court cancelled
the Ranch's conditional water right in May 2001 without notice. In
June 2001, the Ranch moved that the water court vacate the
cancellation of its conditional water right and allow it to file a belated
application. The Ranch argued this was necessary because the water
court did not give notice of the cancellation. Colorado Revised
Statutes section 37-92-305(7) provides that the water court must
provide notice of the pending cancellation to the owner of the right
before a conditional water right may be cancelled. Even though the
water court stated there was no evidence it sent notice of cancellation
to the Ranch, the water court denied the motion. The Ranch argued
the water court improperly considered the mandate of section
301(4)(a)(I) while ignoring the notice of cancellation provision of
section 305(7) and appealed the water court's decision to the
Colorado Supreme Court.
The court turned to the history and legislative intent of the two
sections in order to give them both a consistent effect. The Colorado
General Assembly enacted section 301(4) (a) (I) in 1969 as part of the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act. Reviewing the
language of the statute, the court found that the section requires
notice that the water court intends to cancel the conditional water
right, not that an application for a finding of reasonable diligence is
due. Considering section 305(7), the court referred to the historical
background of the bill. Ultimately, the court found sufficient evidence
of the statute's intent to hold the water court may not cancel a
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conditional water right and that a conditional water right does not
expire without first providing notice of cancellation or expiration
under section 305(7).
Thus, even though the Ranch failed to file its application for a
finding of reasonable diligence, the water court improperly canceled
the conditional water right by failing to provide the Ranch with the
required statutory notice that its conditional water right would expire
or be cancelled. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment and
directed the water court to allow the Ranch to file an application for
finding of reasonable diligence.
Mark Shea

West Elk Ranch v. United States, No. 02SA93, 2002 WL 31681910
(Colo. Dec. 2, 2002) (holding a party cannot show they "can and will"
put water to a beneficial use if they have not obtained, and there is no
evidence the party will obtain, the required permits to use the United
States National Forest).
West Elk Ranch ("West Elk") sought a conditional water right to a
spring adjacent to their property on the United States National Forest
in the water court for Water Division No. 4. The United States Forest
Service ("USFS") denied West Elk's application for a Special Use
Permit ("SUP") to capture water and divert it to their property.
Therefore, the water court granted summary judgment to the USFS
and denied the conditional water right request because West Elk did
not meet the conditional water right "can and will" requirement. West
Elk appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court claiming they would
eventually obtain an SUP, however, the court affirmed the lower
court's decision.
West Elk's predecessor in interest applied for a conditional water
right to use Bear Gulch Spring, located on the national forest, for
stock watering and domestic use. The Department of Justice filed a
statement of opposition to the petition because West Elk had not
obtained an SUP and the USFS expressed concerns over the project's
environmental effects. Ultimately, after filing SUP applications, the
USFS denied West Elk's application due to environmental concerns.
The water court found that West Elk could not and would not put the
water to beneficial use without an SUP from the USFS; therefore, it did
not meet the conditional water right "can and will" requirement. After
the USFS filed a summary judgment motion, the court denied West
Elk's application and granted summary judgment in favor of the USFS.
On appeal, the supreme court first reviewed the definition of
conditional water rights. A conditional water right is perfected when
the holder of a right with priority finalizes their appropriation with
reasonable diligence.
The application must establish that the
applicant has taken the "first step" towards perfecting his right and
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illustrate how the applicant "can and will" finalize the appropriation.
The court then reviewed the FW case where FWS and the
Colorado Division of Wildlife ("DOW") owned adjacent submerged
property. FWS wanted a conditional right to expand its storage right,
however, DOW would not grant permission to submerge more land
and expand the storage capacity of the lakes. Therefore, the FWS
court did not grant FWS a conditional right because they did not
obtain permission to enlarge the lake and, therefore, could not put
water to a beneficial use.
West Elk argued the present case was analogous to In re Gibbs
where Gibbs requested a conditional right to withdraw water from a
well located on adjacent property. The well property owner had not
granted access permission. In granting a conditional right, the In re
Gibbs court did not require such permission at the time of the decree
because Gibbs illustrated she could gain access to the well through a
prior easement or private condemnation.
The court found this case more factually similar to WS than In re
Gibbs because the USFS did not grant West Elk an SUP, nor was there
evidence that it would grant an SUP in the future. Thus, absent an
SUP, West Elk could not and would not put water from Bear Gulch
Spring to beneficial use. In finding the water court properly granted
summary judgment, the supreme court concluded there was no
question of material fact and West Elk could not meet the "can and
will" requirement.
Holly Kirsner

CONNECTICUT
Ace Equip. Sales v. Buccino, 797 A.2d 516 (Conn. 2002) (holding that
a pond originally created by damming a natural stream is treated
under the law in the same way as a natural pond with respect to
riparian rights and that owners of abutting land are presumed to
possess riparian rights in the adjoining pond).
Ace Equipment Sales ("Ace") initiated this suit in the Superior
Court of Connecticut seeking an injunction to bar Thomas and Irma
Buccino ("Buccino") from entering onto or using Hall's Pond for
recreational purposes, and a declaratory judgment that Buccino
owned no part of the pond bed. Buccino claimed ownership of a sliver
of subaqueous land at the base of the pond dam and sought a
declaratory judgment regarding that boundary and an injunction to
enforce their right to use the pond and removal of a fence, erected by
Ace, which barricaded their right-of-way. The court granted summary
judgment in favor of Buccino and denied Ace's motion. The issue of
the precise location of the boundary between Buccino's land and that
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of Ace remained unresolved by this decision.
Gardiner Hall ("Hall") owned all the land under Hall's pond and
surrounding it. The pond was a manmade pond formed by the
erection of a dam and spill way at its southwesterly end. On December
23, 1995, Hall conveyed the dam and mill property downstream of the
pond to the predecessors in title of Buccino who then acquired the
dam and mill property on February 24, 1967. Hall retained the land
upstream from the dam until July 1, 1987, when it was conveyed to the
predecessors in title of Wellington Fish and Game Club ("WFGG")
who acquired the land on July 29, 1996. On September 11, 1996,
WFGG conveyed most of this property to Ace but retained a portion
including about one-half acre of the pond bed.
Buccino and Ace were the only owners of the land abutting the
pond. When Buccino purchased the dam and mill property, they also
acquired rights to take and use pond water for industrial purposes to
meet the needs of the mill and factory on the property and the
obligation to maintain the dam.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on the complaint and
counterclaim. The court concluded that a genuine factual dispute
existed regarding Buccino's boundary line because the court did not
establish whether Buccino owned the sliver of land in issue or had
acquiesced to having the dam as their boundary. However, because
there was no factual dispute that the dam was constructed on land that
Buccino owned and the dam abutted the pond, riparian rights to use
the body of water were still appurtenant to land merely bound by that
water but not extending underneath it. According to the court,
riparian land applies to a tract of land that borders on a watercourse
or lake, whether or not it includes a part of the bed of the watercourse
or lake.
Ace argued abutters of artificial water bodies have no riparian
rights and because the pond was manmade, riparian rights did not
apply. However, the court agreed with Buccino's position that riparian
rights were appurtenant when property abuts an artificial pond in the
absence of contractual restriction or prescriptive extinction of those
rights. Additionally, a riparian proprietor can make reasonable use of
a pond for recreational purposes.
Ace also argued that this right only applied to natural ponds, not
artificial manmade ponds. The court concluded if a natural stream is
dammed so as to form a lake or pond permanently, or for an extended
period of time, that artificial lake or pond is treated the same as a
natural one in terms of riparian rights.
Because Hall's Pond existed as a pond for at least half a century,
there was no proof that the pond was constructed temporarily. The
court concluded that the pond should be treated under the law
similarly to a natural pond with respect to riparian rights. The court
held that the owner of abutting land presumes to possess riparian
rights in the adjoining lake or pond. Thus, because there was no
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evidence that Buccino's predecessors withheld such rights, Ace had, as
a matter of law, the right to use Hall's pond for recreational purposes.
Regan Rozier

City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002)
(holding exhausting administrative remedies is unnecessary to a
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act claim and finding
unreasonable public trust impairment must be consistent with
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act statutory scheme)
City of Waterbury ("Waterbury") appealed the Connecticut
Superior Court's declaratory judgment for the Town of Washington
("Washington"), which held that Waterbury's Shepaug dam operation
violated the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA")
because it polluted the public trust, but not by becoming a public or
private nuisance. The trial court found alleged excessive diversions
interfered with the Washington's riparian rights, breaching the parties'
1921 contract. On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the
Washington cross-claimed for injunctive relief, alleging the diversions
unreasonably impaired the public trust, and that relief granted could
not cure Waterbury's breach. The supreme court reversed and held
that: (1) exhausting administrative remedies was unnecessary to a
CEPA claim; (2) the trial court's unreasonable impairment finding was
incorrect because it did not consider minimum flow statutes as within
CEPA's mandate; and (3) Waterbury established a prescriptive
easement against the Washington's riparian rights. On remand, the
court must consider CEPA, public trust and riparian rights claims, as
well as a new remedy for the contractual claim.
A 1921 contract permitted Waterbury to divert, out of the Shepaug
River, only amounts necessary for consumption and storage.
Diversions were unlawful when reservoirs were full. When Waterbury
built a treatment plant in 1988, a reservoir, from which it did not draw,
frequently overflowed.
Waterbury also incurred increased costs
pumping water uphill to "high-service areas," allegedly with a greater
impact on natural resources than necessary. Over-reliance on Shepaug
dam diversions resulted, though other reservoirs overflowed.
Waterbury claimed an 1893 agreement allowed these diversions if
in accord with minimum flow statutes, and therefore also in accord
with CEPA. It challenged the trial court's unreasonable impairment
definition, contending that only administrative agencies have
jurisdiction to determine whether minimum flow statutes are within
CEPA's scope.
CEPA, however, did not require exhausting
administrative remedies because the requirement was neither
statutorily explicit nor implicit. Its legislative history contemplated
administrative relief prior to trial, with judicial discretion over whether
to retain the case or refer it to the agency. The trial court therefore

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

properly had subject matter jurisdiction. Cases requiring exhausting
administrative remedies were overruled.
Further, the trial court's unreasonable impairment definition as
"something more than de minimus," would force defendants to claim
lack of alternatives as a sole affirmative defense. CEPA compliance
instead determines the proper standard. Because minimum flow
statutes were not designed solely to protect fish and wildlife, they were
proper factors in establishing unreasonable impairment, consistent
with CEPA's statutory scheme.
Waterbury further established a prescriptive easement against
Washington. Waterbury's conduct was sufficiently open and visible for
the statutory period to give the Washington notice that flow
diminished by diversions adverse to the Washington's rights. The
easement's scope however, was for the trial court to determine on
remand, with reference to the 1893 and 1921 agreements. The trial
court's remedy was inadequate because it was based on a faulty,
unreasonable impairment definition and denied relief for Waterbury's
contractual breach.
Robert Lykos
Grannis Island Co., Inc. v. City of New Haven, No. CV000445887S,
2002 WL 230912 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2002) (affirming a city
planning commission's denial of a proposed regrade plan because the
petitioner did not support the plan with sufficient evidence and the
plan was inconsistent with the Connecticut Coastal Management Act).
Grannis Island Co. ("Grannis") owned property in New Haven,
bordered by tidal wetlands and property owned by New Haven Land
Trust ("NHLT").
Previously, the New Haven Water Authority
("NHWA") owned the adjacent property where Grannis stored
construction materials. Subsequently, NHWA conveyed their property
to NHLT. Upon acquiring ownership, NHLT requested Grannis
remove the stored materials from their property. Consequently,
Grannis decided to "regrade and fill 4.6 acres of upland on [its]
property" in order to store their construction materials. To attain
permission for the regrade, Grannis applied to the New Haven City
Plan Commission ("Commission") for a coastal site plan review and a
soil and erosion control permit. After a hearing, the Commission
denied Grannis' application. Grannis appealed the application denial
to the Superior Court of Connecticut.
At issue before the court was whether the record supported the
Commission's decision to deny Grannis' application. The court
affirmed the Commission's decision based on the following factors: (1)
there was insufficient evidence regarding the spatial relationship
between the proposed regrade and the tidal wetlands border; (2) the
description of the regrade plan was insufficient; (3) Grannis failed to
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identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts of the regrade; and (4)
the Commission identified conflicts between the goals of the
Connecticut Coastal Management Act ("CCMA") and the regrade
when discussing open space in relation to Grannis' property.
First, the court addressed the Commission's conclusion there was
insufficient information showing the spatial relationship between the
regrade area and the tidal wetland border. During the Commission's
hearing on Grannis' application, a letter from the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") stated the DEP
could not define the boundary of tidal wetlands on the subject
property. Thus, the court found the DEP letter supported the
Commission's conclusion.
Second, the court discussed the Commission's conclusion that the
project's description was insufficient. While Grannis submitted a letter
showing proposed sediment and erosion controls, it did not show
these measures on the regrade plan nor did Grannis establish where
on the property they would place the measures. Hence, the court
affirmed the Commission's decision that the description was
insufficient.
Third, the court addressed the Commission's conclusion that
Grannis failed to identify and mitigate potential adverse impacts of the
regrade. Specifically, Grannis introduced no evidence of plans to
mitigate the effects of rainwater washing over construction materials
stored on their property.
Consequently, the court upheld the
Commission's conclusion that Grannis failed to mitigate adverse
impacts.
Fourth, the court evaluated whether the Commission based its
denial of Grannis' application on a desire for the property to become
open space.
The Commission initiated a zoning ordinance
amendment process to re-designate open space areas no later than
November 1, 2000, twenty-one days after the Commission denied
Grannis' application. The newly proposed zoning ordinance map
labeled Grannis' property as open space. If the Commission rezoned
Grannis' property to open space, then storage of construction
materials would be a non-conforming use. Further, the Commission
acknowledged open space was consistent with New Haven's "future
land use plan" and the Commission supported the NHLT acquiring
property in the area where Grannis' property was located. While the
court found the evidence could support a conclusion that the
Commission based its denial of Grannis' application on a desire for
the property to become open space, the court found it was more
reasonable the Commission was identifying conflicts between the
regrade and the goals of the CCMA. For the above reasons, the court
found the record supported the Commission's conclusion.
Heather Chamberlain
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Delmar Assocs., Inc. v. Monroe Planning & Zoning Comm'n, No.
CV010509213S, 2002 WL 1816338 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 2, 2002)
(holding that a corporation applying to develop low-cost housing is
aggrieved when a town Planning and Zoning Commission denies the
application without providing specific harms to aquifers, streams, and
other aspects of community character or the probability that the harms
will occur).
Delmar Associates ("Delmar"), acquired two parcels of land
totaling approximately 23.8 acres from two 1998 deeds in Monroe,
Connecticut. Delmar owned these parcels without interruption and
without conveying the land to a third party from 1998 to 2002. It filed
three applications to approve the creation of an affordable housing
project called Castle Wood. They applied to (1) amend Monroe's
zoning regulations by adding a new Design Housing Opportunity
("DHO") district; (2) rezone the 23.8 acres associated with Delmar's
proposal to the DHO district; and (3) seek approval for the
development of the residential unit. Less than one percent of
Monroe's housing consisted of affordable housing.
The Town of Monroe Planning and Zoning Commission
("Commission") denied Delmar's three applications. The Commission
based their decision on the following five concerns: aquifer and stream
protection, wastewater disposal, preservation of community character,
blasting, and reduction of open space.
The Superior Court of Connecticut conducted a plenary review of
the records in support of the Commission's denial of Delmar's
applications. The court held that the Commission arbitrarily denied
the applications and abused its discretion. The court reversed the
Commission's denial of the applications and gave revisions and
modifications. The court determined the outcome by looking at
whether the Commission based their denial on a substantial public
interest. The review process consisted of two parts: (1) weighing the
public interest against Monroe's need for affordable housing, and (2)
whether reasonable modifications could be made to the application
permitting approval.
The Commission expressed concern about converting areas near a
stream into impermeable surfaces. The high-density surfaces could
result in less water penetrating and recharging the groundwater system
and an increase in the pollutants entering streams. The court stated
that concerns about pollutants entering streams and the recharging of
groundwater systems are public interests in need of protection.
However, it noted the lack of a reasonable basis that the Commission's
denial of the applications will protect this public interest. The court
pointed to the absence of evidence in the record of specific harm and
the possibility that the harm will occur to reverse the denial of the
application on the impermeable argument. It also declared that the
Commission provided no evidence of the lack of reasonable
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modifications.
The court reiterated that the Commission must consider other
permitting and regulatory agencies' actions when protecting the
public interest. For example, the Commission expressed concern
about the proposed septic tank having a designed flow of 13,950
gallons a day. The Commission noted that larger septic systems have
more potential for heavy impact than individual septic systems. The
court pointed to the fact that the State Department of Environmental
Protection must approve, permit, and regulate every septic tank with a
capacity exceeding 5,000 gallons a day.
The court acknowledged that all five concerns constituted public
interest in need of protection. Upon a scrupulous review of the
record, it also determined that the Commission had no reasonable
basis to conclude that the denial of Delmar's applications would
protect these public interests. Mere possibility of harm would not be
enough to validate a denial, but rather the record must contain
evidence of the potential harm and the probability that such harm will
occur.
Adriano Martinez

IDAHO
N. Snake Ground Water Dist. v. Gisler, 40 P.3d 105 (Idaho 2002)
(affirming denial of water district's challenge of special master's
conclusions regarding a decree of a water right and awarding attorney
fees).
The North Snake River Ground Water District ("NSGWD")
appealed the decision of the Fifth Judicial District Court of the Snake
River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") to the Supreme Court of Idaho
concerning the Bradley and Linda Gisler's ("Gisler") water right
decree. The court affirmed Gisler's decree, stating that the NSGWD
failed to follow the procedures required by the Idaho statute for
challenging a right.
Under Idaho law, a time-sensitive process exists for both claiming a
water right and challenging that right. A claimant files a water right
claim, after which the Idaho Department of Water Resources
("IDWR") investigates the claim and issues a director's report, to which
any interested party may file objections or responses. The claimant
may then contest the report by utilizing a streamlined, non-judicial
process known as the "standard form five" ("SF5") process, or by
referral to a special master, who issues a recommendation.
Subsequently, a party may file a motion to alter or amend, which the
special master will review and rule upon. The special master's final
decision may be challenged and reviewed by the SRBA district court,
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which may remand to the special master, make a recommendation, or
issue a partial decree. The district court decision is appealable to the
state supreme court.
NSGWD first entered Gisler's water right proceedings with a
motion to alter or amend following Gisler's agreement with the IDWR
in an SF5 and the special master's endorsement of that agreement.
NSGWD argued that IDWR incorrectly utilized a flood irrigation
model rather than a sprinkler model when determining Gisler's water
right. The special master denied the motion, and NSGWD appealed
to the SRBA district court. The district court also denied the motion,
stating that NSGWD's late entry and attempt to enter factual
arguments into the proceedings were an attempt to circumvent the
procedural requirements of the IDWR. The district court found that
this was an improper forum for challenging IDWR's procedures and
that regardless, the factual arguments presented by NSGWD did not
demonstrate clear error. NSGWD subsequently appealed to the
supreme court.
The supreme court denied the motion and held that the timing
required by the IDWR process was well established, and that to permit
a party to object to an agreement after the fact was an unfair burden
on the claimant. By ignoring the steps outlined by IDWR, a party
endangers its ability to challenge a water right. Further, the court
found that the NSGWD on prior occasions attempted similar late
entries with motions to alter or amend, and the court advised NSGWD
of the impropriety of this practice. As such, the court found NSGWD's
appeals to be frivolous, unreasonable, and lacking a foundation in law.
The court awarded attorney fees and costs to Gisler.
Chris Cummins

ILLINOIS
Sparks v. Gray, No. 5-00-0382, 2002 WL 481567 (MII. App. Ct. Mar. 29,
2002) (holding a permanent injunction against adjacent property
landowners was an appropriate solution where a significant
accumulation of water on landowner's property was caused by the
addition of fill dirt on adjacent property and constituted a substantial
injury of a continuing nature).
Property owners, James and Margaret Sparks, sued adjoining
property owners, Donald and Virginia Gray, seeking injunctive relief
from the Grays spreading fill dirt on their property. The Circuit Court
of Madison County, Illinois granted the injunction, enjoining the
Grays from placing fill on their land. The Grays appealed to the Fifth
District of the Appellate Court of Illinois claiming the court was
incorrect in granting the injunction because the injury to plaintiff's
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land was neither substantial nor of a continuing nature.
The Sparks and the Grays owned adjoining lots in Pontoon Beach,
Illinois. Roads bordered the two lots on two sides, and a canal
bordered their properties on one side. The Grays' land also had
ditches on three sides that accommodated water runoff from Sparks'
property. The City of Pontoon Beach required all new construction to
be built on lots with an elevation of at least 417 feet above sea level.
The Grays' land was under this 417-foot requirement, while the Sparks'
property was 423 feet above sea level.
The Grays decided to procure a building permit for their property,
but knew that in order to do so, it was necessary to elevate the land to
the 417-foot level. To accomplish this, defendants brought in a large
supply of fill dirt to raise the elevation of their property. This increase
in elevation resulted in a reversal of the natural flow of rainwater and
caused water to accumulate on Sparks' property.
The issue in this case is whether the significant accumulation of
water on the Sparks' property constituted a substantial injury of a
continuing nature.
The Sparks requested a temporary and a
permanent injunction against the Grays, claiming the flooding of their
property caused irreparable harm for which they had no adequate
remedy at law. During the bench trial, the court heard expert
testimony that the fill on the Grays' property would affect flooding.
The court granted the Sparks' request for injunctive relief and
prevented the Grays' from spreading any more fill dirt on the
property.
The Grays appealed, claiming there was insufficient proof that
specific, substantial injury would have occurred unless the court
granted the injunction. The appellate court refused to substitute their
judgment for that of the trial court judge regarding the credibility of
the witnesses, and deferred to the trial court's factual findings as well.
The court noted the trial judge, after hearing the witnesses and
examining the property herself, determined the Spark's injury was
substantial enough to grant the injunctive relief requested. The court
then reviewed the record and agreed with the trial court judge,
holding the evidence and reasonable inferences there from supported
a finding of substantial injury. The appellate court ultimately found
that, because the significant water accumulation on Sparks' property
constituted an injury of a continuing nature, there was no adequate
remedy at law and affirmed the trial court's grant of permanent
injunction.
Note: At the time of publication, The Appellate Court of Illinois for
the Fifth District reheard the case and reversed its previous decision.
The court held that, because the Grays' actions only result in the
displacement of water and did not result in impeding its natural flow;
the Sparks failed to prove they possess a clear and protectable interest
entitling them to an injunction. 777 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
David W Hall
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MASSACHUSETTS
Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenney v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., No. 01-1920 BIS,
2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 71 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2002) (holding
a differing site condition could not be proven to account for a failure
to meet a contractual post-mining baseline water inflow, thus negating
tunnel constructor's claim of equitable adjustment).
Kiewit-Atkinson-Kenney ("KAK") sued the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority ("MWRA") to recover extra costs KAK claimed
they incurred due to a "differing site condition" ("DSC"), resulting in
increases in water inflows during tunnel construction. KAK moved for
partial summary judgment in the Superior Court of Massachusetts at
Suffolk, requesting the court to declare that, for contractual purposes,
the DSC was the reason KAK failed to meet a contractual post-mining
baseline for water inflows into the tunnel of one thousand gallons per
minute ("gpm").
In April 1988, as part of the Boston Harbor clean-up effort, the
MWRA planned to accept bids for the construction of Outfall Tunnel,
a 9.5 mile-long tunnel carrying treated wastewater to the ocean. Prior
to soliciting bids, the MWRA had its design engineer prepare a
Geotechnical Design Summary Report ("GDSR") for the project. The
GDSR established the geotechnical baselines for the project.
In March 1990, MWRA solicited bids for construction of the
tunnel. KAK, a joint venture, submitted the lowest bid, totaling
$201,900,000. MWRA and KAK entered into a contract entitled
Boston Harbor Project-Effluent Outfall Tunnel ("contract"). KAK
divided the project into three operations: (1) the mining and lining of
the entire outfall tunnel, including 43,026 feet of mainline tunnel and
6,600 feet of diffuser tunnel; (2) the excavation of smaller tunnels
running to the ocean floor and connection thereof to the diffuser
section of the main tunnel; and (3) the clean-up and removal of the
required construction utilities. KAK completed the project in January
1999.
KAK claimed it incurred additional costs because of a DSC water
inflow increase during construction. A DSC is a physical site condition
that differs substantially from the expected conditions set forth in the
contract. The issue here was whether a DSC caused the increase in the
water inflow, requiring KAK to spend more money during
construction. The contract included a clause that granted KAK the
right to an equitable adjustment of the construction price should it
encounter a DSC. Under the contract, the GDSR established the only
geotechnical baseline for all subsurface and physical conditions. The
GDSR distinguished between inflows occurring prior to tunnel
construction as being more than one thousand gpm and expected
inflows of less than one thousand gpm after completion of the tunnel.
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KAK claimed the GDSR set a baseline of one thousand gpm for water
inflow after the first operation of mining and lining, while the MWRA
claimed the GDSR merely set a goal for water inflow. Each position
was ambiguous due to the uncertain language of the DSC when
applied to either the baseline or the goal.
The court found merits in both arguments. KAK had to achieve a
goal along with a baseline by which that goal could be measured. The
court stated the baseline was not significant unless MWRA could prove
the reason for the baseline's failure, whether the baseline failed
because of a DSC or otherwise. The court noted there was no
evidence of water inflow differing from the baseline after the
installation of the lining, nor was there evidence the first operation
had failed. KAK's motion asked the court to order a partial summary
judgment identifying a DSC and stating the contractual post-mining
baseline for water inflows to the tunnel was one thousand gpm. The
court refused to declare a DSC caused the failure to achieve the postcontractual baseline without further exploration.
The court granted KAK's motion for summary judgment to the
limited extent of declaring the contractual post-mining baseline for
water inflows into the tunnel was one thousand gpm, however, the
court did not recognize the existence of a DSC.
David W Hall

MINNESOTA
Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Big Stone County Bd. of Conm'rs,
638 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that ditch repair in
protected wetlands required: (1) either Department of Natural
Resources permission or a public waters work permit; (2) a mandatory
Environmental Impact Statement; and (3) either an approved wetland
replacement plan or exemption determination from the local
government unit).
County Ditch 2 was an agricultural drainage ditch that passed
through a Type-5 protected wetland. In 1998, adjacent landowners
petitioned the Big Stone County Board of Commissioners ("Board") to
repair the ditch by removing sediment to re-establish its original
depth. The Board then commissioned an Environmental Assessment
Worksheet ("EAW"), a brief document that determined if an
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") is necessary. The EAW
incorrectly identified the area as a Type-3 wetland, incorrectly found
that the repair would not affect wetland status, and concluded that an
EIS was unnecessary. The Board additionally determined the project
was exempt from the statutory wetland replacement plan requirement,
but did not seek an exemption from the local governmental unit prior
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to beginning work.
The Minnesota Center for Environmental
Advocacy ("Center") sought a declaratory judgment in the Big Stone
County District Court to determine which requirements applied to the
ditch repair project.
The district court first granted partial summary judgment in favor
of the Center requiring the Board to obtain Department of Natural
Resources ("DNR") permission and a public waters work permit to
undertake the project. At the conclusion of the trial the district court
held the Board was required to have an approved wetland replacement
plan or exemption from the local government unit, but was not
required to have an EIS. The Board then appealed the district court's
granting of partial summary judgment and its conclusion.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals first addressed the
Board's argument the applicable statutes did not require them to
obtain either DNR permission or a public waters work permit prior to
beginning the project. Section 103E.011 (2) of the Minnesota Statutes
defined the circumstances requiring permission and a public waters
work permit, and section 103G.245(1) (2) identified the exception to
the work permit requirement. The court found that if the Board
satisfied the statutory permission requirements, then the permit
exemption would apply to the ditch repair project. However, since the
Board did not get permission from the DNR Commissioner as
required by statute, the Board was not entitled to the work permit
The court held the Board must have either DNR
exemption.
permission under section 103E or a public waters work permit to
proceed with repairs altering wetland public waters.
Second, the court addressed the district court's ruling that an
exemption to the statutory EIS requirement existed for "routine ditch
maintenance or repair within twenty years of major repair." The court
found this exemption to the EIS requirement did not apply, and
according to the unambiguous language of section 4410.4600s(20) of
the Minnesota Rules, the EIS requirement was mandatory because the
Since the EIS was
ditch repair eliminated a protected water.
mandatory, the court held the Board did not have to prepare a
corrected EAW.
Finally, the court addressed the Board's claim that it was exempt
from the statutory wetland replacement plan requirement. The Board
relied on section 103G.2241(3)(1) of the Minnesota Statutes,
providing an exemption for activities that are exempted from federal
regulation under 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f). However, the court relied on
section 103G.221, stating a party can not drain public waters wetlands
unless they are replaced by wetlands that will have equal or greater
public value. The court found the ditch repair did not qualify for the
exemption under section 103G.2241 for parties who drain wetlands,
and in this case the federally regulated activity was the drainage of
wetlands, not the discharge of dredged materials into the ditch. The
court held the project required either an approved wetland
replacement plan or an exemption determination from the local
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government unit in addition to the DNR permission or public waters
work permit requirement and mandatory EIS.
JaredB. Briant
Zaluckyj v. Rice Creek Watershed Dist., 639 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002) (requiring landowners to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to bringing declaratory judgment and mandamus action and
holding landowners were not entitled to ajury trial on issue of
exhaustion of administrative remedies).
A district court order dated April 12, 1909, established the
Washington County Judicial Ditch No. 2, a thirteen-mile public
drainage system. A mixture of private and public holdings, including
public wetlands and waters, comprised the land ownership along the
ditch. A group of landowners ("Landowners") and the City of Hugo
("City") owned the land on or near the ditch. Rice Creek Watershed
District ("Watershed District") was the drainage authority. The
landowners petitioned the Watershed District to fix drainage pipes
after water overflowing from the ditch flooded their land. In 1995, the
City applied to the Watershed District for a permit to lower three
culverts. The Watershed District issued a permit in 1998 to lower one
of the culverts.
The City lowered the culvert then sought
determination as to whether to lower the other two culverts,
obstructing the flow of the ditch. The Watershed District denied the
petition and noted the City may petition the Watershed District to
repair the ditch.
The Washington County District Court ruled the landowners failed
to exhaust administrative remedies and dismissed the complaint. The
City did not petition for repair or seek district court review of the
decision on petition. Instead, the City and landowners filed a
declaratory judgment complaint and a petition for a writ of mandamus
in district court, seeking an order for removal of the obstructions and
repair of the ditch.
The Landowners appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held the Landowners were not entitled to ajury trial on exhaustion of
administrative remedies because the petition for repair of the ditch
was still an available remedy. The Landowners claimed they were
entitled to ajury trial because the issue of exhaustion of administrative
remedies involved disputed questions of fact. The court held that facts
existed which required resolution by the court, and the issues of
exhaustion and futility of administrative remedies are generally legal
questions for the court. Having decided the issue was properly within
the court's discretion, the court decided whether the Landowners had
exhausted their administrative remedies.
The Minnesota legislature created an extensive statutory
administrative process for addressing ditch problems that would
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allocate the costs among the landowners who benefit from the
drainage. Landowners argued this process was not available to them,
as a matter of law, because the statute required the costs of repair not
exceed the benefits. Landowners also asserted the costs of present-day
repairs would exceed the determination of benefits in 1909 and that
no redetermination had been calculated. While the court decided this
is true under the statute, it also noted an alternate provision under the
statute that authorizes repairs if the drainage authority determines the
repairs are necessary for the best interests of the property owners.
This section did not use a cost-versus-benefit analysis.
The court held the petition for repair of the ditch would not be
futile and that the Landowners had failed to show evidence the
Watershed District made a policy decision against redetermination, or
a final decision on whether to repair the ditch. Landowners may
petition for repair of the ditch.
Julie S. Hanson

MONTANA
Bitterroot River Prot. Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 45 P.3d
24 (Mont. 2002) (holding an authorized conservation district had
jurisdiction to determine whether a body of water was a stream entitled
to the protections of the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation
Act of 1975).
The Bitterroot Conservation District ("BCD") served as the
conservation district for Ravalli County, Montana. Under the Natural
Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 ("Streambed
Preservation Act"), BCD, as the authorized conservation district, was
responsible for issuing permits to anyone who planned to alter or
modify a perennial-flowing stream in Ravalli County. The Bitterroot
River Protection Association ("BRPA") was a private conservation
group and it filed for a writ of prohibition in Montana's District Court.
BRPA wanted to stop BCD's determination of whether a slough was a
"stream" as defined in the Streambed Preservation Act. The Montana
District Court originally heard the case. Upon the district court's
denial of the writ, BRPA filed for a writ of prohibition in the Supreme
Court of Montana.
In July 1995, Brian Monta requested a portage permit from BCD
for the Mitchell Slough ("slough"). Mr. Monta planned to alter or
modify the slough, and he needed a permit because BCD considered
the slough a body of water in Ravalli County. However, a question
arose as to whether the slough constituted a perennial-flowing stream
and thus subject to BCD's jurisdiction under the Streambed
Preservation Act. BCD announced it would determine the slough's
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status following a public hearing on the issue. After the public
hearing, but before BCD classified the slough, the Bitterroot River
Protection Association ("BRPA") filed its suit requesting a writ of
prohibition.
As the party requesting the writ, BRPA had the burden of
demonstrating that BCD's proceedings to determine the status of the
slough were clearly unlawful. The district court held that BRPA failed
to meet this burden, and declined to issue the writ and the BRPA
appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana.
The Streambed Preservation Act defines a stream, but it does not
explicitly give any entity the power to classify bodies of water as
streams. Since the Streambed Preservation Act applies only to streams,
such classification is necessary.
The courts generally allowed
government agencies to decide whether an agency had jurisdiction
over a particular issue. However, courts may interfere with that
decision only when three conditions are met: (1) the agency's
jurisdiction is plainly lacking; (2) there is clear evidence that requiring
a party to exhaust its administrative remedies will result in irreparable
injury; and (3) the agency's special expertise will be of no help in
determining jurisdiction.
The court found that none of these
conditions were present in this case.
BCD did not plainly lack jurisdiction. The court acknowledged
that the Streambed Preservation Act gave BCD the explicit power of
declining its protection to certain streams. If the legislature had given
any entity other than BCD the classification power, BCD could
effectively veto that entity's decision. The court found that it made
sense for the classification power to be within the BCD's jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the initial BCD classification did not result in irreparable
injury-judicial review, for example-would still be available if BRPA
did not agree with BCD's decision. Finally, the court found that BCD's
expertise would be useful in making this type of classification. The
legislature intended the Streambed Preservation Act to protect streams
with significant aquatic and riparian attributes in need of protection;
BCD's expertise made it better equipped than the court to determine
which streams possessed those attributes. Therefore, the court had no
reason to interfere with BCD's determination of its jurisdiction over
the initial classification of the slough.
BRPA also argued that if the slough did not qualify as a stream
under the Streambed Preservation Act, it would be excluded from the
constitutional guarantee of citizen access to surface waters as a ditch.
BRPA argued that this threat to citizens' constitutional rights made a
judicial classification of the slough's status more appropriate. The
court rejected this argument, holding that no dichotomy existed
between streams (as the term is used in the Streambed Preservation
Act) and ditches (in the constitutional sense).
The court denied BRPA's petition for a writ of prohibition.
James Siegesmund
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In re Adjudication of Existing Rights to the Use of All the Water, 55
P.3d 369 (Mont. 2002) (overruling case erroneously claiming: (1) fish,
wildlife and recreational uses were not beneficial uses; and (2)
diversion was required for a valid appropriation. Holding water
court's inclusion of a remark from overruled case in abstracts on
rulings prior to this decision did not violate claims examinations
rules.)
Appellant Montana Department of Fish Wildlife and Parks
("Department") took issue with the repeated inclusion of a remark in
the abstracts of rulings by Respondent Montana Water Court ("Water
Court"). Particularly, the Department contested the inclusion of the
remark on five pre-1973 water rights claims by the Department in the
Missouri River drainage area. The remarks noted the Montana
Supreme Court's earlier holding, in an adjudication known commonly
as the Bean Lake case, raised questions about the validity of the
Department's claims. The questions arose because the Department's
five claims involved diversionary appropriations for fish, wildlife and
recreational purposes. The remark suggests such diversions and Bean
Lake suggested these uses had not been recognized as valid bases for
appropriations before 1973. The Montana Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve confusion about two issues stemming from the
Bean Lake decision. The court overruled Bean Lake holding: (1) fish,
wildlife and recreational uses were recognized as beneficial uses prior
to 1973, and therefore provided valid bases for appropriation; and (2)
appropriations did not require a diversion.
First, the court addressed the issue of whether Montana law
recognized appropriations based on fish, wildlife, or recreational uses
prior to 1973. In 1973, Montana adopted a new constitution allowing
appropriations based on fish, wildlife and recreational use. Prior to
this, a statutory provision called a "Murphy Right" allowed for nondiversionary appropriations for in-stream flow. Montana legislators
created these rights primarily to protect in-stream flows for designated
"blue ribbon" fisheries in the state. The water court's remark
excerpted the Bean Lake holding, stating Montana law recognized no
pre-1973 appropriations for fish, wildlife or recreation except under a
Murphy Right.
The court criticized the Bean Lake court's rigid view of a Murphy
Right as the only way to get an appropriation for fish, wildlife, or
recreational uses prior to 1973. To support this criticism, the court
undertook a discussion of the historical treatment of fish, wildlife and
recreational uses in western water law. Citing a number of scholarly
works and judicial opinions, the court declared beneficial use the
"touchstone" of the appropriation doctrine. Accordingly, if courts
historically recognized fish, wildlife and recreational uses as beneficial
uses before 1973, such uses provided a sufficient basis for an
appropriation. Since the Bean Lake decision recognized fish, wildlife
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and recreational uses as beneficial, its insistence on the requirement of
a Murphy Right added an obligation unsupported by law and
suggested such uses alone could not serve as a basis for an
appropriation. On this point, the court overruled Bean Lake.
The second issue of confusion engendered by Bean Lake concerned
whether Montana law recognized non-diversionary appropriations for
fish, wildlife, and recreation outside of a Murphy Right. While the
Department and the dissent suggested correction of the Bean Lake
holding need only cover diversionary appropriations, the court found
it best not to so limit its revision of the Bean Lake rule. The court
reasoned since the Bean Lake decision never discriminated between
diversionary and non-diversionary appropriations, and since courts
subsequently applied the Bean Lake rule to cases involving both types
of appropriations, this necessitated a broad review of the law in all
areas affected by the creation and application of the Bean Lake rule,
including non-diversionary appropriations.
Again, the court engaged in an analysis of the historical
development of the prior appropriation doctrine. The numerous
scholarly works cited emphasized historical flexibility of the prior
appropriation doctrine. These works argued practical considerations,
not rigid adherence to formal rules, historically guided courts in
determining requirements for a valid appropriation. In sum, while
diversions helped give notice of intent to put water to a beneficial use,
and to define the approximate extent of that use, they were not
required. Precedent showed the law required only the intent to use
the water, which could be proved without a diversion.
The court highlighted numerous prior decisions from Montana
and other western states upholding non-diversionary appropriations
for situations like instream watering of cattle, floating of logs on rivers,
and public recreational use. In particular, the recreational use cases
recognized a public right to use waters for such purposes under the
historic "public trust doctrine." This doctrine antedated the 1973
Constitution and the Murphy Rights statute. The court also noted
language in the Montana Water Use Act ("Act") recognizing pre-19 7 3
non-diversionary, instream uses by Indian tribes as beneficial, and felt
this recognition should be extended to non-tribal waters since the Act
likewise recognized the uses.
The court recounted and criticized an argument in Bean Lake
assigning significance to the fact the framers of the Montana
Constitution deleted a proposed subsection listing recreation as a
beneficial use. The court determined the legislative record from the
convention showed the deletion of this subsection more likely
reflected the framers' intent to prevent possible subsequent
modifications to it, not hostility to recreational uses. Having thus
concluded its exhaustive study of the diversion issue, the Court
overruled Bean Lake, holding fish, wildlife and recreational uses had
always provided a proper basis for appropriation with or without
diversion.
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Finally, the court determined the water court's inclusion of the
Bean Lake remark in any cases prior to this decision did not constitute
a policy stance or opinion, and therefore did not violate provisions of
the claim examination rules put forth by the court. In essence, the
court resolved the "remark" controversy in favor of the water court, but
in resolving the confusion underlying the remark, the court ruled in
favor of non-diversionary, non-consumptive public water rights in
Montana.
Daniel C. Wennogle

NEBRASKA
City of Lincoln v. Cent. Platte Natural Res. Dist., 638 N.W.2d 839
(Neb. 2002) (holding: (1) a decision not to allow a party to join a water
permit application can not be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable;
and (2) the party seeking to become part of a water permit application
must prove why they would benefit or be harmed if the application was
granted).
The appellee, City of Lincoln ("City"), filed an application for a
water permit. The appellant, Saunders County ("County"), objected to
the permit, requested a hearing, and sought to become a party to the
proceedings. The Director of the Nebraska Department of Natural
Resources ("Department") denied the County's request to become a
party. The County appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of
Nebraska.
The City filed a permit application to appropriate flows of the
Platte River for induced ground water recharge on September 9, 1993.
Following the application, the City published a notice announcing the
deadline for filing objections and requests for a hearing was August 17,
1994. Several parties filed timely objections, various hearings
occurred, and the City dismissed some of the objections. The
remaining objectors settled with the City. The settlement reduced the
stream flow initially requested by the City.
On September 23, 1999 the County filed an "Objection and
Request for Hearing" and asked to become a party to the proceedings.
The City opposed the County's request since it was filed five years after
the deadline. Subsequently, the director of the Department denied
the request due the County's late response and failure to prove injury.
The director based the denial on the County's failure to prove either
that it would benefit or be harmed if the City granted the application.
The director considered five factors in the conclusion: (1) why the
County did not file its request by the deadline; (2) whether the County
had sufficient interest in the subject matter; (3) whether another party
represented the County's interest; (4) whether the County's
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participation would be helpful in a decision; and (5) whether the
County's participation would unduly disrupt or delay the proceeding.
The director found each factor sufficient to deny the request.
The County based this appeal on twenty assignments of error. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska focused on whether the director's
decision was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and discussed all
the other assignments of error in relation to this issue. First, the
County argued the Department used incorrect standards to determine
if the County could be a party and that the Department failed to keep
complete records. The court held the County did not establish why
the standards were incorrect. Also, the court found the Department's
decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable even though
the record does not include a draft of the Department officer's
findings.
Secondly, the County claimed Susan France, the division manager,
LeRoy W. Sievers, the hearing officer, and the Department director
participated in ex parte communications excluded from the record.
Further, the County asserted France and Sievers were investigators on
the City's application. According to the County, the Department
should have excluded France and Sievers from serving in
administrative proceedings regarding the same case. Sievers also
served as legal counsel for the Department and provided advice on
applications proceedings. The director stated in response that no one
from the Department served as an investigator in the contested case.
Accordingly, no one from the Department participated as an advocate
or prosecutor in this case since 1994. The court rejected the County's
allegations for lack of factual support to prove France and Sievers were
prosecutors, investigators, or advocates in this matter.
The County then asserted Sievers erred in denying its request for
subpoenas for a state hydrologist and France. According to Nebraska
Evidence Rules, the party who objected to the denial of subpoenas
must prove the people subpoenaed had necessary and unique
knowledge relevant to the case. Therefore, the County had an
obligation to prove the hydrologist and France had unique knowledge
necessary to whether or not the County could be a party. The court
held the County failed to meet its burden of proof.
Finally, the court addressed whether the director's decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. The County claimed it did not
object to the application sooner, because they did not know the City
changed the original proposal by not asking for enough water to
recharge the aquifer under the Platte River and to provide water for
the County. Further, the County based its claim of interest in the
application on five reasons: (1) citizens' interests; (2) Clear Creek
Drainage District rights; (3) zoning regulations; (4) the County's rights
to County roads; and (5) County riparian rights. The court found the
County failed to support any of its claims of interest and the director's
decision was based on competent, relevant evidence.
Therefore, the court affirmed the Department's decision since the
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County failed to establish the director's denial of the County's hearing
request was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Susan Curtis
Saunders County v. Metro. Utils. Dist.-A, 645 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding: (1) a plaintiff must have standing to bring the
cause of action; (2) a given water right will not give standing to
challenge previously established water rights; (3) the authority to
enforce zoning and flood plain regulations does not provide standing
without evidence the water rights will violate these regulations; (4)
riparian rights alone will not give standing without evidence of their
infringement by the water right being contested; and (5) a contractual
relationship alone will not suffice to establish standing to challenge a
water right).
Saunders County brought this action before the Nebraska Court of
Appeals after the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources
("NDNR") dismissed eighteen causes of action filed by the county
against the Metropolitan Utilities District ("District").
On October 6, 1993, the District applied to the NDNR for a permit
to appropriate the natural flow of the Platte River for induced ground
water recharge. On March 1, 1994, the District filed a second
application with the NDNR requesting the transference of the Platte
waters to the Platte West Wellfield. The NDNR published notice of the
District's requests on multiple occasions duringJuly and August of that
year. No parties filed objections in response to these notices, and as a
result, the NDNR granted the two permits on December 10, 1998.
On May 11, 1999, Saunders County filed a complaint with the
NDNR regarding the District's applications. Saunders County argued
the NDNR's initial approval of the District's application was void due
to procedural inadequacies, and the county requested a hearing on
these matters. The county also sought an injunction halting further
water withdrawal.
In November 1999, the NDNR responded to the seventeen causes
of action, ruling Saunders County did not have sufficient standing to
contest the District's applications. The county later sought a hearing
on this issue, which the NDNR granted, but only to uphold its previous
dismissal of Saunders County's claims due to a lack of standing.
Subsequently, the NDNR denied Saunders County's request for a
rehearing. The county appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals on
five grounds: (1) NDNR violated the county's due process rights; (2)
NDNR erroneously allowed a department hearing officer and unit
supervisor to be involved in the proceedings; (3) NDNR erroneously
denied requested subpoenas; (4) NDNR failed to keep a complete
record; and (5) NDNR erroneously dismissed the county's seventeen
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causes of action.
In analyzing these five assignments of error, the court stated an
appellate court's obligation in assessing a director's factual findings is
to ensure the previous rulings were supported by competent and
relevant evidence, so as not to be arbitrary, capricious or
unreasonable. The court then proceeded to apply this test to the five
aspects of Saunders County's appeal. The Nebraska Court of Appeals
affirmed the NDNR's judgments.
First, the court recognized that Saunders County incorporated
allegations of deprived due process within almost all of its assignments
of error to the NDNR. However, in City of Lincoln v. CentralPlatteNRD
the Supreme Court ruled both federal and state constitutional rights
to due process apply only to "people" in a jurisdiction. Noting a
county is neither a natural nor an artificial person, the court
disregarded all of Saunders County's arguments regarding due process
violations.
Second, the court assessed Saunders County's argument that
NDNR should have prohibited the involvement of the hearing officer
and unit supervisor, Sievers and France, in the county's proceedings
regarding the District. Saunders County also asserted the officers'
involvement violated disciplinary and ethical standards. However, the
NDNR contested Sievers' and France's involvement, stating in the
previous hearing there was no evidence that reflected either officers'
role in investigation, prosecution, or advocacy related to this
complaint. The court then held Saunders County failed to present
sufficient evidence of the officers' prior involvement as investigators,
prosecutors, or advocates on this matter to outweigh the presumption
of honesty.
Third, the court analyzed Saunders County's claim that the NDNR
erroneously denied its requests for subpoenas for Sievers; France; Ann
Bleed, the state hydrologist; and David Vogler, an NDNR attorney.
Again, the appellate court resorted to the Supreme Court's language
in CentralPlatteNRD, stating persons performing adjudicative functions
are "presumptively incompetent to testify" and parties may not
subpoena them, unless that employee has "unique knowledge
indispensable to the adjudication." The court in this case held the
burden of proving unique and indispensable knowledge was on
Saunders County, yet it failed to demonstrate these four employees
had any such information. Therefore, the court dismissed this
assertion of error for denial of subpoenas.
Fourth, the court similarly dismissed Saunders County's claim that
the NDNR failed to maintain a complete record of the proceedings on
this matter and failed to disclose the hearing officer's findings. The
court held a record's imperfections do not lead a department's
conclusions to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Fifth, the Court addressed Saunders County's contention that
NDNR erred in dismissing its seventeen causes of action against the
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District based on their finding that the county lacked standing to bring
these actions. The court acknowledged one must have standing to sue
via some real interest in the cause of action, such as some legal or
equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy. Saunders County contended the subject matter of the
controversy is the District's wells, and the county did have a legally
protected interest in the matter. The NDNR conversely stated
Saunders County's complaint reveals that the subject matter of this
controversy pertains to the District's applications, not its wells. The
court agreed with the NDNR on this issue, holding each cause of
action brought by Saunders County alleged deficiencies in the
District's applications or the department's approval of those
applications.
Within this framework, the court then evaluated Saunders
County's contention that the NDNR inaccurately assessed the county's
standing given the county's: (1) outstanding surface water rights
applications; (2) adjacent water well; (3) obligation to administer
zoning and flood plain regulations; (4) alleged riparian water rights;
and (5) construction contract with the District that allegedly provided
the district with water from the District's wells.
Saunders County first asserted it had standing to bring actions
against the District because the county filed three applications to
appropriate surface water. The NDNR had yet to grant these
applications, and the county filed them after the NDNR approved the
District's applications; therefore, the District had the earlier priority
date. Finding that a mere application for a water right does not grant
a property right to the applicant, the NDNR originally dismissed the
claim that these outstanding applications gave Saunders County any
standing in the instant case. The court affirmed NDNR's conclusion,
finding it well supported by the evidence, and neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor unreasonable.
Saunders County also attempted to establish standing based upon
a water well constructed near the District's well field, arguing its well
would suffer potential negative consequences due to the drawdown in
the area of the District's well. Nevertheless, Saunders County did not
register its well until approximately two years after the NDNR
approved the District's applications. The court affirmed the NDNR's
initial judgment that a new well cannot create a water right that gives
rise to standing to challenge a water right previously established.
Next, Saunders County alleged standing in this cause of action
because of the county's role in zoning and flood plain regulations. Yet
Saunders County provided no evidence the District's water rights
would violate zoning or flood plain restrictions in any fashion.
Therefore, the court established the county proved no legal or
equitable right, title, or interest in this case upon the basis of zoning
and flood plain guidelines.
Saunders County also alleged its real estate deeds and patents in
Saunders County gave the county riparian water rights that gave rise to
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its standing in this case. In assessing this claim, the court stated it must
first determine if any property is riparian in nature, and then
determine the extent to which Saunders County demonstrated this
right. Based on the evidence, the court concluded at least some of the
county's property did have water flowing over or along its borders, and
was, therefore, riparian in nature. However, the court then agreed
with the NDNR's finding that Saunders County failed to make these
riparian rights relevant to the instant case by neglecting to prove any
manner in which the District's granted water rights would harm those
of the county.
Lastly, Saunders County argued it granted the District a
construction permit stipulating the District would supply water to areas
of Saunders County on a cost basis, as permitted by law. Again,
Saunders County was insufficient in making this fact relevant to the
instant case. The court stated the county did not provide any basis for
how this contractual clause should warrant standing to challenge the
legality of the District's applications for water rights it the county.
Once more, the court found the evidence adequately supported
NDNR in rejecting Saunders County's argument for standing based
upon this construction contract, and was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable.
Jessica L. Grether
NORTH CAROLINA
Deep River Citizens' Coalition v. Dep't of Env't & Natural Res., 560
S.E.2d 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding trial court's failure to state
both whether it used a de novo or whole record standard of review,
and the extent to which the court applied either standard to each issue
raised, precluded appellate review of decision).
Deep River Citizens' Coalition ("DRCC") challenged the Piedmont
Triad Regional Water Authority ("Water Authority") petition to the
North Carolina Environmental Management Commission ("EMC").
Once EMC issued a final decision, DRCC appealed this final decision
to the Wake County Superior Court. The court upheld the agency's
final decision. DRCC appealed to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, claiming the trial court erred by not reviewing EMC's
decision under a de novo standard of review. The Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded the case, ordering the trial court to advance its
own characterization of the issues and delineate the standards of
review for each issue presented.
For over a decade, the Water Authority sought to build a water
supply reservoir on the Deep River, located in eastern North Carolina.
In 1988, the Water Authority sought EMC's approval to purchase land
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by eminent domain and divert water from the Deep River Basin. Four
years after the Water Authority submitted the petition, EMC approved
the purchase and diversion. DRCC challenged the approval in Wake
County Superior Court.
Although the trial court reversed EMC's approval of the purchase
and diversion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals later remanded
the case to the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings
("OAH"). In the original proceeding, DRCC did not have a contested
case hearing. Thus, the appellate court held the trial court was
without jurisdiction to review the case, vacated the trial court's
decision, and remanded the case to OAH to provide DRCC with a
contested case hearing upon which EMC could make a final decision.
After the OAH hearing, EMC granted summary judgment against
DRCC on all issues. DRCC appealed EMC's decision to the Superior
Court of Wake County, which both affirmed EMC's order and issued a
supplemental order concerning the scope of its review. DRCC's
appeal of both orders provided the basis for this decision and its
second visit to the court of appeals.
In its appeal, DRCC argued the trial court erred because it did not
review the record de novo. North Carolina uses a de novo standard of
review when an appellant claims an agency made a decision based on
an error of law and uses a whole record review when an appellant
claims an agency's decision was arbitrary and capricious or not
supported by substantial evidence.
DRCC claimed the trial court should have applied a de novo
standard of review because the record did not support EMC's
conclusions and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources abused its discretion by refusing to hold a public hearing.
The court rejected this claim and held that a whole record review was
appropriate because DRCC did not assert the trial court made errors
of law.
In addition, the court also held it could not properly conduct its
review of the trial court's decision because the trial court never
explicitly stated whether, or to what extent, it was using a whole record
or de novo standard of review. The trial court stated the standards of
review but did not outline its application to this particular case. As a
result, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the trial court
decision and ordered the trial court to advance its own
characterization of the issues presented by the petitioners and
delineate, clearly, the standards of review used for each issue.
Merc Pittinos
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PENNSYLVANIA
Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 799 A.2d
751 (Pa. 2002) (holding that courts must consider horizontal
conceptualization of property must be considered when determining
whether the Environmental Quality Board effected a taking of
property in designating property unsuitable for surface mining of
coal).
Owners of coal mining property sued the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") for declaring their
property unsuitable for mining, thus rending the property unavailable
for mining in the future. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
declared that some but not all of the designations by the DEP were
invalid, and both the DEP and the owners appealed to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The court affirmed the ruling that one
property parcel had no value for mining purposes, but reversed the
remainder of the judgment and remanded to the trial court with
directions to consider: (1) whether a taking occurred under all
applicable analyses; and (2) whether mining could be enjoined under
a theory of public nuisance.
In 1989, the Brisbin Recreation Board and the Locust Grove
Sportsmen club petitioned the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources ("DER") to declare the Goss Run Watershed
"unsuitable for mining" ("UFM"). Such a regulation would affect the
property rights of Machipongo Land and Coal Co., Inc., the Victor E.
Erickson Trust, and Joseph Naughton ("property owners"). All the
property owners stipulated that they use their property for activities
other than coal mining and that they owned interests in their land for
several decades.
The property owners intervened in the DER
administrative proceedings, however, DER determined that surface
mining of coal within the Goss Run Watershed had a "high potential to
cause increases in dissolved solid and metal concentrations in Goss
Run that would adversely affect the use of the stream as an auxiliary
water supply" and "a significant potential to disrupt the hydrologic
balance
causing
decreases
in
the
net
alkalinity
of
discharges... destroying the habitat for wild trout populations."
The Pennsylvania Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
("PaSMCRA") determines if use of land for mining: (1) is
incompatible with existing state or local land use plans or programs;
(2) will affect fragile or historic lands in which such operations could
result in significant damage to important historic, cultural, scientific
and aesthetic values and natural systems; (3) will affect renewable
resources of lands in which such operations could result in a
substantial loss or reduction of long-range productivity of water supply
or food or fiber products and such lands to include aquifers and
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aquifer recharge areas; or (4) will affect natural hazard lands in which
such operations could substantially endanger life and property, such
lands to include areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of
unstable geology.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly revised PaSMCRA in 1980 to
comply with Federal SMCRA in creating a mechanism to designate
certain lands as UFM. It stated the purpose of PaSMCRA was to
prevent the pollution of rivers and streams, protect wildlife and the
environment generally, and to maintain jurisdiction over in-state
mining activities. The statute delineated standards to determine
whether land should be deemed UFM.
The DER recommended to the Environmental Quality Board
("EQB") that the Goss Run Watershed be designated UFM. The EQB,
effective May 23, 1992, designated the 555-acre area of the Goss Run
Watershed UFM and the property owners protested. The property
owners challenged designation of the land as UFM and argued
alternatively that if the land was UFM, then such designation
constituted a government taking of property which requires just
compensation pursuant to article I, section 10 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated three
categories of land analysis to determine whether all economical,
beneficial, or productive use of land was prevented by government
intervention.
The court found that property rights could be severed on a piece
of land by: (1) a horizontal, physical division; (2) a vertical division,
severing by air, surface, and/or mineral rights; or (3) a temporal
division. The property owners urged the court to divide their property
vertically, thus by regulation declaring the Goss Run Watershed
property UFM, the government deprived them of economic use of the
land.
The court rejected the property owner's argument that courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have refused the vertical
severance of mineral, air, and surface estates. The court held that, in
determining whether a government designation of UFM constituted a
taking, it may only look at horizontal property rights, not vertical or
temporal.
Also on appeal was the issue of whether the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania could present evidence that the proposed use of the Goss
Run Watershed by the property owners constituted a public nuisance.
The court held that the lower court erred by not allowing the
Commonwealth to present evidence of nuisance because the
Commonwealth recognized that "polluting the waters of the
Commonwealth is a public nuisance."
SarahA. Hubbard
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TEXAS
City of Waco v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 83 S.W.3d
169 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that a case is ripe when a controversy
exists over the effect of a state statute prohibiting the issuance of
permits to dischargers that cause or contribute to the violation of
water quality standards and there is actual hardship occasioned by a
denial ofjudicial review).
The City of Waco ("Waco") filed a complaint against the Texas
Natural Resource Convention Commission ("TNRCC") in the District
Court of Travis County. Waco asserted that the TNRCC worsened the
impairment of the North Bosque River by granting new applications
for additional discharges of waste into the already polluted river
without developing the Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") plan.
Waco argued that the TNRCC's discretionary "interim policy" of
granting permits was at odds with state law requiring that a sufficient
allocation be available for the water to receive the additional loading
and still meet state water quality standards. Before Waco filed a
complaint, the TNRCC submitted the TMDL plan based on outdated
and flawed information.
Waco wanted a declaration that the TNRCC would not issue any
more permits for new confined animal feeding operation permits
("CAFO") until the it promulgated legally binding regulations to
implement TMDLs. The TNRCC argued that Waco's suit was not ripe.
The district court agreed with the TNRCC in determining the case
was not ripe and dismissed the suit. Waco appealed to the Court of
Appeals of Texas. The court of appeals held that the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA") provided that Waco's claim was fit
for judicial review. In addition, Waco would suffer hardship if judicial
review was not granted. The court concluded the case was ripe and
remanded to the trial court.
During the 1980s, the dairy industry greatly expanded in the North
Bosque River watershed in Waco, Texas. As a result of this growth, the
waste produced by the dairy operations greatly impaired the water
quality of the river. The primary source of the pollution was
phosphorous, a nutrient in animal waste.
The Clean Water Act required TNRCC to identify which of the
state's navigable waters were impaired by pollutants, and to develop a
TMDL plan for assimilation of pollutants present in the water. More
than three years after the TNRCC identified the North Bosque as
impaired, it still had not developed the TMDL plan. TNRCC required
new dairy operations to obtain CAFOs.
In its analysis, the court of appeals stated one must look at whether
the facts demonstrate the presence of "ripening seeds of a
controversy." Here, Waco contended that section 122.4(i) of the Code
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of Federal Regulations, which is incorporated into state law, prohibits
the TNRCC from issuing new CAFO permits until it develops
compliance schedules and pollutant load allocations. The statute
states that no permit may be issued to a new source or a new
discharger if the discharge from its construction or operation will
cause or contribute to the violation of water quality standards.
On the other hand, the TNRCC argued that the statute merely
limits ability to issue permits that would violate water standards, and
this depends on the permit. Thus, the claim was not ripe until the
TNRCC actually approved a permit.
The court reasoned that the controversy as to whether the statute
operated to prohibit TNRCC from approving new discharge permits
until it adopted pollution reduction measures presented a legal
inquiry.
The court concluded that there were two requirements in order to
determine if a case is ripe. First, the issues must be fit for judicial
review. Second, there must be hardship occasioned to the party by the
court's denial ofjudicial review.
The court found that Waco met the fitness requirement. Waco
filed under the UDJA, which stated that parties are not confined to
review of agency rules, but a claimant can obtain a declaration of its
rights under a statute. Under the UDJA, Waco had to demonstrate
that a justiciable controversy existed and the controversy would be
resolved by declaration. In this situation, there was a controversy
between Waco and the TNRCC regarding the effect of section 122.4(i)
of the statute, and a declaration by the court would resolve this
controversy.
The court further concluded that Waco fulfilled the hardship
requirement, the second prong of the ripeness standard. Waco met
the hardship standard because the waters would become much more
polluted if Waco was forced to wait until TNRCC granted another
permit in order to challenge it.
The court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for a
determination on the issues.
Natalie Lucas
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UTAH
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379 (Utah 2002)
(reversing summary judgment because a question of material fact
remained regarding whether defendant's actions in the management
of flood waters could be characterized so as to qualify for immunity
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act).
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. ("PGC") brought suit against Sanpete County
("County") for their alleged negligence and strict liability in
maintaining an elevated road resulting in flood damage to PGC's real
property, as well as an inverse condemnation action. The
Sanpete
County District Court found (1) there were no undisputed facts; (2)
the County's decisions constituted the "management of flood water,"
which were "discretionary functions"; and (3) that the flooding was the
result of a "latent defect" in the lane. As such, the court granted the
County's motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim
under the Utah Governmental Immunities Act ("Act"). In addition,
the trial court dismissed PGC's claims for strict liability and inverse
condemnation as barred by the Act, and dismissed several named
plaintiffs for failure to file notice of claim. PGC appealed and the
Supreme Court of Utah reversed the summary judgment motion and
remanded to the trial court to determine whether the County's actions
in managing flood waters could be characterized as qualifying for
immunity under the Act.
PGC owned property adjacent to the Sevier River in Sanpete
County, Utah. Fayette River Lane crossed the river between PGC's
property and Yuba Reservoir, into which the river flows. Prior to a
flood, which washed out the lane in 1983, floodwaters washed over the
lane when the capacity of an underlying culvert was exceeded, sparing
PGC's lands from damaging floods. The County repaired the lane
after the 1983 flood, which increased the height of the lane and the
underlying earthen structure and prevented overflow, and allegedly
resulted in flood damage to PGC's lands. Following a second flood in
1995, PGC requested that the County breach the lane in order to
prevent continued flooding and to allow the current floodwaters to
recede into the reservoir. Although the county refused to breach the
lane, the floodwater itself caused a breach, and the water receded.
The county rebuilt the lane, allegedly causing further flood damage to
PGC's lands. Subsequently, PGC filed suit alleging that the County was
negligent and subject to strict liability for its maintenance of the lane
and that the resulting flood constituted a taking of PGC's land without
just compensation.
Upon review of the summary judgment motion, the supreme court
found that the Act required a three-part test to determine whether
immunity has been waived for a particular action. The court must
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determine (1) whether the activity is a government function for which
the legislature has granted blanket immunity; (2) whether another
section of the Act waived the blanket immunity; and (3) whether the
Act contains an exception to the waiver resulting in retention of
immunity. Further, the court determined that the test must be applied
to the three separate activities of the defendant, the rebuilding of a
higher lane prior to 1995, the refusal to breach the lane upon flooding
in 1995, and the subsequent reconstruction of the lane. The court
found that while all three activities satisfied the first two prongs of the
test, satisfaction of the final prong turned on whether the County's
actions could be categorized as the management of floodwater, a
discretionary function, or a latent defect.
At the trial court, PGC presented deposition testimony from
several county officials who opposed the motion for summary
judgment. While the trial court did not find the official's testimony
compelling, upon review the supreme court determined that the
testimony was sufficient to raise a dispute over whether the purpose of
the county's activities was for flood control. The court further found
that the trial court failed to address defendant's second ground for
retaining immunity, the exercise of a discretionary function. Finally,
the court found that under Utah law, the existence of a latent defect is
a question for the fact finder to answer. Consequently, in determining
that questions of material fact remained, the court reversed the trial
court's granting of summary judgment and remanded for further
consideration. Additionally, the court found that the language of the
Act did not prohibit claims for strict liability, and reversed the
dismissal.
Inverse condemnation requires that a plaintiffs property interest
be taken or damaged for a public use. The court, in reversing the
summary judgment motion, determined that a factual dispute existed
as to whether the damage was the result of a public use, as required by
Utah precedent, and remanded for reconsideration.
As to the
dismissal of several named plaintiffs, the court affirmed the lower
decision, stating that timely notification under the Act requires the
name of each plaintiff to appear on the notice, not merely constructive
notice of a general claim.
Chris Cummins
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WASHINGTON
Dep't of Ecology v. Acquavella, 51 P. 3d 800 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that an earlier adjudication of water rights resulting in a
decree was a general adjudication of all the water rights within the
river basin and the plaintiff was therefore precluded from asserting a
water right that their predecessors failed to assert at that time).
Acquavella, U.S. Timberlands Yakima L.L.C. ("Timberlands")
asserted a claim for water rights that the Washington Department of
Ecology ("Ecology") denied because the rights were not asserted
earlier in a 1921 water adjudication. The Superior Court of Yakima
County affirmed this denial of water rights and Timberlands appealed.
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court and the
Ecology's denial of Timberlands' asserted rights, holding that
Timberlands was precluded from asserting water rights that their
predecessors failed to assert in the 1921 adjudication resulting in the
Amosso Decree.
In 1917, Washington enacted a state Water Code that declared all
waters within the state to be the property of the public, with the
exception of then existing rights. The code also provided that any
future rights would only be obtained through appropriation, in the
manner provided by the Revised Code of Washington ("RCW"). The
RCW described the Washington state water permit system. Prior to
1917, the Washington legislature had not addressed water rights, and
the courts recognized water rights under both the riparian and prior
appropriation systems. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Washington
decided in Department of Ecology v. Abbott, that riparian owners should
have been given an adequate time to learn about the 1917 Water
Code, and determined that such time was fifteen years. Therefore,
water diversions after 1932 required a state permit.
In 1921, the state hydraulic engineer set in motion the Amosso
adjudication to determine the water rights to the Teanaway River.
Timberlands argued that this adjudication did not encompass all rights
to Teanaway water, but instead covered only lands then under
irrigation. The superior court rejected this argument because the
language of the Amosso referee's report and the subsequent decree
both indicated that more than that was at stake. In fact, the decree's
ownership list included one of Timberlands' predecessors, Cascade
Lumber, but did not have a recorded right to divert at the ten points
that Timberlands asserted in this adjudication. The superior court
held, and the court of appeals here affirmed, the Amosso decree was
representative of a general adjudication and it therefore barred
Timberlands from asserting a water right not earlier asserted or
recognized in the 1921 adjudication. Section 90.03.220 of the RCW
memorializes the application of resjudicata to water adjudications.

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Timberlands also argued that all adjudications prior to 1979 were
not general adjudications encompassing the total water rights to a
stream. Timberlands based this argument on a 1979 addition to the
Water Code that stated water rights subject to determination
proceedings described in RCW sections 90.03.110 through 90.03.240
include all rights to the use of water. Timberlands argued that prior to
this addition, adjudications did not include all water rights in a stream,
and therefore its predecessor was not required to assert their rights in
the 1921 adjudication. The superior court quickly disregarded this
argument because the process of adjudication has remained
substantially the same since the 1917 Water Code was put into effect,
and the 1979 changes served merely as clarification. The court of
appeals found no error in the superior court's disposition of this
argument.
Timberlands next argued that the superior court wrongly denied
them an exception to the application of res judicata because of the
great injustice they would suffer. Timberlands based this claim on its
continuous use of water and that of its predecessors, along with the
necessity of the water for their timber management operations. The
court of appeals however, recognized the limited nature of the
exceptions to res judicata and held that the superior court properly
applied resjudicata to the current adjudication of water rights.
Timberlands also maintained that its predecessor revived a water
right by exercising riparian rights between 1921 and 1932. The court
of appeals held here that though Cascade Lumber, and later Boise
Cascade, used water during those years, perfecting a water right by
such use was impossible because the 1921 adjudication settled all
rights in the Teanaway River. At that time, the adjudication reserved
any unasserted rights to the public and precluded adverse possession
claims against the state.
Timberlands' final two claims addressed the fairness of the
disposition of the case. First, the court of appeals held that there was
not a violation of due process because Timberlands' predecessor
received notice of the original adjudication in 1921. Second, the court
of appeals held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion
when it refused to exercise its equitable powers to confirm
Timberlands' water right. Though Timberlands used water from the
Teanaway River in the past, the actual parties to the 1921 adjudication
had a right to rely on that decree. Furthermore, failure of a
predecessor to assert a water right, for whatever reason, does not
indicate fraud, concealment, or bad faith, the normal causes for
equitable relief. Timberlands' predecessor may have had an existing
vested right to the waters of the Teanaway River that would have been
recognized by the 1921 adjudication, but they failed to assert it.
Erika Delaney-Lew
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Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County v. Dep't of Ecology, 51
P.3d 744 (Wash. 2002) (holding (1) the Washington surface water
statute requires application of water to a beneficial use prior to
granting an application for change in point of diversion; (2) the
Washington Department of Ecology may make tentative
determinations of water rights; (3) a public interest standard may not
be used as ajustification to deny an application for change in point of
diversion; and (4) the Washington Department of Ecology may
condition a water quality certification on instream flow requirements
under the Clean Water Act).
Public Utility District No. 1 ("District") applied to change the
points of diversion for its 1907 and 1980 water rights to the original
point of diversion for the 1907 right, roughly 7,500 feet downstream,
in order to build a hydropower project. The Washington Department
of Ecology ("Ecology") denied both applications. Ecology denied the
application under the 1907 right because of nonuse since 1956, and
because a change in the diversion contradicted public interest.
Ecology denied the 1980 right application on the grounds that (1) a
change in diversion cannot be granted when an inchoate right is at
issue; (2) the utility relinquished its right because of failure to pay
licensing fees; and (3) the change would be contrary to public interest.
The District appealed Ecology's decisions to the Washington
Pollution Control Hearing Board ("Board"), which found (1) Ecology
possessed necessary authority to condition the grant of a water quality
certification on the maintenance of instream flows, even in conflict
with existing water rights; (2) the Washington surface water statute
("WSWS") was inapplicable to inchoate rights, and thus Ecology
possessed authority to deny the 1980 right diversion; (3) Ecology could
consider public interest when considering applications for a change in
point of diversion; (4) Ecology and the board could make tentative
decisions on the validity of water rights when reviewing change
applications; (5) the District's 1980 right had not been relinquished
for failure to pay licensing fees; and (6) the facts presented did not
merit summary judgment for Ecology on the issue of abandonment of
the 1907 right.
Ecology and the District petitioned for review of the board's
decisions in Pend Oreille County Superior Court. The superior court
consolidated the petitions and the Washington Supreme Court
granted review. The court affirmed all of the summary judgment
decisions, except the grant of authority to Ecology allowing a public
interest standard to deny an application for change in point diversion.
Upon review, the court first addressed the disputed points of the
WSWS, affirming the grant of summary judgment to Ecology. The
court held that WSWS required beneficial use of water prior to
granting a permit to change the point of diversion. The court found
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the District's argument, that the second sentence of WSWS allows a
change in the point of diversion prior to the establishment of a
beneficial use, incorrect because the legislature explicitly addressed
undetermined rights. The legislature confirmed that no other change
could be made of water without first applying it to a beneficial use.
Next, the court addressed Ecology's ability to make tentative
determinations regarding water rights. The District argued that
Ecology lacked the authority to adjudicate water rights and determine
abandonment. The court held that the permit process required
Ecology to tentatively determine whether a right existed before
allowing changes in the point of diversion, though the determination
could not be considered final.
The court reversed the Board's grant of summary judgment
allowing Ecology to use a public interest standard to deny the district's
application under the WSWS. The Board believed that the surface
water statute required Ecology to weigh public interest when
considering applications to change diversion points. The court held
that legislative intent underlying the WSWS clearly disallowed Ecology
from using a public interest standard to deny applications.
The court next considered the issue of abandonment of the
District's 1907 water right. Contrary to Ecology's claim, the District
continually attempted to develop a hydropower project, indicating
continual use. This evidence of continual planning for development
overcame Ecology's claim of abandonment, and the court affirmed the
Board's decision that Ecology improperly denied the application on
these grounds.
The court affirmed summary judgment for the District on the issue
of statutory forfeiture of the District's 1980 right. The court held that
the Board correctly found for the District on this issue, because
legislative forfeiture of water rights could not apply to inchoate rights.
In addition, the court found forfeiture contradicted the intent of the
legislature, which specifically included provisions for late payments of
licensing fees.
Finally, the court upheld summary judgment affirming Ecology's
authority to set minimum flow requirements on the water quality
certification for Sullivan Creek. The District's project required a
license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which
necessitated a state water quality certification. The court held that
section 303 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") granted Ecology the
authority to undertake any necessary action in order to comply with
the Act. In addition, the court found that the state's antidegradation
policy prevented any potential degradation of existing beneficial uses.
Regulations of the United States Environmental Protection Agency
also prohibited any activity even partially eliminating an existing
beneficial use. The instream flow requirements protected existing
beneficial uses, including fish spawning, recreation and commerce.
The court dismissed the District's argument that the CWA pertained to
water quality as opposed to quantity, holding that depletion of a water
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body could destroy all beneficial uses, and thus constituted pollution.
The court determined that the legislature expressly protected water
quantity in addition to quality, through the CWA's broad definition of
pollution which hedges against physical alterations of water
endangering beneficial use.
JaredEllis

WEST VIRGINIA
Monongahela Power Co. v. Office of Water Res., 567 S.E. 2d 629 (W.
Va. 2002) (holding impaired water reports submitted to the
Environmental Protection Agency are not reviewable by the state
environmental quality board or by the state circuit courts).
Monongahela Power filed an appeal with the State Environmental
Quality Board ("Board") to challenge the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection's ("DEP") decision to withdraw its Waste
Load Allocations ("WLAs"). The Board affirmed the DEP's withdrawal
of the WLAs. Then, Monongahela Power appealed to the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County. The circuit court stated the Board did not
have jurisdiction to hear permit appeals, and reversed the Board's
decision. The circuit court ordered removal of the Upper Blackwater
River from the 1996 and 1998 section 303(d) lists, and prohibited the
river to be listed on future 303(d) lists until the DEP established
sufficient evidence to support its listing. In addition, the circuit court
determined that DEP was not required to implement the Total
Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") calculations that the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") established. In addition, the court ordered
the DEP to eliminate the "Waterbodies with Biological Impairment"
category on the 1998 303(d) list.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that neither
the Board nor the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear appeals of the
303(d) list, or to review the TMDL list. The court stated the 303(d)
lists and TMDL reports are reviewable only in the United States
District Court. In addition, the court determined the circuit court
exceeded its authority in ordering the DEP to remove the river from its
current and future 303(d) lists, to disregard the TMDL list issued by
the EPA, to restore Monongahela Power its waste allocation permits,
and to eliminate the "Waterbodies with Biological Impairment"
category. The court ordered the DEP to update and revise the TMDL
list and to stay the pending permits.
Pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the DEP submitted a
record of streams that did not meet water quality standards, known as
a 303(d) list, for the EPA to review. For every stream on this list, the
DEP was also required to submit a TMDL, which calculates the level of
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pollutants that can enter the stream.
In 1996, the DEP listed the Upper Blackwater River as an impaired
stream on its 303(d) list due to the river's low oxygen levels. Yet, the
DEP stated it did not have the financial resources or expertise to
compose the TMDL list, so the EPA prepared a draft TMDL list for the
DEP. As a result of the EPA's TMDL list and recommendations, the
DEP withdrew and denied renewal of the WLAs and National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System Permits to Monongahela Power and
several other companies.
In the court's analysis, it reasoned that 303(d) lists were
recommendations, rather than orders. The 303(d) lists have no force
and effect until the administrator of the EPA approves them.
Therefore, the DEP's 303 (d) list was not appealable to the Board.
Furthermore, the court determined that a state circuit court did
not have jurisdiction to review an order of the EPA. A circuit court
cannot usurp the EPA's decision to have Upper Blackwater on 303(d)
lists. The circuit court did not have the authority to review the list or
to order a category to be removed from the list. For the same reasons,
both the Board and circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the
TMDL calculations, and the circuit court erred in ruling that the DEP
is not required to implement the TMDL calculations.
Despite these errors, the court concluded there was sufficient
evidence to demonstrate that the TMDL list was flawed. The court
stated the DEP was required to correct the TMDL list as soon as it
could afford to do so, and stay any pending permits until the TMDL
was revised and updated. The court determined there was no
evidence of anything in the CWA that prevented a state from revising
the list and re-submitting it to the EPA. The court determined that
EPA decisions concerning 303(d) lists and TMDLs are reviewable in
the United States District Court.
Natalie Lucas

COLORADO WATER RIGHTS APPLICATIONS
WATER COURT DIVISION 1
APPLICATION FOR FINDING OF DILIGENCE IN DOUGLAS AND JEFFERSON

COUNTIES, COLORADO. Case No. 2002CW094 (Water Division 1, May
2002) (Original Decree: Dec. 19, 1983, Case No. 80CW408).
Applicant: City and County of Denver, acting by and through its Board
of Water Commissioners (Atty. Casey S. Funk).
1. Application
The City of Denver ("Denver") seeks a finding of diligence for the
Foothills Tunnel and Conduit 26 diversion. Foothills Tunnel and
Conduit 26 ("diversion") divert water from the South Platte River. The
diversion amount is 361 cubic feet per second ("cfs") conditional, 413
cfs absolute, for a total of 774 cfs. The diversion occurs through the
Strontia Springs Dam, located in the NW1/4 of the NW1/4 of Section
21, Township 7 South, Range 69 West of the 6th P.M. in Douglas and
Jefferson Counties. The Strontia Springs Dam, the diversion, and the
Strontia Springs Reservoir ("Reservoir") all make up the Strontia
Springs Diversion Facility, which is a key component of the Denver
Water System.
During the diligence period, Denver undertook numerous projects
to put the diversion to an ultimate beneficial use. Specifically, Denver
spent $900,000 on sediment and debris removal from the Reservoir
caused by the 1996 Buffalo Creek fire and subsequent flooding.
Additionally, Denver investigated the viability of sediment removal,
including a 1997 contract with the United States Geological Survey to
determine the amount of sediment Foothill Tunnel deposited into the
Reservoir and to the determine the rate at which the sediment will
move downstream.
In 1997, Denver purchased an underwater
mapping array to ascertain the sediment growth. Finally, in 2001
Denver contracted with URS Corporation to perform a study on the
viability of removing sediment from the Foothills Tunnel and the
Reservoir.
In addition to sediment removal, Denver spent $575,000 in
purchasing landfill space to deposit residual solids from the Foothills
Treatment Facility. It also spent $700,000 on a treated-water study to
evaluate future improvements to Denver's treated water system.
Denver spent $15,000,000 improving the Foothills Treatment Plant to
provide additional water storage and to comply with stricter water
quality standards.
Further, Denver commenced an Integrated
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Resource Planning process ("IRP") aimed at long-range planning.
Due to information obtained through the IRP, Denver expended
$500,000 to model its raw water collection system, and adopted a
conservation strategy in order to meet its 2003 forecasted water service
requirements.
Furthermore, in response to a United States Forest Service
("USFS") study proposing to include a portion of the South Platte
River in the National Wild and Scenic River System, Denver and other
South Platte users submitted a river management plan to the USFS.
This plan provided a management alternative to the USFS's Wild and
Scenic South Platte inclusion, which has the potential to adversely
affect operations at the Strontia Springs Diversion Facility.
Additionally, Denver spent $160,000 to comply with the Endangered
Species Act. In order to comply with the Act, Denver carried out revegetation of property near the Reservoir for the Preble's meadow
jumping mouse. Finally, Denver engaged in planning, construction
and litigation to further other Denver water system components. For
the above reasons, Denver asserts the diversion will be placed to
beneficial use and requests a finding of diligence.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
HeatherChamberlain

WATER COURT DIVISION 4
APPLICATION FOR FINDING OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE TO MAKE
WATER RIGHTS ABSOLUTE (IN PART). Case No. 02CW153 (Water

Division 4, Aug. 30, 2002). Applicant: Telluride Ski & Golf Company,
LLLP and Mountain Village Metropolitan District (Atty. LoriJ.M.
Satterfield, Balcomb & Green, P.C.).
1. Application
Telluride Ski & Golf Company, LLLP ("Telluride") and Mountain
Village Metropolitan District ("Mountain Village"), collectively as
applicants, request an absolute decree for Upper Prospect Creek
Reservoir Nos. 1 and 2 ("Alternate Reservoirs") and Elk Pond Well.
Conditional water rights were originally decreed on August 7, 1996.
Water Division 4 decreed the changed alternate points of storage
in a previous case for the Alternate Reservoirs and Prospect Creek
Reservoir in any combination of the following: (1) Prospect Creek
Reservoir Alternate No. 1, storage capacity thirty acre feet; (2)
Prospect Creek Reservoir Alternate No. 2, storage capacity ten acre
feet; (3) Prospect Creek Reservoir Alternate No. 3, storage capacity
twenty-five acre feet; and (4) Prospect Creek, which includes Telco
Well Nos. 6, 8, 9,10, and 11 appropriated on December 30, 1991 in the
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amount of twenty acre feet.
Granted conditional to the Alternate Reservoirs, the Prospect
Creek decree can be used in the same capacity as the Alternate
Reservoirs-to fill and refill continually when in priority for
snowmaking, aesthetic, augmentation, municipal, industrial, and
domestic purposes. Elk Pond Well, appropriated on July 1, 1988 from
Prospect Creek for 2.91 acre-feet, can be used for recreation, aesthetic,
and fish propagation.
The applicants assert the above water rights are part of their
integrated water supply system, and to show diligence on the entire
system, they cite Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-92-301(4) (b),
which provides "[w]hen a project or integrated system is comprised of
several features, work on one feature of the project or system shall be
considered in finding that reasonable diligence has been shown in the
development of water rights for all features of the entire project or
system."
Telluride and Mountain Village claim they have diligently pursued
development of their conditional water rights, evidenced by the
following: (1) construction of thirty-six acre feet of storage at the
Alternate Reservoirs location, having filled and refilled structures and
placed water to beneficial use for snowmaking, aesthetic,
augmentation, irrigation, municipal, commercial, fire protection,
recreation, and domestic purposes; (2) construction of Prospect Creek
Hole No. 2/17, used for golf course irrigation by Telluride; (3)
obtainment of a special use permit from the United States Forest
Service to expand Telluride ski area trails, using the subject storage
rights, in part, for snowmaking; (4) completion of capital
improvements to the Telluride ski area, resort, and snowmaking
system at a cost of $67 million; (5) installment, maintenance, and
construction of infrastructure to provide Mountain Village with
municipal, commercial, and domestic water supplies throughout its
service area at a cost of $3 million; (6) regular measurement of the San
Miguel River flow levels as required under their stipulation with the
Colorado Water Conservation Board; (7) regular monitoring of and
opposition to certain filings of other water users in cases presenting
potential injury to their water rights; (8) payment of substantial fees to
protect their water rights through utilizing legal and engineering
services; (9) application for additional water rights and augmentation
plans and making changes to existing water rights; (10) illustration of
no intention to abandon the subject water rights through continued
build-out of Mountain Village, which requires the subject rights as part
of their integrated water supply plan; and (11) placement of the
subject water rights to beneficial use.
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Due to applicant's assertion of diligence, Telluride and Mountain
Village request a decree finding a their conditional rights are absolute
in the Alternate Reservoirs and the Elk Pond Well in the amount of
eleven acre feet and 2.91 acre feet respectively.
2. Opposition
No statements of opposition have been filed.
Kiowa K.Engwis
WATER COURT DIVISION 5
APPLICATION FOR CHANGE OF WATER RIGHTS AND FOR APPROVAL OF
PLAN FOR AUGMENTATION, INCLUDING EXCHANGE. Case No.

02CW077 (Water Division 5, Mar. 2002). Applicant: Basalt Water
Conservancy District (Atty. LoriJ.M. Satterfield, Balcomb & Green
P.C.).
1. Application
The Basalt Water Conservancy District ("BWCD") seeks a change
in water rights to allow contractees to operate court authorized
alternate points of diversion on the BWCD's Basalt Conduit and the
Landis Canal water rights. These alternate points of diversion will be
wells, surface rights, and storage reservoirs utilized for evaporation
replacement only, within Area A and areas which would be designated
Area A by definition. Area A is generally described as those mainstem
areas of the Frying Pan and Roaring Fork Rivers, where there are no
intervening calling water rights present between the point of diversion
and the mainstem, making it possible for those points of diversion to
be augmented year-round by the BWCD's augmentation rights.
The BWCD proposes the following terms and conditions for the
requested change to prevent injury to the water rights of others:
(1) the state engineer or court will approve the alternate points of
diversion, in accordance with implementation
procedures;
(2) alternate points of diversion will be located in Area A, or those
areas that would qualify for diversion under this augmentation plan;
(3) those alternate points of diversion, located in the Roaring Fork
River drainage upstream of the confluence of the Frying Pan and
Roaring Fork Rivers, will be operated and administered under the
BWCD's right of exchange for the Basalt Conduit; (4) alternate points
of diversion at wells will require a permit from the State Engineer
pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes section 37-90-137(2); and
(5) each well user will be required to install a totalizing flow meter as a
condition of diverting at the well.
Furthermore, the BWCD requests approval of a plan whereby
augmentation and exchange would supplement these out-of-priority
depletions. The BWCD proposes to utilize its water rights in and to
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Robinson Ditch, Troy and Edith Ditch, Favre Domestic Pipeline, Ruedi
Reservoir, and Green Mountain Reservoir as well as future court
approved BWCD water rights for this purpose. This plan will take
effect when the Basalt Conduit and Landis Canal are out-of-priority.
Studies conducted previously by the BWCD projected that the Basalt
Conduit and Landis Canal water rights would be out-of-priority from
mid June through October, and anticipated that a call could also be in
effect in April. The BWCD does not anticipate any calls on the Basalt
Conduit and Landis Canal water rights, including the proposed
alternate points of diversion, during the remainder of the year.
The BWCD will calculate the depletions associated with the
alternate points of diversion using engineering assumptions consistent
with the BWCD's prior augmentation plans. The BWCD will account
for the delayed depletions of any wells according to the categories
established by decree in Case No. 87CW155. The delayed depletions
are expected to vary in relation to the wells proximity to the Frying
Pan and Roaring Fork Rivers. The BWCD will ensure that the total
out-of-priority depletions under the proposed augmentation plan and
prior decreed augmentation plans would not exceed the replacement
water available to the BWCD. Moreover, any substituted water will be
of the quality and quantity required by senior appropriators.
The -right of exchange will be utilized to the extent that it is
necessary to augment water replacements introduced to the river
downstream of the authorized points of diversion under the plan. The
maximum extent of the exchange reach is from the confluence of the
Roaring Fork and Colorado Rivers (downstream terminus) up to the
authorized alternate points of diversion (upstream terminus), except
for the exchange on the Roaring Fork River upstream of the
confluence of the Frying Pan and Roaring Fork Rivers, which will be
operated and administered under the priority and right of exchange
claimed in pending Case No. 01CW305. The BWCD requests a
November 9, 1998 priority date for the exchange that is outside the
01CW305 exchange reach. The November 9 priority date reflects the
BWCD's contract with the United States Bureau of Reclamation for
Green Mountain Reservoir releases. There is nothing intended to
restrict or limit the operation of the Basalt Conduit and Landis Canal
under its original priority adjudication.
The BWCD and its users will be limited to the amount of water
available in priority at the original points of diversion. The BWCD and
its users may call on additional sources of supply only as against water
rights that are junior to the date of the subject exchange.
BWCD suggests the applicant for augmentation water under the
plan will submit to the BWCD an application form that will identify
this proposed plan as the source of replacement water. Upon receipt
of the application, the BWCD will collect fees and submit the
application to the state and division engineers. The BWCD will provide
notice of the application in the newspaper of the county where the
point of diversion is located. Any affected person will then be able to
file an objection or other comment with the state engineer. Any
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person not satisfied by the state engineer's decision could request a de
novo hearing with the water court to determine whether the plan for
augmentation has been met with respect to the request for an
authorized diversion. Diversions authorized by either an uncontested
approval by the state engineer or an order of the court will become
part of the decree for the augmentation plan.
2. Opposition
Objecting are Twin Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company ("Twin
Lakes"), Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"), and
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District ("Southeastern").
Twin Lakes seeks assurance that the proposed augmentation plan
will provide augmentation water, in the amounts and at the times
needed so as not to injure its vested and conditional water rights.
CWCB objects because it has instream flow rights on the Roaring
Fork River, Frying Pan River, Crystal River, and Cattle Creek and feels
that it may be adversely affected by the granting of the application.
The proposed change in water rights without adequate augmentation
could jeopardize the CWCB's instream flows.
Southeastern claims that BWCD has not proposed adequate
assurances that its change of water rights and augmentation plans will
not cause injury. Additionally, they assert that BWCD has failed to
propose adequate conditions and administrative procedures and have
not provided adequate measurement devises and accounting to assure
proper administration of the change of water right and augmentation
plan. Southwestern also claims the BWCD may be in violation of
Colorado Revised Statutes section 32-92-302, because their procedure
to implement the augmentation plan may be contrary to statutory
notification. The application fails to give sufficient detail of the rights
claimed and the proposed uses and operations. Therefore, it lacks the
specificity required by statute.
All three objectors contend the application does not contain
sufficient information for the objecting parties to state all potential
grounds for objection. All three objectors reserve the right to advance
other grounds of objection when more facts are known.
Jason Turner

